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Preface
Andrew James Johnston and Gyburg Uhlmann
Since its inception in July 2012, the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) 980 
“Episteme in Motion. Transfer of Knowledge from the Ancient World to the Early 
Modern Period”, based at the Freie Universität Berlin, has been engaging with 
processes of knowledge change in premodern European and non-European cul-
tures.
The project aims at a fundamentally new approach to the historiography of 
knowledge in premodern cultures. Modern scholars have frequently described 
premodern knowledge as static and stable, bound by tradition and highly de-
pendent on authority, and this is a view that was often held within premodern 
cultures themselves.
More often than not, modern approaches to the history of premodern know-
ledge have been informed by historiographical notions such as ‘rupture’ or ‘revo-
lution’, as well as by concepts of periodization explicitly or implicitly linked to a 
master narrative of progress.
Frequently, only a limited capacity for epistemic change and, what is more, 
only a limited ability to reflect on shifts in knowledge were attributed to premo-
dern cultures, just as they were denied most forms of historical consciousness, 
and especially so with respect to knowledge change. In contrast, the CRC 980 
seeks to demonstrate that premodern processes of knowledge change were cha-
racterised by constant flux, as well as by constant self-reflexion. These epistemic 
shifts and reflexions were subject to their very own dynamics, and played out in 
patterns that were much more complex than traditional accounts of knowledge 
change would have us believe. 
In order to describe and conceptualise these processes of epistemic change, the 
CRC 980 has developed a notion of ‘episteme’ which encompasses ‘knowledge’ 
as well as ‘scholarship’ and ‘science’, defining knowledge as the ‘knowledge of 
something’, and thus as knowledge which stakes a claim to validity. Such claims 
to validity are not necessarily expressed in terms of explicit reflexion, however 
– rather, they constitute themselves, and are reflected, in particular practices, ins-
titutions and modes of representation, as well as in specific aesthetic and perfor-
mative strategies.
In addition to this, the CRC 980 deploys a specially adapted notion of ‘transfer’ 
centred on the re-contextualisation of knowledge. Here, transfer is not under-
stood as a mere movement from A to B, but rather in terms of intricately entang-
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led processes of exchange that stay in motion through iteration even if, at first 
glance, they appear to remain in a state of stasis. In fact, actions ostensibly geared 
towards the transmission, fixation, canonisation and codification of a certain le-
vel of knowledge prove particularly conducive to constant epistemic change. 
In collaboration with the publishing house Harrassowitz the CRC has initiated 
the series “Episteme in Motion. Contributions to a Transdisciplinary History of 
Knowledge” with a view to showcase the project’s research results and to render 
them accessible to a wider scholarly audience. The volumes published in this se-
ries represent the full scope of collaborating academic disciplines, ranging from 
ancient oriental studies to medieval studies, and from Korean studies to Arabis-
tics. While some of the volumes are the product of interdisciplinary cooperation, 
other monographs and discipline-specific edited collections document the fin-
dings of individual sub-projects.
What all volumes in the series have in common is the fact that they conceive 
of the history of premodern knowledge as a research area capable of providing 
insights that are of fundamental interest to scholars of modernity as well.
VI Preface
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Introduction
Almut-Barbara Renger & Alessandro Stavru
The majority of the contributions to this volume were first presented at a con-
ference held on October 23–25, 2013 at the Freie Universität Berlin, organized by 
project C02 of the research centre SFB 980 “Episteme in Motion.”1 This research 
centre investigates processes of knowledge transfer in pre-modern European and 
non-European cultures, building upon the hypothesis that transfers of knowl-
edge take place continuously even when such knowledge is apparently stable. 
These processes are often subcutaneous, and frequently take place over a long 
period of time; they both create differentiations within the transmitted informa-
tion and integrate new data. Processes of knowledge transfer do indeed involve 
an attempt to fix knowledge, to pass it on, and to codify it, but this movement also 
entails discarding previously established knowledge. As a consequence, every 
transfer of knowledge entails a negative aspect, that is, the loss of notions or, in 
some cases, the loss of entire bodies of knowledge.
This background is especially illuminating in the case of the Pythagorean tra-
dition. The teachings and doctrines attributed to Pythagoras show in a paradig-
matic way how knowledge undergoes transfers and modifications even when it 
is commonly considered to be stable. In fact, within Pythagoreanism the trans-
fer of knowledge takes place in at least three ways: a) bodies of knowledge are 
passed on, fixed, codified, or discarded within the different epochs and contexts 
of Pythagoreanism; b) the transfer of knowledge takes place between a variety of 
textual genres and diverse argumentative contexts, which in turn influence and 
transform this knowledge; c) the transfer of Pythagorean knowledge occurs be-
tween different social circumstances, institutional conditions, and geographical 
areas – all of which are factors that manage to generate ever-new forms of knowl-
edge, which depend on the practical and theoretical environments.  
Such modes of knowledge transfer can be observed in Pythagoreanism from 
the very start. Immediately after his death, the name of Pythagoras was used 
to legitimize and authorize various forms and strands of knowledge, including 
religious, philosophical, and scientific doctrines. In the Classical period, Plato 
took over important aspects of Pythagoreanism, as did the Old Academy with its 
1 A detailed conference report (in German) can be found online: http://www.sfb-episteme.de/
Listen_Read_Watch/berichte/Pythagoras-Tagung_Renger/index.html (accessed 01.01.2016). 
The present volume also contains contributions that were not delivered at the Berlin confer-
ence. 
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2 Almut-Barbara Renger & Alessandro Stavru
mathematical doctrines. In the Hellenistic period, a rich pseudepigraphic tradi-
tion ascribed to Pythagoras himself or to his pupils made it even more difficult 
to distinguish the original teachings of Pythagoras from the doctrines of the Py-
thagoreans and from the doctrines attributed to them by non-Pythagoreans. In 
our main source on Pythagoras, the Vitae of the imperial age, his life and teaching 
were systematically idealized through embellishing anecdotes. It is difficult, if not 
altogether impossible, to determine who Pythagoras really was, and what kind of 
knowledge he produced and transmitted. Nonetheless, both in ancient and mod-
ern times this vacuum has invited various attempts to fill the gap. In literature, 
art, religion, philosophy, and science two juxtaposed understandings have come 
to the fore: on the one hand, Pythagoras is seen as a religious leader, and on the 
other as a philosopher and scientist.2 Already in antiquity these understandings 
led to very different approaches to Pythagorean knowledge, yielding a variety of 
interpretations that are still debated in contemporary scholarship. Accordingly, 
in the last century two approaches to Pythagorean knowledge became dominant: 
on one side we find the study of its shamanic and religious aspects, which were 
traced back to the legend of Pythagoras himself,3 and, on the other, the analysis 
of its philosophic and scientific aspects, which often entailed the attempt to min-
imize or even negate the irrational elements of proto-Pythagoreanism.4 It should 
be noted that in ancient Pythagoreanism both these forms of knowledge were 
characterized by a radical claim to truth – that is, they were both considered to be 
epistemic bodies of knowledge, albeit of different kinds. 
Various attempts have been made to connect and harmonize these bodies of 
Pythagorean knowledge. The seminal works by Burnet, Cornford, and Guthrie 
presented Pythagoras as both a religious leader and a scientist.5 Yet, given that 
such reconstructions invariably contained contradictory aspects, in more recent 
years we have seen a trend towards isolating these two bodies of knowledge and 
analysing them singly.6 The result has been that the manifold kinds of Pythagore-
an knowledge have often been studied separately, and the contexts of their origin, 
transmission, and dogmatization have retreated into the background.
The goal of the present collection is to reverse this trend. The volume address-
es the question whether and to what extent the practical knowledge of Pythago-
rean agents transmitted in the akousmata and symbola – with the ascetic and “su-
perstitious” aspects presented by institutionalized precepts and rules of life – is 
related to more doctrinal fields of knowledge such as religion and science.7 This 
2    For an overview of the history of Pythagoras’ reception, see Renger / Ißler 2013.
3 See especially Dodds 1951, Burkert 1962/1972, and Kingsley 1995 and 2010.
4 This approach was championed in the past by Zeller 1886. See, most recently, Zhmud 2012.
5 Burnet 1908, Cornford 1922/1923, and Guthrie 1962.
6 See the works by Carl Huffman, especially 1993 and 2005.
7 It is, for example, a well-known fact that the doctrine of the migration of the soul exerted 
great influence both on the Pythagorean “rules of life” and on more abstract theories about 
the nature of the cosmos. See e. g. von Fritz 1963, 242.
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3Introduction
aim should not conceal the fact that substantial tensions arose within the Pythag-
orean community quite early on, eventually leading to a split between those who 
took Pythagorean knowledge literally and ritualistically (the akousmatikoi, who 
were dealing with the mere “fact,” the hoti), and those who interpreted it from a 
rational viewpoint (the mathematikoi, who were concerned with the “reason for 
the fact,” the dioti).8 These tensions imply that the different strands of Pythago-
rean knowledge underwent multiple changes from the outset. The teachings of 
Pythagorean leaders were interpreted differently depending on the level of ini-
tiation of the followers. This led to multifarious transformations, transmissions, 
and eventually also institutionalizations of Pythagorean knowledge: already in 
the fourth century BC rationalistic and dogmatic interpretations of the same doc-
trines and prescriptions were found side by side, resulting in a lack of clarity as to 
their authenticity. This trend was taken further in Late Antiquity, when scientific 
tenets and acousmatic rules formed an inextricable complex, as the biographical 
tradition on renowned Pythagorean leaders and actors unequivocally attests. 
Considering these difficulties, this volume aims to reconcile aspects of Pythag-
orean knowledge which in modern scholarship are often considered to be hetero-
geneous if not altogether incompatible. The attempt is to show how and to what 
extent the religious and scientific bodies of Pythagorean knowledge are mutually 
intertwined. In this respect, an important part is played not only by the “original” 
literature on Pythagoras and proto-Pythagoreanism (Aristoxenus of Tarentum, 
Dicaearchus of Messene, Heraclides Ponticus, and Timaeus of Tauromenium), but 
also by the later Vitae (by Diogenes Laertius, Porphyry, and Iamblichus), whose 
biographical information is also useful for understanding the earliest phase of 
Pythagoreanism. The volume tackles the transfer of knowledge within Pythag-
oreanism from Early Antiquity to Early Modernity but also, within this process, 
grapples with the connections between the different strands of this knowledge, 
that is, between the epistemic doctrines of Pythagorean science and religion and 
the practical wisdom extant in the tradition of akousmata (e. g. rules related to way 
of life, moral precepts and taboos concerning the community of goods, and the 
involvement of women in politics and intellectual life). 
Yet, how should one define these diverse fields of knowledge? Or, to formulate 
the question more sharply, where is the line to be drawn between what is epis-
temic and what is not epistemic in Pythagorean knowledge? Is there, in fact, such 
a limit? Modern scholarship has given no definite answer to these questions, and 
even in antiquity there is no consensus as to which doctrines, beliefs, and life 
practices constitute the distinctive, feature of Pythagoreanism and which do not. 
There even seems to be, from ancient to modern times, a general disagreement 
8 On this split see Burkert 1972, 192–193; Kahn 2001, 15; Huffman 2006; Riedweg 20072, 139–142, 
and, most recently, Horky 2013, 4–35 (who identifies the mathematikoi with Aristotle′s kalou-
menoi).
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4 Almut-Barbara Renger & Alessandro Stavru
about what exactly Pythagorean knowledge is. This difficulty is directly related 
to the problems that arise from the textual evidence we have on Pythagoreanism. 
To take one example: It is striking that a major source such as Aristotle gives 
very different accounts of Pythagoreanism. In his extant writings he dwells most-
ly on its epistemic aspects, whereas in his lost two-book treatise on the Pythag-
oreans he seems to have presented, in addition to these aspects, what we would 
call the pseudo-epistemic, or even non-epistemic, features of Pythagorean knowl-
edge.9 This ambivalence is paradigmatic for the Pythagorean question, and there-
fore deserves closer attention.
In his extant writings on the Pythagoreans, and especially in book Alpha of 
his Metaphysics, Aristotle’s aim is to provide a survey of his predecessors, the fo-
cus of which is not to take into account all kinds of human wisdom, but only those 
which fall into what he calls episteme, that is, a knowledge based on scientific prin-
ciples. In light of these principles, the aitiai, Aristotle determines which of his pre-
decessors should be considered a philosopher or not, and which doctrines should 
be included in or excluded from his enquiry. This methodological stance is very 
important for understanding Aristotle’s account in book Alpha, as it makes clear 
that he is concerned not with Pythagoreanism as such nor with Pythagoreanism 
as a whole, but rather with a specific aspect of it, namely its scientific doctrines as 
they apply to cosmology, arithmetic, and geometry. 
In the fragments of Aristotle’s lost treatises on Pythagoreanism we get a some-
what different picture. Here, in addition to doxographical accounts of scientific 
doctrines, we learn important details about Pythagoras as a miracle-worker and 
about his school’s life practices and ritual prescriptions, which hark back to the 
tradition of akousmata. These legends and rules form a conglomerate that is often 
at odds with common sense, and therefore difficult to understand from a strictly 
epistemic point of view. 
Thus, in Aristotle – certainly one of the most thorough and important sources on 
Pythagoreanism – we come face to face with two different kinds of knowledge: on 
the one hand, epistemic accounts related to the Pythagorean sciences of cosmology, 
arithmetic, and geometry; and on the other hand, the pseudo-epistemic material 
which is often (but not always) linked to the religious aspects of Pythagoreanism. 
Yet, what is the connection between these two kinds of knowledge? Is there, 
indeed, any connection? These questions go well beyond Aristotle, insofar as 
they concern the Pythagorean question as such. Moreover, they broach issues 
that have been much debated in modern scholarship, issues that are of central 
interest in this volume. First, there is a problem of continuity, since we must clarify 
how different kinds of Pythagorean knowledge evolved over time, were trans-
ferred from certain practical and theoretical contexts to other contexts, and thus 
9  On Aristotle’s account of the epistemic and non-epistemic aspects of Pythagorean number 
theory see most recently Primavesi 2014, who draws upon Alexander of Aphrodisias’ report 
of Aristotle’s lost monograph. 
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5Introduction
were transformed themselves while remaining connected to their founder and 
ancestor Pythagoras. Second, there is also a problem of complexity, since we are 
faced with strands of knowledge that are not only highly heterogeneous but also 
related to disciplines and methodological approaches very different from each 
other. This means that we cannot explore specific aspects of Pythagoreanism by 
isolating them from the context to which they belong. As Walter Burkert stated in 
his widely celebrated book, in order to understand such contexts we must “look 
for the causes which brought transformation to the picture of Pythagoras.”10 Such 
an enquiry requires a “many-sided approach,” in which one does not study one 
topic or discipline at a time, but rather looks for the multidisciplinary and com-
plex inter-relations between different issues and methodologies. The evidence we 
have on the epistemic and pseudo-epistemic strands of Pythagorean knowledge 
suggests that even a basic question such as the identification of what is Pythag-
orean and what is not, including the question of which texts or actors should or 
should not be associated with the Pythagorean tradition, must involve the issue 
of how Pythagoreanism underwent transfers and changes through the centuries 
while remaining sufficiently stable to be clearly identifiable as a whole. 
One aim of the present volume is to explore the connections between the dif-
ferent forms of Pythagorean knowledge as well as among its multifarious trans-
formations and refractions from antiquity to modernity. Looking for such con-
nections entails examining an entire set of questions, some of which constitute 
major issues in Pythagorean scholarship. For example, what is the link between 
Pythagoras and his followers? Or between Early Pythagoreanism up to 350 BC 
and the Neo-Pythagoreanism of the imperial age? Or between the religious and 
the scientific aspects of Pythagoreanism? Or between the different ways to deal 
with Pythagorean knowledge, with the “knowing-that” (the hoti) of the akousma-
tikoi and the “knowing why” (the dioti) of the mathematikoi?
To be sure, most of these questions have been addressed since antiquity, and 
will probably remain unresolved in the long run. Nonetheless, the multidisci-
plinary and diachronic structure of this volume paves the way to gaining at least 
a better understanding of them. Its sections are dedicated to topics of Pythagore-
an knowledge such as Orphism, metempsychosis, way of life, dietetics and med-
icine, number and harmony, and philosophy. This interdisciplinary approach is 
coupled with a diachronic perspective that encompasses the earliest extant texts 
on Pythagoreanism, Aristotle, Neoplatonism, the Christian and Arabic Middle 
Ages, the Renaissance, and the Early Modern period.11
*
10 Burkert 1972, 11.
11 This diachronic approach will hopefully contribute to an expanded understanding of the 
Pythagorean tradition, following the example of a recent treatment of Thales and the Mile-
sians, on whom Georg Wöhrle has provided a collection of textual evidence reaching down 
to the fourteenth century AD (Wöhrle 2014).
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The book is divided into thematic sections, each of which focuses on the dia-
chronic and synchronic transfer processes of Pythagorean beliefs and tenets in 
a specific area of knowledge. The first section of the book deals with religious is-
sues related to the connections between Orphism and Pythagoreanism. Alberto 
Bernabé focuses on Pythagorean eschatology and distinguishes between Orphic 
and Pythagorean beliefs in the afterlife. He evaluates Orphic testimonies about 
eschatology and shows how these were transferred into religious doctrines of 
Pythagoreanism held in different times and places. He then analyses how these 
eschatological beliefs can be harmonized with the Pythagorean doctrines of me-
tempsychosis. Francesc Casadesús deals with the famous fr. 129 of Heraclitus. 
He also shows that Pythagoras, and Pythagoreanism, drew on various doctrinal 
elements of Orphism, such as deploying music as a means to influence other peo-
ple, the capacity to communicate with animals, and the ability to travel to Ha-
des. Pythagoreanism may also have absorbed the notions of the immortality and 
transmigration of souls from other religious doctrines, including Orphism, pre-
senting them as its own. Such appropriation could appear to be fraudulent, which 
leads Casadesús to the conclusion that there are sufficient grounds to argue that 
Heraclitus’ criticism of Pythagoras was not unfounded. Luc Brisson analyses the 
myth reported by Iamblichus on Pythagoras’ initiation into the Orphic Mysteries 
through the intermediary of Aglaophamus, showing how this tale was taken up 
and refined by later Neoplatonists, thereby undergoing significant changes. This 
applies in particular to the Neoplatonists of the School of Athens, who interpret-
ed philosophy as an ascent to the divine in which Pythagoras played the role of 
the initiant. Brisson concludes that Iamblichus portrayed Pythagoras in this way 
in order to explain why at the Neoplatonic School of Athens metaphysics and 
theology became indistinguishable.
A major issue for understanding the connections between Orphism and Py-
thagoreanism is metempsychosis, a doctrine to which the next series of papers 
is devoted. Richard McKirahan’s paper deals with Philolaus’ doctrine of the 
soul. McKirahan shows that by rejecting the doctrine of metempsychosis and the 
numerology of earlier Pythagorean thought, Philolaus comprehended existing 
things as products of limiters and the unlimited (B 1, 2, 6), and as a generaliza-
tion of number according to which the world and its constituents are intelligible, 
whereby their being depends on numerical essences. The passage of Plato’s Phae-
do in which Socrates holds a discussion with Simmias and Cebes (86b6–7) pro-
vides hints for claiming that Philolaus regarded the soul as a harmonia. Pythag-
oras was the first archaic thinker to whom the doctrine of the transmigration of 
the soul was ascribed; Sylvana Chrysakopoulou brings together several Platonic 
passages that allude to the pre-incarnate state of the soul, and to the vision of 
truth encountered by the soul before entering the body. Chrysakopoulou shows 
that Plato’s theoria has forerunners in Parmenides and in Pythagorean eschatolo-
gy. Various passages of Plato’s dialogues display an “initiate” who is prompted to 
become the messenger of a beauty that is imperceptible to all other mortals in this 
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world. Such beauty is a cosmic music (Resp. 615a) which reflects the Pythagorean 
music of the spheres: the three Fates in the myth of Er, who are responsible for the 
souls’ incarnation, are also the singers of a cosmic symphony on the Pythagorean 
model. Gabriele Cornelli also aims to analyse the tradition behind the theory of 
the immortality of the soul and metempsychosis. The testimonies of Xenophanes, 
Heraclitus, Ion, and Empedocles suggest that metempsychosis is a proto-Pythag-
orean theory. This suggestion is made most explicit by Aristotle, who uses the 
term mythoi to refer to the Pythagorean doctrines of the soul. In fact, as Cornelli 
points out, the Aristotelian lexicon reveals proto-Pythagoreanism as the source 
for doctrines on the immortality of the soul and its transmigration. The paper by 
Bernd Roling delves into the reception of Pythagoreanism in the Middle Ages. 
Roling shows that although metempsychosis became the focus of the Pythagore-
an doctrines known in the Middle Ages, the French theologian William of Au-
vergne (early thirteenth century) was the first to present a systematic refutation 
of the Pythagorean transmigration of souls. William’s refutation would remain 
authoritative in later periods (e. g. in Albertus Magnus’ Historia animalium and in 
Thomas of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sententiae), when Christian eschatology 
and classic hylomorphism had to defend themselves against the theory of the 
transmigration of souls. 
A crucial issue in Pythagoreanism is the tropos tou biou, the “way of life” that 
characterized those who adopted the Pythagorean lifestyle, to which the next 
group of papers is dedicated. The Greek West, with its Pythagorean communities 
in the Classical age, plays a key role for understanding the historical context of 
the Pythagorean way of life. In his paper, Maurizio Giangiulio relies on evidence 
from Aristoxenus and Timaeus. Both had a profound knowledge of Pythagorean-
ism: to Aristoxenus we owe the paradigm of a “philosophical” life through social 
practices and styles of life; to Timaeus the first reflections on the saying koina ta 
philon (“friends hold all things in common”) and on Pythagorean identity. Aris-
toxenus, however, took a polemical stance against Pythagoreanism by contrast-
ing Pythagoras himself with the vegetarians of the same period, thus de-ritualiz-
ing the way of life he had been teaching; Timaeus, in contrast, had no knowledge 
of Pythagoreanism from the inside, and was not involved in the same polemic as 
Aristoxenus, but his contribution to understanding the Pythagorean hetairiai can 
be compared to that of Aristoxenus. Claudia Montepaone and Marcello Catarzi 
analyse the role of the Pythagorean way of life by focusing on Timycha of Sparta 
and Theano of Croton, whose paradigmatic behaviours can be understood as mo-
tivated by an acousmatic background. Both Timycha and Theano are described 
as models of virtue: the difference between the two is that while Theano teaches, 
essentially delivering precepts, Timycha enacts them. Jan Bremmer discusses the 
tradition of late antique biographies in connection with the lifestyle of the ear-
ly Christian monks. A close analysis of parallels between these monks and the 
Pythagoreans enables Bremmer to conclude that such a lifestyle, as portrayed in 
Athanasius’ Life of Antony, was profoundly influenced by Neopythagoreanism. 
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This influence is also evident in the Christian collection of the Sentences of Sex-
tus. Ilaria Ramelli shows to what extent this corpus contains Pythagorean ideas, 
and how Sextus’ Christianized Pythagoreanism came to exert an indirect influ-
ence upon the spirituality of Christendom. In fact, the Sentences of Sextus, which 
probably date to the late second century AD, are a collection of primarily moral 
sayings inspired by Pythagorean ethics. Ramelli demonstrates how the Pythago-
rean substratum of the Sentences is adapted to a Christian milieu through careful 
reworking, and argues that the shift from philosophical to Christian asceticism 
is the most remarkable feature of this collection. Thus, the Sentences provide an 
interesting instance of the transformation of Pythagorean askesis. Porphyry’s Let-
ter to Marcella also contains a large number of sententiae. Irini Fotini Viltanioti 
claims that Porphyry drew these sayings from a prior collection of Pythagorean 
maxims, in order to present an exemplum of the proper Pagan-Pythagorean way 
of philosophical life to readers who were in danger of being attracted to Christi-
anity. By resituating the Pythagorean moral sentences in their traditional context, 
Porphyry intended to prevent (Neo)Pythagorean moral wisdom from transfer-
ring to Christian circles. It seems however that Porphyry lost the battle, insofar as 
Sextus’ “Christianized Pythagoreanism” came to exercise an indirect influence 
upon the spirituality of Christendom and, especially, upon the Greek Byzantine 
monastic tradition. Luca Arcari deals with another reception of Pythagoreanism 
in early Christianity: the Cohortatio ad Graecos, a work included in Justin Martyr’s 
corpus and recently attributed to the Monarchian Bishop Marcellus of Ancyra. Ar-
cari points out that in a passage dedicated to Pythagoras we have a construction 
of Pythagorean monotheism for Christian apologetic purposes. It seems that, by 
doing so, the author of the Cohortatio aimed to defend the so-called Monarchian-
ism that developed around the period of Arian crisis. For Arcari, the re-inven-
tion of a Pythagorean religion constitutes a Christian apologetic discourse that is 
strictly linked to the invention of an Orphic monotheism, which is in turn semi-
nal for the formation of Christian monotheism. A different understanding of Py-
thagorean askesis can be found in Dirk Baltzly’s paper, which deals with Proclus’ 
Timaeus commentary. Here, a proper way of life derives from a correct reading 
of Plato’s book, which is likely to transform souls through its reception. Balt-
zly argues that a text such as the Timaeus – apparently about things as concrete 
as the planetary order – should instead be thought of as symbolically revealing 
relations among higher causes. For Proclus’ audience it provided the basis for a 
keener awareness of the unity of all things, and a sense of separation from visible 
bodies in the heavens, a separation that metaphorically becomes “the vast indif-
ference of heaven.” Pythagorean-Socratic askesis is limited to the ethical milieu, 
and therefore unlikely to transform the recipient into someone who has a “sci-
entific” attitude towards nature. The Pythagorean way of life continued to be a 
core issue in the Early Modern period. In her paper, Ada Palmer shows that from 
the early fifteenth to the dawn of the seventeenth century, scholars with diverse 
backgrounds, nations, confessions, and intended audiences produced strikingly 
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similar depictions of a pious, virtuous, and above all monastic Pythagoras. Palm-
er shows that this way of depicting the ancient sage was apologetic, in the writers’ 
own defence: humanists were presenting their own role models, the archetypes 
whom they wanted to embody and succeed; these figures also stood for activi-
ties and creations for which they needed to attract funding from patrons. This is 
evident in the work of Giovanni Aurispa (1376–1459), Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), 
Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481), Raffaele Maffei (1451–1522), Filippo Beroaldo the 
Elder (1453–1505), Johannes Reuchlin (1455–1522), Michael Neander (1525–1595), 
and Johannes Arcerius Theodoretus (1538–1604). All of these humanists provided 
biographical sketches in which they emphasized the sacredness of their forefa-
ther Pythagoras. A major step in the discussion of the influence of the Pythago-
rean way of life on Christianity was taken by Richard Reitzenstein in 1914 (Des 
Athanasius Werk über das Leben des Antonius). Building upon Reitzenstein’s work, 
Jan Bremmer deals in particular with the relationship between Pythagoreanism 
and Athanasius’ Life of Antony as well as the origin of this discovery in modern 
scholarship. Bremmer shows that from the point of view of Athanasius, askesis 
was more important than martyrdom. For this reason, Antony is represented 
as recognizably Pythagorean, despite many differences. Certainly, Athanasius 
appropriated and transformed Pythagorean themes: his Life represents both an 
attempt to use pagan knowledge, the influence of which was paramount in Late 
Antiquity, and a desire to create connections between the lifestyle of the earliest 
Christian monks and those pagan traditions that displayed similarities to it.
Next we have a set of chapters which show that, even in fields of knowledge 
such as science and philosophy, an important role was played by askesis and way 
of life. It is clear, for instance, that throughout antiquity Pythagorean discipline 
exerted a strong influence on medicine. Dietetics as a specific therapeutic and 
preventive approach to health, however, did not develop before the middle of 
the fifth century BC. Stavros Kouloumentas focuses on medicine in a broad 
sense, as an intellectual field in which several thinkers propounded theories con-
cerning the human body, well-being, and other interrelated topics, even though 
they were not physicians. Koloumentas maintains that unlike other Presocratics, 
the Pythagoreans were not motivated by a “proto-scientific” interest in explor-
ing microcosmic structures or healing individuals, but rather were inspired by 
moral and religious beliefs, since they adopted a lifestyle tightly governed by 
prohibitions and obligations. In his paper, Andrew Barker concentrates on re-
ports of the fifth century BC onwards about the periods of human gestation. An-
cient medical writers often discuss the theory that children born seven months 
after conception are viable while those born at eight months are not – a theory 
that entails some of the akousmata and ritual injunctions recorded by Iamblichus, 
which probably originated at a much earlier date. This suggests that the purpose 
of the Pythagorean reflections on periods of gestation may have been to provide 
this pseudo-epistemic knowledge with a theoretical foundation. Hynek Bartoš 
demonstrates that the medical discussion of dietetics, as attested by Hippocratic 
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
10 Almut-Barbara Renger & Alessandro Stavru
authors and their contemporaries, influenced the reports about earlier Pythago-
rean tradition rather than the other way round. Indeed, the Hippocratic Regimen 
presents strong echoes of Pythagorean ideas such as the concept of harmony, 
mimesis, or the transmigration theory, which makes a transfer of knowledge from 
the Hippocratic School into Pythagoreanism more than likely. As Bartoš shows, 
the idea that health depends on due proportion between food and exercise, as 
attested in the Regimen, is identified by Iamblichus (Vit. Pyth. 29, § 163–164) as 
constituting a Pythagorean contribution to the field of dietetics. 
The following section contains two papers on Pythagorean music. Antonietta 
Provenza maintains that among the Pythagoreans the use of paeans for healing 
and calming both rage and anger shows that catharsis was meant as a “purifica-
tion” from every kind of excess. Thanks to this purification, strands of knowledge 
such as religion, medicine, and ethics were blended together to provide a harmoni-
ous order within individuals. Music and musical education also played a political 
role, since both were intended to foster social order. That said, as Emidio Spinelli 
shows in his paper, the importance of music in Pythagoreanism should not be over-
estimated. Commenting upon a passage of Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Musicians 
(= M 6), Spinelli points out that Pythagoras’ praise of the cathartic function of music 
does not entail a defence of its irrational elements. In other words, the role of music 
should not interfere with philosophical pursuits, which give primacy to a complete 
way of life through which one can attain inner balance and individual happiness. 
Next we have papers addressing Pythagorean numerology and harmony. 
Leonid Zhmud’s paper tackles the twofold character of Pythagorean knowledge 
about numbers: on the one hand arithmology, which deals with pure mathemat-
ical properties; and on the other, numerology, which identifies number with con-
cepts (i. e. kairos = seven, justice = four, etc.). Zhmud points out that the Pythagore-
ans did not attach particular significance to the number ten. In fact, the doctrine 
that forms the basis of Greek arithmology, that is, that the decad embraces the 
entire nature of numbers, was not Pythagorean, but rather Platonic. Eugene Afo-
nasin shows how Clement of Alexandria occupies an intermediate position be-
tween the Neopythagorean biographical tradition and the literary practice which 
preceded the Neoplatonic synthesis. In his Stromateis, akousmata represent a first 
step toward virtue and wisdom: the highest possible knowledge (gnosis) must be 
gained through the mysteries of Logos. 
A remarkable transfer of Pythagorean knowledge on number can be traced 
in the Arabic tradition. Anna Izdebska analyses two Arabic descriptions of a 
Pythagorean metaphysics of numbers, one contained in the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʼ 
(Brethren of Purity) and one found in the works of al-Shahrastāni. According to 
the Ikhwān – an esoteric Ismaili fraternity of anonymous philosophers who were 
active in Basra and Baghdad around the ninth or tenth century – an analogy oc-
curs between the nature of beings and the nature of numbers. Numbers do not 
constitute the principle of reality, since the Creator is the cause of all that exists. 
The Pythagoreans went beyond this level, and claimed that every number, small 
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and large, even or odd, integer or fraction, is composed from the One, which is 
the origin and the source of number. Abū l-Fat ḥ Mu ḥammad al-Shahrastāni, a 
Persian theologian who lived during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, provides 
a vision of Pythagorean number strongly informed by Islamic theology. Drawing 
from Neoplatonic Pythagorean authors, he derives different notions of oneness 
(hen or monas), which he identifies with the Intellect. 
The connection between mathematical and ethical order is a peculiar trait 
of Pythagoreanism right up to the Early Modern period. Even in the “perfect” 
churches of the Renaissance, as Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier shows in her paper, 
the concept of universal order incorporated a moral reform that opposed war and 
other forms of depravity. It urged frugality, restraint, communal friendship, shar-
ing property, and the practice of piety and justice. Earthly behaviour therefore 
reflected universal order, and enabled humankind to approximate God. Wilhelm 
Schmidt-Biggemann deals with Johannes Reuchlin’s De Arte Cabalistica, a work 
which bears evident traces of Pythagorean number theory. In particular, the sec-
ond book of De Arte Cabalistica is explicitly Pythagorean, aiming to prove that Py-
thagoras, the first Greek philosopher, adopted Kabbalistic teachings. According 
to Reuchlin, the main teachings of the Pythagoreans were the theory of possest 
and the world of numbers. For Reuchlin, possest is the indefinite One. It entails the 
order of the spiritual world, which, in turn, is represented by numbers. Samuel 
Galson’s paper also deals with the influence of Pythagorean number theory on 
modern philosophy. Religious and scientific strains of knowledge are intertwined 
in Leibniz’s lifelong engagement with Pythagoras. In fact, as Galson shows, Leib-
niz associated Pythagoras with the investigation of symbolic systems, the system 
of pre-established harmony, and monadology. Moreover, Leibniz maintained 
that Pythagoras’ doctrine of immortality was based upon mathematical princi-
ples, but that in order to communicate it to a wider audience he “enveloped” it in 
the myth of metempsychosis.
We proceed, finally, to a set of papers devoted to transfers of ancient Pythago-
rean knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern contexts. A remarkable example 
is the presence of Pythagorean doctrines in the Caucasian philosophy of the Mid-
dle Ages. Tengiz Iremadze explores David the Invincible’s Definitions of Philos-
ophy (sixth century AD) and Joane Petritzi’s commentaries on Proclus’ Elements 
of Theology (twelfth century AD). In these thinkers Pythagorean doctrines such 
as arithmology crop up, eventually becoming the subject of Christian reception 
and transformation. The influence of Pythagoreanism is especially evident in Pe-
trizi, who considered the first principle of cosmos, and in particular the One, as 
a source of general philosophical concepts and definitions. The Arab reception of 
various Pythagorean strands of knowledge is the subject of Beate La Sala’s paper 
on Ibn Sīna (Avicenna) and Al-Ghazālī. Both of them adapted Pythagoreanism 
and transferred it into their own systems of thought. In his Mishkat al-Anwar, Al-
Ghazālī employs Pythagoras’ ten categories with their opposites, while Ibn Sīna 
provides a rather critical depiction of Pythagorean mathematics, criticizing its 
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concept of number in relation to the idea of unity. La Sala shows that this critical 
attitude can be understood as common ground between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīna, 
whose approach to Pythagoreanism is both approving and critical.
Denis Robichaud treats Marsilio Ficino’s involvement with Pythagoreanism. 
As Robichaud points out, Pythagoreanism is much more central to Ficino’s philo-
sophical development than has hitherto been noted: not only Ficino’s De secta Py-
thagorica, but also his prisca theologia, seems to be influenced by Pythagoreanism. 
Ficino’s exposition of Plato’s divided line is particularly interesting in this regard, 
as Ficino presents Plato as a follower of a Pythagorean doctrine. Modern scholar-
ship would characterize this doctrine as Neoplatonic, but Robichaud shows that 
Ficino’s interpretation draws on Pythagorean pseudepigrapha quoted by Iambli-
chus, namely Archytas and Brotinus. The paper of Hanns-Peter Neumann focus-
es on the formation of Pythagoreanism in the Early Modern period. Neumann 
shows that the term “Pythagoreanism” was coined by the French scholar Michel 
Mourgues (1642–1713), who in his Plan Théologique du Pythagorisme (1712) and the 
unpublished Plan Philosophique du Pythagorisme referred to the Pythagorean con-
cepts that had the greatest impact on Plato, Aristotle, and the Middle and Neo-
platonists. Contemporary with Mourgues, scholars such as Thomas Stanley, Is-
mael Boulliau, Newton, Leibniz, Ralph Cudworth, and others contributed to the 
transfer and re-adaptation of Pythagorean knowledge. Consequently, Neumann 
concludes, there were different ways of defining “Pythagoreanism”, depending 
on which aspect of Pythagorean knowledge was to be used in argument. 
The volume is rounded off by an appendix of texts on the Pythagorean way of 
life. Emily Cottrell provides a reconstruction of Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras ac-
cording to al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik and Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻa, two Arab scholars of the 
eleventh century. In the introduction to the English translation of the text, Cottrell 
deals extensively with the sources of Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻa, namely:  ̣Sāʻid al-Andalusī, 
Porphyry, al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik, and Plutarch.12 Cottrell shows that the portrait 
of Pythagoras in the Arabic Life of Pythagoras is consistent with Porphyry’s agen-
da. Pythagoras is depicted as a true successor of the Seven Sages, an initiate of 
Eleusis, and a disciple of Zoroaster. Ada Palmer presents two sixteenth-century 
accounts of the life of Pythagoras: the entry on Pythagoras from the Commentarii 
Urbani of Raffaele Maffei (1451–1522), and Michael Neander’s (1525–1595) dedicato-
ry letter for an edition of the Golden Verses accompanied by poems of Phocylides. 
As Palmer points out, Neander had Maffei’s Commentarii Urbani on his desk when 
he wrote the dedicatory letter. The treatments are closely linked, since Neander 
took Maffei as his model and neither was composed as an independent work. 
*
12 A new edition and translation of the Generations of the Physicians by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa is un-
derway by a team led by Emilie Savage-Smith, Simon Swain, and Geert-Jan van Gelder (see 
http://krc2.orient.ox.ac.uk/alhom/index.php/en/). It was not used by the author as it was not 
completed by the time of publication.
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The thematic sections described above outline the many diachronic and synchronic 
transfer processes that take place within specific areas of Pythagorean knowledge. 
Such transfer processes have far-reaching consequences which cannot be limited 
to single, strictly defined bodies of knowledge. Orphism, metempsychosis, way of 
life, dietetics and medicine, music, number and harmony, late refractions of Py-
thagorean beliefs and tenets – these issues can by no means be separated from each 
other. On the contrary, they are vitally interconnected. Most of the contributions 
to this volume show quite clearly the interrelationships of all of these topics. In-
deed, the present collection aims to enhance the study of the many links, transfers, 
and mutual interactions among the different forms of Pythagorean knowledge that 
have emerged throughout history, from Archaic Greece to Early Modern times. 
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Transfer of Afterlife Knowledge  
in Pythagorean Eschatology
Alberto Bernabé – Universidad Complutense de Madrid
1  Preliminary considerations
1.1  Difficulties
The study of Pythagorean literature regarding the fate of souls after death is ex-
tremely complex. Several factors contribute to this complexity. First, the scarci-
ty, diversity, and lack of precision of the testimonies. Second, the blurred lines 
between Pythagoreans and Orphics, which is aggravated by the fact that some 
Pythagoreans composed works under the name of Orpheus.1 Third, another con-
tributing factor is the breadth and diversity of Pythagoreanism (and Orphism) 
in time and space, with the added difficulty that authors tend to pass off diverse 
proposals as ancient and originating from Orpheus or Pythagoras themselves. 
This circumstance on the one hand makes it difficult to date some doctrines, and 
on the other it increases the possibility that diverse eschatological doctrines may 
exist.2 A fourth factor is the need to relate the study of the soul’s fate to doctrines 
about its nature, which are also varied across space and time, and even contra-
dictory. And last but not least, the fifth factor we should take into account is the 
notorious lack of interest by scholars of Pythagoreanism in Pythagorean propos-
als on the afterlife, which has resulted in a scarcity of research and publications 
on this subject. 
It is not my intention in this paper to exhaust the topic, which would require a 
much more detailed study. 
1 Testimonies are collected and commented upon in Bernabé 2004–2005 fr. 403–405 (hereafter 
cited as OF followed by the fragment number); cf. West 1983, 7–15, Brisson 1990, 2925–2926, 
Kingsley 1995, 140–141, and Bernabé 2008, 394–400. Ion of Chios (fr. 116 Leurini) testifies that 
Pythagoras ascribed some of his works to Orpheus himself, cf. Zhmud 2012, 223. 
2 This is confirmed by texts like Arist. De an. 404a 17 (Pythagorici 58 B 40 DK) “For some of 
them (Pythagoreans) said that the soul was the motes in the air, and others that it was what 
moved the motes” (Translation by C. A. Huffman). Cf. Boyancé 1937, 84–86; Dodds 1951, 149 
and 171; Huffman 1993, 327–331.
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1.2 A few basic considerations
The ancient (and modern) mix-up between Orphics and Pythagoreans can none-
theless have a positive aspect: it highlights the existence of large areas of co-ex-
istence between both doctrines. Having said that, from what we know, the Py-
thagorean sect was deeply involved in the scientific explanation of reality and in 
the organization of everyday life, both within the sect and in the politics of the 
city. In these two characteristics they differ from Orphics, who never established 
permanent groups, and whose interest in their fate after death was inversely pro-
portional to their interest in politics. Thus it is to be expected that Pythagoreans 
would be more concerned with the “orthodoxy” of organization of life in the 
world, rather than with fate after death. 
1.3 Data of diverse nature
The texts present data of diverse nature relating to the topic we are discussing, 
and they are sometimes conflicting. To make the analysis easier, in this paper, I 
will divide the explanations into the predominantly physical and the predomi-
nantly religious, although I acknowledge that this division may be anachronistic 
and a bit arbitrary. 
I call “predominantly physical explanations” those focused on the matter of 
which the soul is made, and how it interacts with other matters, in primis of the 
body. Within this group we would propose three types of proposals about the 
soul: 
a)  One postulates that the soul is harmony and does not survive after death 
(§ 2.1).
b)  Another proposes that the soul is aether and it joins aether upon the death of 
the body (§ 2.2).
c)  And a third explanation states that the soul would remain in the air after es-
caping its corporeal form and / or would be inhaled with the air, although the 
composition of the soul in this case is not specified (§ 2.3).
On the other hand, I consider as “predominantly religious explanations” prop-
ositions that are based on the conception of the soul ἀθάνατος, which presents 
a profound deviation from the predominant Homeric tradition, since according 
to Homer only the gods are ἀθάνατοι, while the ψυχαί that inhabit Hades are 
ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα (Od. 10.521, 536 al.), a sort of shadows without consciousness, 
memory, or will, which would never return from Hades. In this group there are 
different interpretations of what happens when the soul leaves the body: 
a)  In one case it is proposed that the soul goes to Hades, where it receives re-
wards or punishments according to the conduct of the person whom the soul 
inhabited (§ 3.1).
b)  In another interpretation, the soul suffers metempsychosis, that is, the soul 
transmigrates to another body (§ 3.2).
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c)  Other versions state that the soul is placed among the heavenly bodies or it 
becomes a heavenly body (§ 3.3).
d)  Another explanation proposes that it becomes a new being of divine nature, 
be it daimon or theos (§ 3.4). 
1.4 Parameters
I think that it is methodologically productive to elaborate a series of parameters to 
apply to each of the hypotheses with the idea of facilitating comparisons, and to 
trace a history of the question, which we can only sketch at this point.
One group of parameters that I propose are external to the doctrine: 
–  the attribution of the doctrine: to Pythagoras or to the Pythagoreans, to Or-
pheus or the Orphics, or both;
–  the date of the testimonies;
–  the origin of the text: from the Orphics or Pythagoreans, or from a different 
source.
Together with these external parameters, there are others that pertain to the con-
tent of the doctrine: 
–  is the matter of the soul specified or not;
–  is the status of the soul after death modified or not;
–  are there any variations;
–  is there an interest in the mechanism by which the process occurs, or not;
–  is the process suffered by the soul lineal or cyclic;
–  is an ending to the process foreseen or not;
–  and with which of the other hypotheses a doctrinal content is compatible, in 
order to determine whether or not it is possible to construct a single, coherent 
doctrine combining them.
Lack of information may naturally lead to imprecise or even incorrect conclu-
sions. 
In the following section I will briefly review each of the documented explana-
tions based on the parameters I have proposed. 
2 Predominantly physical explanations
2.1 The soul as harmony
The doctrine of the harmony-soul is only attributed to Pythagoreans and is docu-
mented in external texts from the fifth and fourth centuries BC: in Plato, Aristot-
le, and also Philolaus through Macrobius.3
3 Plat. Phaed. 86b, Arist. De an. 407b27, Pol. 1340b18, Macrob. Somn. Scip. 1.14.19 (Philol. Test. 
A 23, 323 Huffman).
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The soul is a harmony of elements. Upon the death of the body the status of 
the soul is modified in that it too necessarily disappears when the elements, of 
which it was the harmony, no longer exist. Aristotle seems to reflect variations in 
details,4 although he may be referring to differences between the Pythagoreans 
and Plato.5 The mechanism of the process is outlined, and it is supposed to be 
cyclic and endless: the existence of new harmonic structures entails new souls 
that bring about the harmony of these structures, but it is incompatible with pos-
tulates of immortality or transmigration of the soul.
2.2 The soul is aether
Alexander Polyhistor attributed to Pythagoras the doctrine that the soul is aether 
(and it is often specified that it also returns to aether),6 while Vettius Valens at-
tributed it to Orpheus.7 Thus both are late testimonies. Nevertheless, the doctrine 
was documented much earlier, outside Orphic and Pythagorean circles. Specif-
ically, it can be found already in the fifth century BC in the epitaph for the de-
ceased at Potidaea (432 BC) and other epitaphs.8 The most plausible theory is that 
the doctrine originated in the sphere of Ionic philosophy and achieved a certain 
degree of popularity. For its subsequent history, we could think of two possibili-
ties: either it was reproduced among Orphics and Pythagoreans keen on scientific 
explanations, or supporters of this hypothesis attributed it to Orpheus or Pythag-
oras for reasons of prestige. Burkert indicates with reason that, “if this whole 
development were to be traced back to Pythagoras, one would have to ascribe to 
his teaching a maximum of influence and a minimum of definite context; for the 
testimonia are extremely disparate.”9
Regarding the rest of the parameters: the soul’s matter is specified (as aether), 
but a change of status is not postulated, since at the death of the body the aether 
simply mixes with the aether: similia similibus miscentur. However, the mechanism 
of the process is not mentioned, perhaps because it was considered obvious. It is 
very likely that it was considered to be cyclic: parts of the aether would penetrate 
different bodies once again, to give them life, in a process to which an ending is 
not foreseen. It is similar to – but not the same as – theories that postulate that 
the soul inhabits the aether (§ 3.3), and identify it with the heavenly bodies or the 
gods. It is incompatible with any doctrine about rewards and punishments, and 
with transmigration of the soul.
4 Arist. Pol. 1340b18 διὸ πολλοί φασι τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δ᾽  ἔχειν 
ἁρμονίαν, “owing to which many wise men say either that the soul is a harmony or that it 
has harmony” (translation by H. Rackham). 
5 Plat. Phaed. 93a.
6 Alex. Polyh. ap. D. L. 2.28.
7 Vett. Val. 317.19 Pingree (OF 436).
8 IG I31179 = CEG 10.6 Hansen αἰθὲρ μὲμ φσυχὰς ὑπεδέχσατο, σόμ̣[ατα δὲ χθόν]. “Aither has 
taken their souls, and earth their bodies” (translation by A. Mihai). Cf. Thom 1995, 205; Mi-
hai 2010.
9 Burkert 1972, 361–362, with bibliography, cf. also Molina Moreno 2008, 616–617.
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2.3 The soul remains in the air and / or is inhaled with it
Aristotle attributed to the Orphics the idea that the soul is inhaled with the air 
and there is certainly an Orphic verse that asserts this idea.10 In another passage, 
he ascribes to “Pythagorean myths” the theory that any soul could be clothed in 
any body.11 Additionally, Aristotle picks up the idea that the soul was the motes 
in the air, as postulated by some Pythagoreans.12 This represents a much more 
“materialistic” version than the doctrine attributed to the Orphics. We do not 
know if these three reports are different aspects of the same theory. If this were 
the case, we could explain the attribution of the same doctrine to both Orphics 
and Pythagoreans by accepting Gagné’s proposal13 that this idea was found in the 
poem Φυσικά, ascribed to Orpheus but actually written by Brotinus – that is, a 
Pythagorean.14 The matter of the soul is not specified and it appears that its status 
is not modified; it only changes places. This doctrine is only interested in the 
mechanism of the process: the soul is inhaled and it stays in the air. In a different 
version, it is indicated that the presence of the soul in the air is responsible for 
its movement. The process seems to be cyclic and endless, since particles of the 
soul that are in the air can penetrate another life form again. Despite how it may 
appear, this doctrine is compatible with transmigration, as we will see further 
on (§ 3.2). 
3 Predominantly religious explanations
3.1 Rewards (and punishments) in the afterlife
According to various authors, Orphics and / or Pythagoreans considered that the 
souls of humans received rewards or punishments in the afterlife, depending on 
the fulfilment of specific conditions in this world. A very old testimony can be 
found in Ion of Chios,15 according to whom Pythagoras’ proposals foretold Phere-
cydes a pleasant life in the afterlife as a reward for his conduct. Aristophon, a 
Middle Comedy poet, points out that Pythagorizing followers are the only people 
who sit at the table of Hades, due to their piety.16
In turn, Plato mockingly presents the privileges promised by “Musaeus and 
his son” to righteous men, and Plutarch explains that Plato is talking about the 
followers of Orpheus.17 A banquet accompanied with wine (described as a “for-
tunate honour”) seems to be promised in the Orphic tablet from Pelinna to a 
man who had just died.18 Nevertheless, this vision of wine in the Beyond was 
not shared by the Pythagoreans. Both the information we obtain from Diogenes 
10 Arist. De an. 410b27 (OF 421); Vett. Val. 317.19 Pingree (OF 422).
11 Arist. De an. 407b10 (= Pythagorici 58 B 39 DK). Cf. Nilsson 1935, 212.
12 Arist. De an. 404a16–18 (= Pythagorici 58 B 40 DK).
13 Gagné 2007.
14 OF 800–803.
15 Io Chius fr. 30 West, 92 Leurini. 
16 Aristophon fr. 12 K.-A. (= D. L. 8.38 = OF 432 III). Cf. Battezzato 2008.
17 Plat. Resp. 363c, Plut. Comp. Cim. Luc. 1.2 (OF 431 I).
18 OF 485.6, cf. Bernabé / Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008, 61–94.
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Laertius about Pythagoras calling drunkenness a snare,19 and the burlesque tes-
timony of Aristophon,20 where the Pythagoreans only drink water at Pluto’s ban-
quet, make it unlikely that Pythagoreans would have imagined the consumption 
of wine as a reward in Hades.
Plato completes the passage of the Republic21 by citing the punishment that 
the uninitiated suffer in Hades: to plunge into a kind of mud, or to carry water 
in a sieve. In another passage, Plato presents a scenario that is probably closer to 
Orphic postulates from his time, where being initiated or not is what determines 
the situation in the afterlife.22 This is also recorded in a gold tablet from Pherae 
and an anecdote attributed to Diogenes the Cynic.23
The commentator of the Derveni papyrus relates in col. 2 that a propitiatory 
sacrifice to the Erinyes has to be made in order for the soul to obtain a privileged 
position in the afterlife, and in col. 3 he mentions that not all the daimones sent 
by the gods are benevolent, but if Dike decides to pursue a noxious man with all 
the Erinyes, [the] under[world] daimones (= the Erinyes) will never release them.24
However, there are few statements regarding punishment in the afterlife. On 
the one hand, Aristotle attributes to them the belief that, if it thunders, it must be 
to make the souls in Tartarus afraid.25 On the other hand, Alexander says that Py-
thagoreans thought about the Netherworld as a place where “impure souls were 
not allowed to approach each other, much less to come close to pure souls, since 
they were fettered in unbreakable bonds by the Erinyes.”26
To summarize: the sphere of attribution of rewards and punishments in Ha-
des is both Orphic and Pythagorean, although a certain degree of retribution of 
injustices in this world could have expanded the area of diffusion of this idea, 
and the testimonies are mainly external. We can place this in the fourth century 
BC, the date of the Derveni papyrus, and, although Alexander Polyhistor is from 
a later period, the idea may be much older, since its description resembles that of 
an Erinys tying an evil soul which can be found on an Apulian vase, also from 
the fourth century BC.27
If we compare Orphic passages with those attributed to Pythagoreans, we find 
two similarities. The first is that there is a different fate for pure and impure 
souls. For this reason, the soul declares before Persephone in some Orphic gold 
19 D. L. 8.9.
20 Cf. n. 17.
21 Plat. Resp. 363d (OF 434 I).
22 Plat. Phaed. 69c (OF 429 I). On Plato and Orphism, see Bernabé 2011.
23 OF 493 ἄποινος γὰρ ὁ μύστης “since the initiate is free from punishment,” Iul. Or. 7.25 
(II 1.88 Rochefort, OF 435 I). Cf. Bernabé / Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008, 157.
24 Cf. Bernabé 2014.
25 Arist. AP 94b 33.
26 Alex. Polyx. ap. D. L. 8.31 (FGrHist 273 F 93). Cf. Long 2013, 157–158; on similarities between 
the Derveni papyrus and Alexander, cf. Bernabé 2014, 42.
27 Apulian crater, Ruvo 1094 (360–350 BCE), cf. Pensa 1977, 25; Bernabé 2011, 202–203.
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tablets from Thurii, “I come pure among pure.”28 The second similarity is that 
the Erinyes participate in the punishment of the impure souls. However, the dif-
ferences between them are patently obvious: a) For the Orphics every soul goes 
to Hades, even if they stay in separate locations. The Pythagoreans, on the other 
hand, seem to lead some souls “upwards.” b) There are no Pythagorean referenc-
es to a different fate for initiates achieved through a ritual system by which, as in 
the case of the gold tablets, they need only know some passwords to be accepted 
to a privileged place. A special position is occupied by the Derveni commentator 
because, even if he is an Orphic, he knows philosophy and takes a moral perspec-
tive into account.
The matter of the soul is not specified, and the only mention of modification of 
its status after death is its liberation. We do not find any references to the mecha-
nism of the process, and it is not clear whether it is a lineal or cyclic process. We 
also do not know if it is a never-ending process or if there is an end to it. In any 
case, the doctrine of rewards and punishments, and the transmigration of the 
soul are compatible. 
3.2 Metempsychosis 
Various authors attribute the transmigration doctrine to Pythagoras.29 The oldest 
testimonies come from Xenophanes and Empedocles;30 Heraclides Ponticus af-
firms that Pythagoras knew all his reincarnations, a fact that reveals an ancient 
attribution of the metempsychosis theory to his circle or to the philosopher him-
self.31 Dicaearchus, speaking about Pythagoras’ doctrines, points out that “it was 
especially well-known by all” that the soul is immortal and transmigrates into 
other kinds of animals.32 Ovid puts in the mouth of Pythagoras both the theory of 
metempsychosis and all the memories of his previous identities,33 and Diodorus 
Siculus attributes the doctrine of transmigration to Pythagoras.34
Nevertheless, other authors mention Orpheus as the origin of the theory. Plato 
suggests this explicitly in Cratylus,35 and allusively in other dialogues.36
28 OF 488–490.1, cf. Bernabé / Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008, 100–102.
29 For a more detailed analysis of metempsychosis, cf. Casadio 1991; Casadesús 2011 and 2013; 
Bernabé 2011a and 2013, 127–134, with bibliography.
30 Xenophan. fr. 7 Lesher, cf. Lesher 1992, 78–79; Emp. fr. 99 Wright (B 129 DK), cf. Wright 1981, 
256–258; Trepanier 2004, 124–126.
31 Heraclid. Pont. ap. D. L. 8.4 (86 Schütrumpf). According to Delatte (1922, 157), Heraclides’ 
notice comes from Pythagoreans circles of the sixth to fourth centuries. Cf. also Iamblich. 
VP 134. According to Gottschalk 1980, 115 n. 93 (quoting previous bibliography), “Diogenes’ 
source seems to have been a book forged in Pythagoras’s name in the Hellenistic period, but 
the forger may well have used Heraclides.”
32 Dicaearch. Phil. ap. Porph. VP 19 (fr. 40 Mirhady).
33 Ov. Met. 15.156–161.
34 Diod. Sic. 10.6.1, 5.28.6 (Posidon. fr. 169, 139.6 Theiler).
35 Plat. Crat. 400c (OF 430 I).
36 Plat. Men. 81a (OF 424), Phaed. 70c (OF 428). For an extensive discussion on this topic, I refer 
to Bernabé 2011.
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Sometimes the theory is attributed to both of them. That is what Herodotus 
seems to postulate in a somewhat mysterious passage.37 There has been extensive 
discussion of who are the Greeks to whom he refers, but in any case the expres-
sion “early and late” indicates that he is referring to more than one author, and it 
would be difficult to accept that Pythagoras is not among them, especially as the 
expression “have used this doctrine as if it were their own” is very similar to the 
one used by Heraclitus38 when he is attributing to Pythagoras the appropriation 
of other people’s doctrines. This idea can also be found in Diogenes of Oenoan-
da,39 who mentions them together. 
On the other hand, according to Ion, Pythagoras himself attributed some of his 
own writings to Orpheus. In this way, we can say that Ion believed that Pythago-
ras was the author of certain poems that circulated under the name of Orpheus.40
Let us examine the data according to the parameters mentioned earlier. Re-
garding the sphere in which the teaching is presented, the Orphic proposal pres-
ents traits that differ from Pythagorean ideas.
a) Orphic doctrine conceives metempsychosis as a cycle connected to the need 
to expiate humans’ original sin, which can be summarized in the slogan σῶμα 
σῆμα and is based on the myth of Dionysus and the Titans. According to this, the 
soul can obtain a divine state once it is freed from transmigration. This doctrine 
is expressed in other references from Plato and in Orphic gold tablets, as well as 
in other authors.41
 b) To the contrary, the Pythagorean metempsychosis doctrine describes a cycle 
of re-birth that does not appear to be conditioned by a preceding sin committed 
in the origin of the human race, but seems rather to be the condition of preserv-
ing life, through the soul that perpetuates the beings ἔμψυχα on earth through 
constant reincarnation. This doctrine is found in Herodotus, Androcides, Hera-
clides, Dicaearchus, and Ovid, and it does not contradict Xenophanes’ statement. 
Two pieces of evidence are consistent with this idea. First, a text by Dicaearchus, 
according to which the Pythagoreans considered that the human race always ex-
isted, excludes the postulate of a Titanic sin prior to the origin of men.42 Second, 
for Pythagoreans κύκλος had a different meaning than for the Orphics. For Py-
thagoreans, the cycle is subject to necessity, probably because it is included in the 
regular processes of the world order, as Diogenes Laertius asserts. The Orphics, 
however, consider the cycle as something terrible from which the souls can be 
liberated at some point, for they interpret it as the punishment received by the 
37 Hdt. 2.123.1
38 Heraclit. B 129 DK.
39 Diog. Oen. fr. 40 Smith
40 D. L. 8.8 (Io fr. 116 II Leurini, OF 506 I). Cf. Bernabé 2013, 118 and 128–129.
41 Clearchus (Athenaeus IV 157c) attributes very similar affirmations to a Pythagorean named 
Euxytheus, but Euxytheus is “doubtless a fictitious person,” according to Burkert 1972, 124 
n. 21; nevertheless this reference shows that at some point the Pythagoreans were interested 
in this idea.
42 Dicaearch. Phil. ap. Cens. 4.3 (fr. 53 Mirhady).
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human beings for the Titans’ original crime;43 they believe that this rite will allow 
them to break free and recover their lost divine condition. 
The extreme form of this Pythagorean doctrine is the subjugation to transmi-
gration in precise periods of time, within which the notion of number is supreme 
above everything else. Already Herodotus discusses the fixed duration of a cycle. 
A notable case is that of Hippobotus, to whom Pythagoras’ reincarnations were 
part of a strict mathematical model.44
The documentation of this doctrine among Orphics and Pythagoreans is an-
cient, and there are very clear texts from the Classical period. The testimonies are 
predominantly external, but in the case of the Orphics the doctrine is contained 
in the gold tablets. The matter of the soul is not specified, and among Pythago-
reans there is no mention of the modification of its status. However, the Orphics 
understand the separation between the soul and the body as a liberation and a 
return to the divine life. Interest in the process is in both cases scarce or non-ex-
istent. Its development is clearly cyclical in the case of the Pythagoreans, while 
the Orphics foresee a definitive happiness for the liberated soul at the end of 
the circle of transmigration. The proposal is compatible with the idea of rewards 
and punishments in the afterlife, which can happen between reincarnations. And 
contrary to how it may appear, it is also compatible with the proposal that the 
soul is inhaled with the air, which only refers to the mechanism of the process 
and does not prejudge the nature of the soul, where it comes from, or where it 
is going. Proof of this is that Gregory of Nazianzus attributes both beliefs to the 
same persons, though he does not indicate to whom.45 Even the Rhapsodies com-
bine both ideas, although there is an attempt to distinguish between the souls of 
animals and the souls of men.46
3.3 The soul is placed between the heavenly bodies, or it becomes a heavenly body
There are also scattered testimonies of an astral eschatology according to which 
upon the death of a body the soul seeks the highest place among the heavenly 
bodies. Information on this topic is obscure. Aristophanes presents it as a doc-
trine widespread in his times;47 Iamblichus points out that for Pythagoras the 
Isles of Blessed are the Sun and the Moon.48 According to the Carmen Aureum, 
when the soul is liberated from the body it returns to the aether as a god49 – I will 
come to this idea further on – but, specifically in an Orphic poem called the Lyre, 
written very likely by a Pythagorean of the Hellenistic period, the text mentions 
43 D. L. 8.14; OF 348 (Rhapsodiae), 488.5 (Lamella aurea Thuriis). Cf. Bernabé 2013, 136–138.
44 Theol. Ar. 52 de Falco (Hippobotus fr. 13 Gigante).
45 Gr. Naz. Carm. arc. 7.22–25 and 32–40 Moreschini (OF 421 VIII), cf. Herrero 2010, 213, 341–342, 
371.
46 OF 339 (Rhapsodiae).
47 Ar. Pax 832–835.
48 Iamb. VP 18.82.
49 Carm. Aur. 70.
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that, since the seven strings of the lyre correspond to the seven circles of Heaven, 
“the soul cannot ascend without the lyre,” a statement that – as previously point-
ed out by Nock – “referred to the soul’s ascent after death through the seven plan-
etary spheres.”50 We can establish a connection between this testimony and an-
other one from Aristides Quintilianus, who mentions that Pythagoras exhorted 
his disciples to work at the monochord at his death bed.51 It is thus a Pythagorean 
proposal from the Hellenistic period which was attributed to Orpheus, but the 
Orphics themselves do not appear to have shared this idea, since their doctrines 
place the afterlife in Hades, not among the heavenly bodies.
3.4 The soul becomes a divine being
The idea that the soul may become a divine being is documented among the Or-
phics – in some of the Thurii gold tablets – and among the Pythagoreans, as well 
as in Empedocles.52 Carmen Aureum 63 specifies that the soul is of divine origin, 
so its liberation from the body represents the recovery of its primitive condition. 
Burkert and Thom highlight how the explanation of metempsychosis – which 
appears to be of ancient origin – gives way to the proposal of deification, except 
in the case of Plato, who defends it.53
4 Conclusions
Orphics and a number of Pythagoreans share a prominent interest and a similar 
sensibility toward the difference between soul and body, and toward the survival 
of the soul. Both ideas are the germ of, and the necessary condition for, elaborate 
doctrines on the fate of the soul after death. This combination formed by dualism 
and eschatology has resulted in the development of a set of characteristics that 
apply to Orphics and Pythagoreans, as opposed to other pre-Platonic movements. 
This has two effects: the first is a transfer of ideas – total or partial – between 
the two circles; and the second effect is that, to an outsider, these similarities 
would have been interpreted as belonging to a single group that would have been 
perceived as different and peculiar. This latter circumstance is enhanced by the 
ambition of both groups to distinguish themselves from the rest by leading a 
particular ascetic way of life, refraining from the consumption of meat and, in the 
case of the Pythagoreans, perhaps also wine.
From the two trends that I pointed out at the beginning – always acknowledg-
ing that I am making a simplistic and anachronistic division – of either “predom-
50 Sch. Verg. A. 6.119 ap. Cod. Par. Lat. 7930 (Savage, TAPA 56, 1925, 235 = OF 417, cf. 418–420); 
cf. Nock 1927 and 1929, Keydell 1942, col. 1336, Ziegler 1942, col. 1412, Cumont 1942 [1966] 
addition to 18, Burkert 1972, 357; West 1983: 29–33, Lambardi 1986, Paterlini 1992, Bernabé 
2008, 399–400.
51 Aristid. Quint. De mus. 3.2, cf. Burkert 1972, 357 n. 37. I refer here to Burkert’s excellent chap-
ter on the possible links between astral religion and Pythagoreanism (Burkert 1972, 350–
367).
52 OF 487.4, 488.9, Carm. Aur. 63–71 (cf. Thom 1995, ad locum), Emp. B 112.4 DK.
53 Burkert 1972, 123–124; Thom 1995, 227.
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inantly physical” or “predominantly religious” orientation, it looks like the first 
did not form the majority. The suggestion that the soul is harmony seems to have 
originated from some Pythagoreans (referred to by Plato and Aristotle) interest-
ed in connecting doctrines on the soul with theories about harmony. It does not 
appear to have influenced the Orphics at all, nor does it seem to have been of long 
standing in Pythagorean circles. 
Regarding the hypothesis of an aetherial nature of the soul, it seems that it 
originated outside the Orphic and Pythagorean ambiences (in the oldest testimo-
nies, like the epigram of Potidaea, it appears not in connection with these groups, 
but rather in an “official” sphere of the city). It may have had a certain popularity 
among the most “scientific” followers of Pythagoras, but in turn we can reduce 
nearly to zero the texts that connect this theory with the Orphics. It presents 
similarities with the hypothesis that suggests that the soul departs for a place in 
the aether (which is not the same thing as having an aetherial nature), a postulate 
that seems to have attracted the Pythagoreans. The Orphics clearly preferred an 
eschatology in which the souls gain a privileged place in the Hades. 
Lastly, the idea that the soul is inhaled with the air seems to have been shared 
by Orphics and Pythagoreans from early times.54 Perhaps it originated among 
some of the Pythagoreans who wrote works attributed to Orpheus. It would 
be significant if this idea were expressed in the Φυσικά, a poem attributed to 
Orpheus but which is believed to have been written by Brotinus, a well-known 
Pythagorean. In any case, this explanation does not refer to the nature of the 
soul but to the mechanism through which it can penetrate another body. It is 
obviously compatible with the idea of transmigration, since it is clear that in this 
conception the soul exists separated from the body, it comes from another place, 
and it settles in it (supposedly to exit from it after the death of the body). For the 
most “scientific” Pythagoreans, the soul could be explained as a sort of animated 
matter responsible for providing the body with movement, while also making it 
possible to exploit the benefit of attributing the movement of the air to particles 
of soul. Nonetheless, for the most “religious” this is compatible even with the 
existence of rewards and punishments in the afterlife. 
Regarding privileged treatment in the afterlife as a consequence of activities in 
the world, it seems that we can distinguish two different models, between which 
there could be all kinds of interferences: a) the first one, the Orphic, would be a 
ritualistic model according to which privileged access to the afterlife comes as 
a result of the fulfilment of ritual practices and the knowledge of certain pass-
words. Beyond the ritual, only the observation of justice appears to be required. 
However, the judgment of the souls, mentioned by Plato more than once, is not 
originally Orphic. b) The second model would be an ethical proposition in which 
privileged access is the result of specific conduct, and punishments are not al-
ways mentioned. This seems to be the Pythagorean model followed later by Plato. 
54 Cf. § 2.3. 
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Among Orphics, it appears that it has begun to be accepted in the Derveni papy-
rus, and traces of it can also be found in the so-called Bologna papyrus. 
In metempsychosis I think we can also establish two models, basically differ-
entiated in that the Orphics consider it to be the punishment for a sin after which 
the final liberation of the soul is foreseen, while the Pythagoreans see in metem-
psychosis a simple functioning mechanism of the world, with no end. 
As regards astral eschatology, it seems clear that the Orphics were not inter-
ested in it. They usually imagined that the liberation of the soul would end with 
the gathering of the initiated in a privileged place in Hades, identified in the gold 
tablets as “thiasos of the pure” or “Persephone’s meadow,” where they would 
reunite when already transformed to divine status. Nevertheless, in relation to 
other clearly Pythagorean theories, like the harmony of the spheres or the math-
ematical proportion in the strings of the lyre, in the Hellenistic period a certain 
group of Pythagoreans developed a more abstract eschatology of astral nature, in 
which the soul’s ascent through the seven planetary circles is postulated.
Finally, deification was clearly affirmed by the Orphics, from the evidence of 
the tablets of the fourth century BC. In reality, this doctrine was merely making 
explicit what was implicit in the designation of the soul as ἀθάνατος. It also ap-
pears in Pythagorean circles at a later date and, for example, it is affirmed in the 
Carmen Aureum in terms that remind us of the gold tablets.
To make a final assessment, the Orphics managed to elaborate a relatively co-
herent eschatological scheme based on the proposals we have been analyzing, 
of course with the exception of the soul-harmony and the soul-aether, which are 
incompatible with the rest. The Orphic doctrine is religious, and it does not re-
quire extensive argumentation and introduction in a rational doctrinal scheme. 
In addition, given that transmigration was understood as a punishment against 
a being of divine origin to expiate a sin, the deification meant the end of the pun-
ishment and the final liberation of the soul. It was also easy to fit into this scheme 
an explanation of the mechanism through which the soul could transmigrate 
from one body to another, on the understanding that it was inhaled from the air. 
The idea of rewards and punishments in the afterlife, which would allow regula-
tion of the transit of the soul toward its purification and liberation, is also easy to 
integrate. We have seen already that a text by Gregory of Nazianzus corroborates 
that all this formed part of a whole, since he attributes these characteristics to a 
single doctrine. 
However, in the Pythagorean sphere configuring a coherent scheme is more 
difficult. The mechanism of inhaling the soul through the air is not incompatible 
with transmigration, and it also makes it possible to explain the movement of 
the air by the particles of the soul. It would not be problematic to reconcile the 
idea of rewards and punishments with transmigration, since the Pythagoreans 
showed great interest in ethics right from their origins. In fact it seems that the 
Pythagorean vision in this respect was less ritualistic than the Orphic one, and 
more inclined toward ethical interpretations. However it is much more difficult 
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for them to reconcile transmigration with deification. First, because if, as I have 
postulated, transmigration was conceived as a normal mechanism in the world 
order and the renovation of life, then the idea of deification is not easily compat-
ible with it. Proof of this incompatibility in the Pythagorean sphere is that the 
idea of deification has to be presented as an alternative to transmigration, until 
it eventually relegates it. Second, there are certain philosophical postulates that 
produce greater requirements in the creation of an eschatology. And above all, 
we need to take into account that, while the image of the afterlife was a priority 
of the Orphics, the Pythagoreans were more interested in other questions. For 
all these reasons, we do not find a systematization of eschatological ideas in the 
Pythagorean sphere as we do in the Orphic sphere (or perhaps it would be best to 
say that we find traces of diverse discordant systematizations). 
Above I have presented a proposal that I recognize could prompt the objec-
tion that it is simplistic, but this is because the study of Pythagorean eschatology 
needs more attention. Therefore what I have set out so far should be taken as a 
working outline in which the available texts may be inserted in the most coherent 
way. 
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The Appropriation of the Figure of Orpheus  
and Orphic Doctrines:  
An Example of Pythagoras’ Artful Knavery (kakotechnie)? *
Francesc Casadesús Bordoy – Universitat de les Illes Balears
1  Introduction
In a book such as this, dedicated to dealing in a monographic way with “Forms 
and Transfers of Pythagorean Knowledge: Askesis – Religion – Science,” it needs 
to be noted that the mythicized figure of Pythagoras performed a fundamental 
role in the origin and development of the notion of “knowledge.” In fact, as I will 
attempt to show in this study, Pythagoras was, among the thinkers of Antiquity, 
the most eagerly devoted to the exercise, to the askesis, of compiling decidedly 
varied and scattered knowledge from very different geographic, cultural, social, 
and religious origins. Even the most ancient testimonies coincide in presenting 
Pythagoras as a pioneer who, by virtue of his firm will to acquire new knowledge, 
created a novel activity, philosophy. For this reason, I will attempt to demonstrate 
that Pythagoras’ unrelenting devotion to the acquisition of knowledge constitut-
ed a continuous exercise, an askesis, which caused a true revolution that substan-
tially altered the archaic conception of wisdom, and which led to what we regard 
today as one of humanity’s greatest achievements: scientific research.
It must be noted that this new way of accessing knowledge initiated by Py-
thagoras was not exempt from criticism by those, as in the very significant case 
of Heraclitus, who felt they were the holders and guardians of true knowledge. 
Thus, owing to Heraclitus’ hostile reaction we can, paradoxically, appreciate the 
novelty of Pythagoras’ modus operandi regarding the advance of human knowl-
edge. This, in turn, will help us assess the scope of the innovative Pythagorean 
manner of “doing science.” Let us, to begin our analysis, recall the well-known 
Heraclitean fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius:
Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων 
καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, 
πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην. 
∗ This study is part of the project, “Utilización del vocabulario mítico-religioso en la formación de la 
terminología presocrática” (FFI2012–32647), financed by the Ministerio de Economía y Competi-
tividad of the Spanish Government.
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Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, pursued inquiry further than all other men and, 
choosing what he liked from these compositions, he made a wisdom of his own: 
much learning, artful knavery.1
2 What is the foundation of Heraclitus’ criticism of Pythagoras? 
The fragment contains two parts, a positive one and a negative one. The fact 
that Heraclitus acknowledged that Pythagoras exercised in research, ἱστορίην 
ἤσκησεν, more than any other man, agrees with other information transmitted 
by earlier sources. Thus, Ion of Chios defined Pythagoras as a true man of wis-
dom, a sophos, who “more than all saw men’s mental dispositions and came to 
know them well,” Πυθαγόρης ἐτύμως ὁ σοφὸς περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων γνώμας 
εἶδε καὶ ἐξέμαθεν.2 Empedocles presented him as “a ruler over many and diverse 
wise activities,” παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν <τ’> ἐπιήρανος ἔργων.3 Herodo-
tus, in turn, qualified him as “not the feeblest clever man among the Greeks,” 
Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ.4
It is, thus, no coincidence that the three testimonies we just mentioned agree 
in portraying Pythagoras as a wise man, a sophos, a sophistes, resolutely devoted 
to all kinds of knowledge, pantoion malista sophon, acquired through knowing and 
learning from all men. The earliest sources are, therefore, unanimous in present-
ing Pythagoras as the paradigm of an active researcher, open to the world and 
devoted to the pursuit of a total, holistic, knowledge. This unwavering will to 
knowledge is Pythagoras’ most renowned and characteristic trait. Heraclitus had 
no trouble in recognizing it when noting that he “pursued inquiry further than 
all other men,” ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων.
The use of the expression ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν, in fact, deserves a more detailed 
comment, for it allows us to reflect upon the topic we have been invited to address 
in this volume. It is interesting that Heraclitus used the word historie to define Py-
thagoras’ research activity. Such a term should be understood, according to Huff-
man – who has analysed it in its historical context based on its use in Herodotus’ 
work – as “the active collection of what people say on a given topic.”5 Huffman’s 
comparison of Herodotus’ use of the word historie led to the conclusion that it 
“is a general word for enquiry that does imply an active curiosity and desire to 
know things but is not limited to a specific subject-matter or to a rational outlook 
on the world.”6 For this reason, Huffman argues that historie “has the connotation 
of enquiries that go beyond what is readily at hand and thus that require effort 
and probably travel.”7
1 D. L. 8.6 = B 129 DK. Trans. Ch. Kahn.
2 D. L. 1.120.
3 Emp. B 129 DK.
4 Hdt. 4.95.9.
5 Huffman 2008, 31.
6 Huffman 2008, 23.
7 Huffman 2008, 30.
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In this sense, the fragment underscores the fact that Pythagoras explored and 
investigated others’ knowledge, an activity to which he consecrated all of his ef-
forts. For this reason – to highlight the fact that his search for knowledge was the 
result of an active researching askesis – Heraclitus used the verb eskesen. Hence 
Heraclitus admitted, albeit involuntarily, that research at the highest level re-
quires a life of effort, an askesis, devoted, as is the notorious case of Pythagoras, to 
carrying out long and continuous journeys to acquire much and diverse knowl-
edge. This wisdom, conveniently transformed when introduced to Greece, pro-
moted a true “knowledge in motion,” which fuelled a new way of understanding 
science.
However, in the second part of the fragment, the apparent laudatory tone 
changes radically. There Heraclitus specifies that Pythagoras, choosing what he 
liked from these compositions, ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς, “made a 
wisdom of his own,” ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην. In his opinion, such wisdom 
was nothing more than “much learning,” πολυμαθίην, and “artful knavery,” 
κακοτεχνίην. Heraclitus used these words to reveal what Pythagoras’ praised 
and renowned historie really was. In this context, it is striking that Heraclitus 
denounced the fact that Pythagoras elaborated his “own knowledge” after per-
forming a “selection of these writings.”8 Heraclitus’ use of the plural ταύτας 
τὰς συγγραφὰς emphasizes the diverse and assorted character of the knowledge 
to which Pythagoras had access as part of his research and from which he made 
a selection, ἐκλεξάμενος. Hence, Heraclitus underscored the “eclectic,” selective 
character of Pythagoras, who seems to have sifted the large amount of knowl-
edge, much of it in written form, to which he had access. This attitude of search 
and selection reminds us of the fragment of Heraclitus in which he argues that 
the “seekers of gold dig up much earth and find little.”9
In any case, Heraclitus’ assertion that Pythagoras composed his own wisdom 
from this selection, ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, is most striking. Note that the 
word sophie accords with the testimonies we have just analysed and that under-
score his undisputed status as sophos. Here, however, the word is restricted by 
the possessive genitive, ἑαυτοῦ, to emphasize that it was his wisdom, in the sense 
that he had appropriated it. We cannot devote too much space to considering the 
significance of this statement in the context of the thinking of Heraclitus, who 
criticized most men, οἱ πολλοί, because, oblivious to the wisdom of the common 
Logos, they lived in their own particular one.10 It is evident, from this perspective, 
 8 There are many opinions on the nature and priority of these writings. Although Burkert 
(1972, 131), suggests that they could be Orphic, we believe that, initially, there is no reason 
to justify this attribution. Pythagoras’ untiring research activity allowed him to access all 
kinds of texts on all kinds of wisdom and knowledge. 
 9 Χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον, B 22 DK.
10 Ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες 
φρόνησιν, B 2 DK. “Pythagoras has his own private wisdom, and thus he falls in with the 
rest of mankind who are like sleepers turning away from the public world of the wakeful 
into their ‘private’ world of dreams,” Granger 2004, 246.
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that Heraclitus’ intention when criticizing Pythagoras was to include him among 
the ignorant masses, who are unaware of what the common and universal Logos 
transmits.
In any case, it is worth underlining that, although Heraclitus had to acknowl-
edge Pythagoras’ unquestionable wisdom, he limited it to the range of his re-
search activity, as a manifest result of his appropriation, accumulation, and 
selection of the wisdom of others. Thus, in Heraclitus’ opinion, Pythagoras dis-
tinguished himself for having appropriated the knowledge of others to conform 
to his own wisdom.
Nevertheless, Heraclitus’ accusation, as we will see later, was not new. We 
know from other testimonies that, during his many journeys, Pythagoras accu-
mulated a vast wisdom that conferred on him a particular character that distin-
guished him from others.
In order to clarify the nature of this wisdom, Heraclitus defined it as polymath-
ie, “multiknowledge.” This substantive fits perfectly with Pythagoras’ famous 
and widely acknowledged dedication to gathering varied forms of knowledge. 
With the term polymathie, Heraclitus attempted to lower his status and fame as 
sophos, of wise man, unanimously ascribed to him the early sources. Heraclitus 
himself made it clear that this was his intention by arguing, in another fragment, 
that different sorts of knowledge, polymathie, do not teach intelligence, nous. If this 
were the case, they would have taught diverse thinkers, Pythagoras among them: 
“Much learning does not teach understanding. For it would have taught Hesiod 
and Pythagoras, and also Xenophanes and Hecataeus,” πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ 
διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ 
Ἑκαταῖον.11
With this relentless insistence on relating Pythagoras to polymathie, Heraclitus 
intended to degrade his status as a man of wisdom, to set him apart from the 
more traditional conception of wisdom, sophia, represented by the select group 
of wise men – the seven wise men – with whom he himself felt sympathy.12 Thus, 
Heraclitus placed Pythagoras in contrast to his own conception of wisdom and 
the wise as something divine and unachievable.13 Indeed, Heraclitus believed 
that genuine wisdom could mean only to capture the truth transmitted by the Lo-
gos, the principle that unifies reality, which presents itself as multiple and diverse 
to the senses. Pythagoras represented precisely the opposite of what Heraclitus 
intended with his postulation of a unique Logos, a principle that even unified op-
posites; in contrast, Pythagoras’ endeavour was a dispersed and multiple search 
for knowledge that does not provide true intelligence about things, but rather a 
11 B 40 DK.
12 Bias, one of the seven wise men, was one of the few characters praised by Heraclitus: “In 
Priene lived Bias son of Teutamenes, who is of more account than the rest,” B 39 DK.
13 “Of all those whose accounts I have heard, none has gone so far as this: to recognize what is 
wise, set apart from all,” B 108 DK; “the wise is one, knowing the plan by which it steers all 
things through all,” B 41 DK. Trans. Ch. Kahn.
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simple plurality of forms of knowledge that are useless for the achievement of 
true wisdom. Achieving the Heraclitean logos requires, in sum, intelligence, nous, 
that is to say, precisely what is not conferred by polymathie.14
At this point in the presentation it is convenient to turn to an issue related 
with the topic of this book, “Forms and Transfers of Pythagorean Knowledge: 
Askesis – Religion – Science.” It is very possible that, with his hostile attitude, 
for the first time in Western history Heraclitus questioned what the orientation 
of science should be, whether to promote opening it to the world, transforming 
it into philosophia, or remaining closed as sophia. This controversy reveals that 
philosophy emerged as a novel alternative to the more archaic and traditional 
conception represented by the stern notion of sophia. Pythagoras believed that 
all knowledge deserved to be learned, regardless of whose it was and where it 
came from. This is clearly opposed to Heraclitus’ attitude, who believed that so-
phia should always be original, first-hand learning, and, therefore, inaccessible to 
the immense majority of mortals.15
This is why, in this controversial context, much is made clear by the fact that 
Heraclitus was the first to use the word “philosopher” in relation to the research of 
many things: χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι, “Men 
who love wisdom (philosophoi) must be good inquirers into many things.”16 Al-
though this statement has been interpreted in many different ways, it is notewor-
thy for our analysis, because the word φιλοσόφους, “knowledge lovers,” is direct-
ly associated with the expression μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας, “inquirers into many 
things;” it emphasizes the fact that Pythagoras ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων 
μάλιστα πάντων, “pursued inquiry further than all other men.” Furthermore, by 
directly relating the philosophers to the inquirers of many things, μάλα πολλῶν 
ἵστορας, Heraclitus made it clear that he considered philosophy a synonym of the 
reviled polymathie generated from the sterile Pythagorean inquiry.
It hardly seems mere coincidence that the creation of the word “philosopher” 
has traditionally been attributed to Pythagoras. Moreover, it is essential for un-
derstanding the background of the Heraclitean criticism, while at the same time 
it confirms that the prestige of the incipient philosophia, as opposed to the tradi-
tional sophia, was at stake in this dispute. In this context, Cicero’s attribution of 
the creation of the word “philosopher” to Pythagoras contributes to clarifying 
14 “The nature of the logos which he (sc. Heraclitus) has composed as an expression of his own 
wisdom (is) in contrast to that piling up of erudition which he despises as polymathie, ‘the 
learning of many things’,” Kahn 1979, 20.
15 “It is not difficult to see why Heraclitus is hostile to any form of second-hand learning, to 
both hearsay and book-learning. Reliance on second-hand learning is at odds with the kind 
of first-hand experience Heraclitus considers to be important or essential for ‘understand-
ing’,” Granger 2004, 250.
16 B 35 DK. Some scholars, such as Marcovich (1967, 26), claim that it was not Heraclitus who 
wrote the word “philosophers,” but Clement of Alexandria, who transmitted the fragment. 
Nevertheless, these arguments seem insufficient. For this reason, we believe that it needs to 
be regarded as genuine, as defended by, among other specialists, Mouraviev 2006, 44.
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the issue.17 According to a well-known passage in Cicero’s Tusculanae Disputatio-
nes, all who pursued the contemplation of nature were esteemed and called wise 
(sophoi, sapientes) and that designation of them went back to Pythagoras: omnes, qui 
in rerum contemplatione studia ponebant, sapientes et habebantur et nominabantur, idque 
eorum nomen usque ad Pythagorae manavit aetatem.18 To justify this view, following 
Heraclides Ponticus’ story, Cicero informs us that Pythagoras answered that he 
was a “philosopher” to the question posed by Leon the tyrant of Phlius, “who ad-
miring his genius and eloquence, asked him what art he regarded as specially his 
own,” (cuius [sc. Pythagoras] ingenium et eloquentiam cum admiratus esset Leon, quae-
sivisse ex eo, qua maxime arte confideret; at illum: artem quidem se scire nullam, sed esse 
philosophum).19 After telling this tale Cicero concluded that, “nor was Pythagoras 
merely the inventor of the name; he enlarged (amplificator) the range of subjects 
embraced in philosophy.”20
Although such eminent scholars as W. Burkert have expressed doubts about 
the veracity of Cicero’s story,21 it nevertheless stresses the most salient aspects of 
the figure of Pythagoras, and attributes to him the coinage of the word “philoso-
pher.” This strengthens the hypothesis that Heraclitus criticized Pythagoras for 
having been the first to adopt philosophy as a way to achieve wisdom. Heraclitus 
viewed a philosopher like Pythagoras – in contrast to the true sophoi – as no more 
than an intruder, an inquirer into the knowledge of many others, upon which he 
made up his own sophie, which was nothing more than a useless accumulation of 
different sorts of knowledge, polymathie.
Despite these criticisms, however, Pythagoras attained an extraordinary pres-
tige. No doubt this charisma was enhanced by the fact he introduced to Greece 
the knowledge he had acquired in his numerous and frequent journeys, especial-
ly to Egypt, as can be read in the following testimony by Isocrates:
17 According to some ancient sources, such as Diodorus Siculus 10.10, Pythagoras invented 
the word “philosopher” because he was hostile to the Seven Sages and to the genuine sophia 
which they represented: Ὅτι Πυθαγόρας φιλοσοφίαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ σοφίαν ἐκάλει τὴν ἰδίαν 
αἵρεσιν. Καταμεμφόμενος γὰρ τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ κεκλημένους ἑπτὰ σοφοὺς ἔλεγεν, ὡς 
σοφὸς μὲν οὐδείς ἐστιν ἄν θρωπος ὢν καὶ πολλάκις διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς φύσεως οὐκ 
ἰσχύων πάντα κατορθοῦν, ὁ δὲ ζηλῶν τὸν τοῦ σοφοῦ τρόπον τε καὶ βίον προσηκόντως ἂν 
φιλόσοφος ὀνομάζοιτο. – Pythagoras called the principles he taught philosophia or love of 
wisdom, but not sophia or wisdom. For he criticized the Seven Wise Men, as they were called, 
who lived before his time, saying that no man is wise, being human, and many a time, by 
reason of the weakness of his nature, has not the strength to bring all matters to a successful 
issue, but that he who emulates both the ways and the manner of life of a wise man may 
more fittingly be called a “lover of wisdom.” Trans. C. H. Oldfather.
18 Cic. Tusc. 5.3.8.
19 Cic. Tusc. 5.3.8. Cf. φησιν αὐτὸν ἐρωτηθέντα ὑπὸ Λέοντος τοῦ Φλιασίων τυράννου τίς εἴη, 
φιλόσοφος εἰπεῖν, D. L. 8.8.
20 Nec vero Pythagoras nominis solum inventor, sed rerum etiam ipsarum amplificator fuit. 
Qui cum post hunc Phliasium sermonem in Italiam venisset, exornavit eam Graeciam, 
quae magna dicta est, et privatim et publice praestantissumis et institutis et artibus, Cic. 
Tusc. 5.4.10.
21 Burkert 1960.
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Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιός ἐστιν· ὃς ἀφικόμενος εἰς Αἴγυπτον καὶ μαθητὴς 
ἐκείνων γενόμενος τήν τ› ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας 
ἐκόμισεν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἁγιστείας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς 
ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐσπούδασεν, ἡγούμενος, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῶι 
διὰ ταῦτα πλέον γίγνοιτο παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλ᾿  οὖν παρά γε τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις ἐκ τούτων μάλιστ’ εὐδοκιμήσειν.
Pythagoras of Samos having travelled to Egypt became a student of them 
and also was the first to bring philosophy to the Greeks and more con-
spicuously than others he seriously interested himself in sacrifices and in 
ceremonial purity, since he believed that even if he should gain thereby 
no greater reward from the gods, among men, at any rate, his reputation 
would be greatly enhanced.22
Isocrates’ text provides very interesting complementary information that match-
es the description offered by other testimonies, such as Pythagoras’ well known 
and documented time in Egypt, during which he adopted the modest attitude of 
pupil, μαθητής, appropriate for one who had defined himself as a knowledge lov-
er and inquirer into many things. Moreover, the practice of this inquiring askesis 
among the Egyptians allowed him to accumulate knowledge that he later took to 
Greece, being the first to bring philosophy to the Greeks. With this striking ex-
pression Isocrates may have intended to insinuate, as Heraclitus had denounced, 
that Pythagoras constructed his own philosophy, which had little to do with the 
kind of wisdom that, until then, was common in Greece. Likewise, Isocrates’ testi-
mony underscores the idea that Pythagoras devoted himself to learning religious 
knowledge, including sacrifices and rites, which, as noted in other testimonies, 
he practised much more than others, ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐσπούδασεν, 
which explains how he attained an extraordinary reputation among them, παρά 
γε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ τούτων μάλιστ’ εὐδοκιμήσειν.
Owing to all of this, the reading of Heraclitus’ fragment leads to the conclu-
sion that it coincides with what other sources transmit as a platitude: that Pythag-
oras exercised inquiry more than anyone else. From it he constructed his own 
wisdom, ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, probably constituted, among other things, many sorts 
of knowledge he learned in Egypt about religious matters. This great volume of 
knowledge ended up being transformed, due to the accumulation of multiple 
sorts of knowledge, into philosophy. Heraclitus, nevertheless, viewed this frenet-
ic inquisitive activity as nothing more than a useless polymathie.
3 What was the practice of kakotechnie? 
Heraclitus’ fragment concludes with a fourth substantive, κακοτεχνίην, with 
which culminates the ascending gradation of his criticism. To highlight this ef-
fect, Heraclitus forced a repeated homoioteleuton of -ien, which ends the four 
22 Isocr. Bus. 28.
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words ἱστορίην, ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, and finally κακοτεχνίην. Hence 
what is presented first as “inquiry,” ἱστορίην, is called “own wisdom,” ἑαυτοῦ 
σοφίην, which is nothing more than the accumulation of knowledge, πολυμαθίην, 
and “artful knavery,” κακοτεχνίην. It remains to be seen whether, as we showed 
for the three previous words, ἱστορίην, σοφίην, and πολυμαθίην, there are also 
indications in earlier sources that can explain what Pythagoras’ practice of 
κακοτεχνίην may have actually been.
In order to give an answer to this controversial issue we must keep in mind 
that Diogenes Laertius cited Heraclitus’ fragment in an attempt to clarify whether 
Pythagoras had written any books. Against this possibility, Heraclitus suggests 
that Pythagoras rather selected among “these” books to confect his own wisdom, 
which was no more than the accumulation of knowledge and artful knavery. Dio-
genes added two reports to illustrate the possible ground for this accusation: ac-
cording to Aristoxenus, Pythagoras took most of his ethical doctrines from The-
mistoclea,23 the Priestess of Delphi, and according to Ion of Chios, he attributed 
some of the writings he composed to Orpheus. Both pieces of information agree 
in linking Pythagoras to two names related to two highly relevant religions: The-
mistoclea, with Delphi and Apollo; Orpheus, with Orphism.
Regarding the latter, it is striking that Pythagoras appealed to Orpheus as 
the author of his supposed books. It is an uncontroverted fact that Orpheus is a 
mythical figure with no historical existence. However, due to the supernatural 
influence of his musical power over other beings, he attained a remarkable fame, 
as reflected in the fact that Ibycus, one of the earliest testimonies, referred to him 
as onomakliton Orphea, “Orpheus famous of name.”24
In this sense, it is worth noting that the habit of attributing books written by 
others to Orpheus is well attested, to the point – though this is no more than a 
conjecture – that what came to be known as “Orphism” could have originated 
precisely from the practice of attributing to him the authorship of books that, log-
ically, he could never have written. There are several testimonies to the existence 
of books supposedly authored by Orpheus. Euripides provides one in the scene 
in which Theseus scolds his son Hippolytus for dealing with “the smoke of many 
writings” attributed to Orpheus.25 The other is the very well known and often 
discussed passage in the Republic in which Plato denounces the sorcerers and 
charlatans, agyrtai kai manteis, who presented “a hubbub of books,” also attributed 
to Musaeus and Orpheus,26 in order to demonstrate that they possessed the su-
pernatural powers they preached.
23 Porph. VP 41.
24 Ibyc. 864 T Bernabé.
25 Eur. Hipp. 952–957.
26 Plat. Resp. 364b5–365a3. “The books ascribed to Orpheus must have been legion already in 
the fifth century,” Edmonds 2011, 53. 
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Could have Pythagoras been, as suggested by some scholars, one of the first to 
proceed in this way, attributing his own writings to Orpheus, as stated by Ion of 
Chios, and thus meriting Heraclitus’ criticism of practicing kakotechnie?27
In order to answer this question, we need to keep in mind, first, Pythagoras’ 
tendency to establish his direct relation with the gods or extraordinary figures, 
such as Apollo, Hermes, or Abaris. In the case of Orpheus, this link grew in time 
to the point that both figures, and the movements that they originated – Pythago-
rism and Orphism – became attached to each other. This progressive fusion was 
facilitated by the innovative introduction in Greece of the belief in the soul’s im-
mortality, which was associated, originally, with the names of Pythagoras and 
Orpheus.
Herodotus, in fact, provides some information that must be considered in rela-
tion to Pythagoras’ role in the elaboration and introduction of this idea to Greece. 
The Greek historian argues that the first to postulate the soul’s immortality were 
the Egyptians, from whom some Greeks, subsequently, took this notion and pre-
sented it as if it were theirs:
Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου 
ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος ἐς ἄλλο ζῷον 
αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται· ἐπεὰν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ χερσαῖα καὶ τὰ 
θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὖτις ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσδύνειν· 
τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι ἔτεσι. Τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ 
εἰσὶ οἳ Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ 
ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι· τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω.
The Egyptians were also the first to claim that the soul of a human being 
is immortal, and that each times the body dies the soul enters another 
creature just as it is being born. They also say that when the soul has made 
the round of every creature on land, in the sea, and in the air, it once more 
clothes itself in the body of a human being just as it is being born, and that 
a complete cycle takes three thousand years. This theory has been adopted 
by certain Greeks too – some from a long time ago, some more recently – 
who presented it as if it were their own. I know their names, but I will not 
write them down.28
Many scholars have argued that this passage must allude to Pythagoras because 
the description of the immortality of the soul coincides with what is considered to 
27 “Since there seems to be no good evidence for Orphic poetry before the time of Pythagoras, 
we should perhaps take seriously the judgment of those ancient critics who, in the fifth and 
fourth centuries BC, claimed that the poems ascribed to Orpheus were in fact composed by 
Pythagoras and his followers,” Kahn 2001, 20.
28 Hdt. 2.123. Trans. Selincourt / Burn.
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be his most basic acknowledged teaching.29 Moreover, its Egyptian provenience 
coincides with his renowned journey to Egypt,30 where, as confirmed by Isoc-
rates’ testimony, he acquired multifarious religious knowledge. However, even 
though these arguments are of great value to claim the identification of Pythag-
oras as the main candidate among the Greeks in the context of this presentation, 
it is decisive that Herodotus asserted that those who appropriated the Egyptian 
notion of the soul’s immortality presented it as if it were theirs. In fact, the ex-
pression that Herodotus used, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι, “as if it were their own,” is 
reminiscent of Heraclitus’ charge that Pythagoras constructed his own wisdom, 
ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, from his inquiries and compilation of others’ ideas 
and works, which was, thus, a demonstration that, indeed, he practised kakotech-
nie. It all seems to suggest that Herodotus, in contrast to Heraclitus, decided not 
to write down the names of those who presented the Egyptian notion of the soul’s 
immortality as theirs, to avoid exposing them.31
An additional passage by Herodotus, the earliest of the testimonies to linking 
the Orphics directly to the Pythagoreans, provides highly relevant information. 
Thus, when noting the Egyptians’ custom of not dressing with wool at religious 
ceremonies or being buried in it, because they did not consider it to be chaste, 
ὅσιον, he adds that in this they coincide with those “called” Orphic and Bacchic, 
but that they really are Egyptians and Pythagoreans. Herodotus added that there 
was a so-called sacred discourse, ἱρὸς λόγος, about these practices:
Ὁμολογέουσι δὲ ταῦτα τοῖσι Ὀρφικοῖσι καλεομένοισι καὶ Βακχικοῖσι, 
ἐοῦσι δὲ αἰγυπτίοισι, καὶ <τοῖσι> Πυθαγορείοισι· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτων τῶν 
ὀργίων μετέχοντα ὅσιόν ἐστι ἐν εἰρινέοισι εἵμασι θαφθῆναι. Ἔστι δὲ περὶ 
αὐτῶν ἱρὸς λόγος λεγόμενος.
They agree in this with practices called Orphic and Bacchic, which are in 
fact Egyptian and Pythagorean: for it is impious, too, for one partaking of 
these rites to be buried in woollen wrappings. There is a sacred discourse 
about this.
29 “What he (sc. Pythagoras) said to his followers no-one can say with assurance, for it was no 
ordinary silence that they kept. But what has become best known to everyone is, first, that 
the soul is immortal and furthermore changes into other kinds of animals… Pythagoras 
seems to have been the first to introduce these teachings into Greece,” Porph. VP 19. Trans. 
C. H. Kahn. “That Pythagoras taught the doctrine of metempsychosis is generally regarded, 
and rightly, as the one most certain fact in history of early Pythagoreanism,” Burkert 1972, 
120. Cf. Porph. VP 19.
30 “As early as Herodotus he (sc. Pythagoras) is connected with Egypt,” Burkert 1972, 112. 
31 On the other hand, we cannot discount the possibility that Herodotus’ refusal to write the 
names was an ironic allusion to the law of silence that Pythagoras imposed on his followers 
to stop them from divulging the knowledge he transmitted to them. On this issue see Cor-
nelli 2011, 192.
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Although there are two versions of this passage, depending on whether the in-
formation comes from the Florentine or the Roman manuscripts, we favour the 
latter. The information they offer is much better adjusted, as we have seen, to 
that reported by the other sources.32 Indeed, the Herodotean text offers a funda-
mental piece of information that supports the hypothesis that we are trying to 
defend in this presentation. Observe that Herodotus asserts that those “called,” 
καλεομένοισι, Orphic and Bacchic are really Egyptians and Pythagoreans. As 
other scholars have noted, the participle καλεομένοισι contrasts with the par-
ticiple ἐοῦσι and suggests that although the Orphics were known as such after 
the name of Orpheus, they “are” really Egyptians and Pythagoreans.33 Likewise, 
this association between Egyptians and Pythagoreans  –  in the light of the in-
formation we have already analysed  –  means that Egyptian knowledge about 
the soul’s immortality and religious ceremonies was learned and appropriated 
by Pythagoras and his followers. The fact that Herodotus added that there was 
a hiros logos about all of this seems to confirm, yet again, the possibility that Py-
thagoras had compiled these teachings in a sacred book, which, according to the 
testimony of Ion of Chios, he himself may have attributed to Orpheus. If this were 
the case, we would find ourselves facing a new manifestation of kakotechnie…
In time, this practice of using the name of Orpheus as the author of the Pythag-
orean writings would have engendered the belief that it was Orpheus personally 
who had taught Pythagoras, who, in turn, would have transcribed these teach-
ings as a sacred book, such as the one Herodotus mentioned. Thus Iamblichus 
argues “nor is it to be doubted that when Pythagoras composed his treatise Con-
cerning the Gods, he received assistance from Orpheus, on which account also he 
called it The Sacred Discourse, because it contains the flower of the most mystical 
place in Orpheus.”34 Based on Iamblichus’ testimony, Proclus adds that Pythag-
oras learned the doctrine transmitted by Orpheus “through arcane narrations” 
in Thrace from an initiate named Aglaophamus.35 Proclus’ testimony also adds 
that Pythagoras set out this wisdom in a hieros logos, a “sacred discourse,” and 
that through it “the wisdom of the gods arrived to the Greeks through the Orphic 
tradition.”36
Hence, the earliest testimonies about Pythagoras seem to confirm that the ac-
cusation of what Heraclitus qualified as kakotechnie could be related to the ap-
propriation of knowledge learned in Egypt about the soul’s immortality and di-
verse ritual practices, which would have ended up being compiled in a sacred 
32 The Florentine manuscripts simply read Ὁμολογέουσι δὲ ταῦτα τοῖσι Ὀρφικοῖσι 
καλεομένοισι καὶ Πυθαγορείοισι. For a detailed analysis of the problems of both texts, see 
Casadesús 1994.
33 How /  Wells 1928, 207; Linforth 1941, 42.
34 Iamb. VP 146 = OF 249 T.
35 On this issue see Brisson 2000.
36 Procl. 507 T Bernabé.
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discourse, a hiros logos, whose authorship, finally, would end up being attributed 
to Orpheus.
4 Other affinities between Pythagoras and Orpheus
Pythagoras’ knowledge was not limited to theoretical aspects. It also encom-
passed practical facets, whose actions suggest that Pythagoras followed the mod-
el offered by Orpheus’ extraordinary feats, including his journey to Hades. With 
regard to this, there is a striking story that Herodotus tells about Zalmoxis, one of 
Pythagoras’ slaves, who, after being freed by him, went to Thrace and preached 
the knowledge acquired from his master. To convince his listeners of the soul’s 
immortality – that it lives forever and that death is no more than a transitory 
moment – he built himself an underground dwelling where he spent three years. 
When the Thracians cried as if he had died, he reappeared during the fourth year, 
thus convincing them that all he asserted was true.37 Diogenes Laertius reports a 
similar action, though attributing it to Pythagoras, according to the information 
transmitted by Hermippus:
Pythagoras, on coming to Italy, made a subterranean dwelling and en-
joined on his mother to mark and record all that passed, and at what hour, 
and to send her notes down to him until he should ascend. She did so. 
Pythagoras some time afterwards came up withered and looking like a 
skeleton, then went into the assembly and declared he had been down to 
Hades, and even read out his experiences to them. They were so affected 
that they wept and wailed and looked upon him as divine.38
Leaving aside the more or less fantastic details of both stories, what stands out 
is that, as in the case of Orpheus, Pythagoras’ accomplishments were also related 
to his return journeys to Hades. As suggested by the sources, however, these 
were nothing more than tricks, a “fraudulent return from the underworld.”39 Such 
fraudulent actions inevitably raise the question again, as Heraclitus criticized, of 
whether these were yet another demonstration of Pythagorean kakotechnie.
In addition to his visits to the world of the dead it all suggests that Pythagoras 
elaborated an image very similar to that of the mythical Orpheus. Like Orpheus 
he used music for healing in the form of epodai or enchantments and, like the 
Thracian singer, Pythagoras possessed the capacity to communicate with ani-
mals to calm them. The similarity with Orpheus on this issue is so evident that 
Iamblichus argued that, “Pythagoras demonstrated that he possessed the same 
dominion as Orpheus over savage animals, and that he allured and detained 
them by the power of his voice.”40 However, given that this issue has already 
37 Hdt. 4.95.
38 D. L. 8.41. Trans. R. D. Hicks.
39 Kahn 2001, 12.
40 Iamb. VP 62. 
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been dealt with in extension another work that has just been published,41 we sim-
ply bring it up to conclude this presentation with the hypothesis that Pythagoras 
used the name of Orpheus not only to increase the prestige of his compilations 
and inquiries, but also to emulate the most characteristic traits of his peculiar and 
fascinating personality. However, all this effort to configure his own wisdom was 
nothing more, in Heraclitus’ opinion, than a misappropriation resulting from his 
dishonest practice of kakotechnie.
In any case, Heraclitus’ critical attitude must be understood as a reaction to Py-
thagoras’ novel and even revolutionary way of understanding science. His ascetic 
devotion to the search for all kinds of knowledge, without distinguishing the do-
main of religion from that of science, represented a radical change in the archaic 
conception of wisdom. Owing to his open and well travelled outlook, this sophia 
was transformed into philosophia. With his outlook, Pythagoras demonstrated 
that the richest and most productive way of advancing knowledge is inquiry, 
historie, into the whole set of human knowledge. Pythagoras, in sum, provided 
knowledge with a decisive thrust, showing that, in its broadest sense, it advances 
with everyone’s contribution, be it scientific or religious. His principal merit lies 
in his adoption of ancient forms of knowledge which he mixed, adapted, and 
transformed thus initiating the long path of what today we proudly call “science.”
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The Making of Pythagoreanism: 
Orpheus, Aglaophamus, Pythagoras, Plato
Luc Brisson – CNRS Paris
My goal here is to show that the image of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans that 
has come down to us was, throughout the ages, constructed from scratch by 
philosophers whose presuppositions became more and more clear as Platonism 
re-appropriated Pythagoreanism.1 By attributing its origins to a Pythagoreanism 
that itself depends on Orphism, Platonism established itself as the oldest and 
only true philosophical doctrine, for it depends on the word of the gods, who 
cannot lie. We can thus better understand how and why the scientific dimension 
of Pythagoreanism could have been gradually transferred to its religious dimen-
sion, particularly concerning numerology and the soul’s destiny. 
To provide a historically plausible image of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, 
scholars are faced with a gigantic sand-blasting job, consisting in analysing and 
evaluating the mass of late information, which did not cease to proliferate, as 
time went on, around an enigmatic personage and his followers. A cross-bred 
philosophical appropriation of Pythagoreanism by Platonism and of Platonism 
by Pythagoreanism explains this phenomenon. It is absolutely necessary to ac-
knowledge the importance and fruitfulness of this transfer in the history of West-
ern thought, but one should not confuse ideology and reality. In order to combat 
this confusion, I will appeal to the history of philosophy in Antiquity, and name-
ly to Iamblichus.
The title of the book by Walter Burkert, Weisheit und Wissenschaft, Studien zu Py-
thagoras, Philolaos und Platon, translated into English as Lore and Science in Ancient 
Pythagoreanism2 gives a good indication, it seems to me, of the main difficulty 
that recurs in all studies on Pythagoreanism. In Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism, 
what share shall we grant on the one hand to science, understood as coherent, 
stable knowledge relating to the sensible world, and on the other hand to religion, 
understood as the belief in the existence of beings who are not perceived in any 
way by the senses, but whose power is acknowledged and who are a cause for 
concern? This question is essential for determining the Pythagorean way of life. 
1 See for instance, Schofield (ed.) 2014. 
2 Burkert 1972. 
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Here are the positions I maintain on this subject: 
1)  As far as Pythagoras is concerned, we can say nothing certain, except about 
his existence, for doubt subsists even about the dates of his birth and death 
(580–490 BC).3
2)  Herodotus (480–420 BC),4 and some authors of the Middle Comedy (fourth c. 
BC)5 show that Pythagoreans were open to the influence of some religious 
traditions, particularly Orphism. But Plato (428–348 BC)6 and Aristotle (384–
322 BC)7 knew Pythagoreans living several decades after Pythagoras’ death, 
primarily for their scientific, philosophical, and even political activity.8 There 
was then a balance between religion and science.9
3)  Now, it was on the occasion of the revival of Pythagoreanism,10 in which the 
surrounding Middle Platonism was interested, that science and religion were 
to merge totally with one another,11 and Pythagoras became a sort of medium 
between gods and men.12
4)  Finally, Iamblichus (died in AD 325)13 established the “philosophical myth” 
which, connecting first Pythagoras to Orpheus, then Plato to Pythagoras, 
triggered among interpreters the conditioned reflex associating the name of 
Pythagoras with theological speculation on number and the soul, on reincar-
nation, and on recollection.14
1 Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the Early Empire
From the end of the first century BC and at the beginning of the Roman Empire, 
the dominant philosophy was Stoicism: it even pervaded the Platonism of the 
time, which was under the influence of a cultivated and eclectic Scepticism. In 
the face of this stoicized and aristotelianized Platonism, Platonists gradually felt 
the need for a philosophy that would appear as a means of coming to another 
order of reality: that of the intelligible realm and of the divine, which could be 
apprehended only by the soul. Thus, there occurred among the Platonists the re-
newal which has been called Middle Platonism and was represented by Plutarch 
 3 Brisson 2012, 97–107. 
 4 For an analysis of the decisive sentence of the passage (II 81), see Burkert 1972, 126–130. Some 
words seem to be interpolated in the passage.
 5 For a list of the fragments, see Burkert 1972, 198–199. And for a presentation, see Battezzato 
2008, 139–164.
 6 Brisson 2003; Huffmann 2013; Horky 2013. 
 7 Zhmud 2013; Casertano 2013.
 8 Brisson 1987a and 2013.
 9 Zhmud 2011. 
10 See for instance Schofield (ed.) 2014.
11 On this move, see Athanassiadi / Macris 2013. 
12 Macris 2003.
13 Brisson 2002. 
14 Bernabé 2013 and Casadesús 2013. 
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of Chaeronea, Atticus, Alcinous, and Numenius, who was the most aggressive 
against the New Academy.15
Shortly before the beginning of the Christian era, we find, for instance in Eu-
dorus and Philo of Alexandria, that Platonism gradually moves closer to Pythag-
oreanism, which itself was undergoing a renewal at the time.16 M. Baltes17 thought 
that the work of pseudo-Timaeus of Locri belonged to this trend, which seems to 
have promoted the production of other pseudo-Pythagorean works which were 
strongly influenced by Platonism. Be this as it may, it was in the course of this pe-
riod of time, close to the beginning of the Christian era, that most of the Neopy-
thagorean treatises were written.18 They were followed by the Neoplatonists. 
Longinus, Porphyry’s first master, has the following to say about them, in the 
Preface to his book On the End quoted by Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus:
Plotinus, it would seem, expounded the principles of Pythagorean and 
Platonic philosophy more clearly than anyone before him. The words of 
Numenius and Cronius and Moderatus and Thrasyllus come nowhere 
near the accuracy of Plotinus’ treatises on the same subject (Porphyry, Life 
of Plotinus, 20, 71–75, trans. A. H. Armstrong).
In addition, a close reading of the Life of Pythagoras leads one to conclude that Iam-
blichus possessed a library of these spurious writings, and that he subscribed to 
that synthesis of Platonism and Pythagoreanism19 which Plotinus and his assis-
tant Amelius,20 accused of plagiarizing Numenius, considered as going without 
saying. It was Iamblichus who, most probably using this literature, was to trans-
form the philosophy of Plato into a theology, by seeking the agreement of this 
theology with that of Orpheus, by way of Pythagoras.
2 Iamblichus: when philosophy became theology
Iamblichus was a philosopher of Syrian origin who lived in all probability be-
tween AD 240 and 325, and ran a School at Apamea. In this Syrian town, he may 
have been associated with the teaching of Amelius, the disciple of Plotinus, who 
himself had probably succeeded Numenius sometime later.
Iamblichus’ teaching at Apamea lasted throughout the first quarter of the 
fourth century, and his School was flourishing and animated. In particular, we 
know he had one very gifted student, Theodorus of Asine, who positioned him-
self as the Master’s rival. Theodorus remained under the influence of Numenius 
and Porphyry, and continued to defend the Plotinian thesis that one part of the 
soul does not descend into the world of generation. After Iamblichus’ death 
15 Numenius, frag. 27–28 des Places.
16 Staab 2009. 
17 Baltes 1972. 
18 The surviving fragments have been collected by Thesleff 1965. 
19 For a list, see Macris 2002.
20 On Amelius, see Brisson 1987b. 
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(around AD 325), Sopatros took over the succession at Apamea, while Aedesius 
founded a new school at Pergamum. This school must have been important, for 
it was there that, in AD 351, the future Emperor Julian had his first contact with 
Neoplatonism.
As a professor of philosophy, Iamblichus explained the canonical texts of Plato 
and Aristotle, year after year. His role in this area seems to have been, if not very 
original, then at least highly important for the development of the Neoplatonic 
schools. He seems to have elaborated the doctrine that each work to be comment-
ed upon, and in particular each Platonic dialogue, has one theme and one only, 
which is its scope (skopos), to which everything else must be referred. On the basis 
of this result, he proposed a reading order of Plato’s dialogues that led the disciple 
through the three traditional divisions of philosophy: ethics (Alcibiades I, Gorgias, 
Phaedo), logic (Cratylus, Theaetetus), and physics (Sophist, Statesman), in order to 
introduce him to the crown of these studies, theology (Phaedrus, Symposium), and 
even enable him to reach the summit of theology, the Good (Philebus). Last came 
the Timaeus and the Parmenides, which recapitulated all Plato’s teachings in the 
fields of physics and theology. This reading order, which Iamblichus must have 
followed in his teaching, was to be authoritative among all later Neoplatonists.21
A number of commentaries on the Platonic dialogues, all of which are unfor-
tunately lost, issued forth from his activity as a professor. However, we do have a 
few fragments of his commentary on the Timaeus, as well as of his commentaries 
on the Parmenides and the Phaedrus. The contents of his other commentaries are 
known to us only through remarks on details made by his successors: this is the 
case for Alcibiades I, the Phaedo, the Philebus and the Sophist.22
Iamblichus’ activity as a professor also led him to comment on the works of 
Aristotle, and commentaries by him on works by Aristotle are known (albeit less 
well than the commentaries on the Platonic dialogues), for instance on Aristotle’s 
Categories, Prior Analytics, the De interpretatione and even the De Caelo.23
As far as Plato is concerned, Iamblichus defended a radically new position 
in the interpretation he proposed of the hypotheses of the Parmenides, in which 
the Neoplatonists read the organization of the first principles. In order to ensure 
a place high in the hierarchy of the gods for the “superior beings,” he was led 
to raise up the entire hierarchy of the gods by one rank, and to transcend the 
limits of the Parmenides, since he was obliged to posit an ineffable god outside 
the hypotheses of the Parmenides. To refute Iamblichus’ position, Porphyry had 
to recourse to Plotinus. By producing a new edition of Plotinus’ work, organized 
according to the Plotinian and Porphyrian interpretation of the hypotheses of the 
Parmenides, Porphyry, at the very end of his life (around AD 301), tried to oppose 
to Iamblichus’ system − that is, to theurgy − the authority of the man who was his 
21 Festugière 1969. 
22 See Dillon (ed.) 1973. 
23 Larsen 1972. 
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master at Rome, Plotinus. In so doing, he remained faithful to Greek rationalism, 
as represented in particular by Plotinus.24 In order to understand Iamblichus’ ap-
proach, we must understand how he defined philosophy, and how he conceived 
of its history.
In the first paragraph of his Life of Pythagoras, intended to serve as an introduc-
tion to his ten-volume work On the Pythagorean School,25 Iamblichus writes: 
At the start of every philosophical investigation, it is after all the custom, at 
least for all who are sound-minded, to invoke God. But at the outset of that 
philosophy rightly believed to be named after the divine Pythagoras, it is 
surely all the more fitting to do this; for since this philosophy was at first 
handed down by the gods, it cannot be comprehended without the gods’ 
aid (Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, § 1, trans. J. M. Dillon / J. P. Hershbell).
For Iamblichus, Pythagorean philosophy, which consists above all in the study 
of the four mathematical disciplines of the quadrivium,26 is a mere preparation 
for the true philosophy, that of Plato. Its program is given in the Republic, and it 
culminates in the second part of the Parmenides, considered a veritable treatise on 
theology.27 To establish this line of attack, Iamblichus needed to link Pythagoras 
to a religious movement, which in this case happened to be Orphism. Let us see 
how he went about it.
Since philosophy is a gift from god, it is akin to a revelation. Iamblichus pres-
ents this revelation as the Sacred Discourse or the Sacred Discourse on the gods. Py-
thagoras does indeed present the philosophy he teaches as a revelation, about 
which he gives the following details:
If someone, then, wishes to learn whence these men (the Pythagoreans) re-
ceived such a degree of piety, it must be said that a clear model for Pythag-
orean theology according to number is found in (the writings of) Orpheus. 
It is certainly no longer doubtful that Pythagoras took his inspiration from 
Orpheus when he composed his treatise On Gods, which he also entitled 
the Sacred Discourse, since it sprang from the most mystic part of the Or-
phic corpus… It is certainly clear from this Sacred Discourse (or Discourse on 
the Gods, both titles exist) who gave Pythagoras the discourse on gods, for it 
says: This (discourse) is what I, Pythagoras son of Mnesarchus, learned on 
initiation in the Thracian Libethra, from Aglaophamus the initiator, who 
communicated to me that Orpheus, son of Calliope taught by his mother 
on Mt. Pangaeon, said: “The eternal being of number is a most provident 
principle of the whole heaven, earth, and of the intermediate nature; more-
24 Saffrey 1992. 
25 On this subject, see O’Meara 1989.
26 Hadot I. 1994.
27 See Saffrey / Westerink 1968. 
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over it is a source of permanence for divine (men) and gods and daemons” 
(Life of Pythagoras § 145–147, trans. J. M. Dillon / J. P. Hershbell).
The complicated explanations advanced by Iamblichus concerning the literary 
paternity of this Sacred Discourse [On Gods] and its transmission manifest a con-
cern to prove its authenticity.
Outside of Iamblichus, there exists in Antiquity no other testimony concerning 
a personage as important as Aglaophamus, except that of Proclus, who accepts 
the authenticity of pseudo-Timaeus of Locri, and believes that, when writing his 
Timaeus, Plato was following this Pythagorean model, which was either received 
as a gift, bought, or stolen28 when he went to Sicily and the South of Italy: 
It now remains to show what conceptions we ought to have of the Gods 
mentioned by Plato. For of the ancients, some related what is said about 
them to fables, others to the fathers of cities, others to guardian powers, 
others to ethical explanations, and others to souls. These however, are suf-
ficiently confuted by the divine Iamblichus, who demonstrates that they 
wander from the meaning of Plato, and from the truth of things. After this 
manner therefore, we must say that Timaeus, being a Pythagorean, follows 
the Pythagorean principles. But these are the Orphic traditions. For what 
Orpheus delivered mystically through arcane narrations, this Pythagoras 
learned, being initiated by Aglaophamus in the mystic wisdom which 
Orpheus derived from his mother Calliope. For these things Pythagoras 
says in the Sacred Discourse (Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus III, 167.32–
168.15, trans. Th. Taylor slightly modified after the French translation).
It is interesting to note the reaction of Christian August Lobeck (5/6/1781 – 
25/8/1860), who was a Professor at Königsberg for 46 years, beginning in 1814. His 
great work, Aglaophamus, sive de Theologiae musticae graecorum causis, published at 
Königsberg in 1829, in which he opposed Fr. Creuzer, whom he mocked by saying 
that Creuzer could find symbols under every rock, contains three parts, devoted 
respectively to the mysteries of Eleusis, the Orphic mysteries, and finally to the 
mysteries of Samothrace. Now, in this two-volume work that contains 1392 pages, 
Lobeck does not mention Aglaophamus until page 722, invoking the text by Iam-
blichus which we have just cited. He makes the following ingenuous comment: 
Si antiquiores hunc librum cognitum habuissent, certe major Aglaophami 
et orgiorum Libethriorum foret celebritas, quae ante Jamblichum nemo 
commemoravit.
The most modern computer tools confirm Lobeck’s observation. A search on the 
TLG (Thesaurus Linguae Graecae) shows that no occurrence of the name Agla-
ophamus is detectable in all of Greek literature prior to Iamblichus. The adjective 
28 For more specific information, see Swift Riginos 1976, 165–174.
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aglaophamos “of brilliant reputation” is attested only twice in all of Greek litera-
ture, as an epiclesis, said once of the Curetes [31.4] and again of the Muses [76.2] in 
the Orphic Hymns.29 It can thus be assumed that the character of Aglaophamus is a 
pure invention: perhaps we even owe it to Iamblichus, who was anxious to prove 
the existence of an objective link between Orpheus and Pythagoras. Alternative-
ly, Iamblichus may have been quoting a Neopythagorean pseudepigraphon, or 
perhaps he himself was responsible for the composition of that pseudepigraphon.
Let us return to Orpheus. Like all poets, Orpheus was inspired by the Muses, 
daughters of Zeus and of Mnemosyne (= Memory). In his case, this is all the more 
obvious in that he is the son of Calliope, the Muse whom Hesiod calls “the first 
one of all” (Theog. 79). In addition, Orpheus’ father is often given as Oeagros, a riv-
er of Thrace. One tradition30 will have it that the Libethran mountains,31 a moun-
tainous region of Thrace, were Orpheus’ fatherland. It was here that Pythagoras 
received his initiation into Orphism. In addition, it was on Mount Pangaeon, a 
Thracian mountain between Strymon and the sea, that Orpheus was supposed 
to have learned from his mother the essential elements of his doctrine. Since this 
was an initiation, we can understand that Orphic teaching transmitted esoteric 
doctrines. Pythagoras’ initiant was Aglaophamus, a personage that Iamblichus 
mentions for the first time. Whatever the content of this initiation, Pythagoras, 
who, like Orpheus, expressed himself in the Doric dialect (§ 243) and who exerted 
an influence over wild animals with his song (§ 62), was taught a doctrine that 
came directly from the gods, and which he had the mission of transmitting to 
mankind. Moreover, Pythagoras, like Orpheus, was associated with the nether 
world of Hades, where he descended and whence he returned. His power extend-
ed not only to animals, but even to natural forces. 
Pythagoras was supposed to have revealed the contents of these initiations in 
a work entitled the Sacred Discourse [on the gods].32 A brief glance at the remaining 
fragments of this work allows us to note the following three facts. 1) Iamblichus 
(died in AD 325) was the first to mention this work, in his Life of Pythagoras. 2) 
Syria nus (died in AD 437) alludes to it six times in his Commentary on the Meta-
physics. 3) The citations of the Sacred Discourse by Iamblichus and Syrianus allow 
29 References are to the edition by Quandt; see also Morand, A.-F. 2001. According to Johannes 
Lydus (Fragmenta incertae sedis 7, ed. Wünsch), one of the Sirens was named Aglaopheme: Ly-
dus claims to derive his information from Aristotle in the Peplos, an Orphic work whose 
authenticity is generally considered dubious. See also Eustathius, On the Odyssey, XI 167, XII 
12, and a scholium to Apollonius of Rhodes, IV 892.
30 This tradition is represented in particular by Strabo, Iamblichus VP § 28, Proclus. In Tim. III 
168.9–14 Diehl, and the Orphic Argonautica (v. 50 and 1373–1376).
31 There seems to have been confusion, whether conscious or unconscious, between these 
places in the tradition relative to Orpheus. Pausanias (9.30, 9–11) places Orpheus’ tomb at 
Libethra, a Boeotian city near Mount Helicon; there are also Libethran mountains in Boeotia 
(Pausanias 9.34, 3–4).
32 A prose pseudepigraphon written in the Dorian dialect, described by Holger Thesleff 1961, 
104–106. 
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us to recognize in it the statement of a theology of numbers, as well as a celebra-
tion of number as constituting the world.
3 The status of the soul
How can we explain, on a strictly philosophical level, Iamblichus’ approach, 
which sought to entrench philosophy in the tradition of the Mysteries, going back 
as far as Orpheus by way of Pythagoras? The answer to the first question seems to 
me to be as follows: Iamblichus refuted Plotinus’ thesis that an upper part of the 
soul remains among the intelligibles: 
For the soul is many things, that is all things, both the things above and 
the things below down to the limits of all life, and we are each one of us an 
intelligible universe, making contact with this lower world by the powers 
of soul below, but with the intelligible world by its powers above and the 
powers of the universe; and we remain with all the rest of our intelligible 
part above, but by its ultimate fringe we are tied to the world below, giving 
a kind of outflow from it to what is below, or rather an activity, by which 
that intelligible part is not itself lessened. (Enn. III 4 [15], 3.21–27, trans. 
A. H. Armstrong; see also V 1 [10], 3.1–3).
For Iamblichus, the soul is completely united to the body. This is the Aristotelian 
position, which implies another one: the soul’s salvation must necessarily come 
from elsewhere, and in particular from theurgy,33 as Iamblichus explains in these 
lines: 
Granting, then, that ignorance and deception are faulty and impious, it 
does not follow from this that the offerings made to the gods and divine 
works are invalid, for it is not pure thought that unites theurgists to the 
gods. Indeed what, then, would hinder those who are theoretical philos-
ophers from enjoying a theurgic union with the gods? But the situation is 
not so: it is the accomplishment of acts not to be divulged and beyond all 
conception, and the power of the unutterable symbols, understood solely 
by the gods, which establishes theurgic union. Hence, we do not bring 
about these things by intellection alone; for thus their efficacy would be 
intellectual, and dependent upon us. But neither assumption is true (De 
myst. II 11, 96.13–97.4, trans. E. C. Clarke / J. M. Dillon / J. P. Hershbell).
33 Basing himself on Cremer 1969, Hadot 1978 gives the following definition of theurgy, as 
opposed to magic: “One may speak of the utilization by the theurgist of certain magical 
practices, but they are integrated within an approach that is radically different from magic. 
For theurgy is an operation in which it is the gods that give divine efficacy to human action, 
so that human action receives its meaning because of a divine action and initiative. It would 
be interesting, in this perspective, to compare the Christian theology of the sacraments and 
the Neoplatonic theology of the theurgical operation,” 719.
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The truth can be reached only as the result of a revelation dispensed by the gods 
themselves, who thus contribute a remedy for human weakness, and it is ritual 
that enables us to achieve it. Yet how can such a conception of philosophy as 
revelation find its justification within Plato’s work itself? An answer to this ques-
tion presupposes a highly tendentious interpretation of two passages from the 
Phaedrus concerning madness.34
For Plato, madness is defined as a deviation from the normal behavior and 
customs of a given human group. This deviation may be due either to human 
illnesses or to a divine impulse. In the first case, the human being’s behavior is 
transformed because he accedes to a higher domain, that of the gods: we can then 
say that the human being is mad, but his madness lets him accede to a higher 
level of reality. In the Phaedrus, four levels of “divine” madness are distinguished.
Socrates. And [we said] that there are two kinds of madness, one produced 
by human illness, the other by a divinely inspired release from normally 
accepted behavior.
Phaedrus. Certainly.
Socrates. We also distinguished four parts within the divine kind and con-
nected them to four gods. Having attributed the inspiration of the prophet 
to Apollo, of the mystic to Dionysus, of the poet to the Muses, and the 
fourth part of madness to Aphrodite and to Eros, we said that the madness 
of Eros is the best. We used a certain sort of image to describe erotic pas-
sion; perhaps it had a measure of truth in it, though it may also have led 
us astray. And having whipped up a not altogether implausible speech we 
sang playfully, but also appropriately and respectfully, a story-like hymn 
to my master and yours, Phaedrus – to Eros, who watches over beautiful 
goods (Plato, Phaedrus 265a–b, trans. A. Nehamas / P. Woodruff).
Socrates explains in this passage that the amorous madness he attributes to Aph-
rodite and to Eros is situated in a quite particular context: that of philosophy. In 
this context, love consists not in seeking and possessing beautiful bodies, but 
in moving from a beautiful body to a beautiful soul, in order to succeed once 
again in remembering the contemplation of the intelligible, to which the human 
soul devoted itself exclusively before falling into a body. This is why amorous 
madness is considered as the best, for in fact it corresponds to the practice of phi-
losophy. In this passage from the Phaedrus, philosophy is, to be sure, associated 
with a divine madness, such as divination, initiation, and poetry, but Plato does 
not place it on the same level as the three others, for two reasons. 1) Whereas 
divination, the practice of initiation, and poetry introduce human beings into the 
world of the gods, they do not allow them to accede to the contemplation of the 
intelligible. 2) While these practices allow a passive attitude on the part of human 
34 Phaedrus 245b–c and especially 265a–b.
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beings, philosophy appears on the contrary as a constant apprenticeship of death, 
or the liberation of the soul with regard to the body, with a view to acceding to the 
contemplation of the Intelligible. This passage from the Phaedrus attracted Iam-
blichus’ attention in Book III of his On the Mysteries of Egypt, when, after having 
inquired into the causes of divine madness (chapter 8), he evokes music (chapter 
9), initiations (chapter 10), and divination (chapter 11).
Insofar as, at the beginning of the Life of Pythagoras, Iamblichus insists on the 
fact that philosophy was taught at the beginning by the gods, that it is impos-
sible to grasp it otherwise than by their intervention, and that no human effort 
gives access to it, even progressively, he places philosophy, poetry, divination, 
and initiation on the same level. This is also true as far as the person of Pythag-
oras is concerned. Pythagoras’ relations with poetry, in which verse and music 
are mixed, are frequent.35 Pythagoras was associated with divination to a much 
greater extent than Orpheus.36 Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans accorded a great 
deal of attention to the mystic inspiration that is manifested in ceremonies of 
initiations to the Mysteries, with which philosophy is associated.37 We find the 
vocabulary of the Mysteries throughout the Life of Pythagoras.
Iamblichus takes up all these themes, whose slow emergence can be followed 
from the renewal of Platonism and Pythagoreanism at the beginning of the 
Christian era, and gives them a true coherence for the first time. The end result is 
a “philosophical myth,” that of Pythagoras’ initiation into the Orphic Mysteries 
through the intermediary of Aglaophamus, which was to be taken up and re-
fined by all the later Neoplatonists, particularly those of the School of Athens, for 
whom philosophy culminates in the second part of Plato’s Parmenides, interpreted 
as a treatise on theology. In the context of this grandiose ascent towards the di-
vine, the role of Pythagoras remained, following Aglaophamus, that of the “ini-
tiant,” as Iamblichus tried to portray him in this veritable “philosophical myth” 
which, at the same time as it justified this watershed of Platonism, explained the 
philosophical orientation of the School of Athens, in which science and theology 
became indistinguishable. 
4 The school of Athens and after
At the beginning of his Platonic Theology, Proclus provides a broad outline of the 
entire history of philosophy, in essential conformity with the position of Iambli-
chus:
35 According to Iamblichus, his father entrusted Pythagoras to the Homerid Creophylus 
(VP § 9); he uses the Iliad (VP § 39, 63, 217) and the Odyssey (VP § 255) in his School. He also 
uses music to cure illnesses (§ 110).
36 Pythagoras was associated with divination: that of Delphi, to be sure (VP § 82, 152), but all the 
others as well (VP § 25, 65, 106, 138, 149, 216). He practised divination by numbers (VP § 147); 
this is why the Pythagoreans honoured divination as much as music and medicine.
37 Iamblichus makes generous use of the vocabulary of the Mysteries to speak of philosophy 
(VP § 1, 14, 31, 72, 74, 75, 76, 90, 91, 92, 103, 104, 138, 151, 226, 227, 258).
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These exegetes of the Platonic contemplation (epopteia), who have unfold-
ed to us sacred narrations of divine principles because they [the exegetes] 
were allotted a nature similar to their leader [Plato], I should determine 
to be the Egyptian Plotinus and those who received the tradition of this 
doctrine from him. I mean Amelius and Porphyry, together with those in 
the third place who were their disciples and who attained such perfection 
that we could compare them to statues, viz.: Iamblichus and Theodorus of 
Asine, and any others who, after these, entered this divine choir to raise 
their own thoughts to the level of the Bacchants. From these, he who, after 
the gods, has been our guide to everything beautiful and good, receiving 
in an undefiled manner the most genuine and pure light of truth in the 
bosom of his soul, made us a partaker in all of Plato’s philosophy, made us 
into his companions in the traditions he received in secret from those more 
ancient than he, and mostly made us a part of the choir of those singing 
the mystical truth of divine principles (Platonic Theology I 1, 6. 16–7.8 Saf-
frey / Westerink, trans. Thomas Taylor slightly modified after the French 
translation).
The postulate on which the School of Athens was founded was that Plato was a 
theologian. This postulate determines a twofold task: to extricate this theology 
from Plato’s work, showing that it agrees with all the other theologies: of Pythag-
oras, of the Chaldaean Oracles, of Orpheus, and of Homer and Hesiod. Whether 
applied to philosophy or to poetry, the interpreter’s task was assimilated to that 
of the mystagogue who guides the postulant towards initiation and epopteia in 
the mysteries.
With regard to the relations that philosophy must maintain with myths, the 
School of Athens continued along the same path as Plotinus and Porphyry, who 
were inspired in particular by Numenius and Cronius. However, both in the field 
of philosophy and in that of mythology, the approach of the School of Athens was 
much more systematic. In addition, the Chaldaean Oracles and the Orphic Rhap-
sodies here replaced the poems of Homer and Hesiod, which were however not 
entirely neglected as a reservoir of myths.
For Proclus, the stages are clearly marked. 1) First comes Plotinus, then 2) those 
who received the Neoplatonic doctrine from him, Amelius and Porphyry, 3) their 
disciples, Iamblichus and Theodore of Asine; finally, 4) Proclus’ own master Syri-
anus. The “others” to whom he refers are in particular Priscus and Iamblichus II, 
who trained Plutarch of Athens, who, at the turn of the fourth–fifth centuries BC, 
was the first scholarch to give the School of Athens the philosophical orientation 
it was to maintain down to Damascius.38
38 On this subject, see Saffrey / Westerink 1968, XXVI–XLVIII. One may also consult the work 
by Taormina 1989.
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Taking up a tradition that accused Plato of plagiarizing39 the Pythagoreans, 
but reversing it, since he intends to show Plato’s originality with regard to the 
doctrine on which he is dependent, Proclus establishes a link between Plato’s 
Timaeus and the famous treatise On Nature, attributed to Timaeus of Locri, which 
he regards not as a spurious writing, but as an original work dating from the fifth 
century,40 which he supposes to have inspired Plato to write his dialogue.
At the very beginning of his Commentary on the Timaeus, Proclus writes: 
It seems to me to be glaringly clear to all who are not utterly blind to se-
rious literature that the aim of the Platonic Timaeus is firmly fixed upon 
the whole of physical inquiry, and involves the study of the All, dealing 
with this from beginning to end. Indeed, the Pythagorean Timaeus’ own 
work has the title On nature in the Pythagorean manner. This was, in the 
sillographer’s41 word, [the point] “from which Plato began when he under-
took to do ‘Timaeus-writing’.” We use this work as an introduction to our 
commentary, so that we should be able to know which of the claims of 
Plato’s Timaeus are the same, which are additional, and which are actually 
in disagreement with the other man’s − and make a point of searching 
for the reason for the disagreement. This whole dialogue, throughout its 
entire length, has physical inquiry as its aim, examining the same matters 
simultaneously in images and in paradigms, in wholes and in parts. It has 
been filled throughout with all the finest rules of physical theory, tackling 
simples for the sake of complexes, parts for the sake of wholes, and im-
ages for the sake of their originals, leaving none of the originative causes 
of nature outside the scope of the inquiry. (Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus, I, 1.1–23, trans. H. Tarrant).
This objective link, which associates Plato with Pythagoreanism by way of Ti-
maeus of Locri, is extended by what Proclus says in Book III of his Commentary 
on the Timaeus, into a link between Pythagoreanism and Orphism. Moreover, the 
indications he gives concerning the Orphic theology − six reigns in succession, 
those of Phanes, Night, Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus, and Dionysos − make it clear, in-
dependently of all historical considerations, that for Proclus, Pythagoras was fa-
miliar with the dynasty of gods that play a role in the Sacred discourses in 24 rhapso-
39 On these accusations of plagiarism, see Brisson 2000, 
40 For an edition with translation of this opuscule, see Marg 1972, Baltes 1972, and Tobin 1985. 
See also Centrone 1982.
41 Timon of Phlius (325–235 BC), a sceptic philosopher, follower first of Stilpo and then of Pyr-
rho, who wrote Satires (Sílloi) in dactylic hexameters against the dogmatic philosophers, one 
of whom was Plato. There were also other anecdotes accusing Plato of having plundered the 
Pythagoreans to write the Timaeus, see above note 28. 
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dies, attributed to Orpheus.42 Such a conviction also allows us to understand why a 
Hymn to number43 was attributed to Orpheus, of which Proclus cites several verses.
It was thus through the intermediary of Timaeus of Locri that Plato became 
familiar with the Pythagorean principles, which were in fact Orphic principles; 
since Pythagoras was initiated into the doctrines of Orpheus by Aglaophamus 
and since Plato was under the influence of Pythagoras, metaphysics and religion 
converge.
This interpretation, in which Pythagoreanism and Platonism were insepara-
ble, and rooted in Orphic theology, was to be considered canonical in the Byzan-
tine world, which, through the intermediary of Marsilio Ficino, transmitted it to 
the Renaissance West. This was the image that was taken up or combated by the 
first German historians of philosophy in the course of the eighteenth century.44 In 
short, the polemics over the dividing line between science and religion in Pythag-
oras and in Pythagoreanism must be solved on the basis of a study of the history 
of philosophy in Antiquity, of which Iamblichus is the culmination.
At the beginning of the Roman Empire, the Platonists rejected probabilism, which 
the Old Academy had used against the Stoics, to come closer to thinkers who pro-
moted a new form of Pythagoreanism associated with various religious trends, 
one of which was Orphism. Theology and numerology then occupied the first 
rank, and what became decisive was the care of a soul that featured a harmonic 
structure, had experienced a previous existence before coming into a body, and 
was to move into another body after the death of the one it then inhabited. Yet the 
care of the soul demanded a life that was very strict on the ethical level, and ex-
hibited great solidarity on a political level. This is why the Pythagoreans defend-
ed their identity by renouncing writing as much as was possible, and utilizing a 
language with double meanings, which made use of enigmas, symbols, and pass-
words. This overall image of Pythagoreanism owed more to phantasms than to 
reality, but it was this image which was inherited by Platonism and it transformed 
Pythagoreanism by a kind of feedback effect. Iamblichus put an end to this two-
fold transfer by means of the lineage of Orpheus-Pythagoras-Plato in a philosoph-
ical context, in which the soul rises back up toward the higher divinity from which 
it comes, not as a result of the abilities of its intellect, but through the practice 
of religious rites. This transfer was considered canonical first in the Neoplatonic 
school at Athens and Alexandria, then in the Byzantine world, which, through the 
intermediary of Marsilio Ficino, was transmitted to the Renaissance West. 
This transfer is the source of the retrospective reading of Plato described in this 
paper, and according to which Pythagoras was initiated in the Mysteries of Or-
pheus, and Plato was inspired by Pythagorean doctrine when he wrote the Timaeus.
42 On the problem raised by the relations between the various versions of the theogonies at-
tributed to Orpheus, see the “Introduction” to Brisson 1995. 
43 O. Kern, OT 32, OF 309–317 = 20V F et 695–704 T Bernabé. 
44 Tigerstedt 1974. 
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Philolaus on the Soul
Richard McKirahan – Pomona College Claremont
This paper is part of a larger project to expound and explore Philolaus’ views on 
the nature of reality, harmonia, number, and knowledge, and their interrelations. 
On my view, Philolaus the Pythagorean proposed a theory of the structure of 
entities that brought Pythagorean thought up to date after a period in which it 
had lagged behind the sophisticated philosophical developments of the late fifth 
and early fourth centuries BC. Rejecting the doctrine of metempsychosis and the 
numerology characteristic of earlier Pythagorean thought, Philolaus conceived of 
a philosophically sophisticated way to comprehend existing things as products of 
limiters and unlimiteds (a view whose influence is evident in Plato’s later work) 
and a generalization of the concept of number that guaranteed that the world and 
its constituents are intelligible and that their being and intelligibility is strictly 
dependent on their numerical essence.
I have discussed Philolaus’ metaphysical theory elsewhere in conjunction 
with his generalized conception of harmonia as essentially involving number con-
ceived in his new way.1 The previous study concentrated on fragments B1–B6a. 
In the present paper I extend my previous analysis to encompass the soul. I main-
tain here that Philolaus regarded the soul as a harmonia in the sense developed 
in the fragments mentioned above. I shall discuss three sources of information 
relevant to Philolaus’ view on the nature of the soul. First are the fragments B1, 
B2, B6, and B6a, which present Philolaus’ theory of the nature and composition of 
existing things. In Part 1 I will give a very brief sketch of this theory. Since else-
where he speaks of the soul as something that exists, considering it in the light of 
this metaphysical theory should help us understand his view on the nature of the 
soul. Second is the passage in Plato’s Phaedo that refers to Philolaus and the pas-
sage where Philolaus’ pupil Simmias sets out the view that the soul is a harmonia. 
In Part 2 I look at Simmias’ view in the light of Philolaus’ metaphysical theory, in 
which harmonia plays a crucial role, and I argue that there is no incompatibility, 
and that the context strongly indicates that the view which Simmias sets out is 
due to Philolaus. Third are two fragments of Philolaus (B13 and B14) that mention 
the soul. In Part 3 I argue that both fragments are compatible with the results of 
the preceding discussion.
1 I have discussed these matters in McKirahan 2011 and McKirahan 2013.
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1 Philolaus’s theory of the structure of reality
In fragments B1, B2, and B6 Philolaus provides a brief and highly abstract sketch 
of his theory of the nature of reality. In B6a he provides an illustrative example: 
a lyre tuned to play notes arranged according to certain intervals of pitch (an 
octave, and a fifth, and a fourth).2
B1: ἁ φύσις δ’ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἁρμόχθη ἐξ ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων καὶ 
ὅλος <ὁ> κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα.
Nature in the kosmos was joined from both unlimiteds and limiters, and 
the entire (kosmos) and all the things in it.
B1 identifies two kinds of principles (unlimiteds and limiters) and three kinds of 
things formed from the principles (nature in the kosmos, the entire kosmos and all 
the things in the kosmos). It says that these three kinds of products are “joined” 
(ἁρμόχθη) from both unlimiteds and limiters.
B2: ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα ἢ περαίνοντά 
τε καὶ ἄπειρα· ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐκ ἀεί. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὔτ’ ἐκ 
περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα οὔτ’ ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δῆλον τἆρα ὅτι ἐκ 
περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη. 
δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐντοῖς ἔργοις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ περαινόντων 
περαίνοντι, τὰ δ’ ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων περαίνοντί τε καὶ οὐ 
περαίνοντι, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀπείρων ἄπειρα φανέονται.
It is necessary that the things that are be all either limiters or unlimiteds 
or both limiters and unlimiteds; but not in all cases only unlimiteds. Now 
since it is evident that they are neither from things that are all limiters 
nor from things that are all unlimiteds, it is therefore clear that both the 
kosmos and the things in it were joined together from both limiters and 
unlimiteds. The behavior of these things in turn makes it clear. For those 
of them that are from limiters limit, those that are from both limiters and 
unlimiteds both limit and do not limit, and those that are from unlimiteds 
will evidently be unlimited.
B2 calls both the principles and their products “things that are” (τὰ ἐόντα) and 
argues that two of these three kinds of products (the kosmos and the things in the 
kosmos) are joined together (συναρμόχθη) from both kinds of principles. B2 says 
nothing about the third kind of product, “nature in the kosmos;” that is reserved 
for B6.
B6: (1) περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἁρμονίας ὧδε ἔχει· (2) ἁ μὲν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἀίδιος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μὰν ἁ φύσις θείαν τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνην 
ἐνδέχεται γνῶσιν (3) πλάν γα ἢ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ’ ἦν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐόντων 
2 See references in n. 1.
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καὶ γιγνωσκομένων ὑφ’ ἁμῶν γα γεγενῆσθαι (4) μὴ ὑπαρχούσας τᾶς 
ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων 
καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων. (5) ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπᾶρχον οὐχ ὁμοῖαι οὐδ’ ὁμόφυλοι 
ἔσσαι, ἤδη ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ἁρμονία ἐπεγένετο 
ᾡτινιῶν ἂν τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. (6) τὰ μὲν ὦν ὁμοῖα καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἁρμονίας 
οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ ἰσοταχῆ, ἀνάγκα 
τὰ τοιαῦτα ἁρμονίᾳ συγκεκλεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι.
(1) Concerning nature and harmonia this is how it is: (2) the being (ἐστώ) of 
things, which is eternal – that is, in fact, their very nature – admits knowl-
edge that is divine and not human, (3) except that it was impossible for any 
of the things that are and are known by us, to have come to be (4) if there 
did not exist the being (ἐστώ) of the things from which the kosmos is consti-
tuted – both the limiters and the unlimiteds. (5) But since the principles are 
not similar or of the same kind, it would be completely impossible for them 
to be brought into order if harmonia had not come upon them in whatever 
way it did. (6) Now things that are similar and of the same kind have no 
need of harmonia to boot, but those that are dissimilar and not of the same 
kind or of the same speed must be connected together in harmoniai if they 
are going to be kept in an orderly arrangement (kosmos).
B6 speaks of the “being” (ἐστώ) of things and identifies it with their “very na-
ture.” Here Philolaus explains the relation between “being” and harmonia. Things 
that are and that we know (that is, the kosmos and the things in the kosmos) could 
not have come to be if there did not exist the “being” of the limiters and unlim-
iteds from which the kosmos is constituted. But since limiters and unlimiteds are 
different in kind from one another, they could not have been brought into order 
or kept in an orderly arrangement (κοσμηθῆναι) if harmonia had not come upon 
them.
The “being,” or nature, of a thing I take to be something like what Aristotle 
would call its essence (τὸ εἶναι or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). We might say that what makes me 
a human being is that I have certain material parts that function in certain ways. 
For Philolaus, anything that is (an ἐόν) is constituted of unlimiteds and limiters 
preserved in an orderly arrangement by being connected together in harmoniai. 
The “being” of that thing – what makes it the thing that it is – is determined by 
the unlimiteds, the limiters, and the harmoniai that constitute it.
This is true both for what Aristotle would call universals and for what he 
would call particulars. In general human beings are composed of lungs, hands, 
etc. and each individual human is composed of two individual lungs, two indi-
vidual hands, etc. For Philolaus, whatever the limiters and unlimiteds that com-
bine to form humans may be, individual instances of those same limiters and un-
limiteds will combine to form an individual human. The nature of the harmoniai 
in both cases will be the same.
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B6 informs us that the “being” of things is eternal. This does not mean that 
the things themselves are eternal. What is eternal is what it is for anything to be 
the kind of thing that it is. For a lyre to be tuned in a certain way is, among other 
things, for the pitches of the notes played by the strings to have certain relation-
ships. This always holds whether or not a given lyre is in tune, and it always holds 
regardless of whether any lyres exist at a given moment, or whether any existing 
thing is tuned in precisely that way.
B6a:3 ἁρμονίας δὲ μέγεθός ἐστι συλλαβὰ καὶ δι’ ὀξειᾶν· τὸ δὲ δι’ ὀξειᾶν 
μεῖζον τᾶς συλλαβᾶς ἐπογδόῳ. ἔστι γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας ἐπὶ μέσσαν 
συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσσας ἐπὶ νεάταν δι’ ὀξειᾶν, ἀπὸ δὲ νεάτας ἐς τρίταν 
συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάταν δι’ ὀξειᾶν. τὸ δ’ ἐν μέσῳ μέσσας καὶ 
τρίτας ἐπόγδοον, ἁ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ δὲ δι’ ὀξειᾶν ἡμιόλιον, τὸ 
διὰ πασᾶν δὲ διπλόον. οὕτως ἁρμονία πέντε ἐπόγδοα καὶ δύο διέσιες, δι’ 
ὀξειᾶν δὲ τρία ἐπόγδοα καὶ δίεσις, συλλαβὰ δὲ δύ’ ἐπόγδοα καὶ δίεσις.
The magnitude of the harmonia is the fourth plus the fifth. The fifth is 
greater than the fourth by a 9:8 ratio. For from the lowest string to the sec-
ond string is a fourth, and from the second string to the highest string is 
a fifth, but from the highest string to the third string is a fourth, and from 
the third string to the lowest string is a fifth. What is between the third 
string and the second string is a 9:8 ratio; the fourth has a 4:3 ratio, the fifth 
a 3:2 ratio, and the octave a 2:1 ratio. Thus the harmonia is five 9:8 ratios plus 
two half tones, the fifth is three 9:8 ratios plus one half-tone, and the fourth 
two 9:8 ratios plus one half-tone.
The tuned lyre is the example Philolaus uses in B6a to illustrate the nature of har-
monia. How he might analyse something more complex, such as a human being, 
into limiters, unlimiteds and harmoniai is not easy to discern. In what follows I try 
to understand part of this puzzle on the hypothesis that Philolaus considered the 
soul to be the harmonia that constitutes the appropriate limiters and unlimiteds 
as a living creature.
2 Soul as harmonia
Plato mentions Philolaus by name only twice, both times in a single brief pas-
sage of the Phaedo (61d7, e7) where Cebes and Simmias, who had associated with 
him in Thebes, declare that he had said that it is not right to take one’s own life, 
but that he had not clarified his position. They ask Socrates to account for this 
view. Socrates, who had not himself heard Philolaus speak on that subject, then 
proceeds to give a justification for the prohibition on suicide, saying that this 
justification is given “in the mysteries”4 (62b–c); Socrates does not say that it was 
3 I have discussed this fragment at length in McKirahan 2011 and McKirahan 2013.
4 The translations of extracts from the Phaedo are based on Grube 1997.
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held by Philolaus. On this account we are the possessions of the gods, it is wrong 
for us to destroy ourselves without the gods’ permission, and they will punish 
us if we do. Thus, Socrates’ account of the ban on suicide depends on certain 
religious views not otherwise known to have been held by Philolaus. It is possi-
ble that they were held by Pythagoreans, but this passage cannot be considered 
evidence of this, let alone as evidence that Philolaus held those views. Conclusion 
so far: we do not know on what grounds Philolaus argued against suicide. Since 
reasons can be given against killing oneself that are neither religious nor phil-
osophical, we cannot say whether the recommendation stems from Philolaus’s 
general metaphysical theory. If (as I shall propose) Philolaus believes that individ-
ual souls are mortal, our single life may appear more precious than if we can just 
decide to stop at any point, commit suicide, start over again, and enjoy a new life 
from the beginning – and that is one reason against suicide.
Later in the dialogue these two former pupils of Philolaus present objections 
to Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul. Each of the two men pres-
ents an analogy which, if valid, will undermine if not positively refute the im-
mortality thesis. The analogy that concerns us is the one proposed by Simmias 
(85e–86d). 
By this point of the dialogue Socrates has divided entities into two classes: 
Forms and sensibles. Sensibles are tangible and perceptible by the other senses, 
while Forms are invisible and can be grasped by the soul. The Forms are eternal 
and imperishable, while the sensibles are temporary and perishable. In what is 
known as the Affinity Argument, Socrates declares the body to be akin to the 
sensibles, while the soul, which is invisible, is like the Forms, therefore immortal. 
Simmias then says (85e) that the same argument could be made in connection 
with harmonia, lyre, and strings. Harmonia, which is invisible, is present in a tuned 
lyre, but if the wood and the strings that make up the lyre are damaged or de-
stroyed the harmonia of the lyre perishes. In fact, it typically perishes before the 
wood and strings of the lyre are utterly destroyed. Why, then, should we consider 
the invisible soul more permanent than the invisible harmonia of a body? The 
analogy with the lyre suggests that so far from being immortal the soul may ac-
tually perish before the body.
So far we have just an analogy: the soul is in certain respects like the harmonia 
of a tuned lyre. Simmias has not declared that he believes the soul in fact is a har-
monia, let alone that Philolaus held this view. But in what follows Simmias does 
subscribe to this belief, saying, “we suppose the soul to be precisely something 
of this kind, just as our body is stretched and held together by the hot and the 
cold, the dry and the moist and other such things, our soul is the mixture and 
harmonia of those things when they are mixed with each other rightly and in due 
measure” (86b5–c2). And he asserts that if the soul is in fact a harmonia it is per-
ishable (86c2–5).
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Later in the dialogue Socrates takes up Simmias’ point that the soul must be 
perishable if it is a harmonia of the constituents of the body. He restates it with 
approval (91e5–92c10) and goes on to argue that if the soul is a harmonia it nec-
essarily lacks other characteristics of the soul. Three characteristics, in fact. First 
(92e4–93a10), a harmonia is dependent on its material constituents. It does not rule 
its material constituents but is ruled by them, whereas the soul rules the body 
and is not ruled by it (80a). Second (93a11–e3), things can be more or less fully 
harmonized, but souls cannot be more or less completely souls: an imbalance of 
bodily constituents may account for sickness, but if a soul is a harmonia, then it is 
destroyed immediately the harmonia is lost. Third (93e4–94b3), the harmonia the-
ory cannot account for differences in character, which reside in the soul. If every 
soul is fully harmonized, every person should be fully virtuous.
What are we to make of this? In the first place it is clear that Simmias initially 
maintains the harmonia theory (86b) with its implication, which he himself draws, 
that the soul is mortal (86c–d), and also that he abandons it (92d–e) when he sees 
that it conflicts with Socrates’ Recollection Argument (73b–77a), which he finds 
well founded and entirely convincing. So Socrates wins Simmias over to his view, 
and having done so goes on to bring further arguments against the harmonia the-
ory. 
Why does he make these further arguments? I propose two reasons. First, be-
cause as things stand, the harmonia theory could still be accepted as true by any-
one who is not as convinced as Simmias by the Recollection Argument. And there 
may well have been such people. After all the assumption on which the argument 
is based, which Simmias found so convincing, is the theory of Forms, which was 
introduced and accepted without any argument (76d–e). This gives Socrates a 
strong motive to show that the harmonia theory of the soul is unacceptable on 
other grounds. The second reason for these additional arguments is to point out 
that the harmonia theory gives no account of what Socrates considers important 
functions of the soul: to rule the body and to be the seat of one’s moral character. 
The idea that the soul is a harmonia of the material constituents of the body is un-
acceptable because it does not provide any way to account for these further roles.
If we regard Simmias as initially presenting Philolaus’ theory and subsequent-
ly abandoning it, by the same reasoning we can suppose that Philolaus, who had 
not been confronted by Socrates, did not abandon his own theory. An advantage 
of having Simmias present it as something that he himself believes is that he can 
be shown abandoning it when he finds it in conflict with the arguments Socrates 
presents.
But is there any good reason to suppose that Philolaus maintained the harmo-
nia theory? This has been denied by many and remains a controversial question. 
In my view there are two considerations that tell in favour of this view. First, the 
first person plural in Simmias’ assertion that, “we suppose the soul to be pre-
cisely something of this kind” (86b6–7). The “we” must refer at least to Simmias 
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and Cebes,5 but neither of these two men is presented as an original thinker,6 and 
Simmias does not claim to have been the author of the theory. Thus it seems likely 
that the “we” includes their teacher Philolaus.7
Second, the very term harmonia is reminiscent of the importance of that con-
cept in Philolaus’ account of how reality is structured, and the use of the tuned 
lyre as an example of harmonia points to Philolaus B6a. I believe that the theo-
ry proposed by Simmias according to which the soul is a harmonia of the con-
stituents of the body fits well with Philolaus’s metaphysical theory of limiters, 
unlimiteds, and harmonia, even though it does entail that the soul is mortal. In 
fact, there is no reason to think that Philolaus was ignorant of this consequence 
of the harmonia theory. There is also no evidence that he believed the soul to be 
immortal.8
I will take this as a working hypothesis, that Philolaus held that the soul is a 
harmonia. I will test the hypothesis by seeing whether the soul can be construed 
as a harmonia of the type indicated in B6 and B6a. In the rest of this section I will 
argue that Simmias’ exposition of the harmonia theory can be so construed.
The sentence at 86b8–c2 speaks of the body and the soul. Just as our body 
is “stretched and held together by the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist 
and other such things, the soul is the mixture and harmonia of these very things 
when they are mixed with each other rightly and in due measure (καλῶς καὶ 
μετρίως).” The reference to “stretching” and “holding together” sounds like a 
description of the way the taut strings of a lyre are the cause of the harmonia 
5 The old view that “we” refers to people in general seems to me to be a desperate attempt to 
avoid this obvious claim. After Socrates’ presentation of the Recollection Argument and the 
Affinity Argument Simmias and Cebes whisper to one another and after some prodding 
from Socrates admit that they have objections to his view and Simmias declares that the two 
of them will present their objections in turn (84c–85d). The sentence containing “we” comes 
very shortly afterwards. (It is the third sentence in Simmias’s speech.) In this context “we” 
must refer at least to Simmias and Cebes. And it cannot refer to Socrates, who explodes the 
harmonia theory immediately afterwards; Simmias could have had no reason to suppose that 
Socrates believed this theory.
6 It is true that Cebes presents a view of the soul that is incompatible with the harmonia theory, 
comparing it to a tailor who makes his own clothes. Just as the tailor wears out many suits 
but his last suit survives him, so a soul may go through many bodies but perish before the 
last body it inhabits does (86e–87b). But this is not a theory of the soul’s nature; it is present-
ed as an objection to the Recollection Argument, a dialectical move rather than an original 
conception.
7 Another consideration in favour of this conclusion is found in the immediately following 
assertion of Echecrates, whose conversation with Phaedo is the frame for the Phaedo dia-
logue: “the statement that the soul is some kind of harmonia has a remarkable hold on me, 
now and always, and when it was mentioned it reminded me that I had adopted this view” 
(88d3–6). Echecrates was a Pythagorean from Phlius and a pupil of Philolaus (as we learn 
from Aristoxenus, fr. 19.3–4). His assertion is compatible with his having adhered to the har-
monia theory until, on listening to Phaedo recounting Socrates’ conversation with Simmias, 
he suddenly realized that the harmonia theory is incompatible with the soul’s immortality.
8 See Huffman 1994, 330–332, especially “Certainly it will not do simply to assert that since he 
was a Pythagorean he must think that the soul was immortal” (330).
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described in Philolaus B6a. Where Simmias speaks of pairs of opposites (hot and 
cold, wet and dry), the tension on the lyre’s strings can be described in terms of 
the opposites taut and slack, while on a monochord or a single string of a lyre, 
where the pitch of the note produced depends on the length of the vibrating 
string, the opposition can be described in terms of long and short. Further, the 
notes produced can be described in terms of the opposites high-pitched and low-
pitched. 
For Simmias a body is alive (possesses soul) when it has appropriate amounts 
or balances or degrees of hot and cold, dry and moist, etc. We can die of overheat-
ing or hypothermia, of dehydration or dropsy.9 For Philolaus a lyre is tuned when 
its strings play the right notes (not too high or too low in relation to one another) 
and this happens when the tension in the strings is correctly adjusted so that they 
are not too taut or too loose.
For Philolaus the tuned lyre involves an “unlimited” (here defined in terms of 
high-pitched notes and low-pitched notes), which amounts to a continuous range 
of higher and lower musical pitches, and a “limiter,” which determines certain 
notes or intervals in the unlimited range of possible notes or intervals. An anach-
ronistic example of such a limiter would be the C major scale – a series of notes 
of definite pitches singled out from the infinite number of possible pitches. High 
and low identify a particular kind of range (musical pitch, as opposed to length 
or temperature). Considered simply as the range of musical pitch, this range is 
without limits; no particular notes or intervals are specified. On this unlimited 
range a system of limits is imposed (definite musical notes separated by definite 
intervals) which constitutes one of an infinite number of possible such systems. 
A tuned lyre is a physical object composed of frame and strings, in which the 
strings produce notes that are related to one another in the way specified by the 
tuning. 
A living animal has a body that is susceptible of having a range of tempera-
tures (different mixtures of hot and cold), a range of dry and moist, and so on 
for all the relevant ranges. Each of these ranges is per se without limits but on 
each of them one or more systems of limits can be imposed. The range of hot and 
cold can be defined by the Celsius and Fahrenheit scales, the range of moist and 
dry can be specified in terms of absolute, relative, or specific humidity. As with 
hot and cold, these ranges are not found in the abstract. There we had a lyre, 
consisting of sound box, arms, yoke, bridge, and strings, on which the tuning is 
imposed by putting the strings under tension, and here we have a body. The body 
is “stretched and held together” (whatever precisely that may mean) by the hot 
and the cold, etc. just as the tuned lyre is both stretched and held together by the 
tension in its strings. When appropriate harmoniai are imposed, the lyre is tuned 
in a particular way, and the body is alive in its particular way (supposing that the 
combination of harmoniai characteristic of a dog is different from that of an amoe-
9 More precisely, the conditions that lead to this excessive amount of fluid can cause death.
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ba.) Exactly how this works out in detail is problematic and I am doubtful that 
either Simmias or Philolaus (if this was his theory) worked it out much further 
than what we read in this passage of the Phaedo.
Simmias presses the analogy (86c2–5). The lyre’s tuning is destroyed when 
the lyre is destroyed; so also the body’s harmonia is destroyed when the body 
is destroyed. One cause of death is sickness, and this can be described as what 
happens when the stretching of the hot and the cold and the other constituents 
of the body ceases to be right and in due measure; if the stretching is far enough 
removed from the ideal state, the soul is destroyed and we die. 
This theory of disease is reminiscent of theories found in Alcmaeon and the 
Hippocratic corpus.
Alcmaeon B4 comes closest to what Simmias says.10 It goes as follows:
Alcmaeon holds that what preserves health is the equality of the pow-
ers – moist and dry, cold and hot, bitter and sweet and the rest – and the 
supremacy of any of them causes disease; for the supremacy of either is 
destructive. The cause of disease is an excess of heat or cold; the occasion 
of it is surfeit or deficiency of nourishment; the location of it blood, mar-
row, or the brain. Disease may come from external causes, from quality of 
water, local environment, or toil, or torture. Health, on the other hand, is a 
measured blending of the qualities. (trans. based on Longrigg)
This fragment names (among others) the two contrasting pairs that Simmias does: 
hot and cold, and moist and dry, and it describes health as a measured blending (a 
κρᾶσις that is σύμμετρος) of hot and cold, etc. where Simmias speaks of κρᾶσις 
of the hot and the cold and of their being blended μετρίως. The fragment of the 
physician Alcmaeon unsurprisingly talks about the causes of disease, not about 
the nature of the soul, and it seems plausible that Simmias or Philolaus took over 
this theory and applied it to the soul.
In any case, Socrates rejects the application. An instrument is either in tune or 
out of tune, but in the latter case it can be more or less out of tune. Likewise, either 
we are healthy or we are sick, and if we are sick we can be more or less sick. But 
in the case of the soul, which is consistently conceived in the Phaedo as the vital 
principle, the bearer of life (although other powers are ascribed to it in addition), 
either we are alive or we are dead, and if we are dead that’s that: there are no de-
grees of being dead. This is the substance of the objection at 93b.
I will come back to the question of Philolaus’s connection with this doctrine 
below.
10 See also VM 14 and NH 4.
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3 Philolaus B13 and B14
This final part of my paper takes up Philolaus B13 and B14, both of which mention 
the soul. B13 neatly divides into two halves.
Philolaus B13
καὶ τέσσαρες ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ λογικοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ Φιλόλαος. ἐν τῷ 
Περὶ φύσεως λέγει ἐγκέφαλος, καρδία, ὀμφαλός, αἰδοῖον: (A) κεφαλὰ 
μὲν νόου, καρδία δὲ ψυχᾶς καὶ αἰσθήσιος, ὀμφαλὸς δὲ ῥιζώσιος καὶ 
ἀναφύσιος τοῦ πρώτου, αἰδοῖον δὲ σπέρματος καταβολᾶς τε καὶ 
γεννήσιος. (Β) ἐγκέφαλος δὲ <ἔχει> τὰν ἀνθρώπω ἀρχάν, καρδία δὲ τὰν 
ζώου, ὀμφαλὸς δὲ τὰν φυτοῦ, αἰδοῖον δὲ τὰν ξυναπάντων: πάντα γὰρ 
ἀπὸ σπέρματος καὶ θάλλοντι καὶ βλαστάνοντι.
There are four principles of the rational animal, as Philolaus too says in 
On Nature: the brain, the heart, the navel, and the genital organ. (A) The 
head [is the location] of intellect, the heart of soul and sensation, the navel 
of the taking root and growth of the first [part], the genital organ of the 
depositing of seed and of generation. (B) The brain [contains] the origin 
of man, the heart <contains the origin> of living things, the navel that of 
plants, and the genital organ that of them all. For they all both flourish and 
grow from seed.
B13 presents more problems that I can discuss here. Briefly, I believe that part (A) 
identifies “vital functions” of humans, some of which are found in other living 
things, and that the vital function associated with the soul (here as frequently 
elsewhere in Greek thought) is being alive, which is different from the other vital 
functions and can (and in fact does) exist in individuals who lack one or more of 
the other vital functions mentioned in part A. For present purposes the relevant 
question is whether B13 is compatible with the view that the soul is a harmo-
nia, specifically the kind of harmonia found in Philolaus’s metaphysics. In what 
follows I will present a case for interpreting it this way. Finally I will consider 
whether Philolaus can meet Socrates’ objection that turns on the fact that musical 
instruments can be more or less in tune and animals can be more or less healthy 
but nothing can be more or less alive or dead.
I will proceed by listing some features that a lyre and a living being have in 
common, and showing how these commonalities support the view that there is a 
kind of Philolaic harmonia that constitutes certain bodies as living things just as 
there is a harmonia that constitutes a lyre as a functioning (that is, a tuned) lyre.
(1)  A lyre has components: a sound box, strings, etc. Likewise a body has 
com ponents.
(2)  The lyre’s components must be arranged and put together in a certain way to 
become a lyre. But it may not yet be a lyre that can make music. Likewise for 
the body’s components (although with the body there is no external agent that 
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puts them together). But the same arrangement of parts is found in a living 
animal and in a corpse. 
(3)  Once put together in the right way, the lyre’s components must be adjusted 
appropriately for it to function as a lyre, which it does by making notes. (The 
strings must be put under tension.) Likewise for the body’s components (al-
though there is no external agent that adjusts them). The body’s components 
must have some kind of “vital tension”11 (whatever that might mean) for the 
body to function as a living thing; when it does so, it is alive.
(4)  For a lyre to be in tune the tension must be adjusted so that the notes produced 
by the strings are appropriately related. To be perfectly tuned the notes must 
be in accordance with a set of musical intervals that are precisely defined by 
numerical ratios. To be out of tune is for them to deviate (but not too far) from 
the standard defined by those ratios. If it is close enough to the standard, the 
lyre will be playable but it will not be perfectly in tune. Correspondingly, to be 
alive, the body’s parts must be “mixed together rightly and in due measure,” 
in Simmias’ phrase. A body can be alive even if the mixture is not perfectly 
right and in perfectly due measure, provided that it does not deviate too far 
from that standard. If it is close enough to the standard, the body will be alive 
but it will function sub-optimally.
On this account, the harmonia which is the soul resembles the harmonia which is 
the tuning of a lyre. They are ideal cases which are difficult to achieve and main-
tain in lyres and bodies. The ratios 2:1, 3:2 and 4:3 define musical intervals. A lyre 
tuned to, shall we say. 1.95:1, 3.02:2 and 4.04:3 will be out of tune, but it will still 
be a functioning musical instrument. Further, it is very likely that no physical 
lyre has ever been tuned perfectly – that none has ever been closer to 2:1 than, say 
2.0000000001:1. In any case, we could not tell the difference.
Simmias does not say that a lyre in such a condition does not function as a lyre 
at all, or that a lyre that functions sub-optimally no longer counts as a lyre. He 
talks of the extreme case where someone breaks the lyre so that it cannot make 
any notes at all. Clearly this does not imply that he thinks that a lyre cannot still 
exist and be a lyre if it is out of tune. But what he says is true, and this is the case 
that is relevant to the point he is making, which has to do with cases where a 
living thing dies, not where it merely becomes ill or reaches a state where it func-
tions imperfectly.
Short of the situation where the lyre is destroyed or dismantled, there is a 
range sufficiently far from the unique state of being perfectly tuned, in which the 
lyre exists but cannot make notes, another range (closer to the perfectly tuned 
state) where we would call it out of tune, and one situation for each defined tun-
ing where it is perfectly in tune. 
11 Cf. “stretched and held together” (Phaedo 86b7–8).
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The same holds for the body. When Simmias speaks of diseases and other evils 
relaxing and stretching the body without measure (ἀμέτρως) (86c2–4), he does 
not mean to say that if we are sick we are dead. Death will occur – that is, the soul 
ceases to exist – when the body is stretched or relaxed beyond a certain point. 
The body still exists but it does not perform any vital functions. Short of that, we 
can be more or less sick. As with the lyre, the harmonia of the body that makes it 
a perfectly functioning living thing is an ideal that may be difficult or impossible 
to achieve or maintain in individual living beings. 
In both cases the harmonia is a standard to aim for and from which devia-
tions can be measured. The musician tunes his lyre to be as close as possible to 
the standard. Where the musician is external to the lyre, the living organism is 
self-regulating. The body maintains itself as close to the ideal condition as it can. 
Sometimes it needs help. Doctors understand the ideal condition better than their 
patients, and they know what to do to restore their patients’ bodies to something 
approximating the ideal condition, when the actual condition of their body is far 
enough removed from the ideal state that the patient is diagnosed as being ill. 
When the lyre is damaged badly enough, the components can no longer pro-
duce any notes at all. Therefore there is no tuning. Likewise, when the body is 
damaged badly enough, the creature lives no more. Its components have lost their 
vital tension and the soul has ceased to exist. On this account the souls of living 
things are mortal. 
But perhaps surprisingly, there is a sense in which soul is immortal. We define 
the harmonic intervals in terms of the exact and perfect ratios 2:1, 3:2 and 4:3. As 
Philolaus says in B6a, these are ingredients of the tuned octave which he there 
calls a harmonia. On my understanding of B6, the “being” (ἐστώ) of these inter-
vals is identical with these ratios qua embodied in appropriate matter (a lyre, for 
example). This holds always and everywhere – though it is rarely, if ever, found 
perfectly achieved in actual instruments. The notes of imperfectly tuned instru-
ments can be heard, as would the notes of a perfectly tuned instrument. Howev-
er, even a perfectly tuned instrument is not always in tune. Simmias points out 
that whereas the lyre is physical, bodily, composite, and akin to what is mortal, 
the harmonia is without body, beautiful, and invisible (85e4–86a3). He might have 
added “akin to what is eternal” in contrast with “akin to what is mortal.” Simi-
larly, the ratios of hot and cold, etc. that define the state of the ingredients of a 
perfectly functioning living thing are not perceptible, but if they are embodied in 
a living thing they account for its living optimally.
This way of understanding Simmias as referring to Philolaus’ theory of the 
structure of entities is consistent with the interpretation of Philolaus’ fragments 
presented in the first part of this paper. It also shows how Philolaus could have 
met Socrates’ objection that a harmonia is a harmonia and either you have it or you 
don’t, that something cannot be more or less fully harmonized and therefore can-
not be more or less fully a soul. A person is alive (has a soul) when the body’s con-
stituents are mixed with each other “rightly and in due measure.” This covers the 
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ideal case where someone is perfectly healthy and also the case where a person 
is ill. There is an ideal, perfect condition where we enjoy perfect health, but when 
we are ill our constituents are still mixed rightly enough and in due enough mea-
sure – which is what Alcmaeon’s theory of health, taken up by Simmias, requires.
In B6 Philolaus makes important moves towards distinguishing two levels of 
reality, and understanding one in terms of the other. Witness the assertion (B6.2) 
that the “‘being’ of things… admits knowledge that is divine and not human.” 
Humans can know some things (B6.3) but not this. This may be one reason why 
Philolaus says so little about what he means by “being.” But for our purposes it 
is enough that he tells us that the “being” of things is eternal (B6.2). The ratios 
that define a perfect tuning in a lyre and those that define a perfectly orderly ar-
rangement of hot and cold, and moist and dry, in a living body are eternal. They 
are permanent standards which lyres and living things must meet in order to be 
perfectly tuned lyres or fully functioning living things. In this sense, the soul, as 
the “being” of living things, is eternal – not their individual souls, but the ideal 
condition of their souls in which they are optimally alive. 
I believe that these considerations support the claim that B13 is compatible 
with the interpretation I have proposed, on which soul is the harmonia whose 
presence in the constituents of a living thing makes that thing alive, in the sense 
that its perfect presence makes the thing perfectly alive, living perfectly, and 
whose near-enough perfect presence makes it alive still, albeit not perfectly so.
Philolaus B14
Μαρτυρέονται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντιες, ὡς διά τινας 
τιμωρίας ἁ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σάματι τούτῳ 
τέθαπται.
The ancient theologians and seers testify that the soul is yoked together 
with the body on account of certain punishments, and is buried in it as in 
a tomb.
This fragment has been taken as attributing to Philolaus the doctrine that the 
body is the tomb of the soul, which seems to be incompatible with his belief that 
the soul is as mortal as the tuning of a lyre. This is one reason for holding the 
fragment to be spurious.12 But even if this is a genuine fragment, does it prove 
that he held the doctrine in question? Not at all: the fragment merely quotes him 
as saying that “ancient theologians and seers” held that doctrine – the kind of 
12 B14 has widely been considered spurious. Huffman (1994, 404–406) shares this view al-
though he defuses some objections that have been raised against its genuineness. Neither of 
his reasons for rejecting it seems convincing. The first is met by recognizing that the σῶμα – 
σῆμα doctrine is originally not Pythagorean but Orphic, so that the ancient theologians and 
seers referred to are Orphic priests, and the second objection vanishes when we recognize 
that the author of B14 is simply reporting the doctrine, not endorsing it. I follow A. Bernabé 
(Bernabé 2013) and (Bernabé 2011) in accepting B14 as genuine.
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thing a philosopher might say in a disparaging way before going on to present 
his own quite different view. In fact Clement, our source of the fragment, quotes 
it in connection with his discussion of Plato’s reference at Cratylus 400c to the 
σῶμα – σῆμα doctrine, which Clement states (Strom. 3.3.16) to be an Orphic belief. 
This reinforces the suggestion that the “ancient theologians” Philolaus refers to 
are the Orphics, from whom as an up-to-date philosopher and scientist he sure-
ly distanced himself. I conclude that B14 reveals nothing about Philolaus’s own 
view of the nature of the soul and therefore that this fragment is no obstacle to 
the account of soul advanced in this paper.
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Is Parmenides a Pythagorean? 
Plato on Theoria as a Vision of the Soul
Sylvana Chrysakopoulou – University of Ioannina
In the present article, I will endeavour to bring together several Platonic passages 
that allude to the pre-incarnate state of the soul with a particular emphasis on the 
vision of truth encountered by the soul before entering the body. This particular 
notion of theoria is prima facie a Platonic invention. Nevertheless, what is worth 
exploring in Plato is the extensive use of stylistic, argumentative and imagistic 
patterns, which are employed also in Parmenides’ poem within the context of 
what may be considered a Pythagorean eschatology, Pythagoras being the first 
archaic thinker to whom the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul was as-
cribed.  
At first glance, Parmenides seems far from being considered a Pythagorean by 
Plato: in the Sophist (242d), where Plato constructs a proto-doxographical account 
of the ontological question, Parmenides is presented as Xenophanes’ successor 
par excellence in the foundation of the so-called Eleatic tribe (ethnos), promul-
gating monism against the epic chimeras of the pluralists. Hence, we may sur-
mise that Xenophanes’ well-known ironic criticism of the Pythagorean doctrine 
of metempsychosis (21 B 7 DK) could have influenced Plato’s view of his alleged 
student Parmenides. 
On the other hand, Heraclitus and Empedocles, who come after Parmenides 
in the same account in the Sophist, are portrayed by Plato as the Ionian and the 
Sicilian Muses respectively,1 who sing in different modes the “symphony” of the 
one and the many. Although it is clear from the direct quotations that the point of 
Plato’s reference to the Sicilian Muses is Empedocles in particular (just as Hera-
clitus is indicated when Plato refers to the Ionian Muses), the toponym “Sicilian” 
itself, along with the notion of musical harmony in the same context, echoes a 
Pythagorean tune.
Nonetheless, as Taylor suggests in his introduction to the Timaeus, which is 
considered by a large number of scholars to be the Pythagorean dialogue par 
excellence, “historically it was the Empedoclean influence which led to the de-
velopment of doctrines like that of the soul as the ‘attunement’ (harmonia) of the 
1 On the relation between Parmenides and Empedocles concerning the hymns on gods see 
Bernabé 2005, pers II, farc. 2,  245, VI. Hymni et Epigrammata, 638T (306K).
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body, which are quite inconsistent with the fundamental presuppositions of the 
Pythagorean way of life.”2
Indeed, the principal notion of the sumploke eidon, which Plato introduces in 
the Sophist, has biological undertones, which may be traced back to Empedocles’ 
zoogony. Moreover, the same notion gives a new meaning and turn to the epic 
episodes in the pluralistic accounts, which are described ironically by Plato as 
wars and marriages between beings3 (akin to the notion of sumploke).4 To be sure, 
the ambiguity of the term sumploke, which may indicate at the same time “con-
flict” and “coalescence,” synthesizes in Plato’s mind the Empedoclean and the 
Heraclitean view: according to Plato, the latter consists in the alternation of the 
one and the many, the former in their identity, indicating the unity of opposites, 
or in Heraclitean terms the palintropos5 or “hidden harmony” (22 B 51, 54 DK).
Then again, the ontological priority of the one against the many, which Plato 
ascribes to the first Eleatics, as well as the musical symphony produced by their 
synthetic attempt, echoes to a certain extent Pythagorean themes, Pythagoreans 
being the first to regard number as the principle of the universe, a principle that 
is also reflected in the Pythagorean “music of the spheres.”6 On the other hand, 
the notions of musical harmony and the unity of opposites that Plato ascribes to 
2 Taylor 18. In his introduction to the Timaeus Taylor states that “… Empedocles was the real 
founder of the Sicilian School of medicine and Philolaus was, as we know about him from 
the statements in the Iatrica of the Peripatetic Menon, was a member of this school. The 
special aim of the school as Burnet has shown was to work the Empedoclean theory of the 
four roots, or elementary bodies into the Pythagorean system (EGPh 292–296). This is exactly 
what we shall find Timaeus trying to do in his famous geometrical construction of body 
(53c–55c)… In fact, we might say that the formula for the physics and physiology of the 
dialogue is that it is an attempt to graft Empedoclean biology on the stock of Pythagorean 
mathematics…(We shall see that this incongruity of the Empedoclean with the Pythagorean 
elements in his beliefs leads Timaeus himself into a variety of real inconsistencies which 
culminate in an absolutely unqualified contradiction between a medical or physiological 
determinism and a religious and ethical doctrine of human freedom agreeing precisely with 
the undoubtedly Pythagorean myth of Er in the Republic.”)
3 See Sophist 242c8–d1.
4 The Eleatic Visitor presents the pluralists as naive mythologists – epic poets who could only 
impress children –, whereas he considers the Eleatic “ethnos” to which he belongs by origin 
(to par’hemin ethnos) and more in particular Xenophanes, his alleged founder, as a reformer 
of the epic mythology leading to the monistic view according to which “all is one.” Although 
Plato subscribes to monism against pluralism, he challenges “father Parmenides” by con-
struing a new philosophical generation of thinkers, a synthesis of both genealogies, led by 
Heraclitus and Empedocles, a new sumploke eidon so to say.
5 Note the jeu de mots between the attested term “palintropos” in 22 B 51 DK and the equivalent 
“palintonos” echoed by Plato in the Sophist when he refers to Heraclitus as the “suntonos” 
Muse, resounding the above-mentioned “sum-plekein” and “sum-pheresthai.” On the no-
tion of Heraclitean harmony in Plato cf. also the Symposium 187a.
6 See Cornford 1935, 4: “As a religious philosophy, Pythagoreanism unquestionably attached 
central importance to the idea of unity, in particular the unity of all life, divine, human and 
animal, implied in the scheme of transmigration… Nor is there any ground for rejecting the 
testimony that the principle of Unity, in some form, was regarded as divine (Hippolytus, 
Ref. 1.2). We should expect moreover something analogous to the God of Xenophanes, the 
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Heraclitus and Empedocles respectively are key notions in their thinking, with-
out any necessary reference to Pythagoras.
Yet, Heraclitus was the first to criticize Pythagoras as a “polymath” (22 B 
129 DK),7 the notion of polymathie itself reflecting the tension between the one and 
the many: although Pythagoras is said to have practiced historie most of all men 
– a requirement for the philosopher according to Heraclitus (22 B 35 DK)8 – the lat-
ter accuses the former of putting together an arbitrary collection of written works 
(22 B 199 DK), in which consisted his alleged “wisdom” (heautou sophie), the pro-
noun heautou being a clear reminder of the pejorative sense in which Heraclitus 
describes the “many” (polloi) in the proemium of his account (Logos): the many are 
unable to listen and attune themselves to the unifying principle of Logos, which 
is common to all things (22 B 1 DK), as if each one of them possessed a wisdom of 
one’s own – idian echontes phronesin (22 B 2 DK). 
Similarly to Heraclitus, who condemns Pythagoras’ alleged wisdom as kako-
technie (bad skilfulness) and plagiarism, Xenophanes considers the myths about 
gods told by the epic poets to be plasmata ton proteron, that is to say useless “fic-
tions of the past poets” (21 B 1, v. 22 DK). Heraclitus did not make the accusation 
of polymathy only against Pythagoras, but against all allegedly “wise” men of 
Greece including Xenophanes, who was the first to criticize Pythagoras (21 B 7) 
and the epic poets on similar grounds to those of Heraclitus:9 Heraclitus bans 
Homer, along with Archilochus, from all poetic competitions (22 B 42 DK)10 and 
accuses Hesiod among the other allegedly wise men of being a polymath who 
cannot make good sense of his polymathie because of his lack of nous (22 B 40 
One Being of Parmenides, the Sphere of Empedocles. A system of the Italian type, seeking 
the reality of things in form rather than matter…”
 7 Puthagores Mnesarchou historien eskesen anthropon malista panton; kai eklexamenos tautas tas sun-
graphas epoiesato heautou sophien, polumathien, kakotechnien (“Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus 
pursued inquiry further than all other men and, choosing what he liked from these com-
positions, he made a wisdom of his own: much learning, artful knavery”) Translated by 
Charles Kahn.
 8 Chre gar eu mala pollon historas philosophous andras einai kath’ Herakleiton. I owe the following 
comment to Andrei Lebedev who considers this fragment authentic, because it is to be found 
independently both in and in Clemens (Strom. 5.140.6) despite the fact that in the latter source 
it is not ascribed to Heraclitus in particular. Yet the wording is identical in both fragments 
and thus there is no doubt that Clemens refers to the above-mentioned Heraclitean frag-
ment. As for the term “philosopher” itself in this context, Lebedev suggests an ingenious 
interpretation related to the Heraclitean Theology, where the word “sophon” plays a central 
role substituting for the term “theos.” I am very thankful to him for confiding this interpre-
tation in me at a private discussion. We are looking forward to his forthcoming book on 
Heraclitus.  
 9 Xenophanes’ critique against the plausibility of the Pythagorean theory of metempsychosis 
fits perfectly his epistemological views. Despite his so-called epistemological optimism (21 
B 18 DK) which is a unique phenomenon in the archaic poetry, Xenophanes has strongly 
challenged human capacity on definitive knowledge belonging only to God, who unlike the 
gods of the epic poetry is not anthropomorphic in any respect, but purely “noetic.”
10 Homeron ephasken axion ek ton agonon ekballesthai kai rhapizesthai kai Archilochon homoios.
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DK),11 the unifying principle of perception according to both Heraclitus and Xe-
nophanes.
On similar grounds, Xenophanes addresses his first ironic comment against 
the epistemological foundation of Pythagoras’ theory of metempsychosis (21 B 7 
DK): he turns it into an object of mockery because of the paradoxes which arise 
if one tries to apply it concretely. In other words, both Xenophanes and Hera-
clitus strongly challenged Pythagoras’ epistemology by addressing to him the 
same type of criticism that they addressed to the epic poets. By setting forth a 
philosophical theology, Xenophanes opposes the naive epic mythology, which 
Heraclitus also condemns as nonsensical polymathy in the person of Pythagoras. 
In this respect, Plato in the Sophist seems to follow Xenophanes and Heracli-
tus closely, when he condemns the pluralists as naive mythologists who cannot 
make sense of the “whole as one,” the latter view pertaining to the Eleatic school 
of thought beginning with Xenophanes (Sophist 242b). It is also worth considering 
that the abovementioned monistic formula, which Plato ascribes to Xenophanes, 
is only to be found verbatim in Heraclitus (22 B 50 DK).12 Put differently, Plato 
in the Sophist adopts the harsh criticism that Xenophanes and Heraclitus made 
against Homer and Hesiod for their unmerited predominance in the Hellenic 
paideia.13
On the other hand, in the Republic (606e2–3), where Plato repeats almost word 
for word (τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς) the Xenophanean criticism 
of Homer (21 B 10 DK: ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ’ Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες), Pythag-
oras is presented as an exemplary teacher of a bios (600a–b), and we may note also 
that this is the only explicit reference to Pythagoras in the Platonic corpus. What 
is more, Plato in the Sophist makes an implicit comparison between Parmenidean 
monism and Pythagoreanism: in his attempt to put to the test Parmenides’ funda-
mental thesis, according to which non-being cannot be spoken of, Plato portrays 
non-being as an arrheton. This notion of arrheton goes back to the aporrheta, that is 
to say the doctrines that the Pythagoreans took a vow to keep secret (Phaedo, 62b).
The reason why Plato may here be alluding to Pythagorean doctrines, rather 
than Bacchic and Orphic mysteries, which are also described as arrheta in the dra-
matic literature,14 is the Pythagorean context within which he establishes this rap-
prochement: non-being is characterized as a sort of irrational number between 
11 Polumathie noon echein ou didaskei: “Nous” as the unifying principle of knowledge goes back to 
Xenophanes’ theology, who defines God as pure Intellect (Nous), as opposed to the epic poets 
who ascribe gods the most “naïve” anthropomorphic features, making immortals seem like 
caricatures of mortal men (21 B DK).
12 Ouk emou alla tou logou akousantas homologein sophon estin hen panta einai: Chrysakopoulou 2011.
13 21 B 10,11,12 DK; 22 B 57 DK: didaskalos de pleiston Hesiodos; touton pistantai pleista eidenai, hostis 
hemeren kai euphronen ouk eginosken; esti gar hen.
14 Cf. Euripides, Bacchae 471: Pentheus: Of what nature be these rites? Dionysus: They are un-
speakable (arrheta), not to be known by those uninitiated into the Bacchic rites. Also in Rhe-
sus 943, where the Muse claims that “the torches of the unspeakable mysteries (musteria 
aporrheta) did Orpheus teach…”
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the one and the many, irrational numbers being another fundamental Pythag-
orean taboo:15 “Do you concede then that it is impossible to utter correctly, or to 
say, or to conceive of not-being in itself, or that it is inconceivable, unspeakable 
(arrhetos), inexpressible, and irrational (alogon) (Sophist 238c)?”16 (συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς 
οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτ᾽ εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ 
καθ α᾽ὑτό, ἀλλ᾽ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον;). 
In other words, Plato challenges the very core of the notion of non-being in Par-
menides’ poem, by giving it the status of a Pythagorean taboo, which he attempts 
to abolish, in order to prove to “father” Parmenides that the “unspeakable” 
non-being can indeed be spoken of. 
In conclusion, on the one hand Plato in the Sophist repeats Xenophanes’ and 
Heraclitus’ criticism of the epic poets by explicitly identifying the latter with the 
pluralists, whom he dismisses altogether as naïve storytellers. On the other hand, 
he does not follow Heraclitus, who extends his criticism of the epic poets also 
to Pythagoras and Xenophanes. On the contrary, Plato reckons Xenophanes to 
be the father of Parmenides – the monist par excellence – and thus as the head 
of the Eleatic School of thought, to which Plato subscribes himself as the Eleatic 
Stranger. Moreover, he implicitly compares Parmenides to the Pythagoreans by 
creating a rapprochement between the Parmenidean doctrine and the Pythago-
rean taboos. Far from committing a parricide, as some modern scholars maintain, 
Plato divulges the secrecy of Parmenidean non-being by giving it the status of a 
Pythagorean taboo.
Parmenides’ Pythagorean identity, as implied by Plato, is also reflected in later 
tradition: Diogenes Laertius presents Parmenides as an adept of a poor Pythag-
orean called Ameinias, in whose honor Parmenides built a majestic shrine after 
his death (Lives 9.21–23). As if in response to Plato, Diogenes clearly states that, al-
though Parmenides attended Xenophanes’ lessons, it was Ameinias the Pythago-
rean, and not Xenophanes, who converted Parmenides to hesuchia (silence), a term 
which may be indicative of a Pythagorean kind of bios (way of life), inasmuch as it 
is related to the vow of secrecy regarding the Pythagorean doctrines. 
Furthermore, it is worth considering that Diogenes makes Empedocles a Py-
thagorean (Lives 8.54), to the extent that the latter refers in his poem to an anon-
ymous wise man (sophos), who possesses knowledge of ten or twenty lives (31 B 
129 DK: ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς, ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων 
ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον). This type of knowledge is made explicit through the ex-
pression ploutos (profusion) prapidon (v. 2 and 4). Prapidai (diaphragm) denotes 
the seat of perception since Homer, but this very expression is also to be found 
15 Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 5.9.57,3) records the story of Hippasus of Metapontum, who 
was said to have been assassinated by members of the Pythagoreans, because he divulged 
the discovery of irrational numbers.
16 “In terms of Greek drama, Plato in the Sophist abolishes the distinction between “didakta” 
and “arrheta” Teiresias establishes in Sophocles’ Oedipus rex, by proving that the non-being” 
to which he gives the statue of the “arrheton” can be spoken of (didakton) (Oedipus rex 301).
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in fragment 31 B 132 DK of Empedocles17 in connection with the phrase peritheon 
doxa (opinion on gods).18 In other words, this type of knowledge has a theological 
content. What is more, at the beginning of fragment 910 Kannicht, Euripides em-
ploys exactly the same structure as Empedocles in the fragment just cited (olbios 
hostis),19 except in using histories mathesis20 instead of the Empedoclean expression 
prapidon ploutos, which may be considered equivalent to the former.
Paradoxically enough, the combination of all three abovementioned fragments 
(the two from Empedocles and the one from Euripides) to a large extent echoes 
the Heraclitean fragment against Pythagoras (22 B 129 DK).21 To be sure, Empe-
docles’ and Euripides’ fragments neither convey the ironic attitude Heraclitus 
adopts against Pythagoras, nor allude to the latter in particular. Yet they grant 
a special status of divine blessedness to the kind of wisdom they describe, in-
dependently of whether they are referring to a particular person in possession 
of it or not. Therefore, Pythagoras should not be considered the only candidate 
for the embodiment of this blissful state of wisdom. Nevertheless, what may be 
considered striking is that this Heraclitean fragment seems to be the oldest proto-
type for all three abovementioned fragments, comprising both the ideas and the 
wording present in them, with the exception of the term olbios which, however, is 
equally related to historie and to prapidai in the two fragments that begin with the 
same formulaic expression.22 If this is the case, Heraclitus’ ironic attitude to Py-
thagoras in fragment 22 B 129 DK seems to be a reaction to the presentation of the 
latter as the sophos par excellence, practising historie “most of all men,” especially 
if combined with 22 B 35 DK, where historie is considered to be the requirement 
par excellence for the philosopher according to Heraclitus, not to mention that, 
according to Lebedev, the term “philosopher” has a theological meaning.23
In its original sense, the word historie signifies strictu sensu eye-witnessing, and 
therefore in a wider sense the term is applicable to evidence-based investigation 
using empirical data. Yet, the interchangeability of the expression prapidon plou-
tos in fragment 31 B 132 by Empedocles and of histories mathesis in fragment 910 
Kannicht by Euripides could be a further indication that historie does not exclude 
theological knowledge in which a certain eschatology may be embedded. This is 
also the case in the abovementioned Heraclitean fragment (22 B 25 DK), where 
Heraclitus connects the term “philosopher,” which has a theological connotation 
in the Heraclitean corpus according to Lebedev,24 with the term histor. Indeed, if 
combined with the two abovementioned Empedoclean fragments, the term histo-
17 Olbios hos theion prapidon ektesato plouton, deilos d’oi skotoessa theon peri doxa memelen.
18 Cf. the Xenophanean incitation promutheien theon… agathon (21 B 1, v. 24 DK).
19 Cf. fr. 830, c4 / e5 / f4 Bernabé. 
20 Burkhard 1967.
21 See above, note 7.
22 Cf. the Orphic golden plates in Tzifopoulos 2011. 
23 See above note 8.
24 See above note 5.
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rie as used by Heraclitus and more particularly by Euripides involves the appro-
priate (so to speak) opinion on gods (peri theon doxa). 
In Empedocles’ case, this theological view is somehow connected to the knowl-
edge of a large number of human lives, which made Pythagoras the most plausi-
ble candidate to be the sophos described in the Empedoclean verses, to the extent 
that such knowledge may be a reference to the doctrine of the transmigration of 
the soul, which was first ascribed to him. Last but not least, it is also worth taking 
into account for our purpose that Diogenes Laertius, who identifies Pythagoras 
as possibly the point of Empedocles’ reference, considers Parmenides to be an 
alternative to Pythagoras in the same verses (Diogenes Laertius, Lives 8.54: οἱ δὲ 
τοῦτο εἰς Παρμενίδην αὐτὸν λέγειν ἀναφέροντα).25 Independently of the issue 
of Diogenes’ reliability, what matters for our purposes is that Parmenides and 
Pythagoras are presented as equally possible candidates for this knowledge of 
previous incarnations. 
In the Platonic passages I shall present below, Plato clearly draws from the 
vocabulary, images, and arguments used in the Parmenidean poem, in order to 
describe his teaching as a process of initiation leading to the recollection of the 
vision of truth encountered by the soul in its pre-incarnate state. This philosophi-
cal initiation echoes Pythagorean concerns about the fate of the soul, to the extent 
that the paternity of the doctrine of metempsychosis, to which Plato makes allu-
sions, was first attributed to Pythagoras. What is more, theoria is presented as the 
ultimate stage of this philosophical initiation, when the bodiless and pure soul is 
magnetized by the divine vision of truth, before entering the body and becoming 
amnesiac.
Although Burkert clearly states that Pythagoreanism as such did not involve 
mystery rites (teletai),26 that is to say religious initiation, Pythagoras’ prominent 
interest in all sorts of rituals as a witness practising historie can be compared to 
Plato’s general attitude towards mystery cults, which he takes as a model for his 
teaching without subscribing to a particular cult. Put differently, what may be con-
sidered as an imitation of Pythagoras is Plato’s acute interest in such practices as a 
theoros, especially since the latter describes his teaching as a kind of philosophical 
theoria, a term which is equivalent to historie according to our previous analysis.
Andrea Wilson Nightingale in her seminal article on the notion of philosoph-
ical theoria27 emphasizes the element of the sight of divinity within the Platonic 
context: “wandering” related to pilgrimage and to witnessing foreign rituals in 
the religious sense of the term theoria paves the way for its new philosophical 
sense introduced by Plato. Closely bound to the divine vision of truth encoun-
tered by the soul in its pre-incarnate state, the notion of philosophical theoria is 
a recurrent theme in Plato, found in the Symposium, the Phaedrus, and the end of 
25 Cf. Empedocles (31 b 132 DK): Olbios hos…with fr. 910 Kannicht by Euripides: Olbios hos tes 
historias eschen mathesin…
26 See Burkert 1985, 302.
27 See Nightingale 2008.
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the Republic.28 In those dialogues Plato clearly invests the underlying doctrine of 
the transmigration of the soul with Parmenidean imagery and argumentation. 
Such an operation could be indicative of an Eleatization of Pythagoreanism, re-
flecting to a certain extent a possible merging of the two primary philosophical 
movements born in Italian soil in the archaic era. Undoubtedly Plato was strongly 
influenced by the Eleatics in his ontological concerns. While the Sophist and the 
Parmenides are a response to the Eleatic master of ontological monism, the doc-
trine of the immortality of the soul, which was first ascribed to the Pythagoreans, 
is also closely bound to Platonic epistemology.29
Parmenidean imagery in a Pythagorean context is to be found in the Phaedrus 
(244a–257b), where Stesichorus’ recantation explains Eros as a sort of madness 
(mania) of divine inspiration. Although the manic state of the soul is traditional-
ly associated with Dionysian possession, Plato attributes it to Eros’ divine influ-
ence,30 not to mention that in the Symposium, the Dionysian dialogue par excel-
lence, Plato presents Eros as the most venerable god according to Parmenides. 
The Orphic epic tradition on the other hand, which is allegedly adopted by the 
Pythagoreans, identifies Dionysus with Eros. Parmenides’ praise of Eros in the 
Symposium (178a) celebrates the god as the first and the oldest of all gods (thus 
abolishing the idea of a Hesiodic genealogy,31 which is incompatible with the 
Parmenidean precept of the exemption of being from generation and corruption, 
going back to the Xenophanean theology). Eros is thus presented as the un-gener-
ated God who generates everything (178b = 28 B 13 DK): Parmenides de ten genesin 
legein protiston de Erota theon metisato panton;32 here the term metisato shows the 
close connection between Eros and Metis, the goddess of wisdom,33 who is omni-
present in the Orphic epic tradition and is associated with Pythagoras’ teaching.
The relationship between Eros and wisdom is also emphasized in the Phaedrus. 
As stated above, this kind of wisdom is related to the vision of divine beauty, en-
countered by the soul during the mysteries it attends in its pre-incarnate state. 
What is striking within this mystery context in the Phaedrus is how Plato passes 
from poetic praise of the madness inspired by Eros to a rigid argumentation to 
prove Eros’ divine origin. It is precisely this argumentation within the context of 
the flight of the soul above the heavens that is highly reminiscent of Parmenides’ 
account of being: Parmenides describes his voyage to the halls of the goddess as 
a pompe34 in a chariot led by the Sun Maidens. Similarly to the latter in his poem, 
where the vivid imagery of his journey away from the world is followed by the 
28 See Chrysakopoulou 2010.
29 See Palmer 1999.
30 On the identification between Eros with Dionysos see fr 540 F Bernabé (237 K.) Macrob. Sat-
urnalia 1.18.12.
31 See Strauss / Bernardete 2001.
32 Bernabé 2005, Fasc. 1, 99, 100 (29K), v. 425, presbutaton te kai autotele polumetin Erota, 242, v. 9 
(kai metis protos genetor kai eros poluterpes), 208, 245.
33 Metis is also Eros’ grandmother in the Symposium through his father Poros.
34 On the notion of pompe see Kavoulaki 2011.
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goddess’s rational account of the divine characteristics of being (semata), Plato in 
the Phaedrus furnishes arguments of Eleatic inspiration on the question of soul’s 
immortality, right after describing the flight of the soul above the heavens in its 
pre-incarnate state.35
What is more, Plato’s proofs of the immortality of the soul echo to a large extent 
the semata (tokens), which indicate the path to being, revealed by the Parmenidean 
goddess to the youth (kouros),36 the initiate in mystery language,37 who surpass-
es mortal barriers. Moved by his thumos, a Homeric term describing the seat of 
perception, equivalent to the notion of the self-moving soul in the Phaedrus, Par-
menides is “sent” (pempein) on a journey above the world. Plato makes use of the 
same chariot imagery when presenting the soul’s divine component: the winged 
charioteer, the “helmsman of the soul,” as he characterizes divine intelligence, 
transports the soul beyond the heavens, where it attends the mysteries of true 
being. Likewise, the kouros is led to the halls of a goddess, who resides beyond 
mortal reach and who in a mystery context reveals to him the truth about being. 
There have been several attempts to identify the anonymous goddess with tra-
ditional Greek deities and more particularly with Persephone, the goddess of the 
Underworld, who welcomes the souls of the dead, hence presenting Parmenides’ 
journey as a katabasis (a descent to the underworld).38 Such a reading would also 
be compatible with the myth of Er at the end of the Republic, where the journey of 
the souls is presented in a similar fashion except for the chariot imagery. On the 
other hand, a number of scholars consider Parmenides’ journey to be an ascen-
sion to the heavens rather than a descent into Hades,39 an interpretation which 
would echo the imagery in the Phaedrus.40
The confusion between the Heavens and the Underworld seems to be delib-
erate in Parmenides: he rides the chariot led by the Sun Maidens to the halls of 
35 “And we, on our part, will prove… that the madness of love is the greatest of heaven’s bless-
ings… But first of all, let us view the affections and actions of the soul divine and human…. 
The beginning of our proof is as follows: the soul through all her being is immortal, for that 
which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, 
in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Only the self-moving, never leaving self, never ceases 
to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides…”
36 Plato’s intellectual debt to Parmenides is recognized not only in the homonymous dialogue, 
but more in particular in the Sophist, where the Eleatic Stranger presents himself as a de-
scendant of the Eleatic tribe (ethnos) beginning with Xenophanes and followed by father 
Parmenides (242d). 
37 See Burkert 1969.
38 Cf. note 28.
39 See Fraenkel 1975 and 1960, and Frère 1985.
40 See Planinc 2003, 1–2. Similarly to our interpretation of the Parmenides journey, the writer 
of this book presents the Republic as a “katabasis” and the Phaedrus as an ascension: “From its 
first word – kateben – ‘I went down’, Plato’s Republic remains unfamiliar to us… It cannot be 
an insignificant literary ornament that Plato may be alluding to the scene in the Odyssey in 
which Odysseus, finally reunited with Penelope, tells her of his long travels and the hard-
ships yet to come, as he heard of them from Teiresias (23.251–253). Cf. also Planinc 2003, 85, 
64–110 (“Ascent, the Phaedrus”).
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the goddess, who resides beyond the Gates of Day and night, as known from He-
siod’s Theogony. Yet, the local indications given by Parmenides turn the Hesiodic 
topography upside down, in an attempt to refute it.41 In this respect, Plato seems 
to echo Parmenides in the myth of Er in the Republic, where the souls in Hades 
envision the heavens just before choosing their next incarnation. What is more, 
the description of the heavens in the myth of Er pertains to the mechanism of the 
Universe as presented by Parmenides in the cosmological part of his poem. 
In any case, what matters in our analysis is that, similarly to Parmenides, the 
souls in the Phaedrus undertake their journey in winged chariots to a locus incertus, 
which resides beyond mortal reach, where they are initiated to the truth of being. 
Moreover, Plato follows the pattern of the Parmenidean account of being, in order 
to present his own account of the immortality of the soul. It is striking that he as-
cribes to the soul most of the attributes that the Parmenidean goddess confers on 
being in a similar argumentative fashion.42 In other words, Plato makes use of the 
Parmenidean formulation concerning being in order to prove the soul unbegotten 
and indestructible and thus exempt from generation and corruption. Similarly to 
Parmenides, Plato presents the strict rational arguments on the immortality of 
the soul as a revelation to the initiate. This revelation does not entail a vision, but 
a teaching of a logos, which can only be perceived by the divine Intellect (Nous), 
as opposed to the human senses.43 Likewise in the Phaedrus, the so-called vision 
that the divine intelligence beholds in its pre-incarnate state is not to be grasped 
by sight, but by logos. Accompanied by all other immortals, the divine intelli-
gence envisions the heaven which is above heavens in the following manner: 
The divine intelligence… beholds… knowledge absolute, not in the form of 
generation or of relation, which men call Being,44 but knowledge absolute 
in Being absolute.
Plato’s preoccupation with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and its di-
vine origin seems to be closely entangled with the narrative of the incarnation of 
the soul, to the extent that the soul and more particularly its divine part, the Nous, 
envisions absolute truth before entering the body. In the Phaedrus, the Symposium, 
and the Republic, Plato explains the knowledge of forms in terms of recollection of 
41 Chrysakopoulou 2015.
42 “Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning; but the be-
ginning is begotten of nothing, for if it were begotten of something, then the begotten would 
not come from a beginning. But if unbegotten, it must also be indestructible; for if beginning 
were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, nor anything out of a begin-
ning…”
  Similarly, the Parmenidean goddess teaches Parmenides that “One path only is left for us 
to speak of, namely, that It is. In it are very many tokens that what is, is unbegotten and in-
destructible… If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future. Thus is 
becoming extinguished and passing away”(28 B 8, 18–20 DK).
43 28 B 2,1–5; 28 B 3; 28 B 7, 2–6 DK.
44 28 B 8 DK.
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the beatific vision encountered by the soul before incarnation. On the other hand, 
this vision is explicitly described in Eleatic terms, if we consider the Parmenidean 
poem to be the first example of a rational account of truth presented as a religious 
revelation. Similarly to Parmenides, Plato presents the vision of truth as the last 
stage of the student’s initiation by his master, who is invested with religious at-
tributes. Likewise, the vision of truth marks the end of Diotima’s teaching in the 
Symposium: once more, this vision of truth, described by Diotima to Socrates, is 
very similar in inspiration to the account of truth that the Parmenidean goddess 
reveals to the youth:45
He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love… when he comes 
toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty… 
beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting… This, my dear Socra-
tes said the Visitor from Mantinea, is that life above all others which man 
should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute… Remember how… 
beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring 
forth, not images of beauty, but realities… and bringing forth and nour-
ishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal… Would 
that be an ignoble life?
It is also noteworthy that Diotima presents her teaching as a mathema leading to a 
bios, two terms closely related to the Pythagorean tradition.46 Yet what bears the 
mark of Diotima’s teaching in the Symposium is the relationship that she estab-
lishes between eros and procreation.47 It is precisely this relationship that could 
have served as a model for Socratic maieutics in the Theaetetus. In her last words 
in the Symposium, Diotima underlines that this kind of bios that she proposes does 
not lead to bringing forth images of beauty, but to realities. Similarly, Socrates in 
the Theaetetus describes his teaching as an initiation to the mystery of the birth 
of true knowledge,48 or to the abortion of false perceptions (161d). This initiation 
(muesis) echoes maieusis to the extent that it is parallel to the initiation led by the 
female seer, who is introduced by Socrates in the Symposium (201d) as his wise 
and skillful teacher in matters of Eros and procreation in the philosophical sense 
of the word.49
45 Waithe 1987, 85.
46 Proclus makes of Diotima a Pythagorean (Comment to the Republic, VIII).
47 On the question of procreation as a model for Eros within the frame of Dionysian religion 
see Acker 2008.
48 See Lesher 1969, 73: “Maeutics in its negative sense leads to the abortion of what is not sus-
tainable by reason.” See also Sedley 2004, 34: “Refutation: The requirement that a midwife 
should be able to recognize a false or unviable offspring (105b9–c3) makes Socrates an expert 
at exposing falsehood in argument, thus (210b11–c5) disabusing people of the belief that 
they know what in fact they do not know. This in fact is the most important of his maieutic 
skills (105b9–c3).”
49 See Halperin 1990.
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Similarly to Diotima in the Symposium, in the Theaetetus Socrates presents 
his philosophical teaching to Theaetetus as an initiation to mysteries (mello soi 
ta musteria legein, 156a) and promises to him that they will together extract the 
hidden truths: apokekrummenen aletheian (155e, 156c). Another striking analogy 
between Theaetetus in the eponymous dialogue and young Socrates in the Sym-
posium is related to their initial difficulty in following their master’s teaching. 
Socrates’ lack of understanding is expressed by marvelling at Diotima’s wisdom 
(ethaumazon te sophie, 206c) in a similar way to how Theaetetus exclaims thaumazo 
at Socrates’ elenchos. Yet, Socrates encourages him not to give up his search for 
truth, by revealing to him that this state of perplexity (thauma) is the beginning 
of philosophizing. He proceeds by giving Theaetetus a mythological explanation 
of the notion of wonder (thauma) according to Hesiod: Thaumas is the father of 
Iris, who was the first messenger of the Olympian gods in the Iliad, replaced by 
Hermes in the Odyssey. 
This is another important clue to the parallelism between Socrates’ and Di-
otima’s teaching: at the beginning of her account, Diotima employs the terms 
hermeneuon (interpreting) and diaporthmeuon (transporting), in order to describe 
Eros as a daimon, between mortals and immortals. Both terms are closely related 
to Hermes (herme-neuon), the messenger of the Olympian gods par excellence and 
Iris’s male equivalent. Nevertheless, what is significant for our enquiry is that the 
two participles ascribed to Eros allude to Hermes the psycho-pomp, transporting 
by water (diaporthmeuon) the souls of the dead across the river Styx to Hades.
Diotima, the priestess of Eros, and Socrates in his role as philosophers’ midwife 
are also presented as intermediary figures, describing themselves as psycho-
pomps, transporting the souls of their students-initiates from one realm to the 
other. This is reminiscent of the pompe, the escorting of Parmenides to the halls of 
the goddess beyond mortal reach (ektos patou), who reassures him that he should 
not be afraid of a bad fate, moira kake being the equivalent of physical death in the 
epic tradition.50         
   
If we combine the Phaedrus, the Symposium, and the Theaetetus we can come up 
with a general idea of what is involved in Socratic teaching as initiation, driven by 
eros for wisdom. The task of the philosophers’ midwife is to reawaken the beatific 
vision of true being, which the soul of the beholder witnessed in its prenatal exis-
50 It is noteworthy at this point that Parmenides in the second part of his poem ascribes to 
birth the adjective “stugera,” which is directly derivative from river Styx, another element 
which shows the close connection between birth and death in his poem. Besides, the identity 
between generation and corruption is a common theme for Xenophanes, Parmenides, Hera-
clitus and Empedocles, the four thinkers that Plato brings together in his proto-doxography 
in the Sophist. Likewise, despite the apparent paradox, the relation Diotima establishes be-
tween the god of Eros and birth, ultimately leads to the otherworld, where the soul, the im-
mortal principle in human nature prepares for its re-incarnation, after beholding the vision 
of truth. 
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tence.51 Triggered by eros for true wisdom and knowledge, the philosophical soul 
recovers from its amnesia of the vision of truth and gives birth to truth. Just as 
in Diotima’s speech the eros for another person leads to reproduction, and repro-
duction to the immortality of the species, so the eros for wisdom makes the phi-
lo-sopher pregnant with knowledge. Bringing forth and nourishing the offspring 
of truth leads to immortality. In other words, procreation in Diotima’s account 
leads to the rebirth of knowledge in the soul of the beholder. This knowledge is 
related to a kind of life that transgresses mortal barriers, when the soul, the prin-
ciple of immortality according to Plato, is separated from the mortal body. This 
is the reason why the birth of knowledge in the soul is also associated with the 
death of the body, when the soul is transported to the other world to choose its 
next reincarnation. Metempsychosis is thus used as a narrative device to support 
the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which accounts for a priori knowledge, 
requiring a midwife-psychopomp to bring it back to light. 
At the very end of the Republic, the relation between the life of the soul, phys-
ical death, and rebirth through metempsychosis is again associated with the vi-
sion of invisible beauty. Plato closes his Republic with the myth of Er, who comes 
back from Hades, the realm of the invisible, where the souls linger before choos-
ing their next incarnation. Returning back to life, he relates what he witnessed in 
the other world as a histor or theoros: he was told by the judges seated in between 
the two worlds in a topos daimonios52 that he was to be the messenger who would 
carry the report of the other world to men. Similarly to Hermes and Iris, Er is 
introduced by Socrates as the herald transporting divine wisdom to humans. 
As is the case in Parmenides, the Theaetetus, and the Symposium, the “initiate” is 
prompted to become the messenger of what is imperceptible to all other mortals 
in this world (aggelos genesthai anthropois ton ekei) (also compare with Empedocles 
in my article). 
Thus, Er becomes the witness of the other world par excellence, namely Hades. 
Then again, it is in the realm of the invisible that Er is said to have witnessed 
‘’sights of unfathomable beauty’’ (theas amechanous to kallos) (615a). Once more, 
Plato construes the invisible realm as the stage of a beauty beyond perception. 
Those sights pertaining to the mechanism of the universe reflect the manner in 
which Parmenides presents his cosmology in the second part of his poem. Yet, 
what differs in the Platonic description of the universe is the introduction of the 
cosmic music, echoing the Pythagorean music of the spheres: the three Fates, who 
are responsible for the souls’ incarnation, are also the singers of a cosmic sym-
phony on the Pythagorean model. Invisible beauty is thus transmitted by celestial 
music, which cannot be heard by ears in this world, but only by the soul in the 
otherworld. 
51 On pangs of childbirth, cf. Phaedr. 251e–252a.
52 This place is very similar in description to the premises of the Parmenidean goddess in the 
Proemium: note the use of the expression “chasm’ achanes” in 28 B 1 DK. On the question of 
the resemblances between the Parmenidean poem and the myth of Er see Morisson 1955.
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Similarly to the vision of truth which cannot be seen with the eyes, such music 
is not audible to the ears, but is again visible to the eyes of the soul during its 
pre-incarnate state. The beauty of the universe can only be “heard” by the Nous, 
which transcends all senses by comprising them. The phenomenon of sunaesthe-
sia,53 which Plato employs as a metaphor for the supra-sensorial, is widely cited in 
Greek drama, especially when referring to the art of divination. To this effect, Pla-
to enshrouds his philosophical enterprise in the cloak of initiation, following the 
example of Parmenides and Empedocles, as is shown by lexicographical evidence. 
Yet, beauty as an attribute of the vision of truth is undoubtedly Plato’s addition. 
What is more, this notion of beauty is closely bound to the notion of celestial mu-
sical harmony, belonging exclusively to the Pythagoreans, not to mention that the 
vision of celestial music is only to be seen by the soul before its transmigration, 
a doctrine which was first attributed to Pythagoras. Last but not least, the soul 
attending the vision of truth is presented as a theoros, a stance which encapsulates 
Pythagoras’ fundamental attitude towards the world according to the tradition, 
which makes him the first thinker to use the term “philosopher” in its technical 
sense,54 as developed later by Plato and the Platonic legacy: 
And therefore it is just that the mind of the philosopher only has wings, 
for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with 
those things the communion with which causes God to be divine. Now 
a man who employs such memories rightly is always being initiated into 
perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly perfect (Plat. Phaedr. 249c).
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Aristotle and the Pythagorean Myths of Metempsychosis
Gabriele Cornelli – University of Brasília
Introduction
It is fair to say that, from its very beginnings, tradition has associated the theory 
of transmigration with the figure of Pythagoras. Casadesús (2011) has recently 
provided a comprehensive review and bibliography of the earlier literature on the 
topic. Nonetheless, on this topic “the discussion still heats up wildly,” as Zeller 
used to say (Zeller / Mondolfo 1938, 560), and this is true even now. A recent paper 
by Betegh (2014), for example, as well as several recent works by Bernabé have 
contributed to keeping discussion on the topic alive.
In fact, the transmigration of the soul, eternal return, and universal kinship 
are listed by Porphyry as the doctrines that tradition considers to be the central 
doctrines of the historical Pythagoras. Let us consider the passage:
Some of his [Pythagoras’] statements gained almost general notoriety: 
1) that the soul is immortal, 2) that it transmigrates into other species of 
living beings, 3) that, periodically, what once happened, happens again, 
nothing is absolutely new, and 4) that all living things should be consid-
ered of the same genre. It seems that Pythagoras himself introduced these 
beliefs to Greece for the first time.1
This Porphyrian summary of Pythagoras’ most famous doctrines immediately 
brings us to the heart of the problem. It is clear that his account contains no ref-
erence to mathematics or astronomy, nor even to cosmology or politics, despite 
the critical role these other doctrines have played in the definition of Pythagore-
anism in other strands of the tradition, in particular those corresponding to the 
Aristotelian texts.
Porphyry’s claim that these doctrines originated in Pythagoreanism therefore 
brings up at once the issue of the historiographical categorization of the move-
ment: that is, the great diversity of forms of knowledge and the difficulties in 
articulating them within a coherent philosophical-scientific system.
Although it is historically late, Porphyry’s summary is certainly an excellent 
gateway into the discussion. It is a fine starting point if only because the tradition 
traces the passage back to Aristotle’s pupil, Dicearchus.2
1 Porph. VP 19.
2 Burkert 1972, 122–123, despite resistance from both Rathmann 1933, 3 ff. and Wehrli, who 
does not admit chapter 19 of Porphyry to his volume devoted to Dicaearchus (Wehrli 1944), 
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The first doctrine quoted by Porphyry (VP 19), that of the transmigration of the 
soul, is connected to a widely documented tradition about Pythagoras’ theory of 
the afterlife: these are traditions that are inserted into the model of archaic wis-
dom that Betegh (2006) fittingly defined as a “journey model.” The wise philos-
opher travels beyond the limits of time and space, even to the world beyond the 
grave, acquiring knowledge normally unattainable by other mortals.3
This transmigration of the soul was called metempsychosis in the Greek 
world. Even though the term metempsychosis first appeared only in the first cen-
tury AD, with Diodorus Siculus (10.6,1), and was quickly applied to Pythagoras, 
its etymology points to a much older origin of the term: in fact – contrary to what 
was thought both in antiquity and among many contemporary scholars – the ety-
mology of the word does not indicate the “entry” of something into the soul, and 
it does not even derive directly from the word psyche. Rather, as Casadio rightly 
notes:
It was formed from the verb empsychoo, “to animate” (which in turn is 
connected through empsychos and psyche to the verb psycho, “to blow”), to 
which the preverb meta (Lat. trans), which denotes not only change, but 
also succession or repetition, and the suffix sis, denoting abstract action, 
were added.4
Therefore, the origin and even the usage of metempsychosis denotes the idea of 
blowing the soul back into a body. The cycle is thus conceived as a series of acts 
of inhaling the life-soul, an image which refers to the pneuma in the interior of 
a body and is clearly dependent on the Ionian physical conception of aer. Anax-
imenes fragment 2 links the three terms psyche, pneuma, and aer in the same sen-
tence: “as they say, our soul, which is air, holds us together, thus, air and breath 
keep the entire cosmos together” (13 B 2 DK). This indicates a strong continuity, 
supports this traditional attribution, along with Rohde 1871, 566; Burnet 1908, 92; Lévy 1926, 
50; and Zeller / Mondolfo 1938, 314. He adds clearly convincing arguments, grounded in 
the passage’s skeptical tone, which certainly cannot be attributed to Porphyry, a believer. 
It would more plausibly be a creation of Dicaearchus, Aristotle’s skeptical student, who in 
other fragments reveals the same skepticism and irony; he stated, for example, that the soul 
is simply a word (fr. 7 Wehrli), and that Pythagoras was, in the past, a beautiful courtesan 
(fr. 36 Wehrli). For a new edition of Dicaearchus’ texts see Mirhady 2001.
3  Our investigation does not allow us to develop an account of the archaic journey model. It is 
helpful to refer to Betegh’s discussion (2006) for the formulation of the model, as well as to 
two recent studies that develop a variation of this model, κατάβασις, that is, the journey to 
Hades (Cornelli 2007; Ustinova 2009). Memories of κατάβασις are widely attested within the 
literature on Pythagoreanism. Among them, of course, is the story of the Thracian Zalmoxis, 
narrated by Herodotus (4.94–95), whose discipleship to Pythagoras will be discussed below.
4 Casadio 1991, 122–123, orig.: “si è formato a partire dal verbo empsychóō, ‘animare’ (che a sua 
volta è collegato, attraverso émpsychos e psyché ̅ al verbo psýcho,  ‘soffiare’), cui è stato aggiun-
to il preverbio meta (lat. trans) denotante non solo il cambiamento ma anche la successione 
o ripetizione e il suffissale –sis denotante l’azione astratta.” See for the ancient debate espe-
cially Olympiodorus (In Phaed. 135 Westerink); for the contemporary debate Kerényi 1950, 24 
and von Fritz 1957, 89 n. 1.
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
95Aristotle and the Pythagorean Myths of Metempsychosis
at least in relation to these mantics of “metempsychosis,” with the oldest concep-
tions of soul-breath-life.5
What matters most for the aim of this paper is that the tradition, from its very 
beginnings, associates the theory of transmigration with the figure of Pythagoras.
Pre-Aristotelian testimonies
I shall summarize my present concerns about all the pre-Aristotelian traditions 
on this topic, rather than discuss each one of them in detail. This is primarily, of 
course, for reasons of economy, but secondly because I have already discussed 
them more closely in my last book (Cornelli 2013).
The oldest testimonies attributing the doctrine to Pythagoras suggest to me 
two different hermeneutic routes. First, although old, the theory of the immor-
tality of the soul, apocalyptic by its very nature, does not imply the existence 
of a dogmatic system of beliefs. That is to say that, across the various strata of 
the Pythagorean tradition, the concept of this immortality significantly differed. 
Second, and as a result of the first route, it turned out to be necessary to verify 
how the reception of the theory by later sources contributed to the construction, 
through it, of the category of Pythagoreanism. The testimonies of Xenophanes, 
Heraclitus, Ion, and Empedocles suggest that metempsychosis is quite an old the-
ory, corresponding to the proto-Pythagorean stratum. For the same reasons given 
above, I will not say much about Plato on this topic: I still believe that Plato is a 
reliable source for the existence of a proto-Pythagorean theory of the soul and 
for a close relationship between that same theory and its Orphic origin.6 This 
relationship was described as a mytho-logic exegesis by Pythagoreanism of the 
Orphic traditions, in the manner of the Derveni papyrus. In short, Plato, reveal-
ing his debts to Orphism, ends up pointing directly to the philosophical blending 
that Pythagoreanism must have developed from the former. A recent paper by 
Betegh (2014), dedicated to a reassessment of the relationship between Orphism 
and Pythagoreans, suggests the need for a refinement of Burkert’s classic image 
of overlapping circles. It is probably worth reminding ourselves here of Burkert’s 
idea (1985, 300): “Bacchic, Orphic, and Pythagoreans are circles each of which has 
is own centre, and while these circles have areas that coincide, each preserves 
its own special sphere.” Betegh is probably right to point out something that the 
image could wrongly suggest: the borders of the circles, and the contents of each, 
are fairly indistinct and one should not expect to find clear internal consistency 
or fixed borders (2014, 153).
The testimonies of Herodotus, Isocrates, and Democritus, and the legends of 
immortality and apparent deaths, and especially those focused on Pythagoras’ 
own effective metempsychosis, such as that in Heraclides Ponticus (D. L. 8.4-5 = 
Heraclid. Fragment 89 Wehrli), do not permit firm philological or hermeneutic 
5 See for this continuity, the observations of Casadio 1991, 142 and Bernabé 2004, 76–78.
6 See more recently on the topic Bernabé (2011).
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conclusions. So I feel entitled to skip to Aristotle himself to find the most explicit 
testimony of the existence of a proto-Pythagorean theory of metempsychosis. 
Aristotle’s testimony
I used to disagree with a part of the history of criticism which has worked with 
the assumption that Aristotle’s testimony is valid. Since Cherniss (1935 and 1944), 
with his attempts to reassess the validity of Aristotle’s (as well as Plato’s) testimo-
ny about the Presocratic philosophers, I found myself convinced that Aristotle is 
not, in any of the works we have, attempting to give a historical account of earlier 
philosophy. He is using these theories as interlocutors in the artificial debates 
which he sets up to lead “inevitably” to his own solutions.7
However, at least in this case, Aristotle himself provides the most explic-
it philosophical testimony to the existence of a Pythagorean doctrine of 
metempsychosis. A passage from De Anima reveals the difficulty of attrib-
uting a coherent theory of metempsychosis to the early Pythagoreans. Ar-
istotle seems initially to complain about this difficulty: 
All that these [philosophers] do is describe the nature of the soul; they do 
not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it 
were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed 
by any body.8
Centrone (1996, 105) suggests that this complaint by Aristotle depends more on 
omissions (or lack of coherence) within the writings to which he was referring 
than on a lack of information on the issue, which would contradict the testimo-
nies that indicate that he was in possession of several Pythagorean writings.
Indeed, Chapter 2 of Book 2 of the De Anima, which examines contemporary 
doctrines about the nature and properties of the soul, engages in an extensive 
critique of the inadequacy of all the theories of his predecessors, both in relation 
to failing to understand what the specific properties of the soul are, and espe-
cially for failing to pay attention to the crucial issue of the relationship between 
soul and body. In fact, “the philosophers,” that is, his predecessors, fuse the soul 
to the body by “conjugation” (synaptousin) or “juxtaposition” (titheasin), without 
adding any specification of the reason for their union, or of the bodily conditions 
required for it (De an. 407b13-17).
The Pythagorean myths mentioned in the passage constitute one of the most 
significant examples of this error. The absurdity (atopon, v. 13) of the explanation 
7 Cherniss 1935, xii. See also Cherniss 1935, 349–350, 356–357. Burnet 1908, 56 had already 
begun to distrust Aristotle’s editorial choices, speaking of this habit of his of “putting things 
in his own way, regardless of historical considerations.” See also Schofield (2012) for a recent 
broader discussion of the Pythagorean discussion of Metaphysics A5 as Aristotle’s attempt to 
depict a “mainstream Pythagoreanism” in his account of the school (2012, 143).
8 De an. 407b20–23.
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put forward by both Plato’s Timaeus, as well as all previous theories of the soul 
(see 13–14), is visually exemplified by the following image:
It is as absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could embody itself in 
flutes. Instead, each art must use its tools, each soul its body.9
The soul, in the elegant image of Aristotle, resembles an art. As such, it requires 
its own instrument, that is, a body. This is contrary to the assumption of the Py-
thagorean myths that any soul can enter any body.
This immediately brings to mind metempsychosis.10 The very movement in-
dicated by the verb endyesthai, the soul’s act of “entering” the body, evokes the 
image of transmigration.11 Several scholars, however, have raised problems in re-
lation to Aristotle’s reference to metempsychosis at De Anima 407b20–23. Zeller 
perceives a contradiction between this passage’s explanation of the myths and 
the moralized elements of Pythagorean metempsychosis:
The theory of the soul that enters the newly-born within the air of its 
first breath, casually and however it may chance (kata tous Pythagorikous 
mythous, writes Aristotle in the above passage), probably contributes to 
demonstrating its deficiency in comparison with the doctrine of transmi-
gration, where reincarnation must somehow represent (as is said in the 
myth of Er) a consequence of the previous life, thus requiring a match 
between the temperament (krasis) of the soul and the body in which it en-
ters.12
The reference to the kind of entrance of the soul to the body prompts a 
tendency to understand this passage in light of the previous one from 
404a16 ff., where the soul-dust would have corpuscular features, as dis-
cussed above.13
Indeed, the theory of metempsychosis implies moral responsibility in life, fol-
lowed by a post-mortem trial, which contradicts the idea of randomness repre-
sented by the repetition of the adjective tychon (and by the phrase “any soul in 
 9 De an. 407b24–26.
10 This theory is called μῦθος also in Plato (Gorg. 492e).
11 See for this Kranz (Diels-Kranz 1951 I, 504, 7–9).
12 Zeller / Mondolfo 1938, 562, orig.: “La teoria dell’anima che entra nel neonato dall’atmosfera 
circostante con il primo respiro, a caso e come càpiti (katá toûs Pythagorikoûs mýthous, dice 
Aristotele nel luogo sopra citato) viene probabilmente a mostrare in pieno il suo difetto nella 
sua connessione con la dottrina della trasmigrazione; dove la reincarnazione deve pur rap-
presentare (com’è detto nel mito di Er) una conseguenza della vita anteriore, ed esige quindi 
una corrispondenza fra il temperamento (krâsis) dell’anima e quello del corpo in cui entra.” 
13 Cf. Timpanaro Cardini 1958–1962, III, 213; Maddalena 1964, 340–341; and Guthrie 1962, 129 
and 260.
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any body”).14 Most scholars (Burkert 1972, 121 n. 3) seem to consider that Aristotle 
is referring, in this specific case, not to a single soul and a body, but rather to the 
general nature of the relationship between bodies and souls.
Timpanaro Cardini also displays skepticism over whether the passage refers to 
metempsychosis, but she advances an original and smart explanation for this. Ac-
cording to her, the example of the carpenter and the flutes unmistakably indicates 
that the passage cannot refer to metempsychosis, and should instead be simply 
understood as referring to the association between body and soul. The reason 
for this is that it would not make sense that the art of the luthier be considered 
by Aristotle as separate from the flute because, in order to improve his ability, 
that is, his art, the luthier needs the flute as the soul needs the body (Timpanaro 
Cardini 1958–1962, vol. 3, 214). However, Alesse 2000, 403 n. 23 rightly notes that 
Timpanaro Cardini’s reading depends on a mistaken translation of τεκτονική: 
Timpanaro Cardini believes that this is the art of the luthier, while it would be 
more plausible that Aristotle was referring in this case, to the art of the flute play-
er, that is the flute can be used only by one who possesses the art of playing that 
instrument to perfection. Aristotle would be saying here: this would be the flute 
player, not the luthier. The terms of similarity, however, are quite clear: on the one 
hand, art and soul, on the other, the flute and the body; just as the body stands 
in relation to the soul, the flute is the matter that is predisposed to accept the art 
form of the flautist, and only from him or her, not the art of the carpenter-luthier. 
Cherniss (1935, 325 n. 130) suspects that the passage could refer more precisely to 
the Platonic theory of the Timaeus that there is a choice of the body after the first 
life, thus representing more an anti-Platonic polemic than an anti-Pythagorean 
position. However this is read, the reference to metempsychosis remains in the 
passage, which is what is most directly relevant to our investigation.
A few pages later in the De Anima, Aristotle seems to refine the critique in 
407b by indicating that the problem is more specifically that souls enter different 
bodies:
The body cannot be the actuality of the soul; it is the soul which is the ac-
tuality of a certain kind of body. Hence the rightness of the view that the 
soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot be a body. In fact, it is not a 
body but something relative to a body, and that is why it is in a body, and 
a body of a definite kind, but not as former thinkers thought, who merely 
fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind or the 
qualities of that body, even if it is evident that any one thing cannot receive 
any other thing.15
14 Rathmann 1933, 17 ff. agrees with Zeller as much as Maddalena 1964, 340 and Casertano 
1987, 19 f.
15 De an. 414a18–25.
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Aristotle’s criticism must be understood within the context of his theory of the 
soul as the entelecheia of a body, by which it performs the functions that are al-
ready potentially in the matter which constitutes the body. Therefore, even if it 
is evident that “any one thing cannot receive any other thing,” to claim that any 
body can receive any soul is still to operate at too high a level of generality – only 
a specific kind of body can receive a specific kind of soul, echoing the same idea 
expressed in 407b, in which it is written that “any soul could be clothed by any-
body” (v. 23).
Aristotle’s criticism in the two passages is directed at Pythagorean metempsy-
chosis. Aristotle could not admit the possibility of a soul entering into a body of 
which it is not the entelecheia, as would happen in the case of the transmigration 
of a human soul into an inferior animal body. 
In addition to the theory of entelecheia, a principle of subsumption, in which 
a higher form contains within itself the lower form, “as a quadrangle contains 
the triangle” (De an. 414b31), is also at stake in Aristotle’s critique. The same goes 
for living forms, since “the case of the figures is similar to that of the soul” (De 
an. 414b29). However, the opposite is not true; incidentally, it is absurd (De an. 
407b13). This is quite a Pythagorean approach from Aristotle, I would say, in that 
it connects figures and souls.
Of course, the Aristotelian attack here is directed not only at the theory of me-
tempsychosis, but also at the logically related theory that Porphyry (VP 19), among 
others, considered to be notoriously Pythagorean, namely universal kinship.
In any case, we can conclude that page 414a of the De anima not only refers 
specifically to metempsychosis, but that it is a continuation of the immediately 
preceding passage at 407b. The Pythagorean myths of that page can be under-
stood, therefore, as the theories of metempsychosis of the soul. 
More difficult – although central to our discussion – is to determine whether 
these Aristotle passages refer to proto-Pythagoreanism, or, conversely, to the Py-
thagoreanism of Philolaus and Archytas, who was contemporary to him.
The term mythoi, used to indicate these doctrines, is a sign that Aristotle con-
sidered the mold but not necessarily devoid of all truth. Decisive proof of this is 
that he bothers to refute them. The semantic scope of the terms mythos or mythol-
ogein is often connected in the work of Aristotle with that of theologoi and palaioi, 
indicating not so much a decline in the theoretical value of the doctrines, but 
more precisely obsoleteness. Such mythoi have insufficiently developed logical 
arguments and simply do not fit the “contemporary” way of doing science.16 Ar-
istotle considers Homer, Hesiod, and the Orphics, but also some physiologists, 
to be θεολόγοι and παλαίοι: this is the case also with the Pythagoreans, in Met. 
1091a34–b12, who are there called θεολόγοι in the context of the discussion of the 
number one and the dyad which resumes the discussion of book A on the sub-
16 See Met. 1074b1, 1091b9; Pol. 1269b28, 1341b3; De caelo 284a23.
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ject, in which the Pythagoreans are clearly cited as being in opposition to Plato 
(Met. 987b14–988a8).
Consider the page of the Metaphysics dedicated to the idea of the divine that 
surrounds nature:
A tradition in myth form was passed onto posterity from the old and an-
cient, according to which these realities are gods, and the divine encloses 
the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition was added later to persuade 
the people and to make them subject to the laws and to the common goods. 
In fact, they say these gods are in human form or are similar to certain 
animals and add to these other things of the same or similar nature. If, of 
all of them, regardless of the rest, we assume only the fundamental point, 
that is, the claim that the first substances are gods, we must recognize this 
as being made by divine inspiration.17
The theoretical core of the theory, according to Aristotle, should be considered as 
still valid. However, even if the theory is valid, these mythological arguments are 
the wrong kind of justification for the theory. Similarly, the Pythagorean myths, 
however ancient, received critical consideration in the passages discussed above.
Therefore, it is very likely that by the expression “Pythagorean myths” Aristo-
tle is referring to the early Pythagorean doctrines.18 A further proof of this is that 
the expression is never used in the argumentation Aristotle makes when discuss-
ing Pythagorean mathematics, for example, which only goes back to sources from 
the fifth century BC, such as Philolaus, and whom Aristotle identifies in Book A 
of the Metaphysics as the “so-called Pythagoreans.”19
Another lexical mark of this antiquity is the verb used by Aristotle in the pas-
sage from the De Anima (407b20–23) to indicate metempsychosis: endyomai, “to 
enter” (the soul enters into the body). The same verb is used by Herodotus to 
describe the transmigration of the soul when indicating the Egyptian origin of 
the theory of metempsychosis (Hdt. 2.123, see 3.5). In Plato, the verb is used in two 
passages to indicate the metempsychosis of a soul that was in a man and enters 
into an animal: “asses and other beasts of that sort” (Phaed. 82a), or “an ape” in 
the case of the ridiculous Thersites’ soul within the myth of Er (Resp. X 620c). The 
two Platonic passages illustrate precisely what Aristotle sees as an absurd conse-
quence of the theory of metempsychosis: the possibility of a human soul entering 
into the body of an inferior animal.
If we enlarge the meaning of the verb ἐνδύομαι to the semantic sphere of “to 
dress” (Alesse 2000, 409–411), which also belongs to it, the verb would point im-
mediately to a wide range of images of the body as a garment of the soul, present 
in both the Platonic writings (Phaed. 86e–88b) and in Empedocles’ fragment 126. 
17 Met. 1074b1–10.
18 See in this sense Alesse 2000, 408.
19 For this identification of the Pythagorean doctrines of Book A of the Metaphysics with Philo-
laus’ Pythagoreanism see Burkert 1972, 236–238; Centrone 1996, 105; and Huffman 1993.
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A garment also has the meaning of a tomb in the tradition of the body as the tomb 
of the soul, which is close to an Orphic sensitivity.
The Aristotelian vocabulary of the passage suggests, therefore, that it refers 
to the ancient traditions of the theory of metempsychosis, which Aristotle calls 
“Pythagorean myths,” probably recognizing proto-Pythagoreanism as the source 
of these doctrines on the immortality of the soul and its transmigration. Aristotle 
thus becomes one of the most reliable sources for the attribution of the theory of 
metempsychosis to the older Pythagoreans.
Conclusion: universal kinship and metempsychosis
It is worth mentioning that attributing a theory of metempsychosis to proto-Py-
thagoreanism means much more than simply recognizing a dialogue between the 
latter and the Orphic culture of its time. For, in itself, the theory of transmigration 
of the immortal soul assumes the theory of universal kinship.20 This theory is 
also implied by Empedocles fragment 129 and is not only a logical consequence 
of the very theory of metempsychosis, but embodies a general law of how the 
cosmos works that embraces past and future, and both human beings and other 
living beings, in a coherent explanation of how life in the universe works. With its 
attributes of a totalizing explanation and basis in the premise that the cosmos and 
life are eternal, this doctrine can certainly be regarded as a genuine expression 
of the kind of knowledge in the history of philosophy which has generally been 
called Presocratic.
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1 Introduction: Pythagoras and medieval encyclopaedias
Anyone trying to reconstruct the image of Pythagoras in the Middle Ages must 
first grant that the sources available to the Latin scholarly world were scant.1 
Theologians and philosophers of the period from AD 500 to 1400 had almost 
nothing that could take them further than the patchwork of references in classi-
cal Latin literature. Nonetheless, Pythagoras was very much present in the Latin 
Middle Ages, albeit, as will be shown below, in two very different strains.2 One 
strain linked him with popular philosophy, with texts that addressed a broad 
public, often without Latin, in histories of philosophy, vademecums, and proverb 
collections. A second tradition brought Pythagoras into the philosophy of the 
universities, namely the academic theology of the summas and sententia collec-
tions, but here, as we will see, a single doctrine was taken as a synonym for the 
philosophy of Pythagoras, namely the transmigration of souls.
In the first of these two groups of medieval Latin genres – the lay ethical works 
and the compilations and collections of popular philosophy – Pythagoras had a 
secure position, and the breadth of the transmission of these works can hardly be 
overstated. Pythagoras became a proverbial source of conventional wisdom and 
he was established as the founder of both philosophy and music theory. Asceti-
cism, moderation in all things, and emotional control were the signature features 
of Pythagorean doctrine. The same information, by and large, recurs in doxogra-
phies, collections of dicta, and encyclopaedias that include philosophy, and the 
result is a relatively unified picture.3 If we look up Pythagoras in the Lives of the 
philosophers which long circulated under the name of Walter Burghley and the 
Compendiloquium of John of Wales,4 in the thirteenth century the most important 
medieval history of philosophy, we find well-established traditions of tralaticious 
1 This chapter has been translated from German by Orla Mulholland.
2 A basic and well researched study of the role of Pythagoras in medieval Latin literature has 
been made by Maaz 1998, 385–417.
3 On Pythagoras in medieval doxographies and encyclopedias, see Maaz 1998, 403–406, 414–416.
4 Ps.-Walter Burghley 1886, c. 17, Old Spanish and Latin, 66–81; John of Wales 1655, Florilegium 
sive compendiloqium, Pars III, Distinctio VI, c. 1–12, 234–252.
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material.5 Very similar sketches could be found already in John of Salisbury’s 
Policraticus, which was also read as a summa of ancient philosophy,6 or in the 
Speculum historiale of Vincent of Beauvais, which likewise included expansive 
treatments of the history of philosophy.7
It was the consensus of all these authors that Pythagoras had travelled to 
Egypt in pursuit of wisdom and then to Babylon for the sake of its astronomy; 
he studied the laws of Minos on Crete and those of Lycurgus in Sparta. In Cro-
ton, as was unanimously agreed in the Middle Ages, he himself had become a 
lawgiver and had set up commandments, which all stood under the maxim of 
frugalitas, to eradicate the rampant local tendency to luxury. Pythagoras removed 
children from their parents and raised them separately to ensure their chastity 
and separated the matrons from the men, to protect them from the latter’s impor-
tunities.8 Already Boethius, who devotes a few lines to Pythagoras at the start 
of his work De musica, had no doubt that Pythagoras was the source of the theo-
retical principles of music, namely the knowledge of rhythm and harmony, the 
relation of chords to each other, and the length of the strings.9 This particular role 
of Pythagoras was popularized by Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies;10 it is repeated 
both in the doxographies and in the opening chapters of late Carolingian treatis-
es on music,11 in Regino of Prüm, or the Musica enchiriadis of Hoger of Werden.12 
A second aetiology linked Pythagoras, as might be expected, with philosophy. 
Cicero had mentioned him in his Tusculan Disputations as the first to use the term 
philosophus: the sage had declared that many people came to the forum for the 
sake of pleasure, entertainment, or financial gain, but a person who went to the 
forum to study all these professions, to see their true nature, and to understand 
their essence, that was a philosopher, Pythagoras had insisted.13 Augustine had 
apostrophized Pythagoras in the City of God as founder of the applied sciences 
of life;14 Hugh of St Victor had begun his Didascalicon, his catalogue of sciences, 
with the same observation;15 nor did the doxographers overlook this special role 
of Pythagoras.16 This ennobling of the Graeco-Italian sage might seem to be di-
 5 For a good survey of John of Wales, see Schmidt 2000, here 250–258, and Swanson 1989, 167–200.
 6 John of Salisbury 1909, vol. 2, Liber VII, c. 4, 102–104.
 7 Vincent of Beauvais 1624, Liber III, c. 23–26, 94–95.
 8 Ps.-Walter Burghley 1886, c. 17, Old Spanish and Latin, 66–69, Vincent of Beauvais 1624, 
Liber III, c. 24, 94, John of Salisbury 1909, vol. 2, Liber VII, c. 4, 102–103, John of Wales 1655, 
Flo ri legium, Pars III, Distinctio VI, c. 2, 235–236. 
 9 Boethius 1872, Liber I, c. 1, 4–5. 
10 Isidore of Seville 1987, Liber III, § 2. 
11 John of Wales 1655, Florilegium, Pars III, Distinctio VI, c. 7, 243–245.
12 Regino of Prüm 1784, vol. 1, § 1, 240–241.
13 Cicero 1992, Liber V, § 9, Latin and German, 322–325.
14 Augustine of Hippo 1955, Liber VIII, c. 2, 217.
15 Hugh of Saint-Victor 1997, Liber I, c. 2, Latin and German, 116–119.
16 Ps.-Walter Burghley 1886, c. 17, Old Spanish and Latin, 68–69, Vincent of Beauvais 1624, 
Liber III, c. 23, 94, John of Salisbury 1909, vol. 2, Liber VII, c. 4, 103, John of Wales 1655, Florile-
gium, Pars III, Distinctio VI, c. 1, 234–235.
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minished by Augustine’s observation, in the same work, that Pythagoras was the 
founder not only of philosophy but also of much of necromancy, for, according 
to Augustine, Pythagoras used occult rituals and divined with blood. It is inter-
esting, however, that this observation by the Church Father exerted almost no 
influence on the medieval image of Pythagoras.17
Not only philosophical encyclopaedists like John of Salisbury, John of Wales, 
Walter Burghley, or Vincent of Beauvais,18 but also authors of preachers’ encyclo-
paedias like John of Bromyard, all stress the massive moral authority that Pythag-
oras enjoyed among his followers. Ipse dixit: mere citation of the great master’s 
apophthegm was enough to make any debate wither on the vine.19 John of Salis-
bury and John of Wales, among others, make special reference to Pythagoras’ 
vegetarianism, which had raised his influence in moral matters even higher.20 
From the Church Fathers on, and above all in Jerome’s Kohelet commentary, Py-
thagoras’ relation to his pupils and community was a feature of the ‘Lives’ of 
Pythagoras.21 The great sage judged the aptitude of his adepts from the expres-
sion on their faces; whoever passed the test was allowed to join the collective but, 
as is consistently stressed, was at first obliged to remain silent. Any member of 
the community enjoyed the solidarity of all its members, who were truly a sin-
gle heart and soul, as Vincent and Burghley underline. Likewise a commonplace 
was the exemplum cited in the Latin Middle Ages for the Pythagoreans’ distinc-
tive friendship, the proverbial amicitia of Damon and Phintias, transmitted to the 
Middle Ages primarily by Cicero and Valerius Maximus, which, as was generally 
known, stood firm even in the face of Dionysius of Syracuse.22 Burghley and the 
Compendiloquium repeat this episode,23 but so does one of the most important Lat-
in collections of exempla, the Gesta Romanorum.24
2  The enigmata tradition
A distinct unit within the medieval Pythagoras tradition is formed by the “Enig-
mata” of Pythagoras; these were transmitted through the medium of the doxog-
raphies, i. e. Vincent of Beauvais or Burghley, and also in the exempla collections 
like the Gesta and the dicta and sententia collections, i. e. collections of philo-
17 Augustine of Hippo 1955, Liber VII, c. 35, 215.
18 Ps.-Walter Burghley 1886, c. 17, Old Spanish and Latin, 70–71, Vincent of Beauvais 1624, 
Liber III, c. 24, 95, John of Salisbury 1909, vol. 2, Liber VII, c. 4, 102, John of Wales 1655, Flori-
legium, Pars III, Distinctio VI, c. 3, 236–237.
19 John of Bromyard 1516, Eucharistia, E VI, a. 8, § 28, fol. 104vb.
20 Ps.-Walter Burghley 1886, c. 17, Old Spanish and Latin, 70–71, Vincent of Beauvais 1624, 
Liber III, c. 24, 95, John of Salisbury 1909, vol. 2, Liber VII, c. 4, 103, John of Wales 1655, Flori-
legium, Pars III, Distinctio VI, c. 3, 237.
21 Jerome 1959, Liber III, c. 7, 276.
22 Cicero 1971, Liber III, § 10, 98–99; Valerius Maximus 1998, vol. 1, Liber IV, ext. 1, 282–283.
23 Ps.-Walter Burghley 1886, c. 17, Old Spanish and Latin, 72–73, John of Wales 1655, Florilegium, 
Pars III, Distinctio VI, c. 10, 247–248.
24 Gesta Romanorum 1872, c. 108, 440–442.
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sophical sayings that circulated separately from the doxographies.25 In Pythag-
oras’ case these consist of pithy, at times strikingly phrased moral saws, which, 
despite their apparent triviality, as a collection ultimately go back to Diogenes 
Laertius.26 Any historian of philosophy tempted to disdain this collection of Py-
thagoras’ sententiae on account of their commonplace character should bear in 
mind that the genre of dicta, which could bridge Latin and the vernacular and the 
Arabic and European traditions, may well have been the primary vehicle for the 
transmission of Pythagorean doctrines, ahead of all other textual genres. Qua-
si-Pythagorean sententiae, or ones that are at least ascribed to Pythagoras, can 
be found in the Fiore de virtù, a collection of sayings about virtue; this collection 
had an especially wide circulation in the Romance languages, with not only an 
Italian version, but also Spanish and Catalan ones.27 More Pythagorean sayings 
are found in a similar sententia collection, the Bocados de Oro, in the Latin version 
called the Liber philosophorum antiquorum moralium, which circulated also in En-
glish, French, and Provençal.28 It was based on an Arabic collection, the Mujtar 
al-Hikam of Abul-Wata al-Mubassir, which in turn was based on the Kitab Adab 
al-falasifa of Honain Ibn Ishaq, that is, Johannitius.29 A Hebrew version of this 
work, the Mosrei ha-filosofim of Al-Harizi, also circulated widely.30 In this forest 
of texts it is near impossible to trace how individual strands of tradition depend 
on each other. 
A connecting thread within the many traditions and variants in different ver-
naculars may be that, beside other ancient heroes of wisdom like Bias or Zeno, 
it is primarily Pythagoras who in all these collections becomes the defender of 
temperantia, of moderation, and the spokesman for sound living and emotion-
al balance. These less than earth-shaking sententiae include sayings like “Don’t 
jump over the scales” (i. e. don’t forget about justice), “Don’t smother a fire with a 
sword” (i. e. don’t provoke an angry person), “Don’t travel by public roads” (i. e. 
don’t follow the crowd), or “Don’t let a swallow nest in your house” (i. e. avoid 
gossips). The more expansive sayings are often repeated also in the works known 
as “mirrors of the laity” (Laienspiegel), such as the Speculum laicorum of John of 
Hoveden, or moral encyclopedias like the Summa praedicantium of John of Brom-
25 Ps.-Walter Burghley 1886, c. 17, Old Spanish and Latin, 74–81, Vincent of Beauvais 1624, 
Liber III, c. 25, 95.
26 Diogenes Laertius 2005, Book VIII, §§ 17–18, Greek and English, vol. 2, 334–337.
27 See the “Fiore di virtù,” ascribed to Tommaso Gozzadini, Fiore di virtù 1895a, 235–253, 431–
452; and Fiore di virtù 1895b; on its sources in addition Corti 1959, here 29–82.
28 On the wideranging tradition of the Liber philosophorum, see Franceschini 1976, passim. On 
Pythagoras see e. g. in Spanish Bocados de Oro 1971, 33, 36; in Latin Liber philosophorum morali-
um antiquorum 1931/32, 427, 429; in the medieval French of Guillaume de Tignonville, the Ditz 
Moraulx 1915, 929, 931; or in the English version of Stephen Scrope as The Dicts and Sayings of 
the Philosophers 1941, 54, 55.
29 Honain ibn Ishāq 1985, see on Pythagoras e. g. 118.
30 Al-Harizi 1896, see on Pythagoras e. g. 34.
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yard,31 or in poetry on relevant themes, such as the Architrenius of John of Hau-
villa.32 In part they had been collected already by Jerome;33 they consist of pieces 
of advice about how to live one’s life, such as “The less one suppresses anger, the 
more one becomes its slave,” “No-one speaks well who cannot also stay silent,” 
“All wealth squandered or hoarded is useless,” “Keep weariness from the body, 
arrogance from the soul, gluttony from the belly, and revolt from the state.” In 
answer to the question, “What is philosophy?,” Pythagoras is said to have replied, 
“Meditatio mortis,” the reflection on death, and to the question, “What is new 
in the world?” the answer, appropriate to the Kohelet, “Nothing.” If we believe 
the Bocados de Oro, he informed a pupil, who had admitted that he would rather 
spend time with women than with philosophers, that pigs would feel more com-
fortable in dirty water too.
3 The idea of transmigration
The Latin Middle Ages thus acquired a picture of an ethicist whose sayings, 
aimed at the Aristotelian mean, could easily be integrated into the prescriptions 
of Christian lay ethics and whose stricter demands for chastity, asceticism, and 
vegetarianism fitted just as smoothly into the Rules of the monastic orders, the 
religious elite’s catalogue of standards. The Laienspiegel and the ensemble of mo-
nastic virtues were thus equally able to profit from the ancient sayings. However, 
it was a different element of Pythagorean teachings that became the touchstone 
for dealing with Pythagoras in the Latin Middle Ages. It was well known that Py-
thagoras’ vegetarianism and chastity were only the external moral consequences 
of a metaphysics that centered on the transmigration of souls, as the doxographies 
record. Ovid, in Book 15 of the Metamorphoses, had given a speech to Pythagoras 
in which the sage proclaimed that a long chain of reincarnations had preceded 
his last life, running from the Trojans to Thales.34 Every Latin school pupil was 
familiar with this core element of Pythagoras’ doctrine, for which he had been 
criticized already by Jerome.35 John of Salisbury, John of Wales, and Vincent of 
Beauvais all stress that Pythagoras had quite rightly – and Christianly – insisted 
on the immortality of the soul, but that he had then said it migrated from body to 
body after death.36 Many stages could be expected to occur on this journey, as the 
author of the Policraticus notes: animals could become humans, humans become 
31 On John of Hoveden, see Welter 1914. As an example see John of Bromyard 1516, Consilium, 
C X1, a. 4, § 9, fol. 62v. 
32 Johannes de Hauvilla 1974, Liber VII, c. 4–6, 238–240.
33 Jerome 1883, Liber III, c. 39–40, cols. 506–509.
34 Ovid 2004, Liber XV, V. 60–478, esp. V. 156–175.
35 Jerome 1883, Liber III, c. 39–40, cols. 506–509. 
36 Ps.-Walter Burghley 1886, c. 17, Old Spanish and Latin, 78–81, Vincent of Beauvais 1624, 
Liber III, c. 25, 95, John of Salisbury 1909, vol. 2, Liber VII, c. 4, 104, John of Wales 1655, Flori-
legium, Pars III, Distinctio VI, c. 10, 249–250.
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animals again, men could even become women; all of life would appear as a great 
cycle passing on one to the other from phase to phase.37
These and similar statements admittedly remain at a superficial level. Why 
should the soul be provided with a body again after death at all? Anyone who 
wanted more detail could, already in the Carolingian period, consult Calcidius, 
whose Latin commentary on the Timaeus provided a critical introduction to the 
whole of ancient philosophy.38 The significance of this text for the speculative 
philosophy of the twelfth century can hardly be overstated.39 Calcidius draws 
a more nuanced picture of Pythagoras than was attempted by the historians of 
philosophy of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, who were bound by the lim-
itations of their textual genres. In the monumental work of Calcidius, who could 
still draw on the whole of late antique Greek philosophy, the interested reader 
could find testimonies for the Pythagorean doctrine of number, largely taken by 
Calcidius from Theon of Smyrna: monad and dyad stand in opposition to each 
other like spirit and matter, god and the world;40 the ideal number is the heptad, 
which embraces both the courses of the planets and the musical intervals;41 the 
decad presented the first so-called quadrature of 1, 2, 3, and 4.42 More important, 
however, was the idea of metempsychosis. Calcidius reported that, for Pythago-
ras, each soul had its own home in the realm of the stars, appropriate to its divine 
origin, but it was obliged to descend into the lower world to be purified. It united 
with a body, filled it, and at the moment of death separated from it again. Further 
embodiments could follow – a long chain of animal or human forms that would 
become the soul’s new lodging.43 Calcidius, matching the “Golden Verses of Py-
thagoras,” reports that, once the soul again achieved the state of perfection, it 
divested itself of corporeality, and with it the whole human person, and returned 
to the heavens.44 The redeemed and perfect souls distributed themselves among 
the planets, where they could live in a way befitting their nature.45
The anima thus existed for itself; Pythagoras had declared that in its state of 
purity it did not require embodiment, but that in other conditions it was obliged 
to migrate from body to body. As is well known, Christian philosophy since at 
latest the major sententia collections, that is the theological textbooks of the late 
37 John of Salisbury 1909, vol. 2, Liber VII, c. 10, 133–134. See on this special skill of Pythagoras 
in addition Hyginus 1992, § 112, 87. 
38 As edition see Chalcidius 1962. Recently a French translation has been produced, see Chal-
cidius 2011.
39 On the role of Chalcidius in the history of Platonism see e. g. Gersh 1986, vol. 2, 422–434, 
or Dillon 1977, 401–408. On the early medieval reception of Chalcidius see e. g. Huglo 1990, 
3–20, and e. g. Eastwood 2007, 313–372.
40 Chalcidius 1962, §§ 296–297, 298–300. 
41 Ibid., § 97, 148–150.
42 Ibid., § 35, 84–85.
43 Ibid., §§ 196–197, 217–219.
44 Ibid., § 136, 176–177.
45 Ibid., §§ 200–201, 220–221.
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twelfth century (though in fact since the Church Fathers), had favoured a dif-
ferent concept of the person, and hence also a different form of human identity, 
which was closely linked to the role of the body in resurrection and eschatology.46 
Body and soul, as form and matter, together constituted the human person. Even 
if the soul could subsist in itself, at the moment of resurrection it required the 
individual body to which it had been assigned, which completed man in his per-
sonhood. Only in matter was man’s whole individuality assured. Furthermore, 
as was unanimously stressed, it had to be entirely the same body, for only in the 
combination of form and matter was responsibility beyond death conceivable. 
The soul that was ordered back to life by God therefore did not receive merely 
a similarly designed body matching the previous one in sex and shape, though 
in an optimized form; rather, the creator removed the old body’s imperfections, 
yet the transfigured body must nonetheless consist of a substance standing in a 
direct causal relation to the original body.
4 William of Auvergne and Pythagoras
It is thus no accident that, of the range of doctrines of Pythagoras known in the 
Middle Ages, it was metempsychosis that became the focus; indeed, in this con-
text it made Pythagoras the protagonist of a view that had been refuted by the 
coherent wisdom of Christianity.47 It fell to William of Auvergne in the early thir-
teenth century to present a systematic examination of the Pythagorean doctrine 
of the transmigration of souls. The fact that this French theologian made the ef-
fort shows at the least that in this period it was felt that the Pythagorean doc-
trine merited this attention. It would be tempting to suggest that contemporary 
heretics from the sphere of the Cathars could have been William’s justification in 
undertaking this task, but this suggestion must remain speculation.48 William’s 
refutation is intelligent overall, taking aim at the doctrine’s logical weaknesses, 
but it is in parts unexpected. It would remain authoritative in later periods. Its 
premises were simple: 1. Only humans possess reason. 2. Body and soul consti-
tute the individual; the soul of a human is directed towards its body. 3. There is 
only one life, the first phase of which is ended by death and must pass into eternal 
life.49
46 On the medieval debate on resurrection and postmortal identity see e. g. Weber 1973, 125–
158, 217–253; Heinzmann 1965, 6–146, Walker Bynum 1995, 229–278, or more recently Solère 
2006, here 510–526.
47 Manegold of Lautenbach may have been one of the first medieval Christian philosophers 
to critize the idea of transmigration as an example of an un-Christian philosophy, and to 
connect the idea with Pythagoras, see Manegold of Lautenbach 1972, c. 1, 44–47. On Manego-
ld’s use of Chalcidius in general see Dronke 2008, 85–106, on Manegold and Pythagoras see 
Maaz 1998, 399–401.
48 On William and his treatment of the Cathars in general, see Teske 2006, 81–100, and Bern-
stein 2005, 271–292.
49 Although Maaz 1998, 401, gives attention to medieval philosophy, he completely ignores 
William’s examination of Pythagoras. The whole refutation of Pythagoras can be found in 
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Pythagoras had taught, William begins, that the soul of a man was able to pass 
after death into the body of an animal. For William there was a logical problem 
here, even before reaching the debate about the body-soul relation. A human soul 
in its specific body was a soul that was at least potentially equipped with reason. 
So the animal which, after the death of the human, would be given the freed soul 
would have to be a rational being too, at least optionally.50 But what consequences 
did this transfer have for the relation of human and animal? Would there be, as 
William went on to detail, two variants of animals, those that had been given a 
natural animal soul and those that had a human and hence rational soul? Would 
there thus, as William further infers, be animals which were, objectively speak-
ing, humans in an animal body as well as true animals: pseudo-horses, -donkeys, 
and -cattle as well as true horses and donkeys? Had God made, so to speak, a 
graduated creation and provided for some animals that were animals and oth-
er ones that were foreseen as bodies designed as temporary homes for human 
souls? The moral consequences were not inconsiderable. Should humans treat 
the one kind of animal differently from the other? Did humans have the right to 
use the pseudo-horses to plough the fields, or to prick them with spurs?51 Or did 
one have to assume, as a Pythagorean could argue, that all creatures are rational 
creatures and the exercise of reason is limited only by the physical structure of 
the animal’s body? A horse would then have a potentially human soul, but not 
the body that would make rational abilities possible for this soul. This way out of 
the problem did not seem plausible to William. The anima rationalis was not tied 
to any body in its activity, as was demonstrated by its contemplative capacities. 
On the other hand animals, as William concedes, do indeed possess semirational 
abilities, such as the ability to foretell the weather, which could demonstrate that 
they might indeed be in a position to undertake acts of reason if an appropriate 
kind of soul were available to them.52
The second objection to Pythagoras concerned the relation of body and soul. 
The Greek sage had argued, as William reports, that the souls are obliged to de-
scend into their body to be purified there. But body and soul related to each other, 
as the tradition well knew, like form and matter and like act and potentiality. The 
natural order demanded that every form encompass the matter that belongs to it. 
Hence a soul could not be imprisoned in a body, in an act of incarceratio, as Wil-
liam stresses, but must look upon it in a natural desire. Only when the soul left its 
body, its natural place of rest, did it make sense to talk of a descent. Very obvious-
ly, as experience showed, souls can only be separated from their bodies violently. 
If the separation from the body occurs in a moment of violatio and against its will, 
the bond with it must be a natural one. It would thus be thoroughly unnatural for 
William of Auvergne 1674, vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14–15, 704b–707a. For a useful summary of the 
medieval debates on transmigration in general, see Zander 1999, 216–227. 
50 William of Auvergne 1674, vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14, 704b, G.
51 Ibid., vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14, 704b–705a, H–A.
52 Ibid., vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14, 705a, A–B.
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a human soul to flow into an animal body. Ergo God has assigned to humans qua 
natura the bodies familiar to us.53
Pythagoras had argued, William notes, that the soul would either undergo 
a purification in its human body, or it would have to take on another, even less 
perfect body. The Parisian scholar did not find this hypothesis cogent either. Why 
would the human body be suitable for the improvement of the soul? Did humans 
not know from experience that in this very body they were especially prone to 
sin? Why, on the other hand, would man find an animal body to be a worse con-
dition or a punishment? Was he still free in it? Could he still use it as an instru-
ment of sin? If the soul in the body of a horse had no free will and no memory of 
the misdeeds of its previous life, why should the sojourn in an animal body be 
regarded as a penance or purification at all? Where was the continuity that could 
link the old life to the new? And, consequently, who would feel threatened by this 
scenario and draw moral conclusions from it?54
William goes a step further: if there were a chain of reincarnations, in which 
many further embodiments would follow the soul’s repose among the planets, 
the stages must stand in relation to each other. There must be a continuous con-
sciousness, a chain of memories that would link past and present to each other. 
How could man otherwise be in a position to see his earlier errors clearly? But do 
people have such memories? Clearly not. A Pythagorean might argue that a daze, 
a state of temporary amnesia, could have limited the person’s memory. William 
concedes that it would be entirely understandable if less significant sensual data 
were to disappear from human memory. But why would such a key episode as 
the loss of the stellar condition, which was constitutive of one’s present state, 
leave no trace in memory? Why could he himself not recall his sojourn among the 
stars? William grants that there are people who say they recall previous phases of 
life and, as they claim, once lived as a bird or a king. But a Pythagorean still could 
not advance any plausible argument why people would no longer have access to 
the most important memories from their previous life. The descent into corpore-
ality could not explain this total amnesia. Even when some people claimed that 
they recalled earlier life cycles, the residence in the stars that was proclaimed by 
Pythagoras was totally lacking in these supposed reports of experience. Surely at 
least the philosophers, who are called upon to engage in constant self-question-
ing and introspection, surely they would be able to call up something comparable 
from their memory? However on the contrary, thousands of students – it is not 
clear whether William asked some of them himself – were unable to offer any 
such recollections.55
Another, perhaps more hair-splitting objection to Pythagorean metempsycho-
sis was, for William, presented by the numerical relations of the natural order. 
53 Ibid., vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14, 705a–705b, C–A.
54 Ibid., vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14, 705b, A–B.
55 Ibid., vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14, 705b–706a, C–E.
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If one wished to avoid the conclusion that the animal world must be divided 
between the quasi-human and the purely animal type, all animals must have 
rational, quasi-human souls. William gives a vivid picture of the consequences 
of such a scenario. Every insect, every worm, myriads of molluscs and insects 
would have a soul that would be freed again at their death. Every swallow hunt-
ing flies would set free thousands of souls on every feeding trip, each of which 
would be in search of another home. Every day, therefore, millions upon millions 
of souls would return to the stars or, if they were still too far from perfection, they 
would be put back into another, perhaps higher body. Migrations like this would 
exceed the capacity of both the natural world and the planetary system. The num-
ber of the stars would not be sufficient to hold all the new souls, nor would the 
number of the remaining animals.56
But William did not stop there. Another point that the Parisian theologian 
found problematic was the imbalance that must arise in creation as a conse-
quence of the migration of souls. Given that the animals and all the rest of God’s 
creatures had their specific form which they united with their matter, why was 
this lacking for man? If the soul provided by the stars became embodied because 
it was forced to do so by the loss of its previous condition, it could not be the nat-
ural act of its matter. It was surely not reasonable to assume that the human body 
took any other form. On this premise, however, man would be the only creature 
to which God had denied a specific perfection. Man would exist as a soul that 
had fallen to earth, whereas the other living beings were allowed to exist through 
their inherent forms, from their natural perfection.57 Why would God have al-
lowed such a discrepancy in, of all things, the highest of bodily created beings? 
If the human soul was not the natural perfectio of its body, as the Pythagoreans 
would have to accept, there would be a further difficulty. Why was the soul con-
fronted with its earthly body at all? With what guilt could it have burdened itself 
in the stars, so that it was forced to accept a body on earth? No follower of Pythag-
oras had answered this point. The wish for embodiment could not have been in 
itself a sin, for the soul had approached the body in a desiderium naturale and in a 
natural way. How could such an inconcinnity be squared with the justice of the 
Creator? The whole Pythagorean system was thus a massive insania.58
There was one final, almost gnostic way out of the impasse, as William finally 
concedes. Did humans in their first, stellar life, as Pythagoras might have argued, 
possess the condition of an angel? In their embodiment and incarnation had they 
become like embodied demons? If that were the case Man would never have ex-
isted as a distinct species, as William affirmed. The soul that had fallen to earth 
moved the body in the same way that, in other contexts, was assumed to be done 
by demons – not as form and the act that substantiates it, but merely as a motor 
56 Ibid., vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14, 706a, E–G. 
57 Ibid., vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14, 706a–706b, G–F.
58 Ibid., vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 14, 706b–707a, F–A.
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principle that stands in no immediate relation to the body. Angels who want to 
appear to humans in their earthly life are obliged to proceed in the same way. 
Aside from the fact that such an approach could not be reconciled with Christian-
ity, it involved the difficulty already mentioned, as William repeats: Man would 
be the only creature in the creation that did not present a natural form-matter 
relation; the human would be a hybrid substance with no place in the order of 
things.59
5 William’s legacy
William’s analysis of Pythagorean philosophy was the most detailed offered by 
the scholastic tradition, and it is not mere chance that it occurs at its start. At least 
from the perspective of university scholars, his refutation of metempsychosis as 
an alternative eschatology permanently and perhaps authoritatively banished it. 
A generation later Albertus Magnus briefly mentions Pythagoras and the trans-
migration of souls. In his Historia animalium he admits that a Pythagorean model 
of the soul could be of some help in providing plausible accounts of unusual 
phenomena in the animal world. The architectural skills of the bees or ants, or 
birds that build nests, all exhibit characteristics of rational behaviour. If a general, 
rational soul operated residually in animals, as Pythagoras had propounded (so 
Albert), could that not provide an explanation of such semirational achievements 
in theanimal world? Albert rejects this hypothesis straight away.60 In his work 
De origine animae he firmly concludes that the migration of souls must fail from 
a philosophical point of view, even if Pythagoras, as Albert knew, had become 
a vegetarian on account of the moral consequences. For the Cologne scholar the 
decisive argument was, once again, the hylemorphic theory of the person. The 
human soul that had landed in animal bodies, for example in the body of a bird 
which could make an impression through its gift of song, had lost its humanity, 
for it lacked its specific matter, the counterpart that had allowed it to become a 
human in the first place. In an animal body it could only appear as a motor prin-
ciple; it could not constitute a new individual, for soul and body could not match 
each other in their new association.61
Thomas Aquinas, too, adopted William’s critique of Pythagoras in his Com-
mentary on the Sententiae of Peter Lombard62 Pythagoreans and other defenders of 
the doctrine of transmigration had not seen, as Thomas repeats again, that form 
and matter stand in all creatures in immediate relation to each other. Even if the 
soul of man after death was able to subsist in itself as anima separata, without its 
soul it remained substantia incompleta. A soul that had taken on an animal body 
could thus only enter an accidental association with it. It had lost its personal, 
59 Ibid., vol. 1, Pars I / II, c. 15, 707a, B–D.
60 Albertus Magnus 1916–21, vol. 2, Liber VIII, Tractatus 6, c. 2, Bd. 1, 672–673. 
61 Albertus Magnus 1968a, Tractatus II, c. 8, 31, and Albertus Magnus 1968b, Liber I, Tracta-
tus II, c. 15, 59–60.
62 For a summary of Thomas’ refutation of transmigration, see George 1996, 33–52.
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numerical identity, which should embrace act and potentiality equally; but thus it 
had also lost the principle upon which its responsibility depended, and this, after 
all, as the Pythagoreans wanted to believe, was what had forced it into the body 
of a dog or a lion in the first place. How could man do penance for his wrongs 
if he did not continue to exist as the same man?63 In the Summa contra gentiles 
Thomas draws attention to a theological dilemma. Christ had removed original 
sin from man by his incarnation and passion and had opened the path to salva-
tion for him. What value would the passion of the Saviour and infinite God have 
if the resurrection were subject to a limit in time and led to a further, finite em-
bodiment? The incarnation of Christ must result in the transfiguration of every 
individual and not just the transfiguration of the species.64
Many of the later commentaries on the Sententiae, which at the end of the 
fourth book treat the resurrection in its distinctions, are aware of the Pythago-
rean position but regard it as having been firmly refuted by William’s work and 
the verdict of Thomas Aquinas. It required no further argument, for it was trivial. 
For Thomas of Strasbourg, to give one example, it was self-evident that a soul that 
united with a new body must constitute a person with a new numerical identity. 
If Pythagoras insisted that in a previous life he had been Euphorbus, then that 
would not have been Pythagoras; there was no causal relation that could link the 
two entities. Form and matter, that is the soul and the old body, would need to 
find each other again at the moment of resurrection.65 All ideas to the contrary 
by the the followers of Pythagoras were therefore fabulae, mere stories, which the 
tradition had already easily dismissed, as was stressed by Richard of Middle-
town, one of the Franciscan commentators on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.66 As 
late a figure as Francisco Suarez, in his huge Cursus theologicus, which was the 
sixteenth-century heir to the great tradition of scholastic debates on the resur-
rection, still felt obliged to give brief attention to the doctrine of transmigration, 
though he did not offer any new arguments, and to reduce it ad absurdum.67
The later medieval debate about bodily resurrection, which was pursued by 
thinkers such as Durandus, Duns Scotus, and above all by Petrus de Palude, pick-
ing up the argument from Thomas Aquinas, brought other issues to the fore.68 
Was the reunification of the soul with its body after death an exclusively mirac-
ulous event decreed by God, as one might think, or was it perhaps a natural pro-
cess after all, which brought both components of the human substance together 
again through an inner causality? How far beyond death did the material-bodily 
63 Thomas Aquinas 1874, dist. 44, q. 1, a. 1, 296–297, and in general Thomas Aquinas 1876, IX, 
q. 6, a. 6, 589–590, or Thomas Aquinas 1959, Liber II, Lectio 1, §§ 224–225.
64 Thomas Aquinas 1894, Liber IV, c. 82 (691–693).
65 Thomas of Strasbourg 1564, Liber IV, dist. 44, q. 1, fol. 170vaf.
66 Richard of Middletown 1591, vol. 4, In quartum librum, dist. 44, a. 1, q. 1, 554a.
67 Suarez 1870, Disputatio 44, Sectio II, §§ 1–6, 745–749.
68 Petrus de Palude 1514, Distinctio 43, q. 1–4, fol. 196r–204r, Durandus a Sancto Porciano 2012, 
Distinctio 44, q. 1–3, 67–92.
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identity extend? Were tiny particles enough to guarantee bodily continuity, or 
would it be possible for the body of a person to be brought together with char-
acteristic elements of the earlier life in its proportions too? Did the resurrection 
occur as a single act, in a single instant, or was it a process, with a before and after 
and temporal duration? In these disputes, which were worked out with intense 
attention to detail, Pythagoras had nothing to contribute and he was no longer 
cited.
What is perhaps astonishing is that the discussion about metempsychosis 
had hardly any effect on the reputation that the Latin Pythagoras retained as a 
moralist down to the end of the Middle Ages. Not until the rediscovery of the 
Greek and especially the Neoplatonic tradition would the figure of Pythagoras 
be reviewed, now under different assumptions. The fact that later authors like 
Bulstrode Whitelocke, to name just one example, were once again able to bring 
up the transmigration of souls as an alternative to Christian eschatology and 
classic hylemorphism perhaps reveals that the discussion had not yet come to an 
end after all.69
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Aristoxenus and Timaeus  
on the Pythagorean Way of Life
Maurizio Giangiulio – University of Trento
1 From Plato to the Lyceum
Notoriously, Plato was the first to mention the “Pythagorean way of life” (Pythago-
rikos tropos tou biou). In a passage of the tenth book of his Republic (600a8–e2), he 
contrasts Pythagoras with Homer, and credits him with an astonishing power of 
education. From the comparison we gather that tropos tou biou was integral to the 
teaching of the charismatic Sage, and that he passed it on to those who came after 
him, making his followers in all periods strikingly different from other people. 
Pythagoras’ relationships to his disciples were of a personal and private nature, 
but disciples came to be regarded as a group, as hetairoi forming a community of 
friends.1
This impressive picture of the Pythagorean way of life drawn by Plato must 
have been well known in fourth-century Athens. Both the philosophical debate 
on the good life and how to pursue it, and the Peripatetic genre of philosophical 
biography certainly took it into account.2 Theophrastus (D. L. 5.42), Heraclides of 
Pontus (fr. 22 Wehrli), Dicaearchus of Messana,3 Clearchus (fr. 37–62), and Strato 
(D. L. 5.59) wrote biographical works (mainly Peri bion), and Aristoxenus of Taren-
tum should be placed within this wider context. Aristoxenus dealt with the biog-
raphies of Socrates, Plato, and Archytas, and, as far as Pythagoras is concerned, 
he was especially interested in making him the symbol of a noble and most 
distinguished way of life. Aristoxenus contemporary Dicaearchus attempted to 
show that Pythagoras consecrated himself to the vita activa. Notably, Aristoxenus 
and Dicaearchus were not the only ones to be specially interested in the customs 
of the Pythagoreans. A certain Lycon of Iasus in Ionia wrote a book on the Pythag-
oreios bios,4 which Hermippus of Smyrna had among his sources.5 Now, another 
Lycon is known, who styled himself a Pythagorean and who was “approximately 
1 For more on this, see, most recently, Horky 2013, 98–100.
2 See especially Jaeger 19672 (“On the Origin and Cycle of the Philosophic Ideal of Life,” 455–
456).
3 On his contribution to philosophical biography, see White 2001.
4 57, 3 DK (Ath. 418e); see Burkert 1972, 204 and Zhmud 2012, 131–132.
5 In his biography of Aristotle, as it appears: Düring 1957, 466.
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contemporary to Aristotle,”6 and bitterly criticized his extravagant way of life.7 
There is no cogent reason to distinguish between the two. Even the interest in 
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans shown by the fourth- / third-century Sicilian 
historian Timaeus of Tauromenium may have been partially shaped by the Athe-
nian intellectual atmosphere, and especially by the ongoing debate on Pythag-
orean identity. As Christopher Baron has recently stressed, Timaeus cannot be 
regarded as an isolated scholar detached from contemporary society and must be 
placed within the Athenian intellectual environment of his age.8
2 Aristoxenus
It is commonly held that, whereas Aristoxenus took an apologetic stance toward 
Pythagoreanism, our “scientific” scholarship gives precedence to a critical and 
demystifying approach. And yet, we cannot simply set aside the picture of Py-
thagoras and the Pythagoreioi drawn by Aristoxenus.9 We have to read between 
the lines, and pay special attention to the internal logic of his apologetic dis-
course. Positivistic preconceptions are not well suited to grasp the paradigm of 
“philosophic” life that Aristoxenus aimed to construct by taking the Pythagore-
ans as an example.
Let us begin with the famous story of Damon and Phintias,10 an excellent illus-
tration of the crucial role played by a number of main themes: noble-mindedness, 
friendship, love of freedom, and hatred of tyranny. In respect to noble-minded-
ness, the picture drawn in the story finds confirmation in the emphasis that Aris-
toxenus gives to the fortitude and intellectual strength of Xenophilus of Chalcis,11 
who had been one of his mentors,12 as well as on the self-restraint quintessen-
tial to Archytas. Aristoxenus portrayed him as an example of control of the pas-
sions,13 relying on the testimony of Archytas’ close friend Spintharus, who had 
 6 Düring 1957, 374 (end of the fourth century); Burkert 1972, 204; see also Zhmud 2012, 131–132. 
 7 See 55, 4 DK (Aristocl. fr. 2.8 Chiesara [Euseb., Praep. evang. 15.2.8–10]). There is no evidence 
that he was acquainted with Aristoxenus’ biographical work on Pythagoras, and he may 
well have written before him.
 8 Baron 2012, 89–90.
 9 The best treatments are now Huffman 2008, 2012a, 2012b, and 2012c; Zhmud 2012b.
10 Damon and Phintias: Diod. Sic. 10.4.3; Porph. VP 59–61; Iamb. VP 233–237; cf. fr. 31 Wehrli2 = 
IV 2 50 Kaiser. As Erwin Rohde brilliantly proved (his arguments are summarized and re-
inforced in Burkert 1972, 98–99 n. 6) both Porphyry and Iamblichus independently drew on 
Nichomachus, who in his turn made use of Aristoxenus, and mentioned him.
11 Fr. 20b Wehrli2 (Val. Max. 8.13 ext. 3: Xenophilus […] omnis humani incommodi expers in 
summo perfectissimae doctrinae extinctus est).
12 Fr. 1 Wehrli2 (Suda s. v. Α᾿ριστόξενος); note also fr. 25.
13 See Iamb. VP 197 = fr. 30 Wehrli2 = IV 2 35 Kaiser: λέγεται δὲ καὶ τάδε περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων, 
ὡς οὔτε οἰκέτην ἐκόλασεν οὐθεὶς αὐτῶν ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἐχόμενος, οὔτε τῶν ἐλευθέρων 
ἐνουθέτησέ τινα, ἀλλ’ ἀνέμενεν ἕκαστος τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀποκατάστασιν (ἐκάλουν 
δὲ τὸ νουθετεῖν πεδαρτᾶν). ἐποιοῦντο γὰρ τὴν ἀναμονὴν σιωπῇ χρώμενοι καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ. 
Σπίνθαρος γοῦν διηγεῖτο πολλάκις περὶ Α᾿ρχύτου <τοῦ> Ταραντίνου,  ὅτι διὰ χρόνου 
τινὸς εἰς ἀγρὸν ἀφικόμενος ἐκ στρατιᾶς νεωστὶ παραγεγονώς, ἣν ἐστρατεύσατο ἡ πόλις 
εἰς Μεσσαπίους,  ὡς εἶδε τόν τε ἐπίτροπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκέτας οὐκ εὖ τῶν περὶ τὴν 
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been Aristoxenus’ teacher, and also his alleged father.14 One is led to think that 
no ancient reader of Aristoxenus’ biographical works could help but compare 
those high-minded Pythagoreans to Plato, whose behaviour in Sicily Aristoxenus 
harshly criticized,15 and especially to Socrates, who is portrayed by Aristoxenus 
as an intemperate, irascible, and turbulent person.16
Damon and Phintias’ story also highlights the personal bond that made the Py-
thagoreans feel they belonged to a community of philoi,17 although the two friends 
are not represented as living together, nor as members of a self-contained group. 
In this case, therefore, the Pythagorean way of life seems to be an individual habit, 
and not a communitarian practice. It is important to note, however, that Aristox-
enus, when reporting the revolt against Pythagoras led by Cylon at Croton, takes 
for granted that a Pythagorean community did exist, whose members formed a 
closed group of persons of the highest moral standards. Yet, we do not have to 
see a contradiction here: quite probably Damon and Phintias’ story is to be taken 
as suggesting that late fourth-century Pythagoreans no longer lived together, al-
though they were able to retain a profound sense of collective belonging.
As for hatred of tyranny, the structure of the narrative itself, which in the end 
emphasizes the reversal of roles by which the tyrant asks the persecuted Pythag-
oreans to let him become one of the “friends,” clearly shows that Aristoxenus 
aimed to emphasize the moral superiority of the Pythagoreans over the tyrant. 
Significantly, Aristoxenus made the same point more than once. Pythagoras him-
self fled his homeland when the tyrant came,18 and once settled in Italy he made 
γεωργίαν ἐπιμελείας πεποιημένους, ἀλλὰ μεγάλῃ τινὶ κεχρημένους ὀλιγωρίας ὑπερβολῇ, 
ὀργισθείς τε καὶ ἀγανακτήσας οὕτως ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνος, εἶπεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, πρὸς τοὺς οἰκέτας, 
ὅτι εὐτυχοῦσιν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς ὤργισται. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο συμβεβηκὸς ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοὺς 
ἀθῴους γενέσθαι τηλικαῦτα ἡμαρτηκότας. ἔφη δὲ λέγεσθαι καὶ περὶ Κλεινίου τοιαῦτά 
τινα. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ἀναβάλλεσθαι πάσας νουθετήσεις τε καὶ κολάσεις εἰς τὴν τῆς 
διανοίας ἀποκατάστασιν. οἴκτων δὲ καὶ δακρύων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων εἴργεσθαι 
τοὺς ἄνδρας, οὔτε δὲ κέρδος οὔτε ἐπιθυμίαν οὔτε ὀργὴν οὔτε φιλοτιμίαν οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν 
τῶν τοιούτων αἴτιον γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ πάντας τοὺς Πυθαγορείους οὕτως ἔχειν 
πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς ἂν πατὴρ σπουδαῖος πρὸς τέκνα σχοίη.
14 See frs. 30 (Archytas’ friend) and 1 Wehrli2 (here the Suda makes Spintharus the father and 
the teacher of Aristoxenus at the same time; according to Wehrli in his commentary [47], 
ancient biographical tradition construed Spintharus as Aristoxenus’ father based on his well 
known role as expert musician and teacher).
15 Fr. 62 Wehrli2.
16 Fr. 54a Wehrli2 (Cyril. Adv. Iul. 6.185): λέγει δὲ ὁ Α᾿ριστόξενος, ἀφηγούμενος τὸν βίον τοῦ 
Σωκράτους, ἀκηκοέναι Σπινθάρου τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃς ἦν εἷς τῶν τούτῳ ἐντυχόντων. τοῦτον 
λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκὼς εἴη, τοιαύτην εἶναι τήν τε 
φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἦθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν 
τοῦ εἴδους ἰδιότητα. γίνεσθαι δέ που τοῦτο, ὅτε μὴ ὀργίζοιτο, ὅτε δὲ φλεχθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ 
πάθους τούτου, δεινὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην. οὐδενὸς γὰρ οὔτε ὀνόματος ἀποσχέσθαι 
οὔτε πράγματος. On Aristoxenus’ Life of Socrates, see, most recently, Huffman 2012b.
17 On friendship as a “prominent feature in Aristoxenus’ account of the Pythagorean way of 
life” see Zhmud 2012b, 231–232.
18 Fr. 16 Wehrli2 = III 2 05 Kaiser (Porph. VP 9): γεγονότα δ‘ ἐτῶν τεσσαράκοντα, φησὶν ὁ 
Α᾿ριστόξενος, καὶ ὁρῶντα τὴν τοῦ Πολυκράτους τυραννίδα συντονωτέραν οὖσαν <ἢ> 
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the cities yearn for liberty thanks to his disciples, finally succeeding in setting 
free many cities in South Italy and Sicily.19 Moreover, Cylon, the stubborn oppo-
nent of Pythagoras, features in Aristoxenus’ account as a brute fit for tyrannical 
rule.20 Such an emphasis on love of liberty and opposition to tyranny was proba-
bly meant to prove wrong scholars such as Theopompus, who had been keen to 
suggest that Pythagoras’ philosophy aimed to make tyrannical rule possible.21 At 
the same time, Aristoxenus was probably distancing himself from even earlier 
traditions depicting Pythagoras and his followers as potential tyrants.22 From a 
more general point of view, both the focus on liberty and on philia greatly empha-
sized the moral greatness of the Pythagoreans. Their life was shaped by love of 
mathemata, by friendship and self-control, hatred of tyranny, and defence of law 
and order. These must have been – I surmise – the customs (ethe) which the “last 
Pythagoreans” chose to keep, until they “nobly died out,” as Aristoxenus has it.23
It is important to underline, however, that Aristoxenus seems to take for grant-
ed that Pythagorean identity and way of life were already interrelated at the time 
of Pythagoras. Let us briefly mention again Aristoxenus’ account of the political 
crisis in Croton which led Pythagoras to leave the city. In this context, the enmity 
between Cylon and Pythagoras originated in Cylon’s attempt to be associated 
with the followers of the Master, and, more precisely, “to participate in the Py-
ὥστε καλῶς ἔχειν ἐλευθέρῳ ἀνδρὶ τὴν ἐπιστατείαν τε καὶ δεσποτείαν [μὴ] ὑπομένειν, 
οὕτως δὴ τὴν εἰς ᾿Ιταλίαν ἄπαρσιν ποιήσασθαι (sc. τὸν Πυθαγόραν).
19 Fr. 17 Wehrli2 = III 2 10 Kaiser (Porph. VP 21; cf. Iamb. VP 33–34): ἃς δ‘ ἐπιδημήσας ᾿Ιταλίᾳ 
τε καὶ Σικελίᾳ κατέλαβε πόλεις δεδουλωμένας ὑπ‘ ἀλλήλων, τὰς μὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν 
τὰς δὲ νεωστί, φρονήματος ἐλευθερίου πλήσας διὰ τῶν ἐφ‘ ἑκάστης ἀκουστῶν αὐτοῦ 
ἠλευθέρωσε, Κρότωνα καὶ Σύβαριν καὶ Κατάνην καὶ ῾Ρήγιον καὶ ῾Ιμέραν καὶ Α᾿κράγαντα 
καὶ Ταυρομένιον καὶ ἄλλας τινάς, αἷς καὶ νόμους ἔθετο διὰ Χαρώνδα τε τοῦ Καταναίου καὶ 
Ζαλεύκου τοῦ Λοκροῦ, δι‘ ὧν ἀξιοζήλωτοι τοῖς περιοίκοις ἄχρι πολλοῦ γεγόνασιν. Σίμιχος 
δ‘ ὁ Κεντοριπίνων τύραννος ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ τήν τ‘ ἀρχὴν ἀπέθετο καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὰ 
μὲν τῇ ἀδελφῇ τὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις ἔδωκεν.
20 Fr. 18 Wehrli2 = IV 2 55 Kaiser (Iamb. VP 248): […]αἱ δὲ αἰτίαι τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς πλείονες 
λέγονται, μία μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Κυλωνείων λεγομένων ἀνδρῶν τοιάδε γενομένη. Κύλων, ἀνὴρ 
Κροτωνιάτης, γένει μὲν καὶ δόξῃ καὶ πλούτῳ πρωτεύων τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄλλως δὲ χαλεπός 
τις καὶ βίαιος καὶ θορυβώδης καὶ τυραννικὸς τὸ ἦθος, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν παρασχόμενος 
πρὸς τὸ κοινωνῆσαι τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου καὶ προσελθὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν Πυθαγόραν 
ἤδη πρεσβύτην ὄντα, ἀπεδοκιμάσθη διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας.
21 Theopomp. FGrHist 115 F 73: (Ath. 213–214 f) καὶ μετ’ οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας τύραννον αὑτὸν 
ἀποδείξας ὁ φιλόσοφος (sc. ὁ Α᾿θηνίων 87 F 36) καὶ τὸ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν ἀναδείξας δόγμα 
<τὸ> περὶ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ τί ἠβούλετο αὐτοῖς ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἣν ὁ καλὸς Πυθαγόρας 
εἰσηγήσατο, καθάπερ ἱστόρησε Θεόπομπος.
22 See on this especially Burkert 1972, 118–119 and nn. 55–58, succinctly discussing such tradi-
tions.
23 Iamb. VP 251 = fr. 18 Wehrli2 = IV 2 55 Kaiser: ἀθροισθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ ῾Ρήγιον ἐκεῖ 
διέτριβον μετ’ ἀλλήλων. προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῶν πολιτευμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον 
προβαινόντων… ἦσαν δὲ οἱ σπουδαιότατοι Φάντων τε καὶ ᾿Εχεκράτης καὶ Πολύμναστος 
καὶ Διοκλῆς Φλιάσιοι, Ξενόφιλος δὲ Χαλκιδεὺς τῶν ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης Χαλκιδέων. ἐφύλαξαν 
μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἤθη καὶ τὰ μαθήματα, καίτοι ἐκλειπούσης τῆς αἱρέσεως, ἕως εὐγενῶς 
ἠφανίσθησαν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ᾿ Αριστόξενος διηγεῖται. On this passage Prontera 1976–1977 is 
still important.
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thagorean way of life.”24 Needless to say, we have here Iamblichus’, and not Aris-
toxenus’ ipsissima verba, but Aristoxenus is quoted at the end of the account, and 
the narrative heavily depends on him. There is no reason to assume that Aristox-
enus did not mention at all “the Pythagorean way of life.”25
To sum up thus far, we have seen that a closer look at Aristoxenus’ apologetic 
approach to Pythagoreanism helps us understand the ways in which he succeeds 
in constructing and promoting an exemplary Pythagorean identity. In addition to 
that, it is to be stressed that such an identity is profoundly shaped by the ethical 
values expounded in Aristoxenus’ “Pythagorean Precepts.”26 There is no doubt 
that we have here a strong emphasis on a rational and ethicized Pythagorean way 
of life lived by people of the highest intellectual and moral standards.
One might wonder whether Aristoxenus was actually trying to tackle the 
problem of the true nature of the Pythagorean lifestyle. In other words, was he 
implicitly saying that genuine Pythagoreans had nothing to do with asceticism, 
superstitious abstinences, and ritualistic taboos? And was he also pointing out 
that those Pythagoristai put on stage in Athens by late fourth-century comic poets 
were not related to the Pythagoreans? An affirmative answer to this question 
should be followed by a more detailed evaluation. On the one hand, Aristoxenus 
undeniably depicted the customs of the Pythagoreans as profoundly different 
from those of the low-class, dirty tatterdemalions ridiculed by comic poets, and 
on the other he insisted that the “genuine” Pythagoreans had already died out. 
Now, if Aristoxenus is right, the Pythagorean identity of the Pythagoristai becomes 
problematic, and one would even be led to think that they were no more than a 
theatrical fiction. 
It is important to note, however, that shabby poverty had already been as-
sociated with a Pythagorean identity in the first half of the fourth century, as 
Aeschines’ of Sphettus Telauges shows.27 In this dialogue the alleged son of Py-
thagoras is depicted as a sordid beggar wearing a cloak borrowed from a clothes’ 
cleaner and girt about with a goatskin.28 The same seems to hold true of Diodorus 
of Aspendus,29 the indigent philosopher who lived in Athens in the fourth cen-
tury. He was depicted by the contemporary musician Stratonicus and the poet 
Archestratus of Gela, as well as by the second-century historian Sosicrates of 
Rhodes, as a dirty ragamuffin clothed in skins, eating vegetarian and “Pythago-
reanizing.”30 The ascetic type, then, may well not have been simply constructed 
24 Προθυμίαν παρασχόμενος πρὸς τὸ κοινωνῆσαι τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου; see Aristox., fr. 18 
Wehrli2, 13, 2 = IV 2 55 Kaiser (Iamb. VP 248).
25 On Aristoxenus and Pythagoreans, see, most recently, Zhmud 2012b.
26 On the “Precepts,” see most importantly Huffman 2008.
27 On the Telauges, Dittmar 1912, 213–244 is still essential reading.
28 See fr. 41 Dittmar (Ath. 220a) = SSR VI A 84.
29 Diodorus is discussed in Burkert 1972, 202–204; Bollansée 1999, 286–289; Zhmud 2012, 132–
134; 182–183, and Baron 2012, 156–159.
30 Stratonicus (see Tim. FGrH 566 F 16 = Ath. 4.163e–f and F 737 SupplHell) must have died not 
later than 350 BCE (see Burkert 1972, 202–203, discussed, and not conclusively rejected by 
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by comic poets. Diodorus was most probably a genuine ascetic, although his Py-
thagorean identity was debated. Stratonicus’ and Archestratus’ mentions of him 
were undoubtedly meant to mock his lifestyle, and a few decades later Timaeus, 
too, commented on the striking appearance of Diodorus. Timaeus emphasized 
that he “was affecting to be associated” with Pythagoreans, probably assuming 
that he was not a “genuine” Pythagorean.31 As we can safely infer from the stance 
taken by Aristoxenus, the real nature of Pythagorean identity was controversial 
in late fourth- and early third-century Athens, and Timaeus, too, must have taken 
sides. The point at issue is made clear by Sosicrates in his account of Diodorus’ 
lifestyle, where, based on Aristoxenus, he explicitly contrasts it with the “noble” 
and healthy customs of the real Pythagoreans, who “wore shining bright clothes, 
bathed and anointed themselves, and had their hair cut according to the fash-
ion.”32 Thus, Timaeus was taking Aristoxenus’ side, implicitly saying that a real 
Pythagorean could not be an ascetic.33
The above discussion should lead us to conclude that there must have been in 
fourth-century Athenian society ascetics claiming to be Pythagoreans. Though 
perhaps not the Pythagorean akousmatikoi Walter Burkert was looking for, they 
are possibly to be placed at the intersection of “Pythagoreanizing” and “pro-
to-Cynic” identities. As a consequence, the so-called Pythagoristai are not neces-
sarily to be taken as comic constructions of social destitution.34 Social reality may 
well lurk behind theatrical caricature, and the evidence discussed above seems to 
suggest that “Pythagoreanizing” ascetics did really exist in fourth-century Ath-
ens. This obviously has a bearing on our understanding of Aristoxenus: as dis-
putatious as he may have been, it would have been nonsensical to take seriously 
mere comic characters. Arguably, Aristoxenus aimed to undermine radically any 
claim made in recent times to a Pythagorean identity, both by depicting the noble 
Zhmud 2012, 133 n. 130), and Diodorus’ mention in Archestratus’ Hedypatheia (fr. 23.18–19 
Brandt = F 24 Olson-Sens [Ath. 163d–e]) does not necessarily imply a later date for Stratoni-
cus. As for Sosicrates, see FHG fr. 20 (IV 503) = F 15 Giannattasio Andria. 
31 Tim. FGrH 566 F 16 = Ath. IV 163e–f: Τίμαιος δ’ ὁ Ταυρομενίτης ἐν τῇ ἐνάτῇ τῶν ῾Ιστοριῶν 
περὶ αὐτοῦ γράφει οὕτως· «Διοδώρου τοῦ τὸ γένος Α᾿σπενδίου τὴν ἐξηλλαγμένην 
εἰσαγαγόντος κατασκευὴν καὶ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις πεπλησιακέναι προσποιηθέντος, πρὸς 
ὃν ἐπιστέλλων ὁ Στρατόνικος ἐκέλευσε τὸν ἀπαίροντα τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀπαγγεῖλαι ‘τῷ περὶ 
θηροπέπλου μανίας ὕβρεώς τε περιστάσιμον / στοὰν ἔχοντι Πυθαγόρου πελάτᾳ’». 
32 Fr. 15 Giannattasio Andria (Ath. 163–164 f): Σωσικράτης δ’ ἐν τρίτῳ Φιλοσόφων διαδοχῆς 
βαθεῖ πώγωνι χρήσασθαι τὸν Διόδωρον ἱστορεῖ, καὶ τρίβωνα ἀναλαβεῖν, κόμην τεφορῆσαι, 
κατά τινα τῦφον τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ταύτην προσαγαγόντα, τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ Πυθαγορικῶν 
λαμπρᾷ τε ἐσθῆτι ἀμφιεννυμένων, καὶ λουτροῖς καὶ ἀλείμμασι, κουρᾷ τε τῇ συνήθει 
χρωμένων (for the translation of the last sentence quoted in the text, see Burkert 1972, 202).
33 For a discussion of the reason why Timaeus participated in the debate on Pythagorean iden-
tity, see now Baron 2012, 159–160, who plausibly suspects that for him “The greatest intel-
lectual and spiritual figure of Magna Graecia [scil. Pythagoras] would certainly not have 
produced a poor, dirty, shaggy-haired vegetarian” (160).
34 In Leonid Zhmud’s opinion (Zhmud 2012a, 181; Zhmud 2012b, 228 n. 16) “the character of 
the Pythagorist… is to be found only on the Athenian stage, to which in reality it owes its 
appearance.”
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way of life of the Pythagoreans of old as profoundly different from the lifestyle 
of the ascetics, and insisting that the “last Pythagoreans” had died out. Quite 
importantly, according to Aristoxenus Pythagorean customs had not changed at 
all for centuries, from Pythagoras to the last Pythagoreans he met. In the light 
of the above, one should assume that Aristoxenus not only refused to recognize 
fourth-century ascetics as Pythagoreans, but also denied the existence of ascetic 
trends in the history of South Italian Pythagoreanism. Indeed, the picture Aris-
toxenus drew of Pythagoras’ and his disciples’ daily life makes it reasonable to 
think that he was acquainted with customs shaped by ascetic practices and reli-
gious taboos, but that he wanted to place Pythagoreanism at the greatest distance 
from them.35
The same holds true – it appears – for the taboo on beans and abstinence 
from meat. As is well known, according to Aristoxenus Pythagoras was espe-
cially fond of beans.36 He is the only ancient author to say so, whereas the taboo, 
which is attested in Orphic literature and in Empedocles,37 and was practised in 
the Eleusinian mysteries,38 is attributed to Pythagoras by Aristotle, Heraclides 
Ponticus, Neanthes, and Callimachus.39 Aristoxenus is evidently contradicting a 
well established tradition linking this taboo to Pythagoras, and he cannot easily 
be acquitted of pure invention.40 His polemical stance, probably toward Aristotle 
especially, is beyond doubt here, but he must have had more profound reasons. 
One may suppose that Aristoxenus intended to deny the most notorious of the 
35 The everyday life of the Pythagoreans is famously recounted in Iamblichus’ Vita Pythagorica, 
96–100, which derives from Nichomachus of Gerasa, who for his part depends on Aristox-
enus (cp. VP 97, 56, 24–25 Deubner-Klein with Aristox. fr. 27; 100, 57, 23–58, 11 with frs. 33–34; 
and 98, 57, 12–13 with frs. 28, 29a). Iamblichus, however, heavily manipulated Nicomachus’ 
account, retouching the picture and adding details (as for instance the after-dinner ‘reading’) 
which certainly were meant to call attention to “the similarity to a monastic rule” (Burkert 
1982, 16 and 188 nn. 75–76, also recalling the account of the daily life of the Essenes in Jo-
seph. BJ 2, 128–133); for the study of parallels between monastic life and the Pythagorean 
way of life Festugière 1937 is still enlightening; see also Bremmer 1992. The picture painted 
by Iamblichus is to be taken as an integral part of his anti-Christian tendency, which “auch 
als paganer Gegenentwurf gegen das aufblühende Mönchstum und die christliche Lebens-
führung überhaupt gelesen werden kann” (Riedweg 2002, 48, aptly quoted by J. N. Bremmer 
in “Richard Reitzenstein, Pythagoras and the Life of Antony” (this volume, 227–245).
36 Fr. 25 Wehrli2 (Gell. NA 4.11): Sed Aristoxenus musicus, vir litterarum veterum diligentis-
simus, Aristotelis philosophi auditor, in libro, quem de Pythagora reliquit, nullo saepius 
legumento Pythagoram dicit usum quam fabis, quoniam is cibus et subduceret sensim al-
vum et levigaret. Verba ipsi Aristoxeni subscripsi: Πυθαγόρας δὲ τῶν ὀσπρίων μάλιστα τὸν 
κύαμον ἐδοκίμασεν. λειάντικόν τε γὰρ εἶναι καὶ διαχωρητικόν, διὸ καὶ μάλιστα κέχρηται 
αὐτῷ. 
37 See, respectively, Orph. Frag. 291 Bernabé and 31 B 141 DK.
38 Paus. 1.37.4.
39 Arist. fr. 195 Rose = D. L. 8.34; Heraclid. Pont. fr. 41 Wehrli2; Neanth. FGrH 84 F 31; Callim. 
fr. 553 Pfeiffer; more ancient evidence and the relevant modern literature are to be found in 
Burkert 1972, 183 n. 124. Explanations of the ban on eating beans are discussed in Burkert 
1972, 183–185 and Zhmud 2012a, 237–238.
40 Pace Burkert 1972, 184, who surmises that beans may have been eaten in a ritual meal.
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Pythagorean taboos in order to reinforce the overall plausibility of his account of 
the bios Pythagorikos. 
As regards Pythagorean alleged vegetarianism, the contradictory evidence at 
our disposal has probably to be taken as suggesting that fifth-century Pythago-
reans did not have the same dietary habits, and were not all committed to strict 
vegetarianism, although different individuals and different circles may have 
observed some taboos and practised some abstinences. With regard to animal 
flesh, it is reasonable to assume that Pythagoreans ate some animals only (per-
haps the sacrificial ones), and abstained from eating some specific animals and 
some specific organs.41 However, how “rational” their dietary restrictions were 
must remain an open question, and we cannot rule out that ritual and cult prac-
tice really did lie behind them. There must thus have been a kernel of truth in 
what Aristoxenus said about Pythagoras not eating plow oxen and rams, even 
though Pythagoras’ alleged predilection for young kids, sucking pigs, and cock-
erels sounds somehow paradoxical, as it suggests a certain degree of gastronomic 
luxury.42 Aristoxenus probably intended to contrast the noble Master of old with 
the sordid vegetarians of his age, as well as projecting an image of Pythagoras 
meant to deritualize completely the way of life he had been teaching. 
So far, I have tried to argue that Aristoxenus must be credited with a coherent 
attempt to construct a paradigm of “philosophical” life by taking the Pythagore-
ans as an example, and that polemic and apologetic were no more than a means 
to strengthen such a construct. From a historical point of view, however, it is 
important to remark that Aristoxenus’ contentious arguments should be taken 
as implying not only different contemporary views, but also more ancient reali-
ties, including social practices, styles of life, ways of thought. On this approach, 
Aristoxenus’ polemical stance is telling, and indirectly gives us an idea not only 
of the changing Pythagorean identities in fifth-century Southern Italy, but also of 
the complexities of the knowledge transfer processes involved.
3 Timaeus of Tauromenium
Now, let us attend to the evidence of the historian Timaeus.43 He had no knowl-
edge of Pythagoreanism from the inside, and was not involved in polemic, but 
his contribution to its understanding can be compared to that of Aristoxenus.44
Most notably, Timaeus too seems to have developed an interest in the issue 
of Pythagorean identity. His readiness to distance himself from Diodorus of As-
41 On the problem of Pythagorean “vegetarianism,“ see Burkert 1972, 180–183 and Zhmud 
2012, 234–237.
42 See fr. 25 (note also fr. 28). On Pythagoras’ dietary habits according to Aristoxenus, see, most 
recently, Huffman 2012c, who is inclined to see his account as essentially accurate.
43 On Timaeus, see, most recently Baron 2012.
44 On historical information on Pythagoreanism provided by Aristoxenus and Timaeus, see 
especially von Fritz 1940; Burkert 1972, 103–105 (Timaeus); Giangiulio 1991, 67–82; Zhmud 
2012a, 99–100; Horky 2013, 106–114.
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pendus’ claim to be a Pythagorean most strongly suggests such an interest. In 
addition to this, the focus on the distinctive nature of Pythagorean life that we 
find in Iamblichus’ account of the revolts in Croton, which in part goes back to Ti-
maeus himself, possibly implies that Timaeus also paid attention to the customs 
of the sixth- and fifth-century South Italian Pythagoreans. The same holds true, 
with even greater plausibility, for Timaeus’ treatment of the proverbial saying 
koina ta philon (“Friends hold things in common”).45 A close reading of testimonia 
and passages parallel to Fragment 13 shows that Timaeus carefully discussed the 
meaning of this saying and related it to the common property of the members 
of Pythagorean society in Croton.46 As Christopher Baron acutely remarks, “the 
linking of an explanation for the proverb and admission to Pythagorean Society 
already existed in Timaeus’ text.”47 Now, all four testimonia where Timaeus is 
cited “explicitly note the location of the proverb’s first use,”48 but this does not 
necessarily imply, as Baron thinks, that Timaeus was using his knowledge of Py-
thagorean Society simply to argue that Pythagoras himself originated the saying. 
Indeed, the detailed information given by Timaeus suggests that his main inter-
est was on Pythagorean Society, not on the saying as such. Timaeus must have 
mentioned the proverb in the context of his account of the rules of admission into 
the Society and of the common life of the disciples, at the same time also making 
a point against the alternative version offered by Clearchus, in which the saying 
is attributed to an oracular response of Delphic Apollo.49 The opposite view, that 
Timaeus discussed in detail the internal organization of Pythagorean Society 
solely in order to explain the meaning of the proverb, seems to me to be almost 
implausible. Timaeus does know of common property in Pythagorean Society, 
and refers to it as an explanans, not an explanandum. There is no cogent reason, 
therefore, to assume that his account of the process of admission to the society 
was devised for the purpose of contextualizing an old proverbial saying within 
Pythagorean customs.
In the light of the above, one is led to think that Timaeus was aware of some 
rules of admission of Pythagoras’ hetairoi into an organized society of disciples, 
45 Tim. F 13a = Schol. T Plat., Phaedr. 279c Greene: κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων· ἐπὶ τῶν εὖ μεταδότων. 
φασὶ δὲ λεχθῆναι πρῶτον τὴν παροιμίαν περὶ τὴν Μεγάλην ῾Ελλάδα, καθ’ οὓς χρόνους 
ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἔπειθε τοὺς αὐτὴν κατοικοῦντας ἀδιανέμητα πάντα κεκτῆσθαι. φησὶ 
γοῦν ὁ Τίμαιος ἐν τῇ θ οὕτω· «προσιόντων δ’ οὖν αὐτῷ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ βουλομένων 
συνδιατρίβειν, οὐκ εὐθὺς συνεχώρησεν, ἀλλ’ ἔφη δεῖν καὶ τὰς οὐσίας κοινὰς εἶναι τῶν 
ἐντυγχανόντων.” εἶτα μετὰ πολλὰ φησί· «καὶ δι’ ἐκείνους πρῶτον ῥηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν 
᾿Ιταλίαν ὅτι ‘κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων’». ἐμνήσθη δὲ ταύτης καὶ Α᾿ριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ θ τῶν 
᾿Ηθικῶν (EN 8.11, 1159b31). Κλέαρχος δέ φησιν ὑπὸ Χαλκιδέων τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίαι πεμφθῆναι 
δῶρα εἰς Δελφοὺς Α᾿πόλλωνι καὶ Α᾿ρτέμιδι· τῶν δὲ Δελφῶν μαντευομένων, εἰ ἐξ ἴσης τὴν 
ἀνάθεσιν ποιήσωνται, ἔφησεν ὁ θεὸς ‘κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων’. καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν Α᾿δελφοῖς β 
(III 6, 9 K). 
46 For a detailed discussion, see Baron 2012, 144–147, 150–151.
47 Baron 2012, 150.
48 Ibid., 150.
49 Clearch., fr. 72 Wehrli = Schol. T Plat., Phaedr. 279c (for the text, see n. 25 supra).
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and had some information about the relationship between the disciples and the 
Master, and their customs. On this subject the evidence provided by Iamblichus 
in paragraphs 71–72 of his Pythagorean Life is especially relevant, because the 
wording in the first sentence of 71, when compared to parallel passages, shows 
that the beginning of Iamblichus’ account strictly follows Timaeus’ original text.50 
As a consequence, we should assume that according to Timaeus young people 
willing to be admitted to the community of Pythagoras’ disciples had to pass an 
examination.51 Nonetheless, we should not take for granted that all the details of 
the internal organization of Pythagorean society given in this long passage stem 
directly from Timaeus.52 Traditional source criticism has not succeeded in un-
ravelling its complexities, especially due to the cut-and-paste method of Iambli-
chus, and of Apollonius before him. Even more importantly, both Apollonius and 
Iamblichus had apologetic and ideological purposes, and paragraph 72 prompts 
every reader to suppose that Iamblichus here manipulated the source(s) at his 
disposal. There is, it must be admitted, a notable overlap between Iamblichus and 
50 What is said at the beginning of § 71 of Iamblichus’ Vita Pythagorica with regard to the admis-
sion of young people into the society of disciples (40,15–18 Deubner-Klein): Παρεσκευασμένῳ 
δὲ αὐτῷ οὕτως εἰς τὴν παιδείαν τῶν ὁμιλητῶν, προσιόντων τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ βουλομένων 
συνδιατρίβειν οὐκ εὐθὺς συνεχώρει, μέχρις ἂν αὐτῶν τὴν δοκιμασίαν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν 
ποιήσηται is to be compared with the literal quotation from Timaeus’ text provided by Schol. 
T Plat. Phaedr. 279c: φησὶ γοῦν ὁ Τίμαιος ἐν τῆι θ οὕτω· «προσιόντων δ’ οὖν αὐτῷ τῶν 
νεωτέρων καὶ βουλομένων συνδιατρίβειν…». The coincidence is striking and compels us to 
ascribe to Timaeus the very beginning of Iamblichus § 71.
51 Baron’s doubts on whether Timaeus dealt with the dokimasia of the disciples (Baron 2012, 
149–150) seem to me to be misplaced, as the textual resemblance between Iamb. 71 and the 
Platonic scholium makes it difficult to believe that Timaeus’ treatment of dokimasia was “re-
worked into something new” (Baron 2012, 150) by a later source of Iamblichus.
52 Iamb. VP 71–72: Παρεσκευασμένῳ δὲ αὐτῷ οὕτως εἰς τὴν παιδείαν τῶν ὁμιλητῶν, 
προσιόντων τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ βουλομένων συνδιατρίβειν οὐκ εὐθὺς συνεχώρει, μέχρις 
ἂν αὐτῶν τὴν δοκιμασίαν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ποιήσηται, πρῶτον μὲν πυνθανόμενος πῶς τοῖς 
γονεῦσι καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις τοῖς λοιποῖς πάρεισιν ὡμιληκότες, ἔπειτα θεωρῶν αὐτῶν τούς τε 
γέλωτας τοὺς ἀκαίρους καὶ τὴν σιωπὴν καὶ τὴν λαλιὰν παρὰ τὸ δέον, ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας 
τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους οἷς ἐχρῶντο καὶ τὴν πρὸς τούτους ὁμιλίαν καὶ πρὸς τίνι 
μάλιστα τὴν ἡμέραν σχολάζουσι καὶ τὴν χαρὰν καὶ τὴν λύπην ἐπὶ τίσι τυγχάνουσι 
ποιούμενοι. προσεθεώρει δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν πορείαν καὶ τὴν ὅλην τοῦ σώματος 
κίνησιν, τοῖς τε τῆς φύσεως γνωρίσμασι φυσιογνωμονῶν αὐτοὺς σημεῖα τὰ φανερὰ 
ἐποιεῖτο τῶν ἀφανῶν ἠθῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ ὅντινα δοκιμάσειεν οὕτως, ἐφίει τριῶν ἐτῶν 
ὑπερορᾶσθαι, δοκιμάζων πῶς ἔχει βεβαιότητος καὶ ἀληθινῆς φιλομαθείας, καὶ εἰ πρὸς 
δόξαν ἱκανῶς παρεσκεύασται ὥστε καταφρονεῖν τιμῆς. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς προσιοῦσι 
προσέταττε σιωπὴν πενταετῆ, ἀποπειρώμενος πῶς ἐγκρατείας ἔχουσιν, ὡς χαλεπώτερον 
τῶν ἄλλων ἐγκρατευμάτων τοῦτο, τὸ γλώσσης κρατεῖν, καθὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ μυστήρια 
νομοθετησάντων ἐμφαίνεται ἡμῖν. ἐν δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ τὰ μὲν ἑκάστου ὑπάρχοντα, 
τουτέστιν αἱ οὐσίαι, ἐκοινοῦντο, διδόμενα τοῖς ἀποδεδειγμένοις εἰς τοῦτο γνωρίμοις, 
οἵπερ ἐκαλοῦντο πολιτικοί, καὶ οἰκονομικοί τινες καὶ νομοθετικοὶ ὄντες. αὐτοὶ δὲ εἰ μὲν 
ἄξιοι ἐφαίνοντο τοῦ μετασχεῖν δογμάτων, ἔκ τε βίου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιεικείας κριθέντες, 
μετὰ τὴν πενταετῆ σιωπὴν ἐσωτερικοὶ λοιπὸν ἐγίνοντο καὶ ἐντὸς σινδόνος ἐπήκουον τοῦ 
Πυθαγόρου μετὰ τοῦ καὶ βλέπειν αὐτόν· πρὸ τούτου δὲ ἐκτὸς αὐτῆς καὶ μηδέποτε αὐτῷ 
ἐνορῶντες μετεῖχον τῶν λόγων διὰ ψιλῆς ἀκοῆς, ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διδόντες βάσανον τῶν 
οἰκείων ἠθῶν.
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a passage of Diogenes Laertius where Timaeus is cited in relation to the saying 
“Friends hold things in common.”53 In Iamblichus 72 Pythagoras’ followers are 
allowed to see the Master for the first time and become esoterikoi after a five-year 
silence,54 whereas Diogenes, for his part, reports that new members could not see 
Pythagoras and had to wait five years to pass the examination. The resemblance 
between the two passages is strong, but Diogenes does not strictly speak of a 
five-year silence, and seems to refer to a period during which the disciples were 
not allowed to meet Pythagoras in person. If so, the five-year silence was not men-
tioned by Timaeus. Indeed, rules such as the three-year trial period, or the five 
years of silence,55 and the distinction of esoterikoi and exoterikoi, as well as the role 
played by the oikonomikoi in the administration of properties, either recall much 
later prescriptions and customs, or presuppose technical words, notably esoter-
ikoi, that are attested only in the Roman imperial age.56 Thus, one is inevitably led 
to assume that Iamblichus’ account, taken as a whole freely expanded what was 
said by Apollonius, based indirectly on Timaeus among other sources. 
It is important here to call attention to two other fragments of Timaeus (F 17 
and F 131 Jacoby), where the focus seems to be on the life of Pythagorean women. 
The first (F17) recalls the different names the women bore in each stage of their 
lives,57 while the second (F 131) reports that Pythagoras’ daughter led the girls of 
Croton while still a girl, and the women when she became a woman, adding that 
the citizens made the house of Pythagoras’ family into a temple of Demeter.58 The 
historian was evidently investigating the manners and customs of the Pythag-
orean women, possibly based on an erudite work by Philochorus.59 Again, the 
53 D. L. 8.10: εἶπέ τε πρῶτος, ὥς φησι Τίμαιος (FGrH 566 F 13b), κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν 
ἰσότητα. καὶ αὐτοῦ οἱ μαθηταὶ κατετίθεντο τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ἓν ποιούμενοι. πενταετίαν 
θ’ ἡσύχαζον, μόνον τῶν λόγων κατακούοντες καὶ οὐδέπω Πυθαγόραν ὁρῶντες εἰς ὃ 
δοκιμασθεῖεν· τοὐντεῦθεν δ’ ἐγίνοντο τῆς οἰκίας αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ὄψεως μετεῖχον.
54 See 41,14–18 Deubner-Klein.
55 Zhmud 2012, 163 has a good discussion of this topic.
56 It seems to be a second-third century AD word (note Clem. Al. Strom. 5.9.58, 3; Luc. Vit. Auct. 
26; Hippol. Haer. 1.2, 4.17), and nothing suggests that Timaeus used it (Horky 2013, 87–88 
n. 6 speculates that the term probably derives from Timaeus, adding that he “cannot be 
absolutely certain”). Iamblichus repeatedly depicts the Pythagoreans as Christian monks: 
see, besides VP 96–100 (supra, n. 35), also 29, 17, 10 (Pythagoreans styled as koinobious [!]), and 
253, 136, 1–3 Deubner-Klein (Pythagoreans monazontes en tais eremiais). On the link between 
Pythagoreans and Christian monks made in late antique times, see Burkert 1982, 13 and 
Bremmer 1992, 205–206.
57 Tim. FGrHist 566 F 17 (D. L. 8.11): Τίμαιός τέ φησιν ἐν δεκάτῳ ῾Ιστοριῶν λέγειν αὐτὸν (scil. 
Πυθαγόραν) τὰς συνοικούσας ἀνδράσι θεῶν ἔχειν ὀνόματα, Κόρας, Νύμφας, εἶτα μητέρας 
<καὶ μαίας> καλουμένας. 
58 F 131 (Porph. VP 4): Τίμαιος δ’ ἱστορεῖ τὴν Πυθαγόρου θυγατέρα καὶ παρθένον οὖσαν 
ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν παρθένων ἐν Κρότωνι, καὶ γυναῖκα τῶν γυναικῶν· τὴν δ’ οἰκίαν Δήμητρος 
ἱερὸν ποιῆσαι τοὺς Κροτωνιάτας, τὸν δὲ στενωπὸν καλεῖν μουσεῖον. For a perceptive treat-
ment of the fragment, see, most recently, Baron 2012, 163–164. 
59 See Philoch. FGrH 328 T 1 [Suda, s. v.], where a Συναγωγή ἡρωίδων ἤτοι Πυθαγορείων 
γυναικῶν is mentioned.
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broader context must have been a more or less comprehensive treatment of the 
customs of the Pythagoreans. On the other hand, a detailed local knowledge is 
to be presupposed here, as well as elsewhere in the evidence which goes back to 
Timaeus.
The main problem with the information provided by Timaeus on Pythagoras 
and the Pythagoreans is the original form of his treatment of the subject. Quite 
recently Christopher Baron has argued that Timaeus’ remarks are found in lim-
ited contexts and scattered references only, and that no self-contained narrative 
about Pythagoras and his school should be credited to him.60 The historian, in 
other words, wrote no book-length Pythagorean excursus, as Jacoby notoriously 
maintained.61
Baron, however, tends to take into account only those textual scraps we con-
ventionally call “fragments.” Such an approach is undeniably sound, but, given 
the scarcity of the fragments at our disposal, it is bound to give us no more than 
a glimpse of the topics and themes that interested Timaeus in Pythagoras and 
Pythagoreanism. From this point of view neither a maximalist approach (“an ex-
cursus devoted to Pythagoreanism”), nor a minimalist one (“a bunch of scattered 
references”) seems appropriate. Most probably Timaeus did not write in terms 
of “Pythagoreanism.” And yet, he must have perceived the historical and cul-
tural importance of the role played by Pythagoras and his followers within the 
South Italian cities, and noted the novelty and impact of those communities of 
“friends.” From later sources, which surely relied on Timaeus, though without 
either quoting him literally, or, probably, limiting themselves to his account, we 
gather that he recounted the biography of Pythagoras, reported the public speech-
es delivered by him in Croton – and probably did so much more succinctly than 
(Apollonius)-Iamblichus –, and dwelt at length on the mid-fifth century political 
turmoil that led to the expulsion of the Pythagoreans. Moreover, as we have seen, 
Timaeus was interested in Pythagorean society and investigated the customs of 
its members and of the Pythagorean women. There are reasons to believe that 
such an interest in Pythagorean matters was an integral part of Timaeus’ research 
on the history of Magna Graecia and Sicily. Although nineteenth-century Quel-
lenkunde attributed too much to Timaeus, to the point that now a thorough re-as-
sessment of the scope of the “Timaean tradition” is much needed, we should be 
very careful not to let the pendulum swing too far in the opposite direction.
60 Baron 2012, 168.
61 See FGrH III b Kommentar zu nr. 297–607 [Text], 551, 5–6 (“hat T. in einem excursus, der bis 
ins 10. buch reicht, über Pythagoras’ leben, lehre, und wirksamkeit gehandelt”), and 552, 
21–24 (“Wir… wissen nicht ob T. den grossen excurs an die zerstörung von Sybaris ca. 510 
angeknüpft hat bezw. was er von dem ‘reich’ von Kroton erzählt hat”). 
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Pythagorean Askesis  
in Timycha of Sparta and Theano of Croton
Claudia Montepaone & Marcello Catarzi – University of Naples “Federico II”
This paper will first consider askesis in the two Pythagoreans Timycha and 
 Theano; will then examine it more broadly as a concept; and finally will draw 
conclusions about a distinctively Pythagorean askesis.
1 Exceptionality and daily life: Timycha and Theano
A) Timycha
Both Timycha1 and Theano2 are listed in the Aristoxenic catalogue of Pythago-
reans.3 Although neither is mentioned in the works of Plato, in Proclus’ Commen-
tary on Plato’s Republic, too, on the topic of the need for a common paideia, Timycha 
and Theano are both cited as a model of excellence and proof that the acquisition 
of virtue is unrelated to gender, and, further, they are mentioned alongside the 
model of Diotima.4
To whom are these arguments attributed? Did the Platonic tradition of travels 
in Sicily encounter and spread the “facts” relating to Timycha? Or is this merely 
a later hypothesis?
In The Pythagorean Life by Iamblichus, Timycha certainly has the role of model 
of andreia5 and sophrosyne.6 Together with Myllias the philosopher, she plays this 
1 Iamb. VP 192–195; 214; 267.
2 See Theano A 1 (Iamb. VP 267); A 2 and 7 (Suida s. v. Theano 1 and 2); A 4 (D. L. 8.42–43); A 6 
(Anon. Phot. 438b31); A 14 (Luc. Im. 18–19); A 17 (Clem. Al. Strom. 1.80.4); B 2 (Clem. Al. Strom. 
4.7.44.2); C 1 (Iamb. VP 132) and 3 (Stob. 4.32). The citation of the fragments of Pythagorean 
philosophy quoted in the text follows the numbering of the edition of the female Pythag-
orean writings by Claudia Montepaone, with translation and notes by Ida Brancaccio. In 
particular see Montepaone 2011, 7–8.
3 Iamb. VP 267 (in the edition by Giangiulio 2000). On the catalogue see Thesleff 1965; Waithe 
1987; Montepaone 2011; Mele 2013, 133–144; Pomeroy 2013, in particular 1, 5, 10.
4 See Procl. in Remp. 8.248 (the reference is to Plat. Tim. 42b5 ff.). In Lucian, too, the figure of 
Theano is mentioned alongside that of Diotima. See Theano A 14 (Luc. Im. 18–19). Cf. Stavru 
2011, 174 ff.
5 On the value of andreia see Iamb. VP 214; Phintys B 1 (1) (Stob. 4.23.61); Perictione B 1 (1) 
(Stob. 4.28.19).
6 For sophrosyne / sophrosyna in the female Pythagorean texts, in its linguistic variation (soph-
ron, phronesis / phronasis, phronon) and in different shades of meaning cp. Theano D 1 (1) “to 
Euboule” (Thesleff 195, 22–196, 34); D 3 “to Euridice” (Thesleff, 197, 12–24); D 5 (3) “to Nic-
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role in their joint opposition to Dionysius of Syracuse. This explains the presence 
of “Timycha, wife of Myllias of Croton,” at the top of the list of the seventeen 
“most famous” Pythagoreans women,7 at the end of Aristoxenus’ catalogue. As 
for Myllias,8 also present in eighteenth place on the list of the known male Py-
thagorean philosophers, besides the testimony relative to Timycha, little else is 
known.9 This catalogue is largely attributed to Aristoxenus – himself the author 
of a Life of Pythagoras10 – and records by his statements the importance of the fe-
male presence, a novelty and specific characteristic of the Pythagorean paideia.
In a number of explanatory passages of Iamblichus’ Pythagorean Life, but not 
only there (also in Porphyry), the thaumasta erga of Timycha and Myllias stand 
out as a model par excellence of andreia and sophrosyne, a consequence of the ef-
ficacy of the Pythagorean paideia. It is sophrosyne, that is temperance, which is 
dominant in the “extraordinary deeds” attributed to her and Myllias, namely the 
memorable encounter with the tyrant (discussed below), and which, according to 
the Pythagorean doctrine, defines the philosophical valence of Timycha of Sparta 
and her husband Myllias of Croton.11
Iamblichus writes:
With respect to fortitude (andreia), however, many of the particulars which 
have already been related appropriately pertain to it; such as the admira-
ble deeds of Timycha, and of those Pythagoreans who chose to die rather 
than transgress the decisions of Pythagoras concerning beans (kuamos), 
and other things conformable to such pursuits.12
In precisely the same narrative context, as well as the terms sophrosyne and 
egkrateia, the term askesis is also used: 
Similar to these also were the precepts concerning silence, and those 
which tended to the exercise of temperance (eis sophrosynes askesin). For 
the subjugation of the tongue, is of all other continence (egkrateumaton) the 
most difficult.13
ostrate” (Thesleff 198, 29–200, 15); Melissa D 1 (1 and 2) “to Cleareta” (Thesleff 115, 24–116, 
17); Phintys B 1 (1, 2 and 4) (Stob. 4.23.61) and B 2 (1, 3) (4.23.61a); Myia D 1 “to Phyllis” (Thes-
leff 123, 12–124, 8); Perictione B 1 (1, 3 and 4) (Stob. 4.28.19); B 2 (3) (Stob. 4.25.50); B 3 (Stob. 
3.1.120); Aesara / Aresa B 1 (1 and 2) (Stob. 1.49.27).
 7 It is about paradoxical and inevitable contradiction in terms for the Pythagorean parameter 
“excellence” (male, all the more so if female) between, excellence / imposition for invisibility. 
See Mele 2013, 142 and following; Catarzi 2010, 142–152, in particular 146–148.
 8 Porph. VP 61; Iamb. VP 189 and following, 233, 267.
 9 Iamb. VP 143, 233; 267; cf. Ael. VH 4.17.1.
10 Aristox. fr. 31 Wehrli. As Giangiulio indicates, the quotation from Aristoxenus was present in 
the text of Nicomachus. Cf. Giangiulio 2000, 541–542, n. 233; Mele 2007; Zhmud 2012; Mele 2013.
11 Iamb. VP 187–195; 214.
12 Iamb. VP 214. Cf. Delatte 1930 (1931); Detienne 1975, in particular the second chapter, “The 
Spice Ox,” 37 and following.
13 Other passages in the work where the term askesis appears, besides VP 195, are VP 42: “Py-
thagoras also exhorted young men to the cultivation of learning (pros ten paideian), calling on 
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This statement, again from Iamblichus, is a quotation from historians of the Hel-
lenistic era, Hippobotus (late third century BC) and Neanthes (early second cen-
tury BC). It is thus not chronologically too distant from the previous one – if we 
take into account that the catalogue is of Aristoxenic origin (fourth century BC) – 
and the facts it relates.
In fact, if the “exemplary deeds” of the Pythagorean philosophers Timycha of 
Sparta and Myllias of Croton are comprehensible especially in the significance, 
values, and problems relating to the tradition of the ancient Pythagorean system, 
the data relating to these spouses should in turn be considered a product of a cer-
tain, subsequent Pythagoreanism (at the earliest in the fourth century BC), which 
corresponds to a period when the city of Croton was no longer the only hub of Py-
thagoreanism – as was the case when Pythagoras arrived in Croton from Samos 
(about 530 BC) – but when it was found rather in “the whole of Italy” and Megale 
Hellas, as the provenance of both the male and female philosophers mentioned in 
Iamblichus’ catalogue. To these “extraordinary deeds” Iamblichus had referred 
earlier, in paragraph VP 189, quoting the source and relating the historical event 
– a model of virtue in the Pythagorean way of life – that is, the ambush ordered 
by Dionysius II and carried out by Eumenes from Syracuse, brother of Dion, at 
the head of a group of 30 horsemen against a group of Pythagoreans including 
Timycha and Myllias:
(189) The temperance also of those men, and how Pythagoras taught this 
virtue, may be learnt from what Hippobotus and Neanthes narrate of 
Myllias and Timycha14 who were Pythagoreans (…). (192) (…) They (scil. 
Eurymenes and his thirty soldiers) were returning, but they happened to 
meet with Myllias the Crotonian, and his wife Timycha the Lacedaemo-
nian, whom the other Pythagoreans had left behind, because Timycha, 
being pregnant, was now in her sixth month, and on this account walked 
leisurely. These therefore the soldiers gladly made captive, and led them 
to the tyrant, paying every attention to them, in order that they might be 
brought to him safe. (193) But the tyrant having learnt what had happened, 
was greatly dejected, and said to the two Pythagoreans, “You shall obtain 
from me honours transcending all others in dignity, if you will consent 
to reign in conjunction with me.” All his offers however were rejected by 
Myllias and Timycha; “If then,” said he, “you will only teach me one thing, 
I will dismiss you with a sufficiently safe guard.” Myllias therefore asked 
him what it was he wished to learn; Dionysius replied, “It is this, why your 
them to observe how absurd it would be that they should judge the reasoning power (dianoia) 
to be the most laudable of all things, and should consult about other things through this, and 
yet bestow no time nor labour (ponos) in the exercise of it (ein ten askesin);” and VP 186: “But 
war is the leader and legislator of slaughter. For by this it is increased, and becomes strong 
and powerful. Not to step also above the beam of the balance is an exhortation (askein) to 
justice, announcing that whatever is just (ta dikaia) should be cultivated….”
14 Neanthes FGrHist 84 F 31 (= 31a.: Porph. VP 61; 31b: Iamb. VP 189–194). See Brisson 1996, 202–203.
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companions chose rather to die, than to tread on beans?” But Myllias im-
mediately answered, “My companions indeed submitted to death, in order 
that they might not tread upon beans, but I would rather tread on them, 
than tell you the cause of this.” (194) Dionysius therefore, being astonished 
at this answer, ordered him to be forcibly taken away, but commanded 
Timycha to be tortured: for he thought that as she was a woman, pregnant, 
and deprived of her husband, she would easily tell him what he wanted 
to know, through fear of the torments. The heroic woman, however, grind-
ing her tongue with her teeth, bit it off, and spat it at the tyrant; evincing 
by this, that though her sex being vanquished by the torments might be 
compelled to disclose something which ought to be concealed in silence, 
yet the member subservient to the development of it should be entirely cut 
off. Pythagoreans refused so much friendship with strangers, even though 
they should happen to be royal.
These extraordinary and hardly repeatable reactions, in utterly exceptional situ-
ations, are representative of the model of the spouses Timycha and Myllias. In 
fact, this extreme behaviour of Timycha presupposes the Pythagorean askesis, di-
rected both to males and females in order to prepare them for the test of refusing 
philia with the tyrant. This concerning both the forms of power and especially the 
sharing of knowledge, which is characterized by the primary order of keeping 
“the secret,” a true dogma and proof of excellence in achieving the Pythagorean 
paideia.
The significance of Timycha as model is analogous to what is indicated by the 
arete of Theano, both being the fruit of a common paideia, the acquisition of which 
is not related to gender, but the difference between them is that, whereas Theano 
teaches, essentially delivering precepts, Timycha enacts them.
B) Theano
Although the term askesis does not appear in the texts of the female Pythago-
reans, the function of this notion for achieving the values that predominate in 
the presentation of Timycha as model finds full correspondence in the female 
Pythagorean precepts, which belong to the “world” of Theano. Sophrosyne is cen-
tral to the teaching of Pythagoras for both males and females, a theme already 
significant in Iamblichus.15 He states:
(187) It follows, in the next place, that we should speak of temperance, and 
show how it was cultivated by Pythagoras, and how he delivered it to his 
associate.16 We have already therefore narrated the common precepts con-
cerning it, in which it is said that every thing incommensurate should be 
15 Porph. VP 18; Iamb. VP 132. Cf. Jufresa 1995, 17–40; Jufresa 1996, 95–108.
16 Iamb. VP 187; Porph. VP 18; Theano A 3 (Porph. VP 19); A 15 (Schol. in Luc. 24 6.10–23); Phintys 
B 1 (Stob. 4.23.61).
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cut off with fire and sword. The abstinence also from animal food is a 
precept of the same kind; and likewise from certain foods calculated to 
produce intemperance, and impeding the vigilance and genuine energies 
of the reasoning power. Farther still, to this species the precept belongs, 
that sumptuous food should indeed be introduced in banquets, but should 
[shortly after] be sent away, and given to the servants, being placed on 
the table merely for the sake of punishing the desires. Likewise, that no 
liberal and noble woman should wear gold, but only harlots.17 Of the same 
type are the exercises aiming at the preservation of her purity from any-
thing that might hinder it.18 (188) And again, the exercise of taciturnity, 
and perfect silence, for the purpose of governing the tongue. Likewise a 
strenuous and assiduous resumption and investigation of the most diffi-
cult theorems. But on account of all these, we must refer to the same virtue 
[i. e. to temperance], abstinence from wine; paucity of food and sleep; an 
inartificial contempt of renown, wealth, and the like; a sincere reverence 
towards those to whom reverence is due, but an unfeigned similitude of 
behaviour and benevolence towards those of the same age; an animadver-
sion and exhortation of those that are younger, without envy; and every 
thing else of the like kind.19
The notions of sophrosyne, andreia, egkrateia dominate the exceptional askesis of 
Timycha, while Theano’s paideia falls into the category of the Pythagorean rules 
in daily life. We find evidence of this in the so-called apophthegms attributed to 
Theano:
– “when she [sc. Theano] was asked how many days it was after sex with a man 
that a woman becomes pure, she said: ‘with her own husband, at once, but 
with another man, never.’ And she advised a woman who was about to go to 
her husband to cast off her shame with her clothes, and to pick it up with her 
clothes when she got up again. Asked what that was, she replied: ‘That which 
defines me as a woman.’”20
–  “Theano, the wife of Pythagoras, when asked how she would be held in high 
honour, said, ‘by plying my loom and resisting my bed.’”21
–  Stobaeus reports that, “Theano, when putting on her halation, exposed her 
arm. A man said: ‘your arm is beautiful.’ She said: ‘but it is not public.’ And 
not only the arm. She maintained, in fact, that it was fitting that a wise woman 
should not even air her words in public, and should be ashamed of her voice 
17 Theano D 5 “To Nicostrate” (Thesleff 198, 29–200, 15); Perictione B 1 (Stob. 4.28.19); Phintys 
B 2 (Stob. 4.23.61a). Cfr. Detienne 1975, 164–173; Pomeroy 2013, 62–64; Mele 2013, in particular 
281–283.
18 See also Theano C 2 (D. L. 8.43) and n. 33; Phintys B 1 (4) (Stob. 4.23.61).
19 Iamb. VP 187–188.
20 Theano C 2 (D. L. 8.43); cf. Plant 2004, 70.
21 Theano C 3 (Stob. 4.32); cf. Plant 2004, 70.
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in the presence of strangers as if she were undressing: the voice can, in fact, 
reveal the feelings, nature, and state of mind of she who speaks.”22
–  “Theano, the Pythagorean philosopher, when asked what the duty of a wom-
an was, said ‘to please her husband.’”23
–  Stobaeus also attributes these words to Theano: “It is better to ride a horse 
without reins than to be an unreflective woman.”24
–  And: “There are things which it is fine to discuss; about these things it is 
shameful to remain silent. There are also things which it is shameful to dis-
cuss; about these things it is preferable to remain silent.”25 (This is analogous 
to what Pythagoras himself maintained: “One must be silent or say things that 
are better than silence.”26)
Similar and further indications come down to us from the so-called “Letters of 
Theano,”27 which form the Pythagorean female askesis, directed especially to-
wards the younger female students. These are a corpus28 of extant letters, belong-
ing to the genre of the philosophical epistles of the Hellenistic era, little jewels of 
Pythagorean knowledge. They comprise two groups of texts both of debated au-
thenticity:29 the first related to epistolographic tradition manuscripts, comprises 
three epistles, to Euboule, to Callisto, and to Nicostrate; the other comprises four 
epistles in the manuscript Vaticanus Graecus 578, Theano to Eucleides, to Eury-
dice, to Rhodope, to Timaeonides; an eighth, fragmentary epistle, from Theano to 
Timareta, is preserved in Pollux.30
Particularly interesting are those belonging to the first group, dealing with 
issues that can be resolved by the Pythagorean askesis, founded on sophrosyne, 
andreia, egkrateia, the fundamental values of the Pythagorean paideia. All the texts 
taken together contain a real system of female Pythagorean values relating to 
family life:31 to Euboule, a young mother busy with the care of her child;32 to 
Callisto, a young master of the house busy with the management of the servants 
22 Theano C 4 (Stob. 4.49). On the apophthegms attributed to Theano, see Montepaone 2011, 
32–36, in particular 32, n. 29 and 36 n. 40. Cf. Plant 2004, 70.
23 Theano C 5 (Stob. 4.55); cf. Plant 2004, 70.
24 Theano C 1.6 (Stobaeus, Florilegium Monacense, 268 Meineke); cf. Pomeroy 2013, 69.
25 Theano C 1.7 (Stobaeus, Florilegium Monacense, 269 Meineke); cf. Pomeroy 2013, 68.
26 Stobaeus 3.34.7.2.
27 Montepaone 2011, 37–57.
28 Compare note 44 on page 37 by Ida Brancaccio in Montepaone 2011, 37–57 and relative com-
ment.
29 Montepaone 2011, 37 n. 44 and 41 n. 69.
30 Poll. On. 10.21.
31 Theano C 3 (Stob. 4.32), and n. 36. On this see Pomeroy 2013; also: Waithe 1987; Montepaone 
1993, 73–105 (= Montepaone 2003, 77–131); Montepaone 1999, 237–249; Natali 1995; Jufresa 
1995, 17–40; Jufresa 1996, 95–108; Nisticò 2003; Plant 2004, 68–86; Brancaccio 2011, 19–37.
32 Theano D 1 “to Euboule” (Thesleff 195, 22–196, 34). It is interesting to compare Myia D 1 “to 
Phyllis” (Thesleff 123, 12–124, 8. See Montepaone 2011, 37–41 and 59–63.
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in the oikos;33 to Nicostrate, the young wife facing her husband’s intemperate in-
fidelity.34
One case is representative of all of them: Theano to Nicostrate.35 This is a situ-
ation for which a perfect solution is offered by the parameters of the Pythagorean 
askesis, especially egkrateia, dominion over the thymos, which bars uncontrolled 
acts that go against the Pythagorean arete, and siope, silence regarding the hus-
band’s guilt.
In fact, the philosopher intervenes with her wisdom to resolve a risk that the 
young wife Nicostrate could lose the Pythagorean arete, forgetting the virtue of 
the legitimate Pythagorean wife, because she is beside herself with jealousy: her 
husband has lost his head for a prostitute. She, therefore, plans her revenge, which 
would determine a series of disastrous social consequences, jeopardizing her role 
in the all the relationships involving her (husband, children, slaves, city, etc.).
Instead, how should a Pythagorean wife behave in this situation, compared 
with any other wife? Here one must call into question the gamete arete and, with-
out ever equating oneself to any other “inferior” category (slave, concubine), be 
above all accommodating36 towards the husband, who has yielded to a transient 
carnal “distraction,” urged on by pleasure, contrary to a marital relationship 
based on mutual advantage.
The disastrous consequences of jealousy, in fact, risk strongly destabilizing the 
whole family relationship. Therefore, apply self control (egkrateia), be silent. Mak-
ing the guilt visible, in fact, will only make it stronger, bringing further damage. 
Silence in relation to the outside world37 instead, will keep the misdeed within 
the family and therefore will increase the huband’s shame for the uncontrolled 
physical attraction for the prostitute.
Facing this situation with sophrosyne, egkrateia, and andreia will constitute aske-
sis for the wife and correspondingly paideia for the husband.
Lastly, again according to the values of the Pythagorean askesis, we must assess 
the significance of Medea as a negative model: “The tragedy involving the acts 
committed by Medea against the rules – says Theano – teaches one to dominate 
one’s jealousy.”38 The protagonist of Euripides’ tragedy, according to the teachings 
of Theano, is stereotyped as transgressing the rules due to uncontrolled passion. 
From this follows the necessity to exercise control. Obviously we are far removed 
from Euripides’ understanding of the tragic Medea, which is far more complex 
and full of internal and contradictory rules.
33 Theano D 4 “to Callisto” (Thesleff 197, 25–198, 28).
34 Theano D 5 “to Nicostrate” (Thesleff 198, 29–200, 15). Compare Theano D 3 “to Eurydice” 
(Thes leff 197, 12–24).
35 Detienne 1994, in particular “The Lettuce of Pythagoras,” 123 and following.
36 Cf. Theano C 5 (Stob. 4.55), and n. 39.
37 Cf. Theano C 4 (Stob. 4.49).
38 Cupido 2002, 33–64; Pomeroy 2013, 92–93.
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The advice given to Nicostrate by the Pythagorean philosopher necessarily 
presupposes the social, historical and institutional relations of the ancient city 
(polis), of which the family is a necessary and premise for that given historical 
and social context.
2 The sphere of askesis
In the passage quoted above from his Commentary on Plato’s Republic, Proclus 
mentions Timycha and Theano together with Diotima. The name of Diotima does 
not appear in Iamblichus’ catalogue, but it is clear that Proclus is referring to the 
Diotima of Mantinea who initiated Socrates into love-matters, ta erotika, in Plato’s 
Symposium. For that matter, Plato does not name Theano or Timycha. What might 
the link be between these two excellent Pythagorean women and Socrates’ teach-
er? Is this only a minimal and marginal sign of osmosis between Platonism and 
Pythagorism in the Neoplatonic koine of the fifth century AD? It seems that an an-
swer might be had from Iamblichus, at the beginning of his account of the events 
involving Timycha. Timycha constitutes a model of temperance, sophrosyne, tak-
en to extreme consequences and displayed in an exceptional state. In giving the 
characteristics of sophrosyne,39 Iamblichus, as we have seen, stresses above all “the 
exercise of taciturnity (echemythia), and perfect silence (panteles siope), which to-
gether exercise (synaskousa) for the purpose of governing the tongue (to glosses 
kratein).”40 Certainly the episode involving Timycha, which Iamblichus reports in 
the subsequent paragraph, is an extreme example of “keeping absolute silence” 
and “controlling one’s tongue.” The expression of controlling one’s tongue is also 
the phrase attributed to Theano by Stobaeus, as previously mentioned, though 
she is also known for her prompt answer and advice. But Iamblichus introduces 
an important, albeit indirect, indication of a link between the three women men-
tioned by Proclus. He uses the verb synaskeo to mean cooperation in carrying out 
an exercise in the best way. “Know when to be silent” and “keep absolute silence” 
are two practices that combine to control one’s tongue, or two actions that com-
bine to make up the practice of controlling one’s tongue. Are they training for a 
test, or are they themselves the test? In any case, in its verbal form a key term is 
introduced: askesis.
Askesis can also be applied to Diotima. In fact, in Plato’s Symposium 212b6 Soc-
rates concludes in this way his account of the teachings he received from the 
woman from Mantinea on the matters of love: “I tell you now that every man 
should honor Love, as I myself do honour all love-matters (ta erotika) and exercise 
(asko) them especially (diapherotos), and exhort all other men to do the same.” Soc-
rates is voicing what his teacher has taught him, and certainly for the Neoplatonic 
Proclus there is no sense in posing the problem of the historical authenticity of 
39 Iamb. VP 187.
40 Ibid. 188.
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Diotima,41 who is distinguished by the role she plays in the Platonic dialogue. 
Diotima is her teachings, discernible in the life of her pupil Socrates, who in the 
matters of love considers himself an expert.42 And as an expert Socrates continues 
to practise and encourage this exercise (askesis) in others. In his exercise he excels, 
he stands out in a particular way (diapherontos) from all the others. His distinction 
makes him a model, and he cannot disguise his knowledge of love through irony: 
if love is to be practised it cannot be hidden, it is involvement to the core, whereas 
irony is an exercise of distancing.43 Diotima’s teaching in the Symposium affords 
us a link between eros and askesis.44 Both identify strategies of acquiring and pre-
serving.45 Both refer to a pre-eminence of that which is practical and that which 
cannot be replaced by speech or reasoning.46
Askesis, which with Timycha is presented in a state of exception and with The-
ano in one of an orderly daily life, refers in the case of Diotima to a cohesive force, 
Eros, that increases the more it is practised, and finds the fundamental rules of its 
practice in teaching, in learning, and in preserving.
Askesis is, in fact, essentially exercise, practice, ways of learning, honing, per-
fecting, preserving, and transmitting through practice. But askesis is also a way to 
involve oneself and transform oneself. Terms linked to askesis are askema, “prac-
tice,” asketes, “skilled person, expert,” asketikos, “laborious.” Above all the refer-
ence to the verb askeo, from which the noun derives, is fundamental.
The early meaning of askeo is “to mould,” “build,” “produce,” and later “prac-
tise,” “exercise,” “cultivate,” “submit through practice.” In Homer, for instance, 
the verb is used to indicate to knit, to shape metal, to make a bow.47 But, in par-
ticular, askeo in the Iliad 10.438 is used for the act of adorning and embellishing a 
chariot with gold and silver, and in 14.240 the building of a gold throne by Hep-
haestus. In the Odyssey 1.439 it indicates the wet-nurse Euryclea’s act of carefully 
placing one of Penelope’s dresses, and in 3.438 binding with gold the horns of a 
heifer to embellish them. It is from these last passages of Homer’s poems that the 
verb askeo tends to take on the meaning of an act that increases value, initially 
41 On the problem of the “historical” Diotima cf. Levin 1975.
42 Cf. Plat. Symp. 177d8 and 198d1.
43 On the relationship between truth and simulation in Socrates’ exposition of matters of love 
see Stavru 2011, 171–184.
44 Cf. Macedo 2003.
45 Cf. Plat. Symp. 200c–d. Eros is a desire to have what one does not have, and preservation is a 
desire for the future to have that which is lacking in the present. In the same way askesis is 
aimed at perfecting, and is therefore linked to a lack, as well as to preservation, that is, for 
the future of what has been acquired through it. But eros and askesis also presuppose a cer-
tain “vital energy,” that is an initial willingness to practise, recognizing potential qualities 
in one’s nature. 
46 Cf. Plat. Symp. 209e6–210a3.
47 In Hom., Il. 14.179 askeo indicates making a dress by Athena; in 18.592 shaping metal. In 
Od. 4.134 it expresses knitting, in 23.198 the making of a leg of Odysseus’ bed in the reply he 
gives to Penelope.
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aesthetic,48 and then of some other kind. In the Attic dialect and in the comedies 
askeo takes on for the first time the meaning of “to exercise,” “to practise,” “test 
oneself,” regarding sports events both agonistic and antagonistic, and then to the 
practice of a moral and religious life.49 The verb identifies a goal to be achieved 
and at the same time an opposition to be dominated. The one cannot be had with-
out the other. To practise means to test oneself,50 but there is also practice that is 
preliminary and preparatory to the test.
It is with the meaning of exercise and increase in value that the verb askeo 
is found in the first philosophical contexts.51 In particular, Democritus in B 65 
DK states, “One should exercise (askein) much-sense, not much-learning (poly-
mathie);”52 and in B 110 DK, “Let a woman not exercise (me askei) speech, for that 
is terrible (deinon);”53 finally, in B 242 DK, “More people became good (agathoi gi-
nontai) by exercise (ek askeseos) than by nature (apo physios).” Particularly, in this 
last fragment askesis is placed in opposition to physis.54 One is by nature, but one 
becomes with askesis, going against one’s nature, or in any case finding in it that 
element of friction on which to practise.
Philostratus in Vitae Sophistarum 1.9.5 quotes the words of Dionysius the Elder, 
who in turn quotes the words of Gorgias (B 6 DK) regarding the Athenians who 
distinguished themselves in war for the following qualities: “In time of duty du-
tifully to speak (legein) and to leave unspoken (sigan), to act (poiein) <and to leave 
undone (ean)>, exercising (askesantes) two needed qualities especially, judgment 
(gnomen) <and strength (romen)>, one for deliberating, the other for accomplishing.”
Besides containing what will become two characteristics of Pythagorean so-
phrosyne in the testimony of Iamblichus, that is, “know when to be silent” and 
“be absolutely silent,” and also from the practical perspective of “doing” and “not 
doing,” this passage expresses two meanings of askesis: active knowledge and 
the application of what is learnt, overcoming the resistances and internal and 
external frictions. 
Further elements that characterize askesis appear in Xenophon who, in Memo-
rabilia, 1.2.19 attributes the following words to Socrates: “I notice that, just as those 
who do not exercise (askountas) the body cannot perform the functions proper 
48 For example, in Eur. El. 1073 askeo indicates caring for one’s appearance. In Soph. Tr. 1023 
preparing oneself to appear elegant. In Soph. El. 452, it indicates an embellishing.
49 For a diachronic analysis of the verb and its derivations from the meaning of work and pro-
duction, to that of physical, moral, and religious exercise, cf. Dressler 1947.
50 For example in Aristoph. Pl. 47.
51 For example Xenoph. B 3, 6 DK and Democr. B 53 DK, but not in Emp. B 87 DK and in B 61, 
4 DK.
52 In this fragment, echoing the criticism of polymathie of Heraclit. B 40 DK, askeo expresses a 
qualitative increase compared to a quantitative broadening of one’s learning.
53 In this case the increase rendered by the verb askeo would actually lead to a negative value. 
Therefore the increase expressed by the verb is completely independent of the assessment of 
the increased value.
54 Cf. also Protag. B 3 DK, for whom physis is not a means of contrast to practise upon, but indi-
cates a preliminary inclination to practise and learn.
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to the body (ta somata), so those who do not exercise (askountas) the soul cannot 
perform the functions of the soul (ta tes psyches erga): for they cannot do what they 
ought (dei) to do (prattein) nor avoid what they ought (dei) not to do (apechesthai).” 
Askesis is a preparatory exercise, thus an activity relating to another activity, in-
volving both body and soul, and relates to the determination to do or not do what 
in any case, regardless of the exercise, one knows what one must do or not do. It 
seems that precisely in askesis lies the basis of so-called “ethical intellectualism.” 
The fact that the will is consequent to the intellect, so no-one knowingly commits 
a misdeed but does so only through ignorance of what is right, is true only for one 
who has exercised and continues to exercise, and therefore is able, thanks to aske-
sis, to do what is right after recognizing it as such, and not to do what is not right.
Plato stresses the function of acquisition rendered by askesis.55 The verb askeo 
indicates the act of taking care of something, of cultivating it for oneself, and 
exercising it for others,56 so that the latter may recognize a quality of the person 
exercising it, which is shown precisely through the exercise. Therefore, the mo-
ment of recognizing by others’ askesis occurs regardless of the fact that the latter, 
in turn, are more or less trained to recognise it. This in a certain way may reveal a 
legacy of askesis as athletic training; in fact the well-trained athlete will win, and 
with his victory will make others recognize his gymnastic qualities and, above 
all, the long training he has had to endure to enable him to win.
But it is above all in the two principal political dialogues of Plato that the con-
cept of askesis shows greater intensity. In the Republic, 7.518e1, Socrates states that 
there are virtues of the soul similar to those of the body, that is, that they are not 
pre-existent to incarnation but rather are created in the soul by habit (ethos) and 
training (askesis). Therefore askesis combines with ethos to allow the soul, like the 
body, to acquire something that in itself, because of its very “nature,” the one or 
the other would not have; that is, something foreign to the “nature” of the soul or 
the body but not incompatible with it.57
Besides, not everyone can undergo the same training and the same askesis, 
nor can they all learn the same things. A predisposition to face the love of effort 
(philoponia) is always necessary, in order to wish for the antagonistic contrast with 
effort. Askesis is a form of dominion over the effort, and therefore prepares the 
way for learning. Askesis and learning are two related terms. But first what must 
be identified is the disposition, the character, the nature of the individuals. One’s 
nature predisposes one to a certain askesis, which in turn modifies one’s nature.58
55 For example in Prot. 323d7, Gorg. 486c5.
56 These two moments are preserved in Leg. 7.806a3.
57 The reference to “one’s nature” proceeds, more explicitly regarding the teaching of temper-
ance (sophrosyne), from value (andreia) and magnificence (megaloprepeia) in Resp. 7.536b1 and 
following.
58 Cf. Resp. 3.404a9 and following.
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The reference to the nature of those who practise askesis brings Plato to stress 
the singularity and uniqueness of exercise for each individual.59 Askesis increases 
in relation to the importance of the thing to be practised and is accompanied by 
study. One must train only in one thing in order to do it well. Someone who prac-
tises a virtue cannot at the same time watch over someone else practising it or a 
different virtue.60 It seems that the exercise defines the individuality of those who 
practise it, or that this individuality is expressed through the exercise. 
Aristotle too stresses that askesis must be suited to the nature of the one who 
practises it,61 and stresses its conservative and sustaining function.62
One’s nature predisposes one to the type of exercise, as stated in Politics 
7.1336a21 in relation to the education of children: “The bodily habit of children 
is naturally well fitted (euphyes) by warmth to be exercised (askesin) to bear cold.” 
But, besides nature, another factor that unifies and directs exercise is custom. In 
Politics 8.1337a27, Aristotle presents the need for common and public education 
for all citizens, in conformity with the custom (ethos) of the constitution: “Matters 
of public interest ought to be subject to public exercise (askesis).”63
And finally, the type of virtue for which one is training determines the type 
of exercise, as Aristotle states in Politics 8.1337b3: “All men do not honor the same 
virtue, so they naturally hold different opinions in regard to exercising (pros ten 
askesin) in virtue.”
Aristotle then sets exercise in relation to happiness.64 Exercise is separated 
from teaching and habit. If something can be taught it is unrelated to the nature 
of the person who teaches it and from the person who learns it, whereas habit and 
exercise are not unrelated to nature. A further characteristic of habit and exercise 
compared to learning is the need for repetition that the first two entail: what is 
acquired by habit and exercise can be lost without repetition.
The term askesis appears with limited frequency in Plotinus, even though he 
presents a conception of philosophy as essentially a lifestyle. Besides the general 
meaning of “exercise,”65 askesis emerges here as a condition of acquiring habits.66 
The non-intellectual virtues, the so-called “ethical virtues,” are proper to the in-
dividual and are acquired by habit and exercise. Therefore askesis is an act of 
acquiring and preserving that has nothing to do with the soul but rather with the 
59 For example in Leg. 8.846d4 and following.
60 In this criticism of the multiplicity of the occupations – dealt with again in Resp. 2.370b–d, 
374a, 394e, and then by Arist. Pol. 2.1273b9–12 – there are resonances of the Heraclitean crit-
icism of polymathie.
61 Cf. Arist. Pol. 4.1288b12.
62 Ibid. 2.1271b3 and following. 
63 Cf. also Arist. EN. 9.1170a11: “Moreover the society (suzen) of the good may supply a sort of 
exercising (askesis) in goodness,” where askesis also takes on the meaning of “incitement.”
64 Cf. Arist. EE. 1.1214a19 and EN. 1.1099b9 and b16.
65 For example in Plot. 3.2.8, 16.
66 Ibid. 1.1.10, 13 and 3.6.6.
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passions of the individual.67 Exercise, therefore, does not set in motion a process 
of purification, but of controlling and managing one’s passions. In Enneads 2.9.15, 
17, askesis “saves the world” from the condemnation dealt out by the ethics of the 
gnostics, who suggest an escape by eliminating “the root of all orderly living (to 
sophronein) and of the righteousness (dikaiosunen) which, innate in the moral sense 
(sumphuton en tois ethesi), is made perfect (teleioumenen) by thought (ek logou) and 
by self-discipline (askeseos).” And therefore askesis not only has to do with the ac-
quisition but also of the perfecting of a virtue, justice (dikaiosune), which is innate.
Conclusion
In the events involving the Pythagoreans Timycha and Theano, two co-ordinates 
clearly emerge, namely excellence and normality, which define and enclose an 
area of possible intermediate shades of meaning relating to the field of applica-
tion of the female Pythagorean askesis.
Askesis identifies putting oneself to the test but also training for the test, and 
therefore the test of the exercise is not the test one is training for. In the case of 
askesis as training, repetitiveness is a fundamental characteristic. In the case of 
askesis as a test for which one is training, the fundamental characteristic is its 
uniqueness, its non-repetitiveness. Timycha’s test is certainly not repeatable, at 
least not by her, whereas the askesis that Theano is seen to possess, and to which 
in her letters she invites others to conform, is repeatable both by Theano and by 
the recipients of her letters. 
“Pythagorean” askesis, in addition, expresses belonging to a group, a school. It 
refers, in fact, to one specific exercise as opposed to another, and what identifies 
the singularity of the exercise is the set of values and objectives that belong to 
the group. The individuality of the person who carries out the exercise comes 
into play mainly in relation to contingent factors, and in any case is not founded 
on askesis. In the exercise, what is individual is above all the set of contrasts to 
be overcome, not because they represent any singularity but, on the contrary, 
because they are contingent.
In addition, askesis essentially identifies “a relationship of three components:” 
the doer, what is to be done, and the resistance to be overcome. The Pythagorean 
askesis relates to bioi, that is, to the incarnate souls; it is not presented as a puri-
fying act. What one acquires through askesis can be lost by idleness, by a lack of 
exercise. But above all askesis, which is often associated with habit, is presented 
as an artificial way to create new habits, new spontaneousness regarding one’s 
nature. It promotes a “second nature,” with the consequences of automaticity and 
thoughtlessness that this induced spontaneousness entails. 
With regard to the automaticity of ethos, askesis, however, presents an “active 
automaticity,” a thoughtless mechanicalness in continuous antagonism with a 
friction. Therefore the love of effort – the philoponia that Plato speaks of in the 
67 Ibid. 6.8.6, 25.
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Republic 7.535 d1 and d7 – is a natural predisposition that does not reduce the 
intensity of the friction, but makes the perception of friction a factor that increas-
es the desire to continue to train and measure oneself. And in this sense, unlike 
ethos, askesis is not a conditioning factor but rather one of openness, made possible 
through overcoming resistance.
Through Pythagorean askesis, those who practise it contribute to creating or-
der in the universe, and they reap it through the same exercise by which they cre-
ate it. Everything occurs within the area defined by their role and their functions, 
regardless of distinctions regarding points of view, such as “large” and “small,” 
“high” and “low.” In fact there is no high without low just as there is no state of 
exception (Timycha) without daily normality (Theano).
A system of thought potentially totalizing and “totalitarian” such as the Py-
thagorean system, which aspires to regulate every aspect of life (because the or-
der of the cosmos influences every aspect of life), produces conditions of excel-
lence through askesis, maintaining in these conditions the paradoxical situation 
that is peculiar to any model of excellence: a model is such because it presents dif-
ferences compared with the average, but, at the same time, a model is such only if 
it proves imitable. An inimitable model would constitute a contradiction in terms. 
However, if the model were entirely imitable and everyone were able to conform 
to it, it would lose the characteristics of excellence, of difference compared to that 
average, that have made it a model. That is, for a model of excellence to be such, it 
must be at the same time imitable and inimitable. And this condition is valid for 
the two Pythagorean women Timycha and Theano, as they have been presented 
to us by Iamblichus and Proclus.
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The Sentences of Sextus and the Christian Transformation 
of Pythagorean Asceticism
Ilaria Ramelli – University of Milan “Cattolica”
The so-called Sentences of Sextus (Sextii Sententiae) seem to be, in their present 
form, a Christian collection, probably dating to the late second century CE, of 
mostly moral sayings inspired by Pythagorean ethics.1 This “pagan” Pythago-
rean substratum is here adapted to a Christian milieu through a careful, albeit 
not too invasive, reworking, and the shift from “pagan” philosophical asceticism 
to Christian asceticism is probably the most remarkable feature of this collec-
tion. Thus, it provides an extremely interesting instance of the transformation of 
Pythagorean ἄσκησις,2 first in the Christian reworking of the collection itself, 
based on earlier, “pagan” material, and later in the impressively wide and consis-
tent Christian reception of this instance of Christianized Pythagorean asceticism. 
The Greek text of the Sentences is extant in two manuscripts: Patmiensis 263, 
from the tenth century CE, and Vaticanus graecus 742, from the fourteenth cen-
tury. Some of the sayings are also included in P. Palau Ribes Inv. 225v, from the 
fourth-fifth century CE, and a small portion of them was found among the Coptic 
“Gnostic” codices of Nag Hammadi.3 The Sentences of Sextus were also translated 
into Latin by Rufinus of Aquileia, the translator of Origen of Alexandria and Eu-
sebius of Caesarea, at the end of the fourth to the early fifth century. It is signif-
icant that the Origenian ascetic and monk, Rufinus, the friend of the Origenian 
ascetics Melania and Evagrius Ponticus, saw such a continuity between the ascet-
ic ideas expressed in these Sentences and the Christian ideals of “philosophical” 
asceticism and monasticism dear to Origen and his followers that he ascribed this 
collection of Christianized Pythagorean moral wisdom to Pope Sixtus II (Xystus), 
 1 The 451 “sentences” considered to be authentic are translated into English and commented 
on by Wilson 2012, who has also offered a new critical edition based on the two Greek man-
uscripts and on the ancient Latin and Syriac versions.
 2 On Pythagorean asceticism see Finn 2009, 27–30.
 3 NHC XII,1, ed. Poirier / Painchaud 1983. For a reassessment of the Nag Hammadi collection 
and its meaning in relation to early Christian asceticism see Denzey Lewis / Ariel Blount 
2014. They challenge the hypothesis of James M. Robinson and others that the collection 
was intentionally buried for posterity by ascetics such as Pachomian monks and suggest 
instead that the collection came from Graeco-Egyptian private citizens in late antiquity who 
commissioned the texts for personal use and deposited them as grave goods (following a 
widespread Egyptian practice).
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martyred under Valerian and a contemporary of Origen. Since this attribution is 
also found in the independent Syriac translation of the Sentences (independent 
on Rufinus’ version because of different translation choices and a different Vor-
lage, and found in two Syriac versions, in an Armenian version, and in the Sacra 
Parallela ascribed to John Damascene), it is highly probable that Rufinus took this 
attribution from an earlier tradition. Henry Chadwick deemed the attribution 
to Pope Sixtus not impossible,4 since, even if the Sentences are for the most part 
earlier, their final redaction is Christian, with Christian additions and revisions, 
often subtle. Rufinus was aware that Origen, who died around 255 CE, knew 
this collection and that he attributed it to a Christian philosopher. Indeed, in his 
Homily 1 on Ezekiel Origen quoted Sext. Sent. 352 and ascribed it to a “wise man, 
a believer” (sapiens et fidelis vir). 
Jerome was another monk who, for so long as he too was a great admirer of 
Origen, had been a friend of Rufinus, but he then became his enemy because of 
the Origenistic controversy.5 In Letter 133, written after his U-turn against Ori-
gen and his followers,6 he denounced as illegitimate the cultural operation of 
attributing these Pythagorean sentences to a Christian author – this move was a 
cultural operation because it tended to highlight the continuity between “pagan” 
Pythagorean ethics and Christian asceticism. Jerome claimed instead that the au-
thor of the Sentences of Sextus was in fact a “pagan” Pythagorean, Sextus, homo 
absque Christo atque ethnicus (“a heathen, a person without Christ”). With this, Je-
rome intended both to denigrate Rufinus and, at the same time, to keep “pagan” 
moral philosophy distinct from asceticism. Jerome was wrong, however, because 
the Sentences of Sextus known to him, Rufinus, and Origen were already Chris-
tianized, and this very Christianisation shows that in the eyes of the Christian 
redactor – just as later in the eyes of the Christian admirers of the Sentences of Sex-
tus – there was a profound affinity between (broadly) Pythagorean moral-ascetic 
wisdom and Christian “philosophical” asceticism. The Christian reworker seems 
to have added just a few sentences to his source material, often only changing or 
introducing some strategic words, such as πιστός, “faithful, believer,” and add-
ing brief echoes from Scripture. 
The fact that these Sentences were known already to Origen between the end 
of the second and the beginning of the third century, and that Origen attributed 
them to a Christian Sextus, may have later enhanced the monk Rufinus’ own 
interest in them. The Sentences of Sextus were also used by Basil of Caesarea – the 
founder of “Basilian” monasticism – in his work on baptism and by his disciple, 
the ascetic author Evagrius Ponticus, who spent most of his life in the Egyptian 
desert and soon became a major source of inspiration for Christian ascetics and 
monastics for many centuries. Evagrius also was an Origenian, like Rufinus and 
4 See Chadwick 1959.
5 See Ramelli 2013, 627–658.
6 On which, see Ramelli 2014. For the larger intellectual context of this controversy see ead. 
2013.
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partially Basil.7 The Sentences of Sextus were also cited by Pelagius, St. Benedict, 
and St. Columban – the last two being real fountainheads of monastic tradition. 
The rich reception of the Sentences of Sextus in monastic circles cannot escape 
notice and was obviously due to their ascetic inspiration. It was an asceticism 
that had its roots in Pythagorean ἄσκησις, but a Pythagorean ἄσκησις that had 
already been transformed by a moderate Christianisation.
Precise correspondences can be drawn between the Sentences of Sextus and 
the “pagan” Pythagorean Sentences (Sententiae Pythagoricae), as well as the “pagan” 
Pythagorean collection Clitarchus, but also, for instance, Seneca’s treatise On mar-
riage (De matrimonio), assuming that this work is at least fragmentarily preserved 
by Jerome in his Adversus Jovinianum.8 One example is offered by Sext. Sent. 231–
232, according to which every unrestrained husband commits adultery with his 
own wife; this sentence is found, verbally identical, both in Clitarchus 71 and in 
Seneca’s treatise (84: unde et Sextus in sententiis: adulter est, inquit, in suam uxorem 
amator ardentior), unless this is simply a quotation of the Sentences of Sextus by 
Jerome and not a quotation from Seneca’s own citation of the Sentences of Sextus. 
The principle that procreation is the only goal of marriage – a Pythagorean tenet 
emphasized by Sextus9 – is also found in Roman Stoics such as Musonius Rufus 
(Diatribe 12), later abundantly quoted by Clement of Alexandria and well known 
to, and admired by, Origen as well.10
The author of the Sentences of Sextus may have known Philo of Alexandria, too, 
who was called a “Pythagorean” by Clement of Alexandria,11 and who valued 
philosophical asceticism and described it especially in his De vita contemplativa, 
a treatise entirely devoted to the ascetic life of the Jewish Therapeutae. Richard 
Finn deems the Therapeutae close to Levites, bound by purity laws,12 while Philo 
depicts them in a more philosophical light and inscribes their asceticism in a 
philosophical framework. Philosophical asceticism is a characteristic of Sextus, 
too, and of several Christian thinkers who valued the Sentences, from Origen to 
Eusebius, Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius, and Rufinus. 
 7 See in this respect Ramelli 2015.
 8 This is the opinion of Lentano 1995, who also identifies Sextus with Sextius of the Sextii 
school known to Seneca (43 n. 66), although this identification is highly controversial. See 
discussion in Ramelli 2008 and 2009.
 9 On how sexual ethics and asceticism are treated in the Sentences of Sextus, with particular 
attention to the issues of self-mutilation, celibacy, and procreationism, see Pevarello 2013, 
Ch. 2.
10 See Ramelli 2001 and 2008a, 689–943. For Clement see Paed. 2.10 on this specific point, and 
several other passages for quotations from Musonius: see Parker 1901. Origen, too, admired 
Musonius and considered him a “paradigm of the most virtuous kind of life” (παράδειγμα 
τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου, Cels. 3.66). For Musonius on marriage and procreation see now also Lau-
rand 2014.
11 See Runia 1995 and Otto 2013, who disagree with each other about the reason for this desig-
nation.
12 Finn 2009, ch. 2.
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Echoes of the New Testament are arguably also found in the Sentences of Sex-
tus: for example, Sext. Sent. 230a may reveal a reference to 1 Cor 7:35, and Sext. 
Sent. 233 may echo Matt 5:28. And these are far from being the only probable 
parallels between these Sentences and the Christian scriptures. However, these 
biblical echoes are very discreet, relatively rare, and never explicit – Sextus nev-
er introduces them by means of formulas such as “as Scripture says,” “as the 
Apostle says,” “as Jesus / the Lord says,” and the like. In this way, the Sentences of 
Sextus could convey a Christianized Pythagorean ascetic wisdom in an apparent-
ly “neutral” form, which carried no overtly Christian marks. Thus, for instance, 
Jerome could claim, mistakenly but plausibly, as I have pointed out, that this col-
lection was in fact the product of a “pagan” author.
Another of the Sentences of Sextus is interesting for the conceptual and verbal 
parallels that it exhibits with passages in the New Testament which, again, are 
not quoted as such (1 Tim 5:6, Rev 3:1–2, some Pauline loci), as well as with impe-
rial Stoics and Middle Platonists such as Juvenal, Musonius, Seneca, and Philo.13 
Sext. Sent. 7 revolves around the notion that living a life deprived of virtue makes 
one morally and spiritually dead, even if one is bodily alive: “A faithful person 
whose faithfulness has been proved is a god in a [living] body of a human being; 
a faithless person, if proved such, is a dead human being [νεκρὸς ἄνθρωπος] in a 
living body.”14 The context of this Sentence helps us to understand its conceptual 
framework and makes it clear that the reference is indeed to spiritual death. For 
in Sext. Sent. 1–6 “Sextus” has explained that a “person of God” is faithful and 
really alive, because her conduct is worthy of God: “A faithful human being is an 
elect person. An elect person is a person of God. A person of God is one who is 
worthy of God. One who is worthy of God is a person who does nothing unwor-
thy of God. Therefore, if you endeavour to be faithful, do nothing unworthy of 
God.” Thus, true human life is a life that is worthy of God and makes one closer 
to the divine. A person who lives in vice, on the contrary, is apparently alive, but 
spiritually dead. This is the same notion expressed by the author of 1 Timothy, 
who was steeped in Hellenistic philosophy and describes a widow who lives in 
vice as one who, “albeit alive, is in fact dead” (ζῶσα τέθνηκε, 1 Tim 5:6). This 
conception of the spiritual death of the immoral person is also found in Rev 3:1–2, 
where such a person is called “dead” (νεκρός), in the Neo-Academic Cicero (Ad 
Atticum 12.2: a person who pursues only pleasures “is dead” [βεβίωται]), and in 
authors of the first-second century CE influenced – to different extents – by Sto-
icism, such as Seneca (De brevitate vitae 12.19: a vicious person “is dead” mortuus 
est), Musonius, and Juvenal (Sat. 8.85–86: the dissolute “has already died,” periit, 
while leading a life of pleasure), and repeatedly in Philo of Alexandria, who was 
close to Middle Platonism: in his Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 293: the vicious 
person is already dead, τετελευτηκώς; also in his Deterior potiori insidiari solet 49: 
13 On all these, see Ramelli 2010.
14 All translations are mine, unless otherwise stated.
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the vicious person is dead, τέθνηκε; and in De fuga 55: vicious people are dead 
while living, τεθνηκότες ζῶσι. Origen, who was familiar with the Sentences of 
Sextus as well as with Philo, the New Testament, and Musonius, inherited this 
notion in his own, deep reflection on moral / spiritual death, which he also pos-
ited as the real death and the real evil (physical death being just an adiaphoron or 
indifferent thing in the Stoic sense).15
This second-century collection of originally “pagan” and prevalently Pythag-
orean sayings, compiled and reworked by a Christian, shows how Pythagorean, 
Stoic, Cynic, and Platonic asceticism was taken up by a Christian author, with re-
spect not only to sexual restraint and other manifestations of self-control and re-
nunciation, but also to voluntary poverty. The Sentences of Sextus and their imme-
diate Christian reception actually cast some light on early Christian asceticism 
prior to the formal establishment of monasticism, before both St. Antony and the 
Cappadocians. That the intended audience of the Sentences of Sextus was mainly 
constituted by ascetics and monastics is suggested not only by their advocacy of 
radical poverty, as I shall point out, but also by several Christian adaptations of 
the “pagan” philosophical source material, such as Sext. Sent. 230a, which has no 
parallel in the “pagan” Pythagorean Sentences or Clitarchus and in which a person 
is allowed to renounce marriage to live as a companion of God. As has been ob-
served by Daniele Pevarello, the Sentences of Sextus as well as the Acts of Paul and 
Thecla indicate that a strong ascetic strain existed in Christianity already in the 
second century.16 Indeed, I would add, toward the mid-second century, Justin 
also speaks of many women and men who, in his day, were seventy and had been 
consecrated virgins since their youth (Apol. 1.15.6). These ascetics, therefore, were 
born around 80 CE, which means that before 100 CE many Christians had chosen 
virginity voluntarily. We can take this as one expression of Christian asceticism. 
Justin, however, does not specify whether their asceticism also involved volun-
tary poverty, an ideal that the Sentences of Sextus underline. 
The diffusion of the Sentences of Sextus in early Christian asceticism and mo-
nasticism, from Origen of Alexandria – who attests to their being read and valued 
by many Christians in his day (Cels. 8.30; Comm. in Matt. 15.3) – to Evagrius Ponti-
cus, Rufinus, Jerome – who again testifies to the wide circulation of these Sentenc-
es “through many provinces” (Comm. in Jer. 4.41) – and the Egyptian, Syriac, and 
Armenian monks, as well as the western Benedictine tradition, both confirms the 
continuity of ascetic ideals between “pagan” and Christian ascetics, and at the 
same time reveals the transformation and adaptation of Pythagorean ἄσκησις to 
various Christian milieux. The closeness of the Sentences of Sextus to the Orige-
nian ascetic tradition is emblematically shown by the attribution of Sent. Sext. 152 
in the Regula magistri 11 to Origen himself: Origenes sapiens dicit (sic!). It is signifi-
cant that here Origen is still depicted as a sage, and not as a heretic.
15 See Ramelli 2011.
16 Pevarello 2013, 209.
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Τhe very analysis of the Sentences of Sextus, together with their Christian re-
ception, shows the deep continuity that existed between “pagan” ascetic-phil-
osophical traditions and the origins of Christian asceticism and monasticism. 
Henry Chadwick had already noticed this continuity,17 but new insights and a 
different perspective are in order, since Chadwick wondered whether the Chris-
tian Sextus’ use of “pagan” sources had blurred “distinctions which might bet-
ter have been kept more clearly in view.”18 It is unclear why distinctions, rather 
than continuity, between “pagan” and Christian asceticism should be highlight-
ed, although of course distinctions did exist (for instance, an emphasis on faith, 
the abovementioned πίστις, which is certainly a Christian addition to the earlier 
Pythagorean material, or the recourse to the New Testament as an authoritative 
source – although I have already noted how covert and circumspect this recourse 
was in the Sentences of Sextus). But a strong continuity also existed. This is shown 
by the Sentences of Sextus themselves, in the very fact of their constitution out 
of Pythagorean lore, which was almost entirely preserved and only very slight-
ly supplemented or changed, and their Christian reception. It is also supported 
by an ongoing, larger investigation into the possible role of asceticism in the re-
jection of slavery and social injustice, not only in early Christianity, but also in 
ancient Judaism and “pagan” philosophy.19 One major issue in this connection is 
the question whether the relation between asceticism and the rejection of both 
slave ownership and social injustice that leads to poverty was simply the result 
of embracing voluntary poverty, since possessing nothing implies possessing no 
slaves either, or whether there were other motivations at work. One such moti-
vation could be the idea that one should avoid robbing other people of what they 
need by possessing too much oneself, on the basis of the principle that wealth is 
tantamount to theft (see below). Now, not only Gregory of Nyssa, but also, as I 
shall argue shortly, the Sentences of Sextus suggest that the latter motivation was 
relevant at least in some cases, and had to do with the connection not only be-
tween asceticism and renunciation or self-restraint, but also between asceticism 
and justice.
The ideal of voluntary poverty and dispossession (ἀκτημοσύνη) of the Chris-
tian sage in the Sentences of Sextus has remarkable implications with regard to 
the continuity between “pagan” and Christian ascetic-philosophical ideas. For 
the ἀκτημοσύνη of the sage passed, more or less directly, into the ἀκτημοσύνη 
of Christian monastics – in this case perhaps through a transfer rather than a 
full transformation –, also thanks to the convergence between this philosophi-
cal ideal and the New Testament ideal of voluntary poverty. The latter is clear-
ly advocated both by Jesus in the episode of the rich young man (Luke 14:33: 
perfection consists in selling whatever one possesses and following Jesus) and 
17 Chadwick 1959.
18 Ibid., 162.
19 Ramelli 2016.
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elsewhere,20 and by Paul, who described himself as poor and possessing nothing 
(2 Cor 6:10), and partially by the author of Acts in 2:44–46 and 4:32–36, where the 
members of the early Jesus movement in Jerusalem are portrayed as possessing 
nothing individually, but as holding everything in common. Pevarello is correct 
when he remarks that, “Sextus depicts voluntary poverty as a distinctive feature 
of moral excellence. This step marks an important stage in the development of 
the Christian understanding of voluntary poverty, anticipating and enabling the 
ascetic severity of monastic poverty as a sign of true wisdom and affirmation of 
one’s freedom from the world and dominion over it.”21 Voluntary poverty will be 
consistently exalted by theologians such as Gregory of Nyssa, an admirer and 
theoriser of Christian asceticism as the true philosophical life.22 Hence, for in-
stance, his enthusiastic portraits of his siblings Macrina and Naucratius as perfect 
ascetics who embraced voluntary poverty.
In Sext. Sent. 81 the reader is invited to throw his or her best possessions (τὰ 
κάλλιστα τῶν κτημάτων) into the mud in order to be pure. And in Sext. Sent. 18 
the ideal philosophical and Christian sage is depicted as without property: “a 
sage without property is similar to God” (σοφὸς ἀκτήμων ὅμοιος θεῷ), in Ru-
finus’ translation sapiens vir et contemptor pecuniae. That God has no possessions 
was emphasized by the Stoic and Pythagorean traditions rather than the Chris-
tian one; this aspect was related to God’s having no needs. Stoics such as Seneca 
and Musonius stressed that God needs nothing, and Musonius presented the 
Stoic-Cynic sage, an imitator of God, as neither needing nor possessing anything 
(Diss. 14.6: ἀκτήμων). And in the “pagan” Pythagorean Sentences the same idea 
is expressed, that the philosopher is similar to God precisely through needing 
nothing and possessing nothing: “the person who is self-sufficient, without 
property, and a philosopher [ὁ αὐτάρκης καὶ ἀκτήμων καὶ φιλόσοφος] lives in 
a way really similar to God [θεῷ ὁμοίως]” (Pyth. Sent. 30c). The ideal of disposses-
sion for the philosopher surfaces again clearly in Sext. Sent. 227: “no possession 
[κτῆμα] should be regarded as the property [μηθὲν ἴδιον] of the philosopher.” 
Likewise, accepting money or possessions is declared incompatible with philos-
ophy (ibid., 300). It is clear that dispossession was an important ideal for Sextus, 
and his Christian readers found it adamantly expressed in his work.
Since the Sentences of Sextus draw a connection between lack of possessions 
and self-sufficiency, it is not surprising that they also link the lack of possessions 
to freedom, ἐλευθερία, apparently not juridical but moral freedom, in line with 
20 Luke 6:20 and Matth 5:3: “Blessed are the poor; for the kingdom of heaven / of God belongs to 
them / you.” While in Matthew those who are declared to be blessed are “the poor in spirit” 
(οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι), in Luke the qualifier “in spirit” is absent: Μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί, ὅτι 
ὑμετέρα ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, thus, the blessed are the poor tout court. See also Jesus’ 
declaration that, “It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich 
person to enter the kingdom of God” (Matth 19:24; Mark 10:25; Luke 18:25).
21 Pevarello 2013, 132.
22 On this, see Ramelli 2012.
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the Stoic tradition. In Sext. Sent. 263–264b, life according to self-sufficiency (κατὰ 
τὸν αὐτάρκη, sic) implies leaving one’s possessions (ἀφεὶς ἃ κέκτησαι) to follow 
the right logos – which is both the philosophical logos and, for the Christian redac-
tor and his readers, Christ-Logos. In this way, one will be free (ἐλεύθερος) from 
everything and will rather be a slave of God (δουλεύων θεῷ). This last detail 
probably comes from the biblical and Christian tradition, where being enslaved 
to God is the only really good kind of slavery. Elsewhere, in Sext. Sent. 17 and 275, 
Sextus opposes the possession of wealth, which is better to lose, to true freedom, 
the freedom of the philosopher, which is never to be lost. And in Sext. Sent. 76 Sex-
tus, like the Pythagorean Sentences 110c, denounces love of money (φιλοχρηματία) 
as a symptom of love of the body (φιλοσωματία), seen as negative in an ascetic 
perspective, the two notions of φιλοσώματος and φιλοχρήματος being associ-
ated already in Plato, Phaedo 68b–c. The insistence on complete dispossession as 
an ideal for the sage makes Sextus’ asceticism – which was based both on Greek 
philosophical asceticism and Jesus’s aforementioned exhortation to voluntary 
poverty – a rather radical ideal, as that of several Christian monastic ascetics 
would be.23 Daniele Pevarello correctly remarks, “Sextus depicts voluntary pov-
erty as a distinctive feature of moral excellence. This step marks an important 
stage in the development of the Christian understanding of voluntary poverty, 
anticipating and enabling the ascetic severity of monastic poverty as a sign of 
true wisdom and affirmation of one’s freedom from the world and dominion over 
it.”24 What is especially noteworthy, I find, is that ascetic practices such as dis-
possession and fasting are said to be in the service of the poor (Sext. Sent. 267). 
The underlying assumption is that owning too much, that is, owning possessions 
beyond one’s needs, immediately means withdrawing resources from the poor 
in a real theft, and being therefore guilty of injustice. This will be maintained by 
Origenian ascetics such as Origen himself, Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius, and John 
Chrysostom.25 Sextus’ position with respect to voluntary poverty as a mark of the 
Christian sage seems indeed close to Origen’s line and more rigorous than that of 
Clement of Alexandria.
What is most interesting for the investigation into the relation between ascet-
icism and the rejection of slavery and social injustice that leads to poverty, in the 
Sentences of Sextus and presumably in the circles influenced by them, is that ascet-
icism is related not only to piety and friendship with God (Sext. Sent. 86a–b), but 
23 Pevarello 2013, 205, questions the opinions of scholars such as Edwards / Wild 1981 and oth-
ers, who regard the Sentences as an expression of a mild form of asceticism, open to com-
promise with everyday life. Likewise Osborn 1976, 81, correctly noted that, “Sextus has a 
much stronger ascetic strain than Clement” of Alexandria, especially with reference to his 
Quis dives salvetur. Indeed, Sextus appears to be closer to the line later taken by Origen and 
Evagrius.
24 Pevarello 2013, 132.
25 Ramelli 2016.
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also to love for human beings,26 respect and solidarity with them, and renouncing 
their oppression. In this perspective, it would seem that something more was at 
work than the mere principle of ἀκτημοσύνη, however radical. In Sext. Sent. 370–
372 it is stated that whoever commits injustice (ἀδικῶν) against a human being 
cannot worship God. The verb is the same as in the principle maintained by Ori-
gen, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, and Evagrius that it is impossible to 
become or be rich – that is, to possess more than the necessary – without commit-
ting injustice (ἀδικοῦντα) against other humans who are thereby left without the 
necessary.27 Sextus goes on to explain that piety toward God is grounded in love 
of humanity (φιλανθρωπία), care for human beings (προνοῶν ἀνθρώπων), and 
prayer for all (ὑπὲρ πάντων). In this perspective, renouncing riches that imply 
poverty for other fellow humans, as well as giving up slave ownership, would 
seem to be not simply a matter of dispossession, but also of love and respect for 
fellow human beings. Gregory of Nyssa’s attitude was along these lines, though 
probably more radical: he advocated not simply voluntary poverty, but also re-
spect and love for fellow humans as images of God and all endowed with the 
very same dignity, just as the three persons of the Trinity are ὁμότιμοι with one 
another.28 However, the Sentences of Sextus, like the Stoics, never explicitly criticise 
slave ownership, and the same sentences, Sext. Sent. 370–372, could also be used 
in a much less radical fashion by a Neoplatonist ascetic, Porphyry, who grounded 
in them not the necessity of renouncing outright the keeping of slaves, but the ne-
cessity of behaving justly and generously with one’s slaves (Letter to Marcella 35).29
For Sextus, love of humanity also implies that one should not amass wealth 
(Sext. Sent. 300), presumably on account of the above-mentioned principle that 
whatever exceeds one’s needs is in fact stolen from other people’s needs. Accord-
ing to him, asceticism and piety must result in being beneficial to fellow humans 
(ἡ ἀνθρώποις εὐεργεσία, 47). Gregory of Nyssa, again, took the same line. He 
was adamant that ascetic practices, such as fasting, are completely useless if the 
subject is not benefiting, but rather oppressing, fellow human beings, for instance 
through usury, or the refusal to share one’s wealth, or by keeping slaves. As-
ceticism aims for purification, but Sextus is clear that the best form of purifica-
26 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 7.13.4–14.1, likewise associates θεοσέβεια with φιλανθρωπία, 
but not asceticism.
27 Full documentation for this Patristic principle (οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν, μὴ ἀδικοῦντα πλουτεῖν, 
“it is utterly impossible to be rich without committing injustice,” John Chrysostom, Homily 
on 1 Tim 12:3–4 PG 62.561–564) in Ramelli 2016. 
28 See Ramelli 2012.
29 I deem probable Irini Fotini Viltanioti’s thesis that Porphyry had direct knowledge of the 
Sentences of Sextus (besides the Pythagorean Sentences). See her paper in this volume, where 
she also suggests – following Sodano’s and, in part, Whittaker’s hypotheses – that Porphyry 
was deliberately responding to Sextus’ Christian appropriation of Pythagorean moral wis-
dom. This is quite possible; for, although we have seen how discreet Sextus’s own Christian-
isation of Pythagorean asceticism was, Porphyry was surely aware of the success that the 
Sentences of Sextus were enjoying among prominent and influential Christian intellectuals 
such as Origen.
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tion is – again – not to commit injustice against anyone (τὸ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν, 23). 
Indeed, apatheia, the goal of asceticism, goes hand in hand with benefiting all 
humans (κοινὸς ἀνθρώπων εὐεργέτης) and avoiding mistreating them (κακῶς 
χρώμενος, κακῶς ποιήσει, Sext. Sent. 209–212). 
This is the main way in which the significant Christian transformation and 
assimilation of Pythagorean philosophical asceticism presented in the widely 
circulated Sentences of Sextus inspired the Origenian line of philosophical asceti-
cism, which was already present in Philo “the Pythagorean” (according to Clem-
ent), was then central in Origen and in Origen’s admirer Eusebius of Caesarea in 
his portraits of Philo, St. Pamphilus, and Origen, and became especially evident 
in Origen’s faithful follower, Gregory of Nyssa, and in Gregory’s disciple Evagri-
us Ponticus.30
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Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella * 
A Literary Attack on Christian Appropriation  
of (Neo)Pythagorean Moral Wisdom?
Irini Fotini Viltanioti – University of Oxford
1 Introduction
The Letter to Marcella is generally considered to be one of Porphyry’s latest works, 
composed around AD 300, a few years before the philosopher’s death around 
AD 305 (the Suda attests he lived up to the time of Diocletian).1 However, this date 
is not certain, since the only internal evidence – Porphyry’s own claim that he de-
clined into old age (εἰς τὸ γήρας ἀποκλίναντι)2 – is not clear. Hence, Aaron John-
son3 has recently expressed some doubts, suggesting that Porphyry may have 
been younger than is generally assumed when he wrote the letter. Furthermore, 
Porphyry mentions that he composed the letter while he was away, called by 
“the need of the Hellenes” (καλούσης δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων χρείας).4 The allusive 
nature of this phrase does not allow us to go further than mere speculation. As 
Johnson5 points out, there is no evidence for the hypothesis that “the need of the 
Hellenes” refers to Porphyry’s journey to Diocletian’s court in Nicomedia to at-
tend the secret deliberations preparing the so-called Great Persecution launched 
on February AD 303.6 Without entering into this debate, I would add that this 
hypothesis is in tension with the philosopher’s spiritual path and ascetic ideal. 
From this point view, Johnson’s7 proposal to read the “need of the Hellenes” in an 
educational, academic context seems preferable.
Porphyry addresses his letter to his wife Marcella, the widow of a friend and 
mother of seven children. Except for the information provided by the letter and 
some references in later biographies that depend on it, we do not know who Mar-
cella was, whether she was Roman or not,8 or when Porphyry married her. It 
*  I am grateful to Jan Bremmer for written comments. I also thank David Yates and Tamer 
Nawar for revising the English.
1 Smith 2011, XIV 721.
2 Marc. 1, 6, 9–10 Pötscher.
3 Johnson 2013, 20–21.
4 Marc. 9, 8, 22–23 Pötscher.
5 Johnson 2013, 21.
6 Chadwick 1959, 142; Wilken 1979; Beatrice 1993; DePalma Digeser 2012.
7 Johnson 2013, 21, 250–251. 
8 Chadwick 1959, 142; Whittaker 2001, 150–151; Sodano 20062, 39–40; Johnson 2013, 280.
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must however be said that there is no hint of her being a literary fiction. The 
ostensible purpose of the letter is to console Marcella for Porphyry’s absence, and 
to encourage her to make progress in the spiritual path of ascent towards virtue 
and wisdom. The central topic is, in fact, virtue, wisdom, and assimilation to God 
through philosophy and contemplation. Within this context, Porphyry’s words 
often echo Pythagorean maxims. 
The question I will endeavour to answer in this paper is how these Pythagorean 
echoes relate to the purpose of the Letter to Marcella. I will argue that Porphyry’s 
use of Pythagorean maxims in this letter, composed in the form of a “spiritual 
guide”9 ostensibly addressed to Marcella but in reality destined for a wider audi-
ence, is a response to the Christian appropriation of pagan, especially Pythago-
rean, moral wisdom. Porphyry forges his response by re-appropriating this wis-
dom and by re-situating it within the context of its original pagan source. In what 
follows, I will first give a brief survey of the extant interpretations of the letter’s 
purpose and then argue that the letter has a double purpose, both pedagogical 
and anti-Christian. 
2 The purpose of the Letter to Marcella
Several views have so far been advanced with regard to the letter’s purpose. Bi-
dez10 considers it to be Porphyry’s response to Marcella’s sense of depression over 
her husband’s departure. However, there is no hint in the text that Porphyry is 
replying to a letter from his wife. Further, Bidez considers that the letter was to 
be circulated to a wider audience and reads it partly as Porphyry’s apology for 
his marriage and partly as a spiritual guide inspired by traditional wisdom. Sim-
ilarly, Chadwick11 calls the letter an apologia pro nuptiis suis, arguing that Porphy-
ry’s primary purpose would have been to defend himself against the accusations 
mentioned in the first chapter of the letter. In addition, Porphyry would have 
intended to give his wife “advice in the form of a succession of religious and 
moral aphorisms.”12 Pötscher13 takes it for granted that the letter was to be circu-
lated to a wide readership. Des Places14 believes that Porphyry’s purpose was to 
console Marcella as well as to offer a treatise on the spiritual life and a guide to 
philosophical religion. However, he does not directly engage with the problem of 
the letter’s intended readership. Rousselle15 and Wilken16 are inclined to see it as a 
private letter, and Saffrey17 also considers that the letter was primarily addressed 
 9 Johnson 2013, 182.
10 Bidez 1913, 112–116. 
11 Chadwick 1959, 142–143.
12 Ibid., 143.
13 Pötscher 1969, 50.
14 Des Places 1982, 89.
15 Rousselle 1983, 228.
16 Wilken 2003, 134.
17 Saffrey 1992, 56.
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to Marcella. O’Brien Wicker18 thinks it could be considered a private letter, since 
she finds no hint of its being addressed to a wider readership. Nevertheless, she 
acknowledges that this hypothesis does not accord with the great care Porphyry 
obviously took in its composition. More consistent with the letter’s carefully craft-
ed structure is Alt’s19 view. Alt proposes that it was directed to those who, like 
Marcella, were concerned with pursuing a philosophical way of life. Similarly, ac-
cording to Edwards,20 besides self-justification, Porphyry’s aim is to offer “an epit-
ome of practical philosophy for any disciple who had been suddenly left to his 
own devices.”21 Likewise, Johnson, in his recent monograph, stresses the letter’s 
pedagogical role, characterizing it as a “didactic and hortatory letter embodying 
a pedagogy of privilege and marking out the limits of learning to the few,” that is 
to a “philosophical novitiate readership.”22 What the above interpretations have 
in common is, I submit, the fact that they disregard the letter’s anti-Christian 
perspective, as expressed through various allusions as well as through a striking 
number of passages echoing Christian literature. Even Edwards, who draws a 
series of analogies between Porphyry’s letter and those of Paul, concludes that 
these analogies illustrate only “the incommensurability between the two forms 
of piety.”23
The letter’s anti-Christian perspective has been pointed out by Sodano and 
Whittaker. Sodano made a breakthrough in our understanding of the letter by 
drawing attention to the great number of parallels between, on one hand, the 
Letter to Marcella and, on the other, the letters of Jacob, Paul, and Peter, the Acts, 
and the gospels of Matthew and John.24 Thus, according to Sodano, the letter’s 
purpose is to defend paganism by showing that, “Christianity is not innovative,” 
but, on the contrary, draws its ideas from the austerity, dignity, and ascetic spirit 
of Greek culture.25 Working independently of Sodano, Whittaker26 likewise con-
cluded that the letter should be considered in light of Porphyry’s anti-Christian 
polemic. She proposes that it was intended for readers attracted to Christianity 
or in danger of being so. On her account, Porphyry has chosen the epistolary 
form because it is more suitable for promulgating ideas to a wide audience. He 
ostensibly addresses it to Marcella because the particular appeal of Christianity 
to women was a commonplace27 and because a personalized message is always 
more compelling. 
18 O’Brien Wicker 1987, 12.
19 Alt 1997, 25–16, 30–31.
20 Edwards 2006, 156–161.
21 Ibid., 157.
22 Johnson 2013, 183.
23 Edwards 2006, 159.
24 Sodano 20062, 26–30.
25 Ibid., 25.
26 Whittaker 2001.
27 As Bremmer 1989 has shown, Christianity made inroads not just in the world of women, but 
especially among intellectual women. 
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In the wake of Whittaker’s reading, one could perhaps take a step further and 
suggest a more subtle implication: by making his dedicatee a woman, Porphyry 
could have been playing upon the old Pythagorean association of female with 
darkness and matter, alluded to in chapter 33,28 to imply (and to warn against) 
the darkness and excessive attachment to the material body threatening souls 
attracted to Christianity. Whatever the case, it is difficult to judge whether the 
letter was addressed to those attracted to Christianity in general or specifically 
to women. It seems reasonable to me that, even if his principal intended audi-
ence had been female, Porphyry would naturally have sought to reach the widest 
possible readership, in order to promulgate his anti-Christian ideas and defend 
paganism more efficiently. I submit that the letter’s pedagogical purpose should 
be considered within this anti-Christian framework. Porphyry’s pedagogical aim 
would have been to instruct those who were in quest of spiritual perfection, by 
orientating them towards true philosophy and towards the high ideals of Greek 
culture, while preventing them from being attracted to Christianity. After all, 
ever since Paul’s discourse in the Areopagus, Christianity had been systemati-
cally appropriating Greek ideas, adapting them within its own ideological frame-
work, and subsequently using them for its own anti-pagan propaganda.29 Now, 
in the Letter to Marcella, Christians would have been confronted with a reversal of 
their strategy, namely pagan re-appropriation of Greek ideas previously used by 
Christian authors. The re-appropriation of Greek Pythagorean wisdom is further 
combined with anti-Christian attacks, the whole being presented as intimate cor-
respondence containing instructions in virtue and assimilation to God.
The question I will attempt to answer in what follows is how Pythagorean 
echoes figure in this purpose. To that end, I will first refer to Pythagoreanism in 
Porphyry’s letter.
3 Pythagoreanism in the Letter to Marcella
As has already been observed, the most significant feature of the Letter to Mar-
cella is the use of maxims whose parallels are to be found in various sources. 
The majority of parallels occur in the following two sources: first, an alphabetical 
collection of Pythagorean maxims dating from the first to the third centuries AD, 
reconstructed and edited by Chadwick on the basis of three Greek manuscripts, 
one from Patmos (10th century), another from Vienna (15th century) and a third 
from the Vatican (16th century); and, second, in the Christian collection of the Sen-
tences of Sextus, which is first mentioned by Origen (ca. AD 184–254) in the mid-
third century, and which is probably to be dated around AD 180–210. The latter 
has also been edited by Chadwick, who characterizes it as “one of the most re-
markable monuments of second century Christian piety,”30 and, more recently, by 
28 Marc. 33, 36, 18–19 Pötscher: φεῦγε τῆς ψυχῆς πᾶν τὸ θηλυνόμενον, ὡς εἰ καὶ ἄρρενος εἶχες 
τὸ σῶμα περικείμενον.
29 On the case of Christian appropriation of Orphism, cf. Herrero de Jáuregui 2010, 243–246. 
30 Chadwick 1959, 116.
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Wilson.31 Rufinus of Aquileia, who translated Sextus’ Sententiae into Latin at the 
end of the fourth century, identifies their author as Pope Xystus II; however, some 
years later, Jerome notes that the author was Sextus the Pythagorean.32 In reali-
ty, the collection is the work of a Christian compiler who has carefully revised 
and modified a previous pagan collection or, most probably, collections, adapting 
them within the Christian ideological framework.33 It is noteworthy that there is 
nothing spectacularly Christian or pagan in Sextus’ collection.34 As Chadwick 
proposes, the motive underlying this absence could be related to the compiler’s 
purpose, who would have intended to envelop Christian doctrine in the garment 
of pagan, distinctively Pythagorean, wisdom, in order to make the former more 
appealing to those who were prejudiced against Christianity. He notes:
The Christian touches are so carefully and subtly made that the plan must 
have been deliberate … There is a single mind behind the compilation and 
the work of revision … and his purpose is evident; it is to bring the moral 
wisdom of Greek sages under the wing of the church to whom all truth 
belongs. With adjustments here and there the language of Stoic or Pythag-
orean wisdom could pass in Christian circles. Pythagoras saepe noster might 
be his motto.35
In addition to the Pythagorean Collection and to that of Sextus, a more limited num-
ber of maxims in the Letter to Marcella are found in three other sources: the Collec-
tion of Cleitarchus, dating back to the second or third century AD and again edited 
by Chadwick;36 an Epicurean collection (Marc. 27–31), which Chadwick associates 
with Neopythagorean circles;37 and, finally, the anthology compiled in the fifth 
century by Stobaeus, who, among other things, preserves fifteen maxims of the 
Vienna collection, attributing them to Pythagoras and arranging them in alpha-
betical order.
However, the majority of parallels with the Letter to Marcella are found in Sex-
tus and the Pythagorean Collection. In fact, the number of parallels occurring in 
Porphyry’s letter, in Sextus, and in the alphabetical Pythagorean Collection, is so 
large that it poses “a synoptic problem of the greatest complexity,” as already 
pointed out by Chadwick.38 Thus, Chadwick39 and Sodano40 conclude that Por-
phyry and Sextus drew independently on a prior pagan collection, from which 
the alphabetical Pythagorean Collection is a secondary development. It would be 
31 Wilson 2012.
32 Ibid., 137.
33 Ibid., 138. See also Ilaria Ramelli’s learnt article in this volume. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 159–160.
36 Ibid., 73–83.
37 Ibid., 149.
38 Ibid., 144.
39 Ibid., 148. 
40 Sodano 2006, 35.
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impossible to take into account all the aspects of this complex problem in the 
present paper. Nevertheless, it may be observed that, as shown by the synop-
tic table (see below), in the remaining parts of the Letter to Marcella, interrupted 
in Chapter 35, Porphyry quotes 43 of the 123 maxims of the Pythagorean Collec-
tion. 22 of them are common to Porphyry and to Sextus, in whose collection are 
contained, according to Chadwick’s catalogue, 45 sententiae of the alphabetical 
Pythagorean Collection. 21 maxims of the latter occur only in Porphyry, while 23 
occur only in Sextus.
Why would there be such emphasis on Pythagoreanism in both Sextus and 
Porphyry? Regarding the former, it is likely that the ascetic and austere Pythag-
orean spirit would have been considered to be well suited to Christian ideology. 
Hence, Pythagorean maxims would provide the compiler with the ideal material 
to attract pagan worshippers to Christianity. The question is more complex with 
Porphyry. Some explanations for the use of Pythagorean maxims in the Letter to 
Marcella have already been offered. Chadwick thinks that this use is motivated by 
Porphyry’s “profound respect for ancient lore and the wisdom of philosophers” 
of the remote past.”41 Smith notes that “the many Pythagorean echoes . . . in the 
‘Letter to Marcella’ show clearly the important role which Porphyry attached to 
Pythagoreanism in moral and spiritual formation.”42 Johnson notes that, “in a let-
ter whose second half consists of a pastiche of Pythagorean sayings, the esoteric 
tendencies central to the Pythagorean way of life are fitting.”43
However, the above explanations face two basic difficulties. First, they down-
play the anti-Christian function of the Letter to Marcella, thoroughly demonstrat-
ed by Sodano and Whittaker. In other words, they do not address the question of 
how Pythagoreanism fits with the anti-Christian scope. Second, they do not take 
into account Porphyry’s preference for the alphabetical Pythagorean Collection and 
the parallels with Sextus. Porphyry’s interest in the Pythagorean tradition and 
his respect towards this ancient form of wisdom is not sufficient to explain his 
predilection for this specific collection. If his interest in Pythagoreanism is his 
only motivation, why are Pythagorean maxims quoted in his Life of Pythagoras or 
known from other sources absent from the Letter to Marcella? 
With respect to the anti-Christian scope, Sodano’s explanation seems more 
convincing. Sodano thinks that Porphyry intended to compose a kind of anti-gos-
pel by drawing from the source of Pythagorean wisdom and opposing Pythag-
oras to Jesus Christ. In other words, on his account, Pythagoras was chosen as 
“the best alternative to Christ.”44 Three reasons are given for this choice: first, the 
acknowledgement of the debt of Platonism to Pythagoreanism; second, Pythago-
rean ethics and piety as well as the austerity, severity, and dignity of the Pythag-
orean spirit; third, the hypothesis that the letter reflects the ideas of a Neopythag-
41 Chadwick 1959, 143.
42 Smith 2011, XIV 761.
43 Johnson 2013, 183.
44 Sodano 2006, 36.
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orean circle whose Porphyry and Marcella were members and which could be 
compared to the group which, in the first century BC, used to meet in the Basilica 
of the Porta Maggiore45 in Rome. Sodano’s interpretation has the merit of taking 
into account the letter’s anti-Christian purpose. In addition, the hypothesis of a 
Pythagorean Porphyry is attractive. Further, the idea that Pythagorean ethics, pi-
ety, ascetic austerity, and dignity are not inferior to Christian principles, is not in 
doubt. However, Sodano’s explanation neglects the fact that, as underlined below, 
more than half of the Pythagorean sayings in what remains of Porphyry’s Letter 
to Marcella occur also in the collection of Sextus, with whom Porphyry shares a 
significant number of further parallels. 
I submit that this can hardly be a coincidence. I propose that Porphyry’s choice 
of Pythagorean sayings in his letter was largely determined by Sextus’ use of 
Pythagorean sayings. It is likely that Porphyry, so well informed about Christian 
literature and so committed to refuting it, would have known Sextus’ collection 
and would have been troubled by its great success among those who, in quest 
of spiritual perfection, were attracted to Christianity through the sententiae of 
Sextus. The Pythagorean material in Sextus’ collection would not have escaped 
Porphyry’s attention. The philosopher might hence have chosen most of the Py-
thagorean maxims cited in his letter on account of Sextus’ use of those maxims. 
In other words, it is not impossible that Porphyry had before his eyes not only the 
earlier Pythagorean collection (the source of the extant alphabetical collection) 
that served as a common source for him and for Sextus, but also Sextus’ Christian 
compilation itself, and that he deliberately incorporated in the Letter to Marcella 
a large number of Pythagorean maxims quoted by Sextus. I suggest that, by this 
means, Porphyry would have intended to re-appropriate the Pythagorean moral 
wisdom previously appropriated by the Christians, by resituating it within its 
original pagan context. A great part of his project in the Letter to Marcella would 
thus have been a carefully crafted literary attack on Christian appropriation of 
Pythagoreanism, an attack cunningly dissimulated under the garment of inti-
mate correspondence. The letter’s purpose would have been to defend Hellenism 
against Christianity, and, within this distinctively anti-Christian framework, 
would thus have been pedagogical. Among other things, and, perhaps, above 
all (given the extent of the Pythagorean echoes), Porphyry would have aimed to 
profess the Hellenism of Pythagoreanism against its Christian appropriation, as 
well as to prevent readers from being attracted to Christianity through Christian 
plagiarism of Pythagorean wisdom. The intended readership would have been 
broad enough to encompass all those who were attracted to Christianity – mostly 
women but men as well – through Christian reading material in general, and, 
more precisely, through the widely studied compilation of Sextus, with which the 
Letter to Marcella has so many parallels. 
45 Carcopino 1943.
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4 Conclusion
Did Porphyry succeed in his effort to prevent Christianity from appropriating 
Pythagorean moral wisdom? No. Pythagoreanism had already taken root in 
Christian soil, and growth would follow within the idiosyncratic ideological 
framework of Christianity. I will not deal with the transformations of Pythag-
orean wisdom in the Christian era here. However, taking a huge step in time, it 
would be tempting to compare some maxims of the alphabetical Pythagorean Col-
lection with contemporary Orthodox aphorisms attributed to modern holy men of 
Mount Athos and contained in widespread and widely appreciated popular col-
lections, which could be compared to that of Sextus. Here are some of these aph-
orisms: “The more you labour, the more pleasure and grace you will enjoy;” “Sal-
vation is not a matter of convenience or coincidence but a matter of labour;” “Evil 
begins with evil thoughts;” “All problems derive from dependence on passions;” 
“Set limits to your material needs;” “The pleasures of the soul are different from 
the pleasures of the body;” “Man’s nature is to be with God;” “Those who find 
rest in the material world and are not concerned with the salvation of their soul 
resemble reckless little birds which do not make an effort to break their egg’s shell 
in order to get out and enjoy the sunshine, but stand still and die within the egg;” 
and many more. Of course, similarities are probably due to indirect continuity 
rather than conscious appropriation. However, on this last point, I could recall 
the advice a Greek Orthodox monk gave me some years ago referring to my study 
of Pythagoreanism. “Study it thoroughly,” he said, “because, if you do, you will 
become a good Christian.” Pythagoras saepe noster, as Chadwick observed. Hence, 
in conclusion, Porphyry lost. Yet, nonetheless, this is a story of victory: by con-
quering new, fertile ground, Pythagoreanism won.
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Synoptic table of the sentences occurring in Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella,  
in the Pythagorean Collection and in Sextus46
Porph. Marc. ed. Pötscher Pyth. Sent. ed. Chadwick Sext. Sent.  
ed. Chadwick
5
Marc. 5, p. 10, 16–17: 
οὐ διὰ ῥᾳστώνης ἡ τῶν 
ὄντως ὄντων ἀγαθῶν 
κτῆσις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 
περιγίνεται.
P 31: 
ἡ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων 
κτῆσις διὰ ῥᾳστώνης οὐ 
παραγίνεται.
Omitted
7
Marc. 7, p. 12, 23–24: 
ἔδοξε τοῖς σώφροσι τὰ 
ἐπίπονα τῶν ἡδέων μᾶλλον 
συντελεῖν εἰς ἀρετήν.
P 101: 
τὰ ἐπίπονα τῶν ἡδέων 
ἡγοῦ μᾶλλον συντελεῖν εἰς 
ἀρετήν.
Omitted
Marc. 7, p. 12, 26–27: 
παντὸς γὰρ καλοῦ 
κτήματος πόνους δεῖ 
προηγεῖσθαι.
P 78: 
παντὸς καλοῦ κτήματος 
πόνος προηγεῖται ὁ κατ’ 
έγκράτειαν47.
Omitted48
Marc. 7, p. 14, 3–5: 
οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν δι’ ἡδονῆς 
βεβιωκότων ἀνθρώπων αἱ 
εἰς θεὸν ἀναδρομαί, ἀλλ’ 
ἐκ τῶν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν 
συμβαινόντων γενναίως 
διενεγκεῖν μεμαθηκότων.
P 72: 
οὐκ έκ τῶν δι’ ἡδονῆς 
βεβιωκότων αἱ είς θεοὺς 
ἀναδρομαί, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν 
τὰ μέγιστα πεπονηκότων 
ἐγκρατῶς καὶ τὰ 
συμβαίνοντα ἐνεγκεῖν 
μεμαθηκότων.
Omitted
46 I have used Chadwick’s catalogue (1959, 144–146) and Sodano’s synoptic tables (20062, 127–
133), but the above synoptic table differs from both.
47  Cf. Iamb. VP 85: ἀγαθὸν οἱ πόνοι, αἱ δὲ ἡδοναὶ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου κακόν· ἐπὶ κολάσει 
γὰρ ἐλθόντας δεῖ κολασθῆναι. Ibid. 84: φορτίον μὴ συγκαθαιρεῖν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ αἴτιον 
γενέσθαι τοῦ μὴ πονεῖν) συνανατιθέναι δὲ. Porph. VP 42: φορτίον δὲ συνανατιθέναι μὲν 
τοῖς βαστάζουσιν, συγκαθαιρεῖν δὲ μή, δι’ οὗ παρῄνει μηδενὶ πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην, ἀλλὰ πρὸς 
ἀρετὴν συμπράττειν.
48  On the value of labour, cf. S 125: ὧν ἡγεμόνες οἱ πόνοι, ταῦτά σοι εὔχου γενέσθαι μετὰ 
τοὺς πόνους.  Porph. Marc. 12, p. 18, 14–15: καὶ ὧν ἡγεμόνες οἱ μετ’ ἀρετῆς πόνοι, ταῦτα 
εὐχώμεθα γενέσθαι μετὰ τοὺς πόνους.
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Porph. Marc. ed. Pötscher Pyth. Sent. ed. Chadwick Sext. Sent.  
ed. Chadwick
8
Marc. 8, 15–19: 
τίνα οὖν ἦν ἄρα, ἃ παρὰ 
τῶν σαφέστατ’ εἰδότων 
τὰ κατ’ ἀνθρώπους 
μεμαθήκαμεν; ἆρ’ οὐχ, ὅτι 
μὲν σοὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὁ ἁπτὸς 
οὗτος καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει 
ὑποπτωτός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ
πλεῖστον ἀφεστηκὼς τοῦ 
σώματος, ὁ ἀχρώματος καὶ
P 74: 
ὁ ὡς ἀληθῶς [-ὴς MS] 
ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ 
ἁπτὸς καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει 
ὑποπτωτός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πλεῖ-
στον ἀφεστηκὼς τοῦ 
σώματος, ὁ ἀχρώματος 
καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος   καὶ 
χερσὶ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἁπτός, 
διανοίᾳ δὲ κρατητός.
Omitted
9
Marc. 9, p. 14, 22–25: 
a πᾶν πάθος ψυχῆς 
εἰς σωτηρίαν αὐτῆς 
πολεμιώτατον.
b καὶ ἀπαιδευσία μὲν τῶν 
παθῶν πάντων μήτηρ
c τὸ δὲ πεπαιδεῦσθαι οὐκ ἐν 
πολυμαθείας ἀναλήψει, ἐν 
ἀπαλλάξει δὲ τῶν ψυχικῶν 
παθῶν ἐθεωρείτο.
P 2: 
b πᾶν δὲ πάθος ψυχῆς εἰς 
σωτηρίαν πολεμιώτατον.
Cf. P 116: ψυχῆς πᾶν πάθος 
εἰς σωτηρίαν αὐτῆς πολε-
μιώτατον.
a ἀπαιδευσία πάντων τῶν 
παθῶν μήτηρ.
c  τὸ δὲ πεπαιδεῦσθαι οὐκ 
ἐν πολυμαθείας ἀναλήψει, 
ἐν ἀπαλλάξει δὲ τῶν 
ψυχικῶν παθῶν θεωρεῖται.
S 205: 
πᾶν πάθος 
ψυχῆς λόγῳ 
πολέμιον.
11
Marc. 11, p. 18, 3–4: 
θεὸς μὲν γὰρ δεῖται 
οὐδενός, σοφὸς δὲ μόνου 
θεοῦ.
P 39: 
a θεὸς δεῖται οὐδενός· 
σοφὸς δὲ μόνου δεῖται 
θεοῦ.
S 49: 
ὁ μὲν θεὸς 
οὐδενὸς 
δεῖται, ὁ δὲ 
πιστὸς μόνου 
θεοῦ49.
49 Cf. Clitarch. 4, p. 76 Chadwick.
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12
Marc. 12, p. 18, 16 - 17: 
ἃ δὲ κτησαμένη οὐ 
καθέξεις, μὴ αἰτοῦ παρὰ 
θεοῦ· δῶρον γὰρ θεοῦ πᾶν 
ἀναφαίρετον· ὥστε οὐ 
δώσει, ὃ μὴ καθέξεις.
P 3: 
ἃ κτησάμενος οὐ καθέξεις, 
μὴ αἰτοῦ παρὰ θεοῦ· 
δῶρον γὰρ θεοῦ πᾶν 
ἀναφαίρετον· ὥστε οὐ 
δώσει ὃ μὴ καθέξεις.
S 92: 
ἃ δίδωσιν ὁ 
θεός, οὐδεὶς 
ἀφαιρεῖται = 
S 404: 
ὅσα δίδωσιν 
ὁ θεὸς οὐδεὶς 
ἀφαιρεῖται50. 
Cf. S 118: 
κτῶ ἃ 
μηδείς σου 
ἀφαιρεῖται.
S 128: 
ὃ κτησάμενος 
οὐ καθέξεις, 
μὴ αὶτοῦ 
παρὰ θεοῦ.
Marc. 12, p. 18, 18–19:
a ὧν δὴ τοῦ σώματος 
ἀπαλλαγεῖσα οὐ δεηθήσῃ, 
ἐκείνων καταφρόνει· 
b καὶ ὧν ἂν ἀπαλλαγεῖσα 
δεηθῇς, ταῦτά σοι 
ἀσκουμένῃ τὸν θεὸν 
παρακάλει γενέσθαι 
συλλήπτορα.
P 121: 
a ὧν τοῦ σώματος 
ἀπαλλαγεὶς οὐ δεήσῃ, 
ἐκείνων καταφρόνει 
πάντων·
b καὶ ὧν ἀπαλλαγεὶς 
δεήσῃ, πρὸς ταῦτά σοι 
ἀσκουμένῳ τοὺς θεοὺς 
παρακάλει γενέσθαι 
συλλήπτορας
S 127: ὧν τοῦ 
σώματος 
ἀπαλλαγεὶς 
οὐ δεήσῃ, κα-
ταφρόνει.
Marc. 12, p. 18, 20: 
οὔκουν δεήσῃ οὐδενός, ὧν 
καὶ ἡ τύχη δοῦσα πολλάκις 
πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖται.
P 120: 
ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία καὶ δοῦναι 
καὶ ἀφελέσθαι οὐ δεήσῃ 
οὐδενός.
Omitted 
50 Cf. Clitarch. 22, p. 77 Chadwick.
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13
Marc. 13, p. 20, 3–5: 
a σοφὸς δὲ ἄνθρωπος 
ὀλίγοις γινωσκόμενος, εἰ δὲ 
βούλει, 
b καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων 
ἀγνοούμενος, γινώσκεται 
ὑπὸ θεοῦ. 
P 92: 
a σοφὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεὸν 
σεβόμενος γιγνώσκεται 
ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ·
b διὸ οὐδὲ ἐπιστρέφεται κἂν 
ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων 
ἀγνοῆται51.
S 145: 
σοφὸς ὁλίγοις 
γιγνώσκεται.
14
Marc. 14, p. 20, 10: 
αἱρετωτέρου σοι ὄντος 
λίθον εἰκῆ βαλεῖν ἢ λόγον.
P 7: 
αἰρετώτερόν σοι ἔστω 
λίθον εἰκῇ βάλλειν ἢ 
λόγον ἀργόν52.
S 152: αἱρετώ-
τερον λίθον 
εἰκῇ βάλλειν 
ἢ λόγον53.
Marc. 14, p. 20, 12–19:            
a ἀδύνατον τὸν αὐτὸν 
φιλόθεόν τε εἶναι 
καὶ φιλήδονον καὶ 
φιλοσώματον. 
b ὁ γὰρ φιλήδονος καὶ 
φιλοσώματος,
c ὁ δὲ φιλοσώματος πάντως 
καὶ φιλοχρήματος,
 d ὁ δὲ φιλοχρήματος ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης ἄδικος,
e ὁ δὲ ἄδικος καὶ εἰς θεὸν καὶ 
εἰς πατέρας ἀνόσιος καὶ εἰς 
τοὺς ἄλλους παράνομος.
P 110: 
a φιλήδονον καὶ 
φιλοσώματον καὶ φιλόθεον 
τὸν αὐτὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· 
b ὁ γὰρ φιλήδονος καὶ 
φιλοσώματος· 
c ὁ δὲ φιλοσώματος καὶ 
φιλοχρήματος· 
d ὁ δὲ φιλοχρήματος ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης καὶ ἄδικος· 
e ὁ δὲ ἄδικος εἰς μὲν θεὸν 
ἀνόσιος, εἰς δὲ ἀνθρώπους 
παράνομος·
S 76: φιλοχρη-
ματία φιλο-
σωματίας 
ἔλεγχος.
51 For a similar claim concerning not wisdom but justice, cf. Pl. Resp. 612e f. Another Pythago-
rean idea is to be found in Marc. 13, p. 18, 26–27: ταῦτ’ οὖν θέλε καὶ αἰτοῦ τὸν θεὸν ἃ θέλει τε 
καὶ ἔστιν αὐτός. Cf. Iamb. VP 145: βουλοίμην μᾶλλον, ὅσ’ ἂν μοὶ παρὰ θεῶν γένηται. Ibid. 
137: δεῖν δὲ ὡμολόγηται παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου τἄγαθὸν αἰτεῖν. The same idea occurs in Sextus; 
cf. 134: ταῦτα θέλε ἃ θέλοι ἂν καὶ ὁ θεός.
52 Cf. Iamb. VP 256: μηδὲν εἰκῆ λέγειν. 
53 Cf. Clitarch. 28, p. 77 Chadwick.
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f ὥστε κἂν ἑκατόμβας θύῃ 
καὶ μυρίοις ἀναθήμασι τοὺς 
νεὼς ἀγάλλῃ, ἀσεβής ἐστι 
καὶ ἄθεος καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει 
ἱερόσυλος. διὸ καὶ πάντα 
φιλοσώματον ὡς ἄθεον καὶ 
μιαρὸν ἐκτρέπεσθαι χρή.
f ὥστε κἂν ἐκατόμβας θύῃ 
ὁ τοιοῦτος, πολὺ μᾶλλον 
ἀνοσιώτερος τέ ἐστι καὶ 
ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἄθεος καὶ τῇ 
προαιρέσει ἱερόσυλος· 
διὸ καὶ πάντα φιλήδονον 
ὡς ἄθεον καὶ μιαρὸν 
ἐκτρέπεσθαι χρή54.
15
Marc. 15, p. 20, 20 -22: 
a λόγον γὰρ περὶ θεοῦ τοῖς 
ὑπὸ δόξης διεφθαρμένοις 
λέγειν οὐκ ἀσφαλές· 
b καὶ γὰρ καὶ τἀληθῆ λέγειν 
ἐπὶ τούτων περὶ θεοῦ καὶ τὰ 
ψευδῆ κίνδυνον ἴσον φέρει.
P 55:
a λόγον περὶ θεοῦ τοῖς 
ὑπὸ δόξης διεφθαρμένοις 
λέγειν οὐκ ἀσφαλές·
b καὶ γὰρ καὶ τἀληθῆ 
λέγειν ἐπὶ τούτων περὶ 
θεοῦ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ 
κίνδυνον φέρει.
S 351: 
Οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς 
ἀκούειν περὶ 
θεοῦ τοῖς ὑπὸ 
δόξης διεφθ-
αρμένοις.
S 352: περὶ 
θεοῦ καὶ 
τἀληθῆ λέ-
γειν κίνδυνος 
οὔ μικρός. 
Marc. 15, p. 20, 25: 
ἀλλ’ ἀκροᾶσθαι καὶ λέγειν 
τὸν περὶ θεοῦ λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ 
θεοῦ.
Ρ 112: 
χρὴ καὶ λέγειν καὶ 
ἀκροᾶσθαι τὸν περὶ θεῶν 
λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ θεοῦ.
Omitted
Marc. 15, p. 20, 27–28: 
ἀνοικοιοτάτη γὰρ θεολογία 
κενοδοξίᾳ ψυχῆς. νόμιζε 
αἱρετώτερον εἶναι σιγᾶν ἢ 
λόγον εἰκῆ προέσθαι περὶ 
θεοῦ.
P 115: 
ψυχὴν νόμιζε αἱρετώτερον 
εἶναι προέσθαι ἢ λόγον 
βλάσφημον περὶ θεοῦ.
S 362: 
ψυχὴν 
αἱρετώτερον 
ἢ λόγον εἰκῆ 
προέσθαι 
περὶ θεοῦ.
54 Cf. Iamb. VP 122: οἱ μὲν Ὀλύμπιοι ταῖς τῶν θυόντων διαθέσεσιν, οὐ τῷ τῶν θυομένων 
πλήθει προσέχουσιν.
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Marc. 15, pp. 20, 29–22, 1: 
ἀξίαν σε ποιήσει θεοῦ τὸ 
μηδὲν ἀνἀξιον θεοῦ μήτε 
λέγειν μήτε πράττειν μήτε 
πάντως εἰδέναι ἀξιοῦν. 
P 40: 
θεοῦ ἄξιος ἄνθρωπος ὁ 
θεοῦ ἄξια πράττων.
S 4: 
θεοῦ ἄξιος 
ὁ μηδὲν 
ἀνάξιον θεοῦ 
πράττων.
Cf. S 5: ἐπι-
τηδεύων οὖν 
πιστὸς εἶναι 
μηδὲν ἀνἀξι-
ον θεοῦ πρά-
ξῃς.
Marc. 15, p. 22, 1: 
ὁ δὲ ἄξιος ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ 
θεῖος ἂν εἴη.
P 4: 
ἄξιος ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ θεὸς 
ἀν εἴη ἐν ἀνθρώποις.
S 376: 
ἄξιος 
ἄνθρωπος 
θεοῦ θεὸς ἐν 
ἀνθρώποις
Cf. S 3: 
θεοῦ 
ἄνθρωπος ὁ 
ἄξιος θεοῦ.
16
Marc. 16, p, 22, 2–4: 
a καὶ τιμήσεις μὲν ἄριστα 
τὸν θεόν, ὅταν τῷ θεῷ τὴν 
σαυτῆς διάνοιαν ὁμοιώσῃς·
P 102:
a τιμήσεις τὸν θεόν ἄριστα, 
ὅταν τῷ θεῷ τὴν διάνοιαν 
ὁμοιώσῃς·
S 381: 
τιμᾷ θεὸν 
ἄριστα ὁ 
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
διάνοιαν 
ἐξομοιώσας 
θεῷ εἰς 
δύναμιν.
b ἡ δὲ ὁμοίωσις ἔσται διὰ 
μόνης ἀρετῆς.
 
c μόνη γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἄνω ἕλκει καὶ πρὸς τὸ 
συγγενές.
b ἡ δὲ ὁμοίωσις ἐστι διὰ 
μόνης ἀρετῆς·
c μόνη γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὴν 
ψυχὴν ἄνω ἕλκει πρὸς τὸ 
συγγενές.
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Marc. 16, p. 22, 6: 
κακῶν δὲ πράξεων κακὸς 
δαίμων ἡγεμών.
P 49: 
κακῶν πράξεων κακὸς 
δαίμων ἡγεμών.
S 305: 
κακῶν 
πράξεων 
κακὸς δαίμων 
ἡγεμών ἐστι.
Marc. 16, p. 22, 11–13: 
a οὐχ ἡ γλῶττα τοῦ σοφοῦ 
τίμιον παρὰ θεῷ, ἀλλὰ τὰ 
ἔργα.
b σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ καὶ σιγῶν 
τὸν θεὸν τιμᾷ. 
P  14:
a γλῶττα σοφοῦ οὐ 
προηγουμένως τίμιον 
παρὰ θεῷ, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἔργα·
b σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ σιγῶν τὸν 
θεὸν τιμᾷ.
S 426: 
Οὐχ ἡ γλῶττα 
τοῦ σοφοῦ 
τιμία παρὰ 
θεῷ, ἀλλ’ ἡ 
φρόνησις.
S 427: σοφὸς 
ἀνὴρ καὶ σι-
γῶν τὸν θεὸν 
τιμᾷ [εἰδὼς 
διὰ τινα 
σιγᾷ].
Marc. 16, p. 22, 13–14: 
a ἄνθρωπος δὲ ἀμαθὴς καὶ 
εὐχόμενος καὶ θύων μιαίνει 
τὸ θεῖον.
b μόνος οὖν ἱερεὺς ὁ σοφός, 
μόνος θεοφιλής, μόνος 
εἰδὼς εὔξασθαι.
P 15: 
a γλώτταλγος ἄνθρωπος 
καὶ ἀμαθὴς εὐχόμενος καὶ 
θύων τὸν θεὸν μιαίνει.
b μόνος οὖν ἱερεὺς ὁ σοφός, 
μόνος θεοφιλής, μόνος 
εἰδὼς εὔξασθαι.
S 429: 
ἄνθρωπος 
ἀκρατὴς 
μιαίνει τὸν 
θεόν.
17
Marc. 17, p. 22, 14–15: 
καὶ ὁ σοφίαν ἀσκῶν 
ἐπιστήμην ἀσκεῖ τὴν περὶ 
θεοῦ.
P 94: 
σοφίαν ἀσκῶν ἐπιστήμην 
τὴν περὶ θεοῦ ἀσκεῖ.
Omitted
18
Marc. 18, p. 24, 1–2: 
ὅστις δὲ τιμᾷ τὸν θεὸν 
ὡς προσδεόμενον, οὗτος 
λέληθεν ἑαυτὸν δοξάζων 
τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττον’ εἶναι.
P 25: 
εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν τιμᾷ ὡς 
προσδεόμενον, λέληθεν 
ἑαυτὸν δοξάζων τοῦ θεοῦ 
εἶναι κρείττονα.
Omitted
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Marc. 18, p. 24, 2–4: 
οὐ χολωθέντες οὖν 
οἱ θεοὶ βλάπτουσιν, 
ἀλλ’ἀγνοηθέντες· ὀργὴ 
γὰρ θεῶν ἀλλοτρία, ὅτι ἐπ’ 
ἀβουλήτοις μὲν ἡ ὀργή,
θεῷ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀβούλητον.
P 8: 
βλάπτει θεὸς οὐ χολωθείς, 
ἀλλ’ ἀγνοηθείς· ὀργὴ 
γὰρ θεοῦ ἀλλότριον· ἐπ’ 
ἀβουλήτῳ γὰρ ἡ ὀργή, θεῷ 
δὲ οὐδὲν ἀβούλητον.
Omitted
19
Marc. 19, p. 24, 11–13: 
a οὔτε θυηπολίαι θεὸν 
τιμῶσιν οὔτε ἀναθημάτων 
πλῆθος κοσμοῦσι θεόν, 
b ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔνθεον φρόνημα 
καλῶςἡδρασμένον 
συνάπτει θεῷ.
c χωρεῖν γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸ 
ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον.
P 20:
a δῶρα καῖ θυηπολίαι θεὸν 
οὐ τιμῶσιν, άναθήματα 
θεὸν οὐ κοσμεῖ·
b ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔνθεον φρόνημα 
διαρκῶς ἡδρασμένον 
συνάπτει θεῷ·
c χωρεῖν γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸ 
ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον.
Omitted
Marc. 19, p. 24, 14–15: 
θυηπολίαι δὲ ἀφρόνων 
πυρὸς τροφὴ καὶ τὰ παρὰ 
τούτων ἀναθήματα 
ἱεροσύλοις χορηγία τῶν 
ἀκολασιῶν.
P 41: 
θυηπολίαι ἀφρόνων πυρὸς 
τροφὴ· τὰ δὲ ἀναθήματα 
ἱεροσύλοις χορηγία.
Omitted
Marc. 19, p. 24, 15–19 :  
σοὶ δέ, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, νεὼς 
μὲν ἔστω τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ ἐν σοὶ 
νοῦς. παρασκευαστέον δὲ 
αὐτὸν καὶ κοσμητέον εἰς 
καταδοχὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιτή-
δειον. 
P 66: 
νεὼς θεοῦ σοφὸς νοῦς, 
ὃν οὐκ ἐφειμένως ἀλλ’ 
ἀεὶ χρὴ παρασκευάζειν 
καὶ κατακοσμεῖν εἰς 
παραδοχὴν θεοῦ.
S 46a: 
ἱερὸν ἅγιον 
θεοῦ διάνοια 
εὐσεβοῦς.
Cf. ibid. 11, p. 16, 26–28: 
λέγει δὲ ὁ λόγος πάντῃ μὲν 
καὶ πάντως παρεῖναι τὸ 
θεῖον, νεὼν δὲ τούτῳ παρ’ 
ἀνθρώποις καθιερῶσθαι 
τὴν διάνοιαν μάλιστα τοῦ 
σοφοῦ μόνην.
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Marc. 20, p. 24, 20–23: 
Ἐὰν οὖν ἀεὶ μνημονεύῃς, 
ὅτι ὅπου ἂν ἡ ψυχή σου 
περιπατῇ καὶ τὸ σῶμα 
ἐνεργὸν ἀποτελῇ, θεὸς 
παρέστηκεν ἔφορος ἐν 
πάσαις σου ταῖς βουλαῖς 
καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, 
αἰδεσθήσῃ μὲν τοῦ θεωροῦ 
τὸ ἄλεστον, ἕξεις δὲ τὸν 
θεὸν σύνοικον.
P 26: 
ἐὰν ἀεὶ μνημονεύῃς ὅτι, 
ὅπου δ’ ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ σου 
καὶ τὸ σῶμά σου ἔργον 
ἐπιτελῇ, θεὸς παρέστηκεν 
ἔφορος, ἐν πάσαις σου ταῖς 
βουλαῖς καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν 
αἰδεσθήσῃ μὲν τοῦ θεωροῦ 
τὸ ἀδιάληστον, ἕξεις τὸν 
θεὸν σύνοικον.
Omitted
21
Marc. 21, p. 24, 26–27: 
θεοῦ γὰρ γνῶσις ποιεῖ 
βραχὺν λόγον.
Ρ 10: 
a  βραχύλογον μάλιστα ἡ 
θεοῦ γνῶσις ποιεῖ. Cf. P 16: 
γνῶσις θεοῦ ποιεῖ βραχύ-
λογον.
b πολλῶν δὲ λόγων περὶ 
θεοῦ ἡ πρὸς θεὸν ἀμαθία 
αἰτία.
S 430:
ἄνθρωπον 
θεοῦ γνώσις 
βραχύλογον 
ποιεῖ.
S 431: 
πολλοὺς 
λόγους περὶ 
θεοῦ ἀπειρία 
ποιεῖ.
26
Marc. 26, p. 30, 10–17: 
νοῦ γὰρ σῶμα ψυχὴν 
λογικὴν θετέον, ἣν 
τρέφει ὁ νοῦς τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ 
ἐννοίας, ἃς ἐνετύπωσε 
καὶ ἐνεχάραξεν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ 
θείου νόμου ἀληθείας, 
εἰς ἀναγνώρισιν ἄγων 
διὰ τοῦ παρ’ αὐτῷ φωτός· 
καὶ διδάσκαλος αὐτὸς 
γινόμενος καὶ σωτὴρ καὶ 
τροφεὺς καὶ φύλαξ καὶ 
ἀναγωγός, μετὰ σιγῆς μὲν 
φθεγγόμενος τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
Ρ 67: 
νοῦ σῶμα ψυχὴν λογικὴν 
θετέον ἣν τρέφει ὁ νοῦς τῇ 
ἀρετῇ, διδάσκαλος αὐτὸς 
καὶ τροφεὺς καὶ σωτὴρ καὶ 
φύλαξ γινόμενος, μετὰ 
σιγῆς φθεγγόμενος καὶ τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν ἐμφανίζων αὐτῇ.
Omitted
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Marc. 31, p. 32, 21–22: 
κρεῖσσον δέ σοι θαρρεῖν 
ἐπὶ  στιβάδος κατακειμένῃ 
ἢ ταράττεσθαι χρυσῆν 
ἐχούσῃ κλίνην καὶ 
πολυτελῆ τράπεζαν.
P 29: 
ζῆν κρεῖττον ἐπὶ στιβάδος 
κατακείμενον καὶ θαρρεῖν 
ἣ ταράττεσθαι χρυσῆν 
ἔχοντα λίμνην [κλίνην]55. 
Omitted
30
Marc. 30, p. 32, 25: 
σαρκὸς δὲ φωνὴ μὴ πεινῆν, 
μὴ διψῆν, μὴ ῥιγοῦν.
P 98: 
σαρκὸς φωνὴ μὴ πεινῆν, 
μὴ διψῆν, μὴ ῥιγοῦν56.
Omitted
Marc. 30, p. 34, 5–8: 
καὶ δέχεσθαι μὲν ἀθορύβως 
τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἀγαθά, 
παρατετάχθαι δὲ πρὸς τὰ 
παρ’ αὐτῆς δοκοῦντα εἶναι 
κακά· ὡς ἐφήμερον μὲν πᾶν 
τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθόν 
ἐστι, σοφία δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμη 
οὐδαμῶς τύχης κοινωνεῖ.
P 60: 
μάθε δέχεσθαι τὰ 
παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἀγαθὰ 
ἀθορύβως, καὶ πεφράχθαι 
πρὸς τὰ παρ’ αὐτῆς κακά· 
ἐφήμερον γὰρ πᾶν τὸ 
τοιοῦτον, ἀγαθόν τε καὶ 
κακόν, σοφίᾳ δὲ οὐδαμῶς 
κοινωνεῖ57.
Omitted
31
Marc. 31, p. 34, 10–13: 
κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου 
λόγος, ὑφ’ οὗ μηδὲν πάθος 
ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται· 
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἱατρικῆς οὐδὲν
ὄφελος, εἰ μὴ τὰς νόσους 
τῶν σωμάτων θεραπεύει, 
οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ 
μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει 
πάθος.
P 50: 
κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου 
λόγος, ὑφ’ οὗ μηδὲν 
ἀνθρώπου πάθος 
θεραπεύεται· ὥσπερ γὰρ 
ἰατρικῆς μηδὲν ὄφελος μὴ 
τὰς νόσους ἐκβαλλούσης 
ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων, οὕτως 
οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μὴ τὸ 
τῆς ψυχῆς κακὸν ἐκβάλοι.
Omitted
55 Cf. Epicur. Fr. 207, p. 163, 4–5 Usen. According to Chadwick 1959, 149, it is possible that the 
Epicurean collection used by Porphyry (Marc. 27–31) derives from Neopythagorean circles. 
56 Cf. Gnom. Vat. Epicur. 33, p. 63, 13 Mühll. 
57 Cf. Epicur. Fr. 221, p. 169, 14–17 Usen.
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32
Marc. 32, pp. 35, 15–36, 5: 
εἰ μὴ τὸ σῶμα οὕτω σοι 
συνηρτῆσθαι φυλάξεις 
ὡς τοῖς ἐμβρύοις 
κυοφορουμένοις τὸ χόριον 
καὶ τῷ σίτῳ βλαστάνοντι 
τὴν καλάμην, οὐ γνώσῃ 
σεαυτήν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλος 
ὅστις μὴ οὕτω δοξάζει 
ἔγνω ἑαυτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν 
τὸ χόριον συγγενόμενον 
καὶ ἡ καλάμη τοῦ σίτου, 
τελεωθέντα δὲ ῥίπτεται 
ἑκάτερα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ 
συναρτώμενον τῇ ψυχῇ 
σπαρείσῃ σῶμα οὐ μέρος 
ἀνθρώπου. ἀλλ’ ἵνα 
μὲν ἐν γαστρὶ γένηται, 
προσυφάνθη τὸ χόριον, 
ἵνα δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς γένηται, 
συνεζύγη τὸ σῶμα. ὅσῳ τις 
τέτραπται πρὸς τὸ θνητόν, 
τοσούτῳ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
γνώμην ἀσύμμετρον 
παρασκευάζει πρὸς τὸ 
τῆς ἀφθαρσίας μέγεθος· 
καὶ ὅσῳ τῆς τοῦ σώματος 
προσπαθείας ἀφίσταται, 
τοσούτῳ μέτρῳ τῷ θείῳ 
πελάζει.
P 106: 
ὑπολάμβανε τὸ σῶμα 
οὕτως σοι συνηρτῆσθαι, 
ὡς τοῖς ἐμβρύοις 
κυοφορουμένοις τὸ χόριον 
καὶ τῷ σίτῳ βλαστάνοντι 
τὴν καλάμην. ὥσπερ οὖν 
τὸ χόριον συγγινόμενον 
οὐκέτι ζῴου μέρος οὐδὲ τὸ 
ἄχυρον καὶ ἡ καλάμη τοῦ 
σίτου (τελειωθέντων γὰρ 
ῥίπτεται ἑκάτερον), οὕτω 
καὶ τὸ συναρτώμενον ψυχῇ 
σπαρείσῃ σῶμα οὐ μέρος 
ἀνθρώπου· ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὲν ἐν 
γαστρὶ ὑπομένῃ τὸ βρέφος, 
προσυφάνθη τὸ χόριον καὶ 
τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς 
ἐν τῷ χορίῳ σηπεδόνος, τὸ 
δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐξιὸν κεκα-
θαρμένον· οὐδ’ αὐτὸς οὖν 
ἕκαστος τὸ μετὰ σώματος 
ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς κυ-
οφορούμενον, τὸ δὲ ἐξιὸν 
καὶ ἀναχωροῦν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ 
πρὸς τὸν σπείραντα καὶ 
καταπέμψαντα πατέρα.
Omitted
Marc. 32, p. 36, 5–7: 
ὁ συνετὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ 
θεοφιλής ὅσα οἱ ἄλλοι 
μοχθοῦσι τοῦ σώματος 
ἕνεκα, τοσαῦτα ὑπὲρ 
τῇς ψυχῆς σπουδάσεται 
πονῆσαι.
P 95: 
συνετὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ 
θεοφιλής, ὅσα οἱ ἄλλοι 
μοχθοῦσι τοῦ σώματος 
ἕνεκα, τοσαῦτα σπουδάσει 
αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ τῇς ψυχῆς 
πονῆσαι.
S 301: 
ὅσα πονεῖς 
διὰ τὸ σῶμα, 
καὶ διὰ 
τὴν ψυχὴν 
πονέσας 
σοφὸς ἂν 
εἴης.
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Marc. 32, p. 36, 7–8: 
οὐ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι ὧν 
ἤκουσεν αὔταρκες εἶναι 
νομίζων, τὸ δὲ ἀνατρέχειν 
εἰς ἃ δεῖ  δι’ ὧν ἤκουσεν 
μελετῶν.
P 75: 
οὐ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι μόνον 
ὧν ἤκουσας αὔταρκες 
εἶναι νομίζειν δεῖ πρὸς 
εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ 
ἀνατρέχειν εἰς ἃ δεῖ δι’ ὧν 
ἤκουσας μελετῶν.
Omitted
33
Marc. 33, p. 36, 9–10: 
γυμνὸς δὲ ἀποσταλεὶς 
γυμνητεύων καλέσει τὸν 
πέμψαντα· μόνου γὰρ 
τοῦ μὴ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις 
πεφορτισμένου ἐπήκοος ὁ 
θεός.
P 17: 
γυμνὸς ἀποσταλεὶς σοφὸς 
γυμνητεύων καλέσει τὸν 
πέμψαντα58· μόνου γὰρ 
τοῦ μὴ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις 
πεφορτισμένου ἐπήκοος ὁ 
θεός.
Omitted
34
Marc. 34, p. 38, 2–4 : 
ὅτι καὶ χαλεπώτερον 
δουλεύειν πάθεσιν ἢ 
τυράννοις· ἀδύνατον δ’ 
εἶναι ἐλεύθερον τὸν ὑπό 
παθῶν κρατούμενον.
P 21: 
δουλεύειν πάθεσι 
χαλεπώτερον ἢ τυράννοις.
S 75a: 
δεινότατόν 
ἐστιν πάθεσι 
δουλεύειν.
Marc. 34, p. 38, 4: 
ὅσα γὰρ πάθη ψυχῆς, 
τοσοῦτοι καὶ ὠμοὶ δεσπόται.
P 71: 
ὅσα πάθη ψυχῆς, τοσοῦτοι 
καὶ ὠμοὶ δεσπόται.
S 75b: 
ὅσα πάθη 
ψυχῆς, 
τοσοῦτοι 
δεσπόται59.
35
Marc. 35, p. 38, 13–14: 
πολλῷ γὰρ κρεῖττον 
τεθνάναι ἢ δι’ ἀκρασίαν τὴν 
ψυχὴν ἀμαυρῶσαι.
P 103: 
τεθνάναι πολλῷ κρεῖττον 
ἢ δι’ ἀκρασίας τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἀμαυρῶσαι.
S 345: 
κρείττων 
ἀποθανεῖν 
λιμῷ ἢ διὰ 
γαστρὸς 
ἀκρασίαν 
ψυχὴν 
ἀμαυρῶσαι60.
58 Cf. Plat. Gorg. 523c sq. 
59 Cf. Clitarch. 85, p. 80 Chadwick.
60 Cf. Clitarch. 114, p. 82 Chadwick. 
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Porph. Marc. ed. Pötscher Pyth. Sent. ed. Chadwick Sext. Sent.  
ed. Chadwick
Marc. 35, p. 38, 17: 
κρηπὶς εὐσεβείας σοι 
νομιζέσθω ἡ φιλανθρωπία.
P 51: 
κρηπὶς εὐσεβείας 
ἡ φιλανθρωπία σοι 
νομιζέσθω.
S 371: 
κρηπὶς 
θεοσεβείας 
ἡ φιλανθ-
ρωπία.
To sum up, the alphabetical collection contains:
123 Pythagorean Sentences [PY]61  (cf. pp.  84–94 Chadwick), of which:
– 43 occur in Porphyry  [PO] (cf. the above table).
– 45 occur in Sextus [S]62 
(cf. Chadwick 1959, 144–146).
– 22 are common to Porphyry and Sextus (cf. the above table)63.
– 21 occur only in Porphyry (cf. the above table).
– 23 occur only in Sextus.
61 The Greek text is contained in three manuscripts: Patmiensis 263, saec. X.; Vienna Hofb iblio-
thek, cod. Philos. et philol. 225, saec. XV; Vaticanus gr. 743, saec. XVI. A Syriac version is con-
tained in a manuscript in Brit. Mus. Add. 14658, saec. VI–VII.
62 The Greek text is contained in two manuscripts: Patmiensis 263, saec. X, foll. 213–216 and 
Vaticanus Graecus 742, saec. XIV, foll. 2–23. Cf. Chadwick 1959, 3f.
63 According to Sodano 2006, 131–132, Porphyry and Sextus share 31 maxims. According to 
Chadwick 1959, 144–146, they share 57 maxims.
123 PY
43 PO + PY
21 PO + PY 22 PO + PY + S 23 S + PY
45 S + PY
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Reinventing the Pythagorean Tradition  
in Pseudo-Justin’s Cohortatio ad Graecos
Luca Arcari – University of Naples “Federico II”
1 Pythagoras in Pseudo-Justin’s Cohortatio ad Graecos
In conformity with the Christian exhortatory genre, the anonymous author of 
the Cohortatio ad Graecos (henceforth Coh. Gr.),1 a text later included in the cor-
pus ascribed to Justin Martyr, presents the great Greek thinkers and poets as in 
conflict with each other, arguing that when they did produce true statements, as 
sometimes happened, they did so in dependence on Biblical texts.
The first mention of Pythagoras in Coh. Gr. is part of a set of references to other 
thinkers belonging to the Greek tradition.2 In one such notice, the anonymous 
author maintains that Pythagoras, identified as the son of Mnesarchos, defines 
numbers, along with their proportions and harmonies (τὰς συμμετρίας καὶ τὰς 
ἐν αὐτοῖς ἁρμονίας) and the elements composed of both (τά τ›ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων 
σύνθετα στοιχεῖα), as the first principles (ἀρχὰς), which also include unity and 
the indefinite dyad (ἔτι μέντοι μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα).3 The anony-
mous author seems to be referring to the same traditions as are transmitted by 
1 In this article I follow the new critical edition of Pouderon et al. 2009 (henceforth SC 528). 
2 Cf. Coh. Gr. 4.1 = SC 528, 136–139. 
3 On the unity, see Eudorus of Alexandria, according to which One is the first principle and 
the Supreme One is the creator of matter and all things (cf. Dillon 1977, 126–127). Athena-
goras quotes the Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus as saying that “everything is kept fast 
bound by God who is one and is above matter” (Leg. pro Christ. 6). Philo of Alexandria has 
earlier echoed this Pythagorean belief when he states that God is “one and alone” (Legum 
allegoriae 2.1). On such a question, see Bostock 2003, 468: “The Pythagorean understanding 
of creation as a generative process emanating from the divine ‘One’ is directly linked to 
their understanding of number itself in which the ‘One’ represents the numerical aspect of 
the godhead. The ‘One’ therefore is to be understood as far as more than a mere unit. It is 
the fount of reality and of number. As Philo put it, ‘the Monad is not a number, buti s the 
source of number’ (Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 39). The Pythagorean principle that the one, 
meaning the sacred Monad, is essentially the source of number as the source of all things 
did not simply reflect a sophisticated theory of number, but also recognized that an under-
standing of unity lays beyond the concept of a mere unity. Consequently the Pythagoreans 
distinguished between the μονάς as the unitary source of number and the ἕν which denoted 
a single unit in the numerical sense.” See also Burkert 1972, 231. 
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Aetius,4 Diogenes Laertius-Alexander,5 Philo,6 and Hermias.7 Diogenes gives 
more detail, recording that, according to some Pythagorean memoirs,8 Alexan-
der said that the principle of all things is the monad or unit (ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν 
ἁπάντων μονάδα). In Diogenes’ account, Alexander insisted also on the fact that 
the indefinite dyad arising from this monad serves as material substrate to the 
monad, which is understood as cause (ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος ἀόριστον δυάδα ὡς 
ἂν ὕλην τῇ μονάδι αἰτίῳ ὄντι ὑποστῆναι). From the monad and the indefinite 
dyad spring numbers; from numbers, points; from points, lines; from lines, plane 
figures; from plane figures, solid figures; from solid figures, sensible bodies. The 
elements of the things listed above are four: fire, water, earth, and air. These ele-
ments are interchangeable and mix together in order to produce a universe which 
is animate, intelligent, spherical, with the earth at its centre. The earth itself is 
spherical and inhabited.
The second mention of Pythagoras in Coh. Gr. occurs in a context which gives 
the impression that, like other Greek authorities, Pythagoras was dependent on 
Hebrew wisdom because of his past presence in Egypt, the land of Moses.9 Having 
already proved the antiquity and excellence of Moses, the first prophet (Coh. Gr. 
9–12), and presented the story of the Septuagint translation (13), Ps.-Justin makes 
some further remarks about the Greeks, who were by now well acquainted with 
the writings of Moses in Egypt and therefore expressed monotheistic views (14). 
The anonymous author quotes as authorities Orpheus (15), the Sibyl (16), Homer 
(17), Sophocles (18), Pythagoras (19), and Plato (20–27). The work then proceeds 
by attempting to show the dependence of Homer and Plato on the Hebrew Scrip-
tures (28–33).10
Unlike Justin Martyr himself, in Coh. Gr. there is no explicit reference to the 
idea that philosophers were able to reach the truth through the exercise of rea-
son and by living according to λόγος. M. Marcovich brings out the importance 
within Coh. Gr. of the concept of divine πρόνοια, which this scholar considers to 
be a substitute for Justin’s idea of the λόγος σπερματικός.11 The author of Coh. Gr. 
stresses that Pythagoras seems to have encountered ideas about the unity of God 
as a consequence of his sojourn in Egypt. This could explain why the philosopher 
 4 Pythagoristae anonymae B 1a DK.
 5 Cf. D. L. 8.25. Diogenes quotes Alexander’s Successions of Philosophers.
 6 Cf. De providentia 1.22.
 7 Cf. Irrisio gentilium philosophorum 16.
 8 According to Wellmann 1919, Diogenes’-Alexander’s extract preserves in the main a source 
contemporary with Plato. On the contrary, according to Festugière 1945, this source is defi-
nitely post-platonic. 
 9 Cf. Coh. Gr. 19.1–2 = SC 528, 190–193. On this issue see also Arcari 2011. There is a very similar 
tradition concerning Pythagoras’ journey to Egypt in Isoc., Bus. 29 and Porph., Plot. 6. In 
doctrinal developments of such a reference, there are echoes of Alexandrian fluxes of trans-
mission: see Bostock 2003, 467.  
10 The sequence appears to be taken from Diod. Sic. 1.96.2, who also lists Greek personalities 
who visited Egypt. On Diodorus in Christian apologetic literature, cf. Beatrice 1998. 
11 Cf. Marcovich 1990, 10. 
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said that unity is the first principle of all things, the cause of all good, and why 
he taught by means of allegory, or mystically and symbolically, that God is one. 
Ὁ δὲ τοῦ Μνησάρχου Πυθαγόρας, ὁ τὰ δόγματα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοσοφίας 
διὰ συμβόλων μυστικῶς ἐκθέμενος, ὡς δηλοῦσιν οἱ τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ 
γεγραφότες, ἄξια καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀποδημίας περὶ ἑνὸς θεοῦ 
φρονῶν φαίνεται.12
And Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, who expounded the doctrines of his 
own philosophy, mystically by means of symbols, as those who have writ-
ten his life show, himself seems to have entertained thoughts about the 
unity of God not unworthy of his foreign residence in Egypt.13
This assessment is made more clearly in the Pythagorean saying paraphrased in 
Coh. Gr., according to which unity and one differ widely from one another. 
Τὴν γὰρ μονάδα ἀρχὴν ἁπάντων λέγων καὶ ταύτην τῶν ἀγαθῶν 
ἁπάντων αἰτίαν εἶναι, δι' ἀλληγορίας ἕνα τε καὶ μόνον διδάσκει θεὸν 
εἶναι. Ὅτι δὲ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ἀφ' ὧν μονάδα καὶ ἓν πολλῷ 
διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων ἔφη· τὴν μὲν γὰρ μονάδα ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς εἶναι λέγει, 
τὸ δὲ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς.14
For when he says that unity is the first principle of all things, and that it is 
the cause of all good, he teaches by an allegory that God is one, and alone. 
And that this is so is evident from his saying that unity and one differ 
widely from one another. For he says that unity belongs to the class of 
things perceived by the mind, but that one belongs to numbers.15
The anonymous author thus maintains that for Pythagoras unity belongs to the 
class of things perceived by the mind, while one belongs to category of numbers. 
A real quotation, traditionally ascribed to the authority of Pythagoras, further 
confirms Ps.-Justin’s re-invention of the Pythagorean conceptions: 
Εἰ δὲ καὶ σαφεστέραν ἀπόδειξιν περὶ ἑνὸς θεοῦ τῆς Πυθαγόρου δόξης 
ποθεῖτε γνῶναι, ἀκούσατε καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ δόξης. Οὕτω γὰρ ἔφη· “Ὁ μὲν 
θεὸς εἷς, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐχ, ὥς τινες ὑπονοοῦσιν, ἐκτὸς τᾶς διακοσμήσιος, 
ἀλλ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κύκλῳ ἐπισκοπῶν πάσας γενέσιάς ἐστιν, 
κρᾶσις ἐὼν τῶν ὅλων αἰώνων καὶ ἐργάτας τῶν αὐτοῦ δυνάμιων καὶ 
ἔργων, ἀρχὰ πάντων, εἷς ἐν οὐρανῷ φωστὴρ καὶ πάντων πατήρ, νοῦς 
12 Coh. Gr. 19.1 = SC 528, 190.
13 Trans. from Robertson / Donaldson / Cleveland Coxe 2007a, 280.
14 Cf. Coh. Gr. 19.1 = SC 528, 190.
15 Trans. from Robertson / Donaldson / Cleveland Coxe 2007a, 280–281.
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καὶ ψύχωσις τῶν ὅλων, κύκλων ἁπάντων κίνασις.” Οὕτω μὲν οὖν ὁ 
Πυθαγόρας.16
If you desire to see a clearer proof of the opinion of Pythagoras concerning 
one God, hear his own opinion, for he spoke as follows: “God is one; and 
He Himself does not, as some suppose, exist outside the world, but in it, 
He being wholly present in the whole circle, and beholding all generations; 
being the regulating ingredient of all the ages, and the administrator of 
His own powers and works, the first principle of all things, the one lumi-
nary in heaven, and Father of all, the intelligence and animating soul of 
the universe, the movement of all orbits.” Thus, then, Pythagoras.17
2 Pseudo-Pythagorean Fragments and self-defining re-readings:  
a comparison with Clement of Alexandria (Protr. 6.72.4)
A more or less similar fragment directly ascribed to Pythagorean authority can 
be found also in the Pythagorean texts from the Hellenistic period,18 as well as in 
other Christian texts.19 In Clement of Alexandria’s Protrepticus the same Pythago-
rean passage quoted by Ps.-Justin is attested. There the Alexandrian teacher pro-
claims the existence of an immanent divinity which sustains the whole cosmos. 
Οὐκ ἀποκρυπτέον οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν, οἵ φασιν “ὁ μὲν θεὸς 
εἷς, οὖτος δὲ οὐχ, ὥς τινες ὑπονοοῦσιν, ἐκτὸς τᾶς διακοσμήσιος, ἀλλ' ἐν 
αὐτᾷ, ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κύκλῳ ἐπίσκοπος πάσας γενέσιος, κρᾶσις τῶν 
ὅλων αἰώνων καὶ ἐργάτας τῶν αὑτοῦ δυνάμιων καὶ ἔργων, ἁπάντων ἐν 
οὐρανῷ φωστὴρ καὶ πάντων πατήρ, νοῦς καὶ ψύχωσις τῷ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ, 
πάντων κίνασις.” Ἀπόχρη καὶ τάδε εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν θεοῦ ἐπιπνοίᾳ θεοῦ 
πρὸς αὐτῶν μὲν ἀναγεγραμμένα, πρὸς δὲ ἡμῶν ἐξειλεγμένα τῷ γε καὶ 
σμικρὸν διαθρεῖν ἀλήθειαν δυναμένῳ.20
We must not either keep the Pythagoreans in the back-ground, who say: 
“God is one; and He is not, as some suppose, outside of this frame of things, 
but within it; but, in all the entireness of His being, is in the whole circle 
of existence, surveying all nature, and blending in harmonious union the 
whole – the author of all His own forces and works, the giver of light in 
heaven, and Father of all – the mind and vital power of the whole world – the 
mover of all things.” For the knowledge of God, these utterances, written by 
those we have mentioned through the inspiration of God, and selected by 
us, may suffice even for the man that has but small power to examine truth.21
16 Coh. Gr. 19.2 = SC 528, 192.
17 Trans. from Robertson / Donaldson / Cleveland Coxe 2007a, 281, slightly modified.
18 Cf. Thesleff 1965, 186.
19 See Cyril., Adv. Iul. 1.42 and Clem. Al., Protr. 6.72.4.
20 Cf. Protr. 6.72.4 = Stählin 1905, 55.
21 Trans. from Robertson / Donaldson / Cleveland Coxe 2007b, 192.
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The bibliography on such pseudo-Pythagorean literature is rich, and the debate 
on whether it is of Jewish origin or otherwise is ongoing.22 C. Riedweg, for exam-
ple, thinks that the excerpt quoted by both Clement and Ps.-Justin is not a Jewish 
composition,23 pace N. Walter.24 Whatever the case, the Alexandrian provenance 
of the Pythagorean excerpt is clear, as its transmission by Clement well shows. Of 
particular interest is the expression within our fragment, ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κύκλῳ 
ἐπίσκοπος πάσας γενέσιος.25 R. E. Witt compares it with Cic., Nat. D. 1.27 and 
Ammonius Saccas apud Nemesius, Nat. H. 58, Plotinus, Enn. 5.1.2 and 6.4.5 in or-
der to show Clement’s proximity to Neo-Platonism, and points out that the sen-
tence κρᾶσις τῶν ὅλων αἰώνων, in spite of its Stoic ring, is not to be understood 
as hylotheism.26 Another parallelism seems to be apparent in Clement’s explana-
tion concerning Pythagoreans’ ἐπίπνοια θεοῦ.27 Clement takes his material from 
a source specifically dedicated to demonstrating the plagiarism of the Greeks, a 
source that we find also in Strom. 5.28 However, Clement does not seem willing to 
stress that point in the Protrepticus, perhaps because he was aware that it would 
not work as an argument for the “Greeks” to whom the text is addressed. This 
is why in this case, in spite of his adherence to the theory of dependence of the 
Greeks on Hebrew Scriptures,29 Clement prefers to emphasize (or to force) the 
parallels without offering a consistent explanation.30
Ps.-Justin’s rereading of the Pythagorean fragment is quite different. The au-
thor underlines the fact that the Greek “inspired” thinkers were forced to say 
22 Further details in Burkert 1961 and 1972, 109–121; Macris 2002. More generally on ancient 
pseud epigraphy, see von Fritz 1972, Cerri 2000 and Dobroruka 2014.
23 Cf. Riedweg 1994, 365. 
24 Cf. Walter 1983, 257.
25 According to Protr. 6.72.4. In Coh. Gr. 19.1 we find ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κύκλῳ ἐπισκοπῶν πάσας 
πάσας γενέσιάς ἐστιν.
26 Cf. Witt 1931.
27 In the quoted passage Clement repeats some words used earlier in Protr. 6.71.1 (Stäh-
lin 1905, 53): Καί μοι μὴ μόνον, ὦ φιλοσοφία, ἕνα τοῦτον Πλάτωνα, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ 
ἄλλους παραστῆσαι σπούδασον, τὸν ἕνα ὄντως μόνον θεὸν ἀναφθεγγομένους θεὸν 
κατ’ ἐπίπνοιαν αὐτοῦ, εἴ που τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιδράξαιντο // “And let it not be this one man 
alone – Plato; but, O philosophy, hasten to produce many others also, who declare the only 
true God to be God, through His inspiration, if in any measure they have grasped the truth” 
(trans. from Roberts / Donaldson / Cleveland Coxe 2007b, 192).
28 Stemplinger 1912, 57–80 examines this text by Clement. On how plagiarism is understood in 
Christian literature, see Aragione 2007. 
29 For example, see Protr. 6.70.1. On such a question, see Dawson 1992, 204: “Following Philo and 
his Hellenistic Jewish predecessors, as well as the chronological calculations of Justin’s pupil 
Tatian (in his Address to the Greeks), Clement asserts the absolute priority of Hebrew scripture 
to classical literature, of Moses to Homer and Plato. Moses turns out to be not only older than 
Greek poets and wise men, but even older than the Greek deities (Strom. 1.21.107,6). Having 
established the priority of Hebraic wisdom, Clement next shows that Greek wisdom is de-
rived from it. The Greeks copied the miracles recorded in Hebrew scripture, and all their 
chief philosophical ideas are plagiarized from the same source (Strom. 2.1.1,1–2).” For a new 
approach to this problem, see Itter 2009, 79–112.
30 For this argument, see also Herrero de Jáuregui 2008, 207–208. 
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many things by the divine regard (ὑπὸ τῆς θείας προνοίας) for mankind, espe-
cially those among them who were in Egypt. Ps.-Justin is probably combining 
two disparate explanations of the origins of truth in the Greek world: πρόνοια 
and literary dependency on Hebrew Scriptures. Nevertheless, those who dis-
cerned some truth through the exercise of reason (perhaps Sophocles)31 and those 
who experienced a more direct form of inspiration (like the Sibyl, as Ps.-Justin 
later explains)32 can be distinguished from those who owed their knowledge of 
the truth to their acquaintance with Hebrew sources (the case of Pythagoras).
In keeping with his general intention of promoting Greek expressions of mono-
theism, the introductory formula to the Pythagorean excerpt in Coh. Gr. 19.2, Εἰ δὲ 
καὶ σαφεστέραν ἀπόδειξιν περὶ ἑνὸς θεοῦ τῆς Πυθαγόρου δόξης ποθεῖτε γνῶναι 
– the focus of the phrase is clearly on περὶ ἑνὸς θεοῦ – is well suited to the content 
of the Christian re-reading of the quotation that is presented in the text, in which 
an assumption of monotheism is implied (in the words of the excerpt, Ὁ μὲν θεὸς 
εἷς, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐχ). In Coh. Gr. 16.1, we find a similar pronouncement introducing 
the Sibylline quotations.33 But in this case the anonymous author clearly frames 
the Sibyl herself firmly within the pagan religious context, since she supposedly 
confesses that “we” have strayed from the proper path.34 Such an identification of 
the Sibyl with her fellow pagans gives the impression of a confession after con-
31 Cf. Coh. Gr. 18 = SC 528, 188–190: Εἰ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς περὶ ἑνὸς θεοῦ μαρτυρίας 
ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι δέοι, ἀκούσατε καὶ Σοφοκλέους οὕτω λέγοντος· “Εἷς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἷς 
ἔστιν θεός, / Ὃς οὐρανὸν τέτευχε καὶ γαῖαν μακράν, / Πόντου τε χαροπὸν οἶδμα κἀνέμων 
βίας. / Θνητοὶ δὲ πολλοὶ καρδίᾳ πλανώμενοι / Ἱδρυσάμεσθα πημάτων παραψυχήν, / Θεῶν 
ἀγάλματ’ ἐκ λίθων τε καὶ ξύλων, / Ἢ χρυσοτεύκτων ἢ ἐλεφαντίνων τύπους· / Θυσίας τε 
τούτοις καὶ καλὰς πανηγύρεις / Τεύχοντες, οὕτως εὐσεβεῖν νομίζομεν.” Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ 
Σοφοκλῆς. // “And if it is needful that we add testimonies concerning one God, even from 
the dramatists, hear even Sophocles speaking thus: ‘There is one God, in truth there is but 
one, / Who made the heavens and the broad earth beneath, / The glancing waves of ocean 
and the winds / But many of us mortals err in heart, / And set up for a solace in our woes / Im-
ages of the gods in stone and wood, / Or figures carved in brass or ivory, / And, furnishing 
for these our handiworks, / Both sacrifice and rite magnificent, / We think that thus we do a 
pious work’. Thus, then, Sophocles” (trans. from Robertson / Donaldson / Cleveland Coxe 
2007a, 280).
32 Cf. Coh. Gr. 36.4–37.3. In particular, cf. 37.1 = SC 528, 262: Ἔσται δὲ ὑμῖν ῥᾳδίως τὴν ὀρθὴν 
θεοσέβειαν ἐκ μέρους παρὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς Σιβύλλης, ἔκ τινος δυνατῆς ἐπιπνοίας διὰ 
χρησμῶν ὑμᾶς διδασκούσης, μανθάνειν ταῦθ’ ἅπερ ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τῆς τῶν προφητῶν 
διδασκαλίας. // “And you may in part easily learn the right religion from the ancient Sib-
yl, who by some kind of potent inspiration teaches you, through her oracular predictions, 
truths which seem to be much akin to the teaching of the prophets” (trans. from Robert-
son / Donaldson / Cleveland Coxe 2007a, 288).
33 See the introductory phrase to the excerpt from Oracula Sibyllina, frag. 1.7–9 Geffcken: διὰ 
χρησμῶν ὑμᾶς διδάσκειν περὶ ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου θεοῦ συμβαίνει. The Sibylline oracle quoted 
in Coh. Gr. starts with Εἷς θεὸς <ὃς> μόνος ἔστιν (SC 528, 184). On both Sibyls and Sibylline 
Oracles in early Christian literature, see Hooker 2007.
34 See the second Sibylline oracle quoted by Ps.-Justin (SC 528, 184): Ἡμεῖς δ' ἀθανάτοιο 
τρίβου πεπλανημένοι ἦμέν, / Ἔργα δὲ χειροποίητα γεραίρομεν ἄφρονι μύθῳ, / Εἴδωλα 
ξόανά <τε> καταφθιμένων ἀνθρώπων // “But we have strayed from the Immortal›s ways, 
And worship with a dull and senseless mind Idols, the workmanship of our own hands, 
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version, a sort of palinode parallel to that of Orpheus recalled in Coh. Gr. 36.4.35 
It is not by chance that Orpheus, like the others, is explicitly said to have visited 
Egypt in Coh. Gr. 14.2.36
3 Competitive (and / or apologetic) views of Pythagoras in Late Antiquity
A preliminary conclusion that can be drawn, concerning the ideological struc-
ture of Coh. Gr. is that some Greek thinkers did not always espouse monotheism, 
and that therefore their access to the truth was not constant throughout their 
lives. Their confessions show that monotheistic declarations were a departure 
from what they had observed and proclaimed in different ways. Concerning Py-
thagoras, Ps.-Justin’s text coincides with other Jewish and / or Alexandrian tradi-
tions.37 The anonymous author of Coh. Gr. stresses that Pythagoras, like Orpheus, 
Homer, Solon, Plato, and some others, had been to Egypt and taken advantage 
of Moses’ enquiry, and they then divulged doctrines concerning the gods which 
were the opposite to those promulgated before. More specifically, the anonymous 
author stresses that Pythagoras expounded the doctrines of his own philosophy 
mystically, by means of symbols, entertaining thoughts about the unity of God. 
The expression used in Coh. Gr. 19.1, διὰ συμβόλων μυστικῶς, is relevant be-
cause it recalls the exegetical method of inquiry in which instruction is given 
to the interpreters of the sacred texts by means of symbols, i. e. allegorically.38 
Philo informs us that the Egyptian Therapeutae prayed for keenness of spiritual 
vision.39 The study of the Law and the Prophets was carried out both privately 
And images and figures of dead men” (trans. from Robertson / Donaldson / Cleveland Coxe 
2007a, 280). This quotation coincides with Orac.Sib. 3.721–723, Geffcken.
35 SC 528, 260: τῷ γοῦν πρότερον ὑμᾶς τὴν πολυθεότητα διδάξαντι, ὕστερον δὲ λυσιτελῆ 
καὶ ἀναγκαίαν παλινῳδίαν ᾆσαι προελομένῳ πείσθητε, Ὀρφεῖ… // “yet believe him who, 
though at first he taught you polytheism, yet afterwards preferred to sing a useful and nec-
essary recantation – I mean Orpheus…” (trans. from Robertson / Donaldson / Cleveland 
Coxe 2007a, 280). On this issue see also Hooker 2007, 228–229. 
36 SC 528, 178: Οὐ γὰρ λανθάνειν ἐνίους ὑμῶν οἶμαι ἐντυχόντας πάντως που τῇ τε Διοδώρου 
ἱστορίᾳ καὶ ταῖς τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν περὶ τούτων ἱστορησάντων ὅτι καὶ Ὀρφεὺς καὶ Ὅμηρος 
καὶ Σόλων, ὁ τοὺς νόμους Ἀθηναίοις γεγραφώς, καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Πλάτων καὶ ἄλλοι 
τινές, ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ γενόμενοι καὶ ἐκ τῆς Μωϋσέως ἱστορίας ὠφεληθέντες, ὕστερον 
ἐναντία τῶν πρότερον μὴ καλῶς περὶ θεῶν δοξάντων αὐτοῖς ἀπεφήναντο // “For I think 
that some of you, when you read even carelessly the history of Diodorus, and of those others 
who wrote of these things, cannot fail to see that both Orpheus, and Homer, and Solon, who 
wrote the laws of the Athenians, and Pythagoras, and Plato, and some others, when they 
had been in Egypt, and had taken advantage of the history of Moses, afterwards published 
doctrines concerning the gods quite contrary to those which formerly they had erroneously 
promulgated” (trans. from Robertson / Donaldson / Cleveland Coxe 2007a, 279).
37 For example, see the fragment attributed to Aristobulus by Euseb., Praep. evang. 13.12.1, 
where Plato, Pythagoras, and Socrates are mentioned as Moses’ pupils. There is also a notice 
quoted by Clement of Alexandria concerning the Phoenician origin of Pythagoras: cf. Clem. 
Al., Strom. 1.62.2–4.
38 Cf. Philo, Quod omnis probus liber sit 82.
39 See De vita contemplativa 89. On the Philonian description of the Therapeutic exegetical meth-
od, see Leonhardt 2001, 91–94. 
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
192 Luca Arcari
and publicly, and the Therapeutic interpretation was substantially an allegorical 
one. Laws of fasting were part of the knowledge derived from this, and those 
who followed them were performing the mysteries of the holy life. In a similar 
cultural milieu, Clement of Alexandria maintained that the knowledge of the real 
or mystic name of the deities was the typical knowledge of their initiates in the 
mysteries.40 As M. Herrero emphasizes, this represents a new image of the mys-
teries that has been adapted to Christianity, in which the believer gets to know 
the name of his father, God-Christ.41 The same epistemological process seems to 
be attributed to Pythagoras by the anonymous author of Coh. Gr. 
Concerning the figure of Pythagoras in Coh. Gr. a further conclusion needs 
to be drawn. According to the recent edition of the work, published in 2009 by 
B. Pouderon and others, the text should be ascribed to the Monarchian bishop 
Marcellus of Ancyra.42 This attribution was first defended by C. Riedweg in his 
edition with commentary published in 1994.43 Obviously, many issues remain 
unsolved by this thesis, as Simonetti has recently stressed.44 However, I am per-
suaded by one aspect of this new approach, which is that it positively stresses the 
cultural operation carried out by Ps.-Justin in a specific phase of the history of an-
cient Christianity, i. e. the third–fourth century CE.45 In keeping with his general 
intention of adducing Greek expressions of monotheism, the element Ps.-Justin 
applies to Pythagoras is μονάς.46 By doing so, Ps.-Justin seems to be drawing a 
parallel with the theosebeia of Orpheus and the Sibyl.47
One can deduce that the monotheism attributed to Pythagoras is a cultural 
construct, closely connected with other Greek authorities, among whom Orpheus 
is the first from a chronological point of view.48 The anonymous author of Coh. Gr. 
aims to defend, perhaps in the period of the Arian crisis, the so-called Monar-
40 See Protr. 115.4. See also Athenagoras, Leg. pro Christ. 20.
41 Cf. Herrero de Jáuregui 2008, 257.
42 Cf. SC 528, 42–46.
43 Cf. Riedweg 1994, 167–182.
44 Cf. Simonetti 2011. Following the edition of the works of Ps.-Justin by B. Pouderon and others, 
in this article Simonetti presents some critical notes concerning both the anonymous works 
that were later included in Pseudo-Justin’s corpus, namely De monarchia and Coh. Gr. Not-
withstanding its significant relationship with Clement of Alexandria, De monarchia seems 
to derive from the Judaeo-Hellenistic context of Alexandria. Concerning Coh. Gr., Simonetti 
suggests that due to its linguistic characteristics the probable author of the work is Marcellus 
of Ancyra, but neither the doctrine nor the exegesis really support this assumption.
45 Further details in Arcari 2011, 308–313.
46 Cf. Coh. Gr. 19.1 = SC 528, 190.
47 Cf. Coh. Gr. 16.1–2. 
48 Cf. Coh. Gr. 15.1 = SC 528, 178: Ὀρφεὺς γοῦν, ὁ τῆς πολυθεότητος ὑμῶν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, 
πρῶτος διδάσκαλος γεγονώς, οἷα πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Μουσαῖον καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς 
γνησίους ἀκροατὰς ὕστερον περὶ ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου θεοῦ κηρύττει λέγων, ἀναγκαῖον 
ὑπομνῆσαι ὑμᾶς // “At all events, we must remind you what Orpheus, who was, as one 
might say, your first teacher of polytheism, latterly addressed to his son Musaeus, and to the 
other legitimate auditors, concerning the one and only God” (trans. from Robertson / Don-
aldson / Cleveland Coxe 2007a, 279). See also the succession in Coh. Gr. 14.2 (cf. supra, n. 36).
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chianic variant of Christian Monotheism. My idea is that the (re-) invention of a 
Pythagorean monotheism and / or religion represents a Christian apologetic dis-
course that is closely connected with the invention of both Sibylline and Orphic 
monotheisms, all of them being cultural constructs re-proposed in the period of 
the Council of Nicaea (325 CE), a seminal phase for the formation of Christian 
monotheism, and at which a type of opposition between “Monarchianic” (Christ 
is not God) and “anti-Arian” (Jesus is God) views of monotheism is well-attest-
ed.49 There is no real evidence of the divinity of Jesus in the Coh. Gr., but we 
do find some of the same authorities quoted in the text that are also quoted in 
Eusebius’ works, which are an important support for the Nicene position on the 
divinity of Jesus.50
This leads to yet another consideration. Ps.-Justin uses a known apologetic ar-
gumentative technique, as well as a broad range of materials that can be function-
alized in such a discourse. We find a similar case in Lactant., Div. inst.51 In the first 
book of this work, entitled De falsa religione, Lactantius unfolds his arguments 
against the traditional polytheism of Greco-Roman paganism. Lactantius begins 
with rational arguments about the existence of divina providentia and the appro-
priateness of connecting it with a single deity rather than many, then continues 
with testimonia,52 especially the biblical prophets.53 He defines such testimonia as 
unanimous, sane, and credible, but he does admit that they are not believed by 
everyone.54 He then mentions the auctores,55 that is the authors of texts recognized 
as authorities by the so-called pagan audience. In this category, he first enlists 
poets (Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, Virgil, Ovid), then philosophers, beginning with 
the Greeks – the last of them being Plato, qui omnium sapientissimus iudicatur56 – 
followed by the Romans with Cicero and Seneca. Lactantius’ general comment 
on the philosophers is that they came close to the truth, but were hindered by 
the tradition of paganism. Lactantius’ appeal to authority is very similar to the 
one employed in Coh. Gr., where a distinction seems to be made between rational 
and divine inquiries concerning the authentic θεοσέβεια. The employment of a 
well-known apologetic and / or argumentative technique on the part of the anon-
ymous author of Coh. Gr. can be considered a sign that the work belongs to this 
historical and cultural milieu. 
The likelihood that Ps.-Justin drew many of his authorities from an extant an-
thology could explain the function of his apologetic discourse. N. Zeegers-Vander 
49 On this issue, see Edwards 2009, 106–107. On so-called Monarchianism, see Simonetti 1993, 
espec. 217–238. On the “Arian crisis,” see Simonetti 1975.
50 On this topic, see the recent study by Inowlocki 2011. 
51 Further details in Hooker 2007, 287–291. 
52 Cf. 1.3.
53 Cf. 1.4.
54 Cf. 1.4 and 1.5.
55 Cf. 1.5.2.
56 Cf. 1.5.23.
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Vorst considered the source of such quotations an anthologie du plagiat.57 J. Daniélou 
saw this collection of quotations as a catena of Jewish origin, which Coh. Gr. had 
supposedly reproduced in toto.58 Aside from the issue related to the origins of this 
anthology and / or these anthologies, a comparison with the De monarchia, anoth-
er composite work included in the Pseudo-Justinian corpus, helps us understand 
Coh. Gr.’s general intention of revealing Greek expressions of monotheism. In the 
De monarchia, the anonymous compiler sets out to prove the truth of monothe-
ism to an implied polytheistic reader, using only quotations from polytheistic 
Greek literature. The excerpts, however, are forgeries ascribed to known authors 
or characters such as Pythagoras, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Philemon, and Orpheus. 
The work never quotes from either the Old or the New Testament and never refers 
to any specifically Christian doctrine, but it rejects idolatry and views God as the 
one creator and judge. The pseudepigraphic passages may have come from a sin-
gle gnomologion, used both by Clement of Alexandria and the author of Coh. Gr. 
It is known that Eusebius was familiar with the De monarchia, which he defines as 
περὶ θεοῦ μοναρχίας.59 Eusebius lists such a compilation among Justin Martyr’s 
writings, without doubting its authorship. This means that an important Chris-
tian historian from late antiquity did not find it impossible that a Christian might 
have written a literary work with no reference to specific Christian doctrines or 
allusion to the New Testament. 
4 Final Remarks
The inclusion of pagan (or purportedly pagan) sources is prima facie an apologetic 
concession: the anonymous author of Coh. Gr. is perfectly willing, in the case of 
Pythagoras, to define the manner of exposition of his philosophical doctrines as 
both mystical and symbolic. Συμβολικῶς and μυστικῶς are not terms solely used 
by Christians. Proclus, for example, applies these two nouns to qualify Pythago-
rean knowledge.60 This parallel should encourage us to explore further contacts 
between ancient Christian (and, more specifically, Alexandrian)61 theologies and 
Neoplatonic schools,62 while keeping in mind the different ideological aims that 
lie behind the use of an almost identical terminology.63 Nevertheless, for the pres-
57 See Zeegers-Vander Vorst 1972.
58 Cf. Daniélou 1961, 103–122. 
59 Cf. Hist. eccl. 4.18.4. We find a parallel statement in (Ps.-)Sophronius, De viris illustribus 23 
(Geb hardt 1896, 22–23). On the Eusebian account of Justin’s works, see SC 528, 29–31.
60 Cf. In Ti. 1.7.30 (see Tarrant 2007, 100). Such terminology seems to be characteristic of the 
Neoplatonists’ allegorical reading of ancient Greek philosophers: cf. Dillon 1976. On allegor-
ical exegesis in Neoplatonism, see also Brisson 2004.  
61 For the definition of a specific Alexandrian Pythagoreanism, see Bostock 2003. 
62 See also Iamblichus’ manipulation of Nicomachus’ account at Iamb. VP 96–100, with the ad-
dition of details that are found also among Essenes and Christian monks. On this topic, see 
M. Giangiulio’s essay in this volume.
63 In Coh. Gr., the expression διὰ συμβόλων μυστικῶς seems to locate Pythagoras, at least in 
part, in the general sphere of exegesis that had been promoted in Alexandrian schools at 
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ent, I would consider it premature to make any definite claim in this regard.64 I 
wish merely to point out that it was possible, on the basis of a very similar meth-
odological approach to ancient philosophy, to convert ancient philosophy into a 
“phase” in scholars’ theological progression (in the case of Iamblichus by seeking 
the agreement of Platonic theology with that of Orpheus, by way of Pythagoras). 
In Neoplatonism the use of terminology found also in Christian works aims to 
prepare scholars for true philosophy, that of Plato (or Plato as seen in the eyes of 
Neoplatonists), via Pythagoras.65 Both Christian and Neoplatonic schools needed 
to link ancient philosophy with a higher level of interpretation, in order to find in 
it a support for their ideological propria. 
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Transformations of Pythagorean Wisdom  
and Psychic ἄσκησις in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary
Dirk Baltzly – University of Tasmania
The Platonists of late antiquity took Plato’s dialogues to communicate the wis-
dom of Pythagoras. However, they believed that Plato combined this wisdom 
with what they took to be a distinctively Socratic φιλανθρωπία (cf. Numenius, 
fr. 24.71–5, Proclus, in Tim. I 7.25). In short, according to a Platonist like Proclus, 
Plato’s dialogues do not merely contain the truth: they also present that truth in a 
way likely to transform souls through its reception. The act of reading a dialogue 
such as the Timaeus with a qualified teacher is thus a distinctly Pythagorean-So-
cratic ἄσκησις.
I begin by considering how Proclus supposed a Pythagorean would transmit 
knowledge. I then consider these general characteristics in relation to a specif-
ic instance of Pythagorean and Platonist teaching in the Timaeus: the order of 
the planets (Moon, Sun, Venus, Mercury, etc). Proclus ultimately accepts the 
Chaldæan ordering of the planets, which places the Sun in the middle of two 
triads on either side (Moon-Mercury-Venus, Sun, Jupiter-Saturn-fixed stars). He 
therefore must ask what Plato the Pythagorean intended by apparently giving us 
the wrong order? I argue that Proclus’ answer is that good Pythagoreans do not 
trouble to indicate the spatial locations of actual material bodies. Pythagorean 
texts apparently about things as concrete as the planetary order should instead 
be thought of as symbolically revealing relations among higher causes. I illustrate 
how this strategy for understanding Pythagorean teachings about the stars and 
planets creates problems for those who are trying to get to the truth about what 
fifth-century Pythagoreans may have thought about astronomy. The Neoplatonic 
approach to communicating (allegedly) Pythagorean wisdom introduces distor-
tions that we, as historians, resent. I conclude by speculating about the possible 
psychagogic purposes of their reading strategies.
My focus on the Neoplatonists and their understanding of Pythagoreanism 
means that this paper is not about Pythagoras or the early Pythagoreans per se. It 
is rather about what the pagan Neoplatonists of the fifth and sixth centuries CE 
regarded as the Pythagorean character of Plato’s dialogues and of the Timaeus in 
particular. I will argue that in the act of reading the Timaeus with a master (like 
Proclus or Syrianus), the aspiring student of Neoplatonism was introduced to a 
particular kind of ἄσκησις – a spiritual exercise in which the student comes to 
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inhabit metaphors for seeing physical things, like visible stars and planets, as 
images of higher incorporeal causes. In particular, he (or she) learned to read 
Plato’s physical theory in the Timaeus – which seems superficially to be about 
matters like the spatial location of planets – in terms of such higher causes. This 
act of reading the Timaeus, they supposed, was part of the process by means of 
which our souls are purified of the accretions that they acquire in the descent into 
Becoming and are thus made ready to revert upon the divine souls that mediate 
our relation to the intelligible. 
In pursuit of this psychic transformation in their audience, the Neoplatonists’ 
commentary practices also transformed the Pythagorean knowledge that they 
transmitted. These transformations were not pointless and stubborn re-writings 
of history or disingenuous fabrications of ancient Pythagorean teachings. Rather, 
they were part and parcel of a reading culture built around practices of self-trans-
formation. 
1 Plato’s Timaeus as Pythagorean text
Modern scholarship on Plato’s dialogue affords it varying degrees of Pythagore-
an authenticity. At one end of the spectrum there is Taylor’s view that the speech 
of Timaeus did not represent Plato’s views at all but was rather a mixture of Py-
thagorean mathematics and Empedoclean natural philosophy.1 This idea has 
been largely rejected. But at the other end there is Kahn’s common-sense obser-
vation that, though the details are Plato’s own, he was working with themes that 
are Pythagorean in origin (p. 4).2 There seems little doubt that Plato is tipping his 
hat to Pythagorean ideas in this dialogue: the speaker, Timaeus, is from Locri in 
southern Italy. His city is under the rule of excellent laws (20a2), as would befit a 
Pythagorean community, and he is an expert in astronomy (27a3–4). 
Ancient Platonists had even stronger reasons to regard the Timaeus as a Py-
thagorean work. First there is the fact they were inheritors of the view of Nume-
nius about the continuity of Plato and Pythagoras generally.3 Second, they be-
lieved that they were in possession of the Pythagorean original which Plato was 
thought to have amplified in his own Timaeus (cf. Proclus in Tim. I 1.8–16; 7.19–22). 
The work ascribed to Timaeus of Locri, On Nature, is thought by us to be a later 
work influenced by Plato’s Timaeus – and not the other way round4 – but Proclus 
took the work to be exactly what it advertised itself as: a Pythagorean precursor 
to Plato’s dialogue. Proclus did not believe that Plato follows Timaeus of Locri’s 
original slavishly but he nonetheless regarded Plato’s physical theory as contain-
ing distinctively Pythagorean elements. 
Proclus takes the tone of the Timaeus to be a beneficial mixture of the Socratic 
and Pythagorean style. What defines the Pythagorean style?
1 Taylor 1928, 11. 
2 Kahn 2002, 4. 
3 Numenius, fr. 1, 55 (Des Places).
4 Baltes 1972. 
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In the Pythagorean tradition, it [sc. the Timaeus] contains loftiness of mind, 
intuition, inspiration, a tendency to link everything with intelligibles, to 
depict the Whole in terms of numbers, to give an indication of things in 
a symbolic and mystical fashion, to remove one’s focus on particulars, to 
make assertions. (in Tim I 7.26–31)5
To get a clearer idea of what this list of abstractions really amounts to, let us 
consider something that Proclus regards as an example of the dialogue’s Py-
thagorean style. This emerges in relation to Proclus’ understanding of the role 
of the recapitulation of the previous day’s conversation at the start of the Timaeus 
(17a1–19b2). In general terms the Pythagorean style is one in which the text’s real 
meaning is cloaked in metaphor. It is rebarbative to those who are not prepared to 
understand it and this coincides with the tradition of secrecy in Pythagoreanism. 
This Pythagorean style in Plato is counterbalanced by the Socratic character of 
the dialogue.
From the considerate Socratic [manner] it possesses approachability, gentle-
ness, a tendency toward demonstration, to studying reality through images, to 
moral content, and so on. (in Tim. I, 7.31–8.1, trans. Tarrant, 2007) 
So while the Pythagorean inheritance is off-putting and exclusive, the So-
cratic aspects of the dialogue make it approachable. Now, you might well 
conclude that such a mixture would have all the appeal of a dish contain-
ing both liver pâté and chocolate ice cream – each a good thing on its own, 
but not in combination. Proclus, however, is quite confident of the benefits 
of such a mixture, which combines Socratic demonstrations with Pythag-
orean assertions. 
The most pervasive aspect of the dialogue’s Pythagorean character consists in the 
fact that it (allegedly) presents higher realities through images. It is axiomatic for 
the Neoplatonists that “all things are in all, but in each in a manner that is appro-
priate to the subject.”6 One and the same god is present in the intelligible mode 
of being at this point in the ontological hierarchy, intellectually at another point, 
psychically at another point, and so on.7 In Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus 
this methodological principle is ascribed Pythagorean authority. Having divided 
things into intelligibles, physical things, and the intermediate mathematicals, the 
Pythagoreans insisted that the intermediates and the physical things are fore-
5 in Tim I 7.26–31 ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ παρὰ μὲν τῆς Πυθαγορικῆς συνηθείας τὸ ὑψηλόνουν, τὸ 
νοερόν, τὸ ἔνθεον, τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν πάντα ἐξάπτον, τὸ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς τὰ ὅλα ἀφοριζόμενον, 
τὸ συμβολικῶς τὰ πράγματα καὶ μυστικῶς ἐνδεικνύμενον, τὸ ἀναγωγόν, τὸ ὑπεραῖρον 
τὰς μεριστὰς ἐπιβολάς, τὸ ἀποφαντικόν· trans. after Tarrant 2007. 
6 Iamblichus took Numenius to be committed to this principle (Numenius, fr. 41, Des Places). 
After him, see Porphyry, Sent. 10; Syrianus, in Metaphys. 81.38; and of course Proclus himself 
in ET proposition 103. 
7 On the adverbial denomination of different modes of being in Proclus, see Baltzly 2008.
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shadowed in a primal manner among the intelligibles, while both the intelligi-
bles and the physical things are present in the intermediates. The intelligibles are 
present in the mathematicals as icons or images, while the physical things find 
their paradigms in the mathematicals. Both intelligibles and intermediates are 
present in physical things as glimmers or ἰνδάλματα. 
This relation among objects permits a corresponding relation among aspects 
of Plato’s text. What appears to be about one thing (for instance, a recapitulation 
of the previous day’s account of the city, in the Republic) may in fact be an image 
in the human realm of a higher cosmic cause. 
The discussion of the constitution and the short condensed summary of 
the classes in it makes a contribution to the entire account of the cosmic 
creation. For they act like images from which it is possible to refocus on 
the universe. Indeed, the Pythagoreans were the outstanding exponents 
of this very method, tracking down the similarities in realities by way of 
analogies, and passing from images to paradigms. That is what Plato is 
doing now too, showing us at the outset things in the universe as seen in 
human lives, and enabling us to study them (in Tim. I 33.4–10, trans. Tar-
rant 2007).
Proclus generously supplies to Plato’s text an implicit division into seven classes 
present in the city (though Plato mentions only two) and correlates these classes 
with the seven heavenly bodies. 
Moon farmers
Venus those who preside over marriages
Mercury those who arrange the lotteries associated with the marriages
Sun educators and judges
Mars warriors
Jupiter kings
Saturn philosophers
This analogia illustrates what Proclus takes to be most characteristic of Plato’s 
Pythagorean style of communication: the correlation of things at various levels of 
the ontological hierarchy and the idea that one thing in Plato’s text may symboli-
cally stand for its ontological correlate at a higher level. 
In a similar fashion, Proclus gives a Pythagorean reading to the entire episode 
about Atlantis. Though this appears on the surface to be a story about the war 
between the Athenians and the Atlanteans, for Proclus it is in fact a symbolic 
presentation of the opposing forces that order the visible cosmos. This is not to 
say that Proclus, Iamblichus, and Syrianus treated the Atlantis story merely as 
fictional allegory – they do not preclude the possibility that it had some basis in 
fact – but they insist that its role in a dialogue about nature is to provide an image 
of causes that are not confined to the human realm:
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… we prefer, too, to take this rivalry also from the human realm and to 
distribute it, in this same way and according to a similar pattern, across the 
whole cosmos and particularly among generated things, so giving wide-
spread meaning to all things, and studying how they partake of this rival-
ry in accordance with the variety of their powers. (in Tim. I 78.1–6, trans. 
after Tarrant, 2007).
Proclus immediately goes on to illustrate this rivalry by adverting to the One 
and the Indefinite Dyad, as well as the opposition (e. g. between Rest and Motion) 
among the Sophist’s megista gene. 
The entire approach to the opening pages of the Timaeus exhibits just those fea-
tures that Proclus associates with Plato’s Pythagorean style: “to link everything 
with intelligibles, … to give an indication of things in a symbolic and mystical 
fashion, to remove one’s focus on particulars.” With this prelude about Plato’s 
Pythagorean means of communicating his meaning in mind, let us turn to the 
order of the planets.
2 The Pythagorean Order of the Planets
There are several longstanding historical problems about the astronomical views 
associated with the ancient Pythagoreans. On the one hand, we have the testi-
mony of Aristotle in De Caelo II.13 that the Pythagoreans posited a central fire 
at the middle of the cosmos and made the Earth orbit it.8 On the other hand, in 
his commentary on this passage in Aristotle, Simplicius attributes to some of the 
Pythagoreans a geocentric theory.
Aristotle also informs us that the Pythagoreans posited an additional planet 
– the Counter-Earth. Aëtius incorporates this Counter-Earth into his account of 
Philolaus on the order of the planets (44 A 16 DK):
Philolaus’ Pythagorean order Platonic order Chaldæan order
Hestia – the central fire  
Counter-Earth  
Earth Earth Earth
Moon Moon Moon
Sun Sun Mercury
Venus  Venus  Venus
Mercury Mercury Sun
Mars Mars Mars
Jupiter Jupiter Jupiter
Saturn Saturn Saturn
Fixed stars Fixed stars Fixed stars
8 Cael. 293a.20–23 οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καλούμενοι δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ 
μέσου πῦρ εἶναί φασι, τὴν δὲ γῆν, ἓν τῶν ἄστρων οὖσαν, κύκλῳ φερομένην περὶ τὸ μέσον 
νύκτα τε καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν.
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Aëtius (44 A 16 and 17 DK) says only that the five planets come “after the Sun.” 
However, Alexander (in Metaphys. 40.24) adds that according to the Pythagoreans 
Mercury is further from the Earth than Venus. We may plausibly assume, I think, 
that the planets above Mercury conform to the order accepted by Plato, Aristotle, 
and others who came later.9
If we leave out Hestia and the Counter-Earth, then Plato and the Pythagoreans 
are in agreement about planetary order. Such a confluence of ancient wisdom 
would be (celestial!) music to a Neoplatonist’s ears. Much of the work of the an-
cient Neoplatonic commentary tradition consists in efforts to show the agreement 
of Plato, Pythagoras, Orpheus, and other ancient authorities with one another. 
However, both the Platonic and Pythagorean order differ from the view about 
the order of the planets that had won wide acceptance by the time of Proclus: the 
Chaldæan order. The latter positions the Sun in the middle of the planetary order, 
with a triad of stars on either side of it. The Chaldæan order is also the one that 
was accepted by Ptolemy and commonly used in astrology. Proclus is committed 
to defending the Chaldæan order as the correct one because he thinks that it is 
stated unambiguously in the Chaldæan Oracles and that these are divine utteranc-
es. He first nudges the Pythagorean order into line with the Chaldæan one and 
then interprets Plato as addressing higher causes in a Pythagorean manner.
By the time of Proclus there was in circulation an alternative account of the 
Pythagorean order of the planets to that provided by Aëtius and Alexander. 
Among the sources that Proclus was undoubtedly familiar with, we find in The-
on of Smyrna (138.9, ff.) an attribution of the Chaldæan order to “some” of the 
Pythagoreans.10 Proclus himself assigns the Chaldæan order of the planets to the 
Pythagoreans, together with a correlation between the elements. These correla-
tions show that all the elements are found everywhere in the universe – albeit in 
different gradations – and the intermediate elements of air and water function to 
bind the extreme terms of fire and earth together. Such a notion, that all elements 
are everywhere and that fire and earth are bound by the intermediate elements 
of air and water, makes Pythagorean doctrine agree with Plato, and this is one 
of Proclus’ main objectives. The order of planets and elements given at in Tim. II 
48.22 ff is as follows:
 9 This would agree with Eudemus’ report (= Anaximander A 19) that the Pythagoreans were 
the first to give the planets’ order – i. e. the order that Plato, Aristotle, etc. took to be the order. 
10 De utilitate mathematicae 138.9–18: τὴν δὲ κατὰ τόπον τῶν σφαιρῶν <ἢ> κύκλων θέσιν τε 
καὶ τάξιν, ἐν οἷς κείμενα φέρεται τὰ πλανώμενα, τινὲς μὲν τῶν Πυθαγορείων τοιάνδε 
νομίζουσι· προσγειότατον μὲν εἶναι τὸν τῆς σελήνης κύκλον, δεύτερον δ᾽  ὑπὲρ τοῦτον <τὸν 
τοῦ> Ἑρμοῦ, ἔπειτα τὸν τοῦ φωσφόρου, καὶ τέταρτον <τὸν> τοῦ ἡλίου, εἶτα τὸν τοῦ Ἄρεως, 
ἔπειτα τὸν τοῦ Διός, τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ἀπλανέσι τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου· μέσον 
εἶναι βουλόμενοι τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου τῶν πλανωμένων ὡς ἡγεμονικώτατον καὶ οἷον καρδίαν 
τοῦ παντός. For other examples, see Burkert 1972, 318. 
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Earth earth, terrestrial
Moon earth, aetherial
Mercury water, aetherial
Venus air, aetherial
Sun fire, aetherial
Mars fire, celestial
Jupiter air, celestial
Saturn water, celestial
Fixed stars earth, celestial
Note that, in the “Pythagorean” reading of the seven classes in Callipolis given 
above, the planets correspond to the increasingly excellent classes of inhabitants 
in a manner that encodes the Chaldæan order. It seems clear that Proclus suppos-
es that the Pythagoreans agree with the divine revelation of Julian the Theurgist 
that the Sun sits in the middle, between Mars and Venus. 
One might well wonder what the evidential basis is for attributing this view 
of elemental bonds to the Pythagoreans. Proclus begins his report of the “Py-
thagorean” elemental bonds from an identification of the Moon as “an aetherial 
Earth” and then quotes one of his favourite passages from Orpheus the Theo-
logian, identifying the Moon as another, limitless Earth with mountains, cities, 
etc.11 Its composition from aether is not part of this passage, which states only that 
it is in some way a counterpart to Earth and similar to it. But presumably if the 
Earth is composed of terrestrial earth and the Moon is another Earth, then the 
Moon must be composed of aetherial earth. Porphyry assigns this notion to the 
Egyptians.12 We may dispute whether Herodotus 2.81 indicates the confluence of 
Orphic, Egyptian, and Pythagorean wisdom, but the Neoplatonists clearly felt no 
such scholarly compunctions: Egyptian, Orphic, and Pythagorean wisdom were 
all regarded as strands in the same great tradition. Hence Proclus felt no com-
punction about putting these pieces together to give us the alternative Pythago-
rean order, which aligns with the Chaldæan placement of the Sun.
The Counter-Earth and the central fire that figure in Aristotle’s report and in 
Aëtius are conspicuously absent from both the account of the order of planets giv-
en in Theon and in Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus. Where have they gone? 
It is in this context – a context in which the reports of Pythagorean astronomical 
views in Aëtius or Aristotle are massaged into conformity with the Neoplatonist 
commitment to the synthesis of all ancient wisdom – that I think we should place 
Simplicius’ famous report about some of the Pythagoreans. Let us review the de-
tails of this report.
11 Kern 1922, fr. 91.
12 Sodano 1964, fr. 16. 
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The more genuine Pythagoreans describe the central fire as participating 
in the demiurgic power that enlivens the entire Earth and re-heats that 
which has cooled off … They called the Earth a “star” in as much as it too is 
an instrument of time, for it is the cause of days and nights, since it creates 
day when the part toward the Sun is illuminated and makes night corre-
sponding to the cone that comes about from its shadow. The Pythagoreans 
called the Moon the Counter-Earth, just as they called the Moon an aethe-
rial Earth, in as much as it intercepts the Sun’s light – a feature distinctive 
of the Earth – and in as much as it forms the boundary of the heavens, just 
as Earth does for the sublunary region.13
Each of these features has a clear counterpart in Proclus’ exegesis of Plato’s Timae-
us. We have already seen that the Moon is an aetherial Earth in Proclus’ account 
of Pythagoreanism. The demiurgic power that enlivens the Earth and warms it 
correlates well with his exegesis of Timaeus 40b8–c3. According to Proclus, there 
are many different levels at which the Earth, Ge, is manifested: there is an intel-
ligible Earth, an intellectual Earth, and finally there is the divine soul and aethe-
rial body that is most truly Earth. It is distinctive of this divine composite that 
it “enlivens” things (in Tim. III 136.4 and 16). Proclus invokes the authority of 
the Pythagorean Timaeus to fend off readings of Plato’s text that would have the 
Earth move (III 138.4; cf. On the cosmos 97e). The Earth might revolve in a circle for 
Heraclides of Pontus, but not for a Pythagorean like the author of the book from 
which Plato has constructed his own Timaeus! The phrase “instrument of time” 
is also Platonic (Tim. 41e5, 42d5). Proclus likewise explains the sense in which 
the Earth is the “guardian and creator of day and night” (Tim. 40c1–2) in terms of 
the conical shadow of the Earth. Finally, the idea that the Moon – this aetherial 
Earth – marks the boundary of the heavens is one of Proclus’ favourite themes. 
The Moon is an isthmus between Being and Becoming, the celestial and the sub-
lunary realm (in Tim. II 87.13, 104.19). 
Burkert rightly suspected that the report of a geocentric model of the universe 
from Simplicius did not represent any “mysterious, secret, pre-Philolaus astron-
omy, belonging to Pythagoras or the Pythagoreans.”14 We have just seen in detail 
how the passage in Simplicius probably arose. The Neoplatonists were commit-
ted to the Chaldæan order of planets and to a geocentric theory on the basis of 
two authorities. For the order of the planets, they deferred to the gods speaking 
13 in Cael. 7.512.9–20 οἱ δὲ γνη σιώτερον αὐτῶν μετασχόντες πῦρ μὲν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ λέγουσι τὴν 
δημιουργικὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐκ μέσου πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ζῳογονοῦσαν καὶ τὸ ἀπεψυγμένον 
αὐτῆς ἀναθάλπουσαν· … ἄστρον δὲ τὴν γῆν ἔλεγον ὡς ὄργανον καὶ αὐτὴν χρόνου· 
ἡμερῶν γάρ ἐστιν αὕτη καὶ νυκτῶν αἰτία· ἡμέραν μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ πρὸς τῷ ἡλίῳ μέρος 
καταλαμπομένη, νύκτα δὲ κατὰ τὸν κῶνον τῆς γινομένης ἀπ α᾽ὐτῆς σκιᾶς. ἀντίχθονα δὲ 
τὴν σελήνην ἐκάλουν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, ὥσπερ καὶ “αἰθερίαν γῆν,” καὶ ὡς ἀντιφράττουσαν 
τῷ ἡλιακῷ φωτί, ὅπερ ἴδιον γῆς, καὶ ὡς ἀποπερατοῦσαν τὰ οὐράνια, καθάπερ ἡ γῆ τὸ ὑπὸ 
σελήνην.
14 Burkert 1972, 317.
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through Julian the Chaldæan. For the Earth’s place at the centre of the universe, 
they deferred to the divine Plato. Their notions of Pythagoreanism, and the ap-
parent precedent of Timaeus of Locri’s own dialogue, afforded them the interpre-
tive latitude to present Pythagorean astronomy as in agreement with their other 
sources of wisdom.
3 Making Plato agree with the Chaldæan order of planets
The text of Plato’s Timaeus and his Republic are far less malleable than the vague-
ly defined tradition of Pythagoreanism. There is no room for doubt that Plato’s 
order of the planets differs from that of the Chaldæans. In his Commentary on the 
Republic, Proclus confronts this fact directly: 
Thus, Plato too followed the astronomers of his time, by which it is also 
clear that the father of the myth [of Er] did not announce all things as he 
himself saw them, but rather he added such things as were most widely 
accepted at the time – as is doubtless the case with the claim that the Sun 
is seventh from the sphere of the fixed stars and immediately above the 
Moon. For it is not only here [in the myth of Er] that one finds this idea, 
but he also appears to say this in the Timaeus. I also know that some as-
tronomers say that the Sun is in the middle of the seven planets, although 
this has not been demonstrated through assumptions that are altogether 
necessary. How, in general, they have tried to do this, we have discussed 
sufficiently in the Commentary on the Timaeus. Nonetheless, when one hears 
from the Chaldæans among the theurgists that “the god then integrated 
the Sun among the seven and made the six other Zones dependent upon 
it,” or one hears from the gods themselves that “god established the solar 
fire in the place of the heart” (Or. Chald. 58), then might you not fear that 
– as Ibycus said – “I have traded honour among men for sinning against 
the gods.” (A line that Socrates also quotes in the Phaedrus [242d1]). While 
I adhere to what has been revealed by the gods, I also say that on these 
matters Plato conformed with the astronomy of his time, for Aristotle too 
thought this, adhering to the astronomical views of those around Callip-
pus. (in Remp. II 220.1–21)15
So in his Commentary on the Republic, Proclus takes Plato to be addressing the 
people of his day who all accept this order of the planets. There is the implication, 
however, that this concession to considerations of audience is not all there is to 
the matter.
15 All translations from Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic are part of the manuscript I’m 
working on with John Finamore and Graeme Miles. This will come out as three volumes 
with Cambridge University Press in a series modelled on the translation of Proclus’ Com-
mentary on the Timaeus. Volume 1 should be published in 2017 with subsequent volumes 
following at two year intervals.
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In the Commentary on the Timaeus, Proclus’ approach to this issue is more nu-
anced. The Commentary on the Republic alludes to the fact that he does not think 
that Ptolemy’s arguments prove that the Sun lies in the middle of the planetary 
order, between Mars and Venus. Thus, if Plato were to assert that it lies just above 
the Moon and before Mercury, he would not be asserting anything that is demon-
strably false, at least on the basis of considerations adduced by the astronomers. 
The Commentary on the Timaeus contains a lengthy discussion of why Ptolemy’s 
arguments for the Chaldæan order are not probative. Rather, what shows that 
Plato is wrong are the divine pronouncements of the Chaldæan Oracles.16
In any event, the true value of Plato’s distinctively Pythagorean natural phi-
losophy lies not in its attention to the specific spatial relations among heavenly 
bodies, but to the non-spatial relations among their intelligible causes. Having 
acknowledged that Plato’s planetary order does not agree with that of the Oracles, 
Proclus goes on to explain the Platonic order given in the Timaeus as resulting 
from the fact that Plato was attending to the way in which the Sun and Moon 
are linked together at a higher level of causes. Both visible planets are the result 
of the same hypercosmic cause, as indicated by the fact that the Moon’s light is 
borrowed from the Sun. 
Proclus’ attitude in these matters follows that of Iamblichus.17 According to 
Iamblichus, the Platonic order of the planets is due to the causal role that the plan-
etary gods play in relation to Becoming. The Sun and Moon (whose light is bor-
rowed) are the Father and Mother of Becoming respectively, while Mercury and 
Venus work in close association with the Sun. The specific causal roles that they 
play in relation to the sublunary realm of Becoming appear to be adapted from 
astrological notions of planetary influence. Neither Proclus nor Iamblichus say so 
explicitly, but it seems to me that their general strategy is to read Plato’s claims 
about spatial order as claims about associations among causes. This affords Plato 
a “higher truth” to reveal through his claims about the order of the planets.
According to Proclus, then, Plato communicates the point that the Sun and 
Moon stem from the same hypercosmic cause by appearing to give them spatial 
positions proximate to one another. This re-reading of the order of the planets 
in Plato’s dialogues, that is, in terms of the symbolic substitution of the relations 
among the higher causes of the planets for the apparent spatial position of the 
planets, exactly conforms to the Pythagorean treatment of the story of the war 
between Athens and Atlantis. In each case, what seems to be about one thing 
– relations among corporeal things like planets or nations in the realm of Becom-
ing – is actually about the paradigmatic causes of the entire cosmos. 
16 Cf. Proclus, in Tim. III 62.10–63.31. 
17 Iamblichus fr. 70 (Dillon) = Proclus, in Tim. III 65.7–66.8.
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4 Pythagorean ἄσκησις and moral progress
From the point of view of modern scholarship, this “Pythagorean” approach to 
interpreting Plato and the other Pythagorean texts is deeply frustrating. We as-
sume that Proclus, Iamblichus, and the other late antique Platonists had access to 
books we no longer possess and we would like them to tell us more about what 
their predecessors really thought. But that is not why they read and interpreted 
Plato. The Iamblichean reading course of the dialogues corresponds to a course of 
moral progress through degrees of the virtues and the re-ascent of the soul to the 
divine.18 For my own part, I do not think that the act of reading and interpreting 
Plato is meant as a separable means to this goal. It is not that Plato tells us what the 
cathartic and the contemplative virtues are and then we Platonists work on acquir-
ing them. Rather, I think that the Neoplatonists supposed that one becomes virtu-
ous in the act of reading Plato’s dialogues with a master. Elsewhere I have called 
this approach perlocutionary hermeneutics.19 Its core consists in the acquisition of 
new conceptual resources for understanding the world and one’s place in it. It is 
the shaking off of these ways of seeing which are naturally recommended to the 
soul by its experience of embodiment, and the acquisition of materials for the con-
struction of new metaphors to live by. The objective is not merely to read the texts 
of Plato but to understand one’s experience in terms of metaphors readily found in 
them, or in terms of metaphors constructed from materials that are suitably Pla-
tonic. Central to the construction of these new metaphors was the identification of 
heretofore undiscerned similarities between one thing and another. 
The construction of a Pythagorean analogia that connects the classes in a hy-
pothetical city with the various planets provides this kind of similarity by which 
one thing can be seen in terms of another. Who knows what further metaphorical 
inferences one of Proclus’ students might make once he began to see a farmer 
ploughing his field as symbolically linked with the Moon, with Artemis, with the 
feminine, as living in cycles? It is grist for a conceptual mill whose purpose is to 
penetrate beyond the apparent plurality and disconnectness of things to see the 
underlying unity that contains everything in the world – from the farmer behind 
the plough to the urbane Platonic philosopher – as part of a single living organ-
ism, the living cosmos.
Proclus’ re-reading of the Platonic order of planets from one of spatial prox-
imity to a “proximity” of causal influence facilitates at least two ways of re-in-
terpreting our experience. First and most obviously, it is another chapter in the 
long-running Neoplatonic campaign to shake off the priority of notions of reality 
that involve place. Thus, for instance, Plotinus invites us to substitute the notion 
of dependence that can attach to the Greek word en in place of the spatial relation 
that is more commonly meant. We should think of the body as “in the soul” in ac-
cordance with this first way of thinking, rather than wondering how the soul can 
18 Cf. Westerink 1962, xl. 
19 Baltzly 2014, 805. 
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be “in the body” in the second way of thinking. Proclus’ re-reading also paves 
the way for seeing the influence of the celestial gods as close to us. When we 
think simply in terms of bodies located in space, these gods are indeed far away. 
But when we think of their order in terms of relations of cooperation in the ad-
minstration of providence, then the spatial separation no longer seems so salient. 
Astrology tells us part of the story about how their role in the providential order 
is exercised, or at least Proclus’ fellow Platonists thought it did. Now, we modern 
philosophers may not regard it as progress to become alive in this manner to the 
influence of the celestial gods in the futures of those born into our midst. But for 
Proclus’ audience it provided the basis for a keener awareness of the unity of 
all things. Our experience as embodied souls recommends to us a sense of vast 
separation from visible bodies in the heavens, a separation that metaphorically 
becomes “the vast indifference of heaven.” It is the opposite of Stephen’s experi-
ence in Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.
He felt above him the vast indifferent dome and the calm processes of the 
heavenly bodies; and the earth beneath him, the earth that had borne him, 
had taken him to her breast. (p. 155).
But of course from the Platonist’s view it is not merely the Earth that supports 
Stephen. Nor will he return to his native star simply by seeing the celestial bod-
ies so far above him as alien to him and indifferent to his plight. He needs new 
metaphors to live by. It is this provision of resources for constructing similes and 
analogies that lies at the heart of Neoplatonic reading strategies. Given their con-
ception of Pythagoreanism, it is a distinctively Pythagorean ἄκησις even if it is 
not – by our lights – level-headed scholarship in the history of philosophy.
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The Active and Monastic Life  
in Humanist Biographies of Pythagoras*
Ada Palmer – University of Chicago
Once there lived a pious and virtuous man who inspired all around him – states-
men and merchants, youths and matrons – to give up their luxurious ways and 
embrace a life of modest temperance. He founded a community where hundreds 
of young men took a sacred vow to follow the same strict regimen of study, prayer, 
silence, contemplation, and modesty in dress and diet which he imposed upon 
himself. His great following kindled suspicion in nearby rulers, and he and his 
followers faced persecution, but many still believed in him. After his death his 
teachings echoed in the works of all later theologians, and his rule for organizing 
a sacred community became a model for many after him.
The only untrue word in this biographical sketch – if we believe our Renais-
sance sources – is the word “once,” since this narrative applies to multiple fig-
ures: St. Francis, St. Dominic, many other monastic founders and reformers like 
Antony of Padua or Bernard of Clairvaux, and, according to every Renaissance 
scholar who took up pen to describe him, Pythagoras. As the huge range of mod-
ern treatments demonstrates, Pythagoras can be presented in many ways: as a 
mathematician, a mystic, a cult leader, a proto-scientist, a proto-hippie, or a pro-
to-Christian. In contrast, treatments of Pythagoras during the early modern clas-
sical revival were astonishingly consistent. From the early fifteenth century right 
to the dawn of the seventeenth, scholars with remarkably diverse backgrounds, 
nations, confessions, and intended audiences nonetheless produced strikingly 
similar depictions of a pious, virtuous, and above all monastic Pythagoras. Even 
Petrarch, who criticized Pythagoras, saying his belief in reincarnation stemmed 
from “the silliness of old maids,” praised his “exceedingly upright character” 
and stressed the quasi-monastic practice of five years’ silence for Pythagorean 
initiates, qualities which continue to dominate humanist portraits of Pythago-
ras for two centuries.1 This consistency is particularly remarkable since, unlike 
*  The author is grateful for the assistance of Federica Ciccolella, Irina Greenman, Jonathan 
Sneed and Jo Walton in the preparation of this article.  
1 Rerum Familiarium X.3, “Pythagoras was a man of outstanding genius, yet his cleverness, 
separated by a wide margin from the truth, often penetrated no further than does the silli-
ness of old maids, hence that ridiculous transmigration of souls into many and varied bodies 
and his rebirth as a philosopher from the warrior, Euphorbus, who had been in the Trojan 
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the many classical figures about whom practically no biographical information 
survives, three separate ancient lives of Pythagoras surfaced in the Renaissance, 
those of Diogenes Laertius, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, plus the commentary by 
Hierocles and many other ancient and medieval references. These sources pro-
vided a cornucopia of claims and anecdotes which scholars could choose from 
when deciding how to transfer Pythagoras to their present, and transform him 
to fit their own agendas and visons of the ancient world. That the Renaissance 
Pythagoras remains so consistently priestly and monastic in so many accounts 
reveals the idealized ancient religion of the philosophers which all these scholars 
– whether early or late, Latinist or Hellenist, Protestant or Catholic, court favour-
ite or struggling scholar – saw as a defining core of the ancient world, of their own 
practices, and of the rebirth they were attempting to effect.
For Renaissance humanists, the presentation of ancient philosophers’ lives 
– separate from their texts and ideas – was not just an informative process but 
an apologetic act of self-fashioning. Supporters of the classical revival worked to 
convince society and patrons that a humanist was radically different from other 
learned professionals of the age: more philosophical than a secretary, more let-
tered than a lawyer, more galvanizing than a scholastic, more spiritual than a 
doctor, more creative than a tutor, and more political than an artist, architect, or 
musician, while fulfilling similar functions to all. Yet, the case for humanism’s 
novelty rested largely on the opposite of this: the premise that humanist practices 
were not new at all, but a revival or continuation of an ancient tradition of phi-
losopher-authors which had been tragically interrupted by medieval barbarity.
Thus, when humanists depicted ancient sages, they were also presenting their 
own role models, the archetypes they wanted to embody and succeed, and whose 
activities and creations they needed patrons to fund. Humanist arguments for 
the piety, virtue, and spiritual and worldly usefulness of these classical figures 
also defended their own orthodoxy and utility. Orthodoxy was essential, since 
humanists had to establish why it was safe and pious for them to read, teach and 
spread the ideas of thinkers who had antedated or, worse, battled Christianity. 
This apologetic programme crossed genres, so dedicatory letters, commentaries, 
and other editorial paratexts served many of the same functions as formal vitae, 
and the most numerous and often the most telling representations of an ancient 
thinker were those created by editors to accompany translations and editions. 
Such informal vitae were particularly central for Pythagoras, since the availability 
war, hence that famous metempsychosis which I marvel could have been accepted by Plato 
or Aristotle. But I marvel still more at Origen, who seems to have embraced the same mad-
ness and therefore deserved the condemnation of Jerome, who admired and praised him, as 
well as of other followers of the truth. But lest this encounter with Pythagoras prompt me 
to digress, the fact remains that, whatever his intelligence, he did possess an exceedingly 
upright character as a result he was given the highest honours during his lifetime, while 
after his death he supposedly joined the council of the gods and his house was considered 
a temple by posterity. What was the first precept of the man? That his disciples observe five 
years of silence.” Trans. Aldo Bernardo, New York, 2014.
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of several classical accounts meant that humanist presentations of Pythagoras 
often took the form, not of new accounts, but of introductions to ancient ones.
Thus, in a sense, the first Renaissance scholar to take Pythagoras’ life in hand 
was the Sicilian Hellenist and book-hunter Giovanni Aurispa (1376–1459). His 
voyages to Byzantine lands brought back to Florence, in the 1420s, the manuscript 
of Diogenes Laertius which enabled Ambrogio Traversari’s immensely influential 
Latin translation of 1433. Then, in 1441, Aurispa acquired several works of Iambli-
chus along with Hierocles’ commentary on the Golden Verses.2 Aurispa laboured 
for years in the East to acquire strong Greek in a generation in which Greek was 
rare in the West and when most Greek teachers were Byzantine scholars accus-
tomed to teaching native speakers of modern Greek, who struggled to adapt 
their grammars and methods to students who spoke only Romance or Germanic 
vernaculars.3 Thus, Aurispa’s eastern voyages, and especially his extraordinary 
Greek training, gave him privileged, if not unique, access to information about 
Pythagoras in the mid-fifteenth century, when Europe was still decades away 
from the print explosion that would offer widespread access to ancient lives by 
Diogenes Laertius (Latin printed 1472, Greek 1533), Iamblicus (Greek 1598), and 
Porphyry (Greek 1610).4
When in 1449 Aurispa dedicated his Latin translation of Hierocles’ commen-
tary on the Golden Verses (printed 1474) to Pope Nicholas V, who, before his election, 
had funded many of Aurispa’s travels and purchases, the dedication contained, 
not a formal vita, but the first spectral Renaissance sketch of Pythagoras’ charac-
ter. Aurispa frames the dedication around a parallel between ancient literature 
and ancient architecture, both arenas which his present age neglects, and whose 
surviving ancient treasures continue to be dismantled and destroyed.5 This cele-
brates Nicholas’ own famous efforts to preserve and repair the architectural and 
literary remains of antiquity, especially Rome’s marbles and Greek letters. Auris-
pa also focuses on the extraordinary “usefulness to the reader” (legenti utili tas) of 
Pythagorean thought, which “hardly differs from Christianity” (parum… a fide 
christiana differt).
This characterization of Pythagoras as a stone in the edifice of Christianity is 
implicit rather than explicit, but one can already see the shape of what Marsilio 
Ficino will do in the next generation, using the suggestion of St. Ambrose that 
Pythagoras had a Jewish father to present a genealogy of philosophical sages as 
a further foundation beneath the rock that is St. Peter, extending deeper in time 
through tiers of freshly-excavated sages – Plotinus, Plato, Philolaus, Pythago-
ras, Aglaophamus, Orpheus, Hermes Trismegistus, Zoroaster – down to Moses, 
2 Hankins / Palmer 2008, 62; Celenza 2001, 13–14.
3 See Ciccolella 2005 & 2008.
4 Hankins / Palmer 2008, 54–55, 62–63.
5 Hierocles 1474, In aureos versus Pythagorae opusculum (trans. Aurispa), Padova, f. a2r.
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whom Ficino presents as almost a direct source of Pythagoras’ thought.6 Aurispa, 
a generation earlier, is more modest than Ficino, claiming that Pythagoras will 
reinforce rather than add new truths to the Christian consensus. Virtuous Py-
thagorean doctrines, Aurispa stresses, can add nothing to Pope Nicholas’ ample 
virtue, but nonetheless it is pleasing to read that which confirms one’s own be-
liefs.7 Finally, addressing the frustrations of settling for the imperfect experience 
of reading a translation, Aurispa claims that language is no great loss since, “Py-
thagoreans strove for things themselves and for usefulness, not words.”8 This last 
claim, that the language of the Golden Verses is less important than their content, 
is at odds with the focus on elegant language which was one of the great human-
ist claims to superiority over scholasticism. Rather than the elegance of Cicero or 
Virgil, Aurispa’s Pythagoras excels (and surpasses the scholastics) because of the 
clarity, purity, and simplicity of the moral messages in the Golden Verses, which, 
much like the Little Flowers of St. Francis, need no literary ornamentation to be the 
“words that sting and bite,” which Petrarch had claimed were so much more ef-
fective at spurring the reader to virtue than any Thomist syllogism.9
Even the structure of Hierocles’ treatment of the Golden Verses contributes to 
Aurispa’s sketch of Pythagoreanism as an ancient humanism. Aurispa’s Pythag-
oras supports strong civic engagement and the active life – not at all our modern 
readings of Pythagoreanism, but one which aligns perfectly with the ideals of 
civic virtue and political engagement which were central to the Petrarchan proj-
ect of healing Italy and Europe by surrounding the ruling class with virtuous 
councilors, as Castiglione depicted in the Courtier. Hierocles’ treatment of the 
Golden Verses begins with a description of what Aurispa confidently renders as 
Pythagorean opinions on God and divine virtue. After that seeming affirmation 
of proto-Christian orthodoxy, the commentary proceeds in two sections, which 
a modern editor might call, firstly, practical virtues focused on forming a good 
person, and, secondly, spiritual virtues focused on surpassing human nature. 
Aurispa’s translation instead presents the first section as civic and political vir-
tues likely to produce a great citizen or statesman, then the second as interior 
virtues which further strengthen morality and faith. The potency of Aurispa’s 
Christianized rereading is documented by one copy of the 1474 print edition, 
where a fifteenth-century reader transcribed into the margin favourite words and 
6 See Joost-Gaugier 2009, 27–30; on Ficino’s genealogy of sages, which varied over Ficino’s 
works, see Hankins 1990, II, 643–644. The Ambrose passage is CSEL LXXXII, 39 and was 
employed by Ficino and others to suggest that Pythagoras inherited his ideas almost directly 
from Moses; see Hankins & Palmer 2008, 65.
7 “…ut neque doctrinae neque virtuti tuae quicquam addi possit, placebit nihilominus legere 
ea quae sententiam tuam confirmabunt.” Hierocles 1474, f. a2v.
8 “Rem enim pythagorei quaesiverunt & utilitatem non verba.” Ibid.
9 De Ignorantia 22.
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phrases such as “pius,”10 “Iusiurandum divinae legis custos est,”11 and “Decet 
amatores dei.”12 The same reader used emphatic underlining and a maniculum 
by the word “perditionem,” a word choice which, in a passage on how inner tran-
quillity helps the sage face bad fortune, makes Aurispa’s translation imply that 
it helps against damnation or perdition, implying that Pythagoras believed in 
something like a Christian Hell.13 Neither Aurispa’s translation nor its preface 
is a formal vita, but for both translator and reader the character of Pythagoras 
the proto-Christian shines through. Clear by implication is his correspondingly 
pious, monk-like, yet also active civic life.
Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) demonstrates how much more ambitious these 
claims can become in the hands of scholars raised with access to the manuscript 
resources that Aurispa and his peers labored to bring to Florence. Christopher 
Celenza14 and Denis Robichaud in this volume have already discussed how Fi-
cino blended Pythagoreanism with Neoplatonism to create his syncretic history. 
Ficino’s broad influence meant that the figure of Pythagoras – as distinct from the 
ideas attributed to him – became a linchpin in the humanist case for a continuity 
stretching back to the earliest days of revealed and philosophical truth. Ficino’s 
depiction of Pythagoras drew largely on Porphyry’s life, and passages in Church 
Fathers suggesting that Pythagoras had been the first thinker to discuss – or “dis-
cover” – the immortality of the soul.15 By tying Pythagoras to Moses and crediting 
him with this essential doctrine – the antidote to more frightening ancients like 
Epicurus and Lucretius, whose attacks on the afterlife felt like threats to theism 
itself16 – Ficino’s genealogy makes Pythagoras and Plato the two primary proofs 
that ancient philosophers were part of the process of divine revelation. In such 
a system, ancient theologians are cornerstones, rather than foes, of Christianity. 
And if Latin and Greek classics are now essential Christian reading, then a good 
humanist tutor is now essential for the education of a Christian prince.
Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481), a contemporary of Aurispa and the young Fici-
no, also voyaged east in search of manuscripts and Greek instruction. His use 
of Pythagoras in his treatise De morali disciplina and his Epistula de opinionibus 
philosophorum have been admirably treated by Christine Joost-Gaugier.17 In the 
10 This note accompanies Aurispa’s line, “Ille vero esse pius & religious qui divinarum rerum 
artem habet & eius perfectionem tanquam honorem optimum causae bonorum omnium,” 
which comes just after a discussion of piety to Apollo. Hierocles 1474, Firenze, Biblioteca 
Nazionale Centrale, Mag. E.6.34. f. b1v.
11 Transcribed directly from the text, f. b4r.
12 Ibid. f. b5r.
13 “Divinorum vero bonorum dux prudentia recte animo hominis collocata suffragatur sibi, 
ut [de] omnibus bene consulat & mortem quidem fortiter, perditionem quoque pecuniarum 
mansuete & aequo animo ferat,” ibid. f. c8v.
14 Celenza 1999.
15 Joost-Gaugier 2009, 16.
16 Hankins 2007.
17 Joost-Gaugier 2009, 22–23; the text of the letter appears in Hankins 1990, II, 515–523.
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letter, he provides a brief but comprehensive survey of philosophers before Plato. 
Filelfo’s description of Pythagoras is almost a formal vita. It describes, in a few 
lines, Pythagoras’ travels to Egypt, his role in founding the mysteries and sacred 
traditions there, then a pilgrimage-like journey to Chaldaea where he encoun-
tered Zoroaster.18 Filelfo includes the (often-omitted) detail that Pythagoras was 
thought to have been an incarnation of Apollo. In writing the letter, Filelfo seems 
to have worked from Diogenes Laertius as well as fragments of a Latinized life 
of Timaeus of Locri (now lost). Focusing on philosophy’s final flowering in Plato, 
Filelfo divides Plato’s debt to his teachers into three parts. From Socrates, he says, 
Plato learned of civic matters, from Heraclitus of things subject to the senses, and 
from Pythagoras, the leader and founder of Italic philosophy, matters of reason 
and the divine.19 By this division, Filelfo again uses Pythagoras to defuse threats 
of unorthodoxy from other ancients. Surviving sources make clear that Hera-
clitus and Socrates disputed or at least doubted the standard afterlife, but if Py-
thagoras is the dominant source of Plato’s theology, while the others influenced 
only his social and epistemological opinions, then Filelfo has established what 
humanists dearly wanted to be true: an antiquity unified by a comfortable, mono-
theistic, proto-Christian theology. And Pythagoras is the “princeps et auctor” of 
ancient thought, prior in time and importance to Heraclitus and Socrates, firmly 
establishing that theology is the heart of classical philosophy.
Another figure indebted to Ficino, and especially to Giovanni Pico della Mi-
randola’s ideas about Pythagoras’ Hebrew origins, is the renowned German He-
braist Johannes Reuchlin (1455–1522).20 Christine Joost-Gaugier’s treatment of his 
work on Pythagoras shows how he struggled to defend the value of Hebrew stud-
ies, and literally to defend Hebrew books from destruction under Maximilian I.21 
Reuchlin’s 1517 De Arte Cabalistica begins with a hyperbolic but touching cele-
bration of Florentine scholarship dedicated to Pope Leo X. Leo’s pontificate, says 
Reuchlin, guarantees the fruition of the blossoming of “Greek, Latin, Hebrew, 
Arabic, Chaldaic, and Chaldaean” enabled by Leo’s father Lorenzo de Medici, 
and his circle, of whom Reuchlin names “Demetrius Chalcondyles, Marsilio Fici-
no, Giorgio Vespucci, Cristoforo Landino, Valla, Angelo Poliziano, Giovanni Pico 
della Mirandola, and others.”22 Reuchlin is distinct in being the only one of these 
framers of Pythagoras who mentions his monk-like virtues only in passing in-
stead of making it a focus, suggesting that there may be more than just flattery to 
18 Hankins 1990, II, 521–522.
19 “Legimus enim Platonem in universa philosophia tris quosdam secutum esse philosophos: 
in rebus civilibus Socraten, at in iis quae sensibus subiiciuntur, Heraclitum, in rebus vero 
illis quae ad intelligentiam et res divinas spectant, Pythagoran hunc Samium, qui philoso-
phiae Italicae et princeps fuit et auctor.” Hankins 1990, II, 522.
20 See Schmidt-Biggemann’s chapter on Reuchlin in this volume.
21 Joost-Gaugier 2009, esp. 42–45.
22 Reuchlin 1983, 37.
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his opening panegyric presenting the circles of scholarship around Lorenzo and 
Leo as the perfect recreations of ancient Pythagorean religion.
Reuchlin credits Pythagoras with the foundation of Italian philosophy,23 and 
promises that the treatise will “bring out the reborn Pythagoras” as Ficino did 
for Plato and Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples for Aristotle.24 Agreeing with Ficino and 
Pico that Pythagoras had had unique access to Kabbalah inherited from Moses, 
Reuchlin sees no contradiction in his Pythagorean treatise in giving Pythagoras 
less than a twentieth as much discussion as Kabbalics (Cabalici), a term he says 
was introduced to Latin by Pico, whom he met during the exile in France.25 What 
little he says about Pythagoras’ life focuses on his travels, and the breadth of his 
studies, mentioning Polyhistor, Antiphon, and many sources bordering on the 
legendary: 
Then our Pythagoras, greatest of all, commenced his first pursuit of 
knowledge along with a certain foreigner named Zora, and thereafter out-
side Greece, where at that time in Egypt people then known as prophets 
practised philosophy with him as did the Chaldees of Assyria, the Druids 
in Gaul, the Shamans of Bactria, a number of Celts, the Magi in Persia, the 
Gymnosophists in India; then he studied with Anacharsis of Scythia, and 
with Zamolxis, who had been Pythagoras’ slave in Thrace… Lastly he also 
studied philosophy with the Jews in India called Brahmans… Pythagoras 
cannot rightly be said to have learned anything from the Greeks and Ro-
mans in either theology or the humanities… As a result… the first of all 
philosophers was not a Greek but a barbarian.26
Unlike Pico and our other Pythagorean biographers, Reuchlin argued for the 
inferiority of Greek thinkers who did not share Pythagoras’ access to Hebrew 
sources. He calls Socrates and Plato “the first Pythagoreans of all,”27 and pres-
ents an extremely Platonic (or rather Neoplatonic) Pythagoranism with dualism, 
forms, and hypostatic layers. He dismisses the idea that Pythagoras held hetero-
dox positions such as belief in reincarnation, saying that, since he was unique in 
his day in understanding the immortality of the soul, other more ignorant au-
23 Ibid., 37.
24 Ibid., 39.
25 Ibid., 89.
26 “Quando idem omnium maximus noster Pythagoras simul cum barbaro quodam nominis 
Zora scientiarum prima studia iniit, adeoque id extra Graeciam, quo tempore apud aegyp-
tios secum philosophati sunt, qui tum dicebantur prophetae, & Assyriorum Chaldaei & Gal-
lorum Druidae, & ex Bactris Samanaei, & Celtarum non pauci, & apud Persas Magi, &apud 
Indos Gymnosophistae, & ille Anacharsis apud Scythas, & in Thracia Zamolxis ante ipsi-
us Pythagorae servus… & apud Indos denique Iudaei quos apellarunt Brachmanas… non 
est certe usque repertus Pythagoras quicquam rerum aut divinarum aut humanarum vel 
a graecis didicisse vel a Romanis… ut barbarum & non graecum fuisse praedicarent hunc 
omnium philosophorum primum.” Ibid., 129.
27 Ibid., 151.
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thors garbled his ideas when they attempted to write them down, or that the dis-
cussions of rebirth referred to Pythagorean belief in the possibility of miraculous 
resurrection, and he credits several supposed Pythagoreans – such as Apollonius 
of Tyana – with actually raising the dead.28 The saint-like and incontrovertibly 
monotheistic faces of the Renaissance Pythagoras are consistent here, even if mo-
nastic virtue is, for once, less important than the promise of transcendent and 
magically efficacious theological truth.
The long life of this humanist need to argue for Pythagoras’ monk-like and 
proto-Christian status, and the diffuse impact of Ficino’s genealogy of sages, are 
both visible in the dedication that opens the 1598 editio princeps of Iamblichus’ 
life of Pythagoras. Produced in Holland by the Dutch classics professor Johannes 
Arcerius Theodoretus (1538–1604), this text shows how the apologetic and Chris-
tianizing program crystallized over a century and a half of humanist discourse, 
explosive multiplication of texts, and Reformation and Counterreformation anx-
iety over heterodoxies new and old. In the dedication, Arcerius enthusiastically 
repeats Ficino’s genealogical model, citing Ambrose as proof that Pythagoras, 
and through him Plato, were students of Moses, thus that the “Schola Socratica” 
should be called a Schola “Mosaica,” founded by God, which, even “without the 
help of God and Scripture” taught about virtue and vice, the just life, and the 
ideal administration of states.29 In this last claim, Arcerius agrees with Aurispa 
by putting Pythagoras in the camp supporting the active life. To extend this ge-
nealogy forward, Arcerius claims that Clement of Alexandria and other Church 
Fathers embraced Pythagoras as part of the Christian tradition. He also rebuts 
those who claim that Pythagoras’ ideas are not wholesome (sani) by contrasting 
him with other ancients who had been challenged from time to time but whose 
works remained familiar staples of education, especially in universities:
Indeed if Aristotle, the most deserving of philosophers, had his fantasy 
– nay we may say delusion – about the eternity of the world, and did not 
seem uncertain about it; and if Pliny, the other most industrious investiga-
tor of nature, also a supremely admirable author… was unable to restrain 
himself from believing the same, to such an extent that he intermingled 
impieties everywhere – about God I say! – which he himself conceived, de-
bating, straying from the tenet that God is omnipotent, doubting that Hell 
exists, openly stating that souls are not immortal, and other unmistakable 
opinions of this type, yet he is not rejected for this, and moreover authors 
who have illustrated his work with commentaries, and as Porphyry, Ploti-
28 Ibid., 178–182.
29 “Quippe qui in Schola Socratica, peneque ut mox dicemus, Mosaica, belle institute, de Deo, 
quatenus quidem naturae melioris ductu, sine Deo & Scripturae adiutorio potuerunt, de 
virtutibus & vitiis german[ae] disseruerunt, exempla itidem salutaria reliquerunt, quibus 
in communi vitae usu juxta, ac rei pub. administratione apprim[e] conducibilibus uti quea-
mus.” Iamblichus, 1598, De Vita Pythagorae, & Protrepticae Orationes ad Philosophiam, [Heidel-
berg], f. *3r.
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nus, and others labelled as enemies of Christianity are not rejected, but 
rather we take the greatest value and delight in them, constantly reread 
them, and practically worship them, then what! Can it be that we, in this 
persuasion, reject Pythagoras, who understood the truth about God, of 
which Clement of Alexandria is the richest witness? And also Plato, who 
splendidly understood and handed down so much about God, the immor-
tality of the soul, and the punishments of the underworld…30
Arcerius then stresses the respect the Church Fathers showed to figures includ-
ing Plotinus, Porphyry, Themistius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Ammonius, Hermi-
as, and Proclus.31 For Arcerius, working two centuries into the humanist process 
of disseminating ancient thought, when Erasmus and Rudolph Agricola have 
joined the list of venerable scholars invoked in the opening and notes,32 the battles 
over Aristotle and Pliny have now been waged and won. These once-forbidden 
authors remain mainstays of scholastic as well as humanist education, so Pythag-
oras “called the Attic Moses” (Mosen atticum vocitarunt) is saintly in contrast.
Even scholars who did not, like Arcerius, accept Ficino’s Mosaic genealogy 
still wanted to argue for a continuity from famous ancients like Pythagoras to 
themselves. That required evidence, both of continuity of ideas, and especially of 
continuity of morals. The personal virtue of an author was a great part of a book’s 
utility when one primary goal of humanist study was, as Petrarch had argued, to 
spur the reader to virtue, and to educate a new generation of leaders as virtuous 
as Cicero and Seneca, who would in turn heal the treacherous and faction-ridden 
Renaissance present. And if Good and Virtue and Truth and God were all One 
– as was established by Thomas Aquinas and, according to Renaissance interpret-
ers, Plato too – then any sage who had access to Truth must have corresponding 
access to Good and Virtue, and thus anyone whose philosophy had enough Truth 
to be worth reading must be a virtuous person, and largely in agreement with 
Christianity.
30 “Etenim si Aristoteles, Philosophorum merito maximus, qui de mundi aeternitate sua 
somnia, ne dicam deliria habuit, nec sensit de eo quid debuit: nec item Plinius diligentis-
simus alioqui naturae indagator, maximeque admirabilis scriptor, qui praeceptorem καὶ 
προηγούμενον Aristotelem secutus se continere non potuit, quin admirando sui operis, 
imo preclarissimo Mundi thesauro de naturali historia initio, idem sentiret, adeoque passim 
intermiscuerit palam impia, de Deo aio, quam ipse conceperat, ambigens, in dogmate de 
Dei omnipotentia hallucinans, inferos esse dubitans, animos non esse immortales, atque id 
genus alia manifesto statuens, non propterea reprobantur, quinimo scriptores, qui eos suis 
commentariis illustrarunt, ut Porphyrium, Plotinum, ac caeteros Christiani nominis hostes 
non aspernamur: sed potius in summo pretio & deliciis habemus, lectitamus, & tantum non 
adoramus, quid? an Pythagoram, quem recte de Deo sensisse, testis est locuplectissimus 
Clemens ille Alexandrinus, cum alias, tum in προτρεπτινῶν rejiciemus? an Platonem, qui 
tam de Deo, quam de immortalitate animorum, e poenis inferorum, & caetera praeclare & 
sensit & tradidit…” ibid. f. *2v–*3r.
31 Ibid. f. *4v.
32 Ibid. f. **1v.
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Thus, in a way which may seem counterintuitive or even fallacious from a 
modern perspective, in Renaissance eyes a philosopher’s writings, especial-
ly their moral content, were deeply important sources about the philosopher’s 
life, as important if not more important than information about places, deeds, or 
dates. Good philosophy was proof of an upright (quasi-Christian) life. Even the 
quality of an author’s writing could be proof of good moral character, since God 
was the source of Beauty as well as Truth. Cicero had argued that only a virtuous 
orator could be persuasive,33 and Plato said that beauty was a reflection of Truth 
and the Good. Thus, in the dedicatory introduction to his 1559 Basel edition of 
the Golden Verses and poems of Phocylides, German philologist Michael Neander 
(1525–1595) could write: “Indeed, as the poems are, so are the authors, Pythagoras 
and Phocylides: they contain truly golden sayings, that is holy, pure, and com-
plete, but concise, smooth, and brief, the sort that promote the piety of wisdom, 
and the upright governance of studies, morals, life, and all things.”34
Neander’s 1559 dedication contains a lengthy and heartfelt general defence 
of pagan sages and their place in the divinely ordained plan flowing forward 
from Solomon and the Hebraic tradition. He lists numerous Church Fathers from 
Maximianus of Ravenna to Basil the Great who embraced pagan authorities, 
especially little books of concise or aphoristic wisdom like the Golden Verses.35 
Thales, Democritus, Epictetus, Theophrastus, Xenocrates, Hesiod, Aesop, Homer, 
Xenophon, Clement of Alexandria, Plutarch, Anacharsis, even the Delphic Oracle 
rush by in a crush of names linked by the production and transmission of little 
capsules of virtue and piety, Pythagoras foremost among them. Toward the end 
of the letter, Neander devotes 500 words to Pythagoras’ life,36 another informal 
vita which draws directly upon (and even acknowledges its debt – a rare cour-
tesy in the sixteenth century) the brief but detailed entry on Pythagoras printed 
the in widely influential encyclopedic 1506 Commentarii Urbani by Raffaele Maffei 
(1451–1522).37 The complete texts and translations of Maffei’s and Neander’s lives 
are included below, and the differences are telling, particularly since there are 
strategic sections of Maffei which Neander chooses to omit, while other sections 
he repeats word for word. 
33 See Kahn 1985, 29–35.
34 “Utrumque vero poema, utriusque autoris, Pythagorae & Phocylidae, praecepta continent 
vere aurea: hoc est, sancta, pura & absoluta, sed succincta, rotunda & brevia: qualia sunt 
sapientum monita de pietate, de studiorum & morum ac vitae denique totius honesta guber-
natione.” Neander, 1559, 19 (f. c2r).
35 “Eam docendi brevem & succinctam rationem a prophetis, & veteris primaeque ecclesiae 
doctoribus acceptam, patres deinde & theologi Graeci sequuti sunt.” ibid. 5, (f. a3r); similar-
ly, “Apud ethnicos enim non pauciores huiusmodi libellos invenias, quibus brevibus dictis 
doctrinam de moribus proponant,” 6 (f. a3v). 
36 Ibid. 17 (f. c1r).
37 The edition used here is Maffei, 1552, Commentariorum urbanorum XXXXIII libri, Lyon; for 
another reading of it see Joost-Gaugier 2009, 40–41.
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Maffei and Neander’s texts are nearly identical in structure. Both begin with 
Pythagoras’ parentage (son of a merchant (negotiatore) in Maffei and a ring-maker 
(annulorum sculptoris) in Neander), and focus on two stages of his life: his voyages 
of study and the foundation of his school. Maffei, in the original, specifies that 
Pythagoras’ journey was undertaken with the blessing or influence (gratia) of the 
stars, a tour of Egypt, Babylon, Crete, and Sparta divinely ordained, like that 
of the Three Kings. Pythagoras’ teaching is depicted by Maffei as primarily a 
campaign against luxury in favour of frugality and temperance. Women feature 
prominently in Maffei’s account: Pythagoras urged matrons to chastity, and his 
example inspired many women to sacrifice their golden and ostentatious gar-
ments as offerings in the temple of Juno. This unusual interest in Pythagorean 
women, otherwise rarely mentioned,38 certainly reflects Maffei’s own interests, 
since he himself had been strongly tempted by the monastic life, and founded 
a house of Poor Clares in his native city of Volterra, in parallel to the school of 
philosophy and theology he hosted in his home. Maffei’s description of the Py-
thagorean acolytes, “three hundred youths bound to him by sacred oath,” could 
not sound more monastic. Maffei’s is also the only account to dwell on the un-
happy fate of the Pythagorean school: that a mob, stirred up by suspicions of con-
spiracy, attempted to burn the Pythagorean students alive, and sixty died in the 
conflagration. This focus on suspicion and persecution is powerful and clearly 
pointed, coming in an account written by a man who had himself witnessed and 
survived many similar persecutions and eruptions of violence. Writing soon after 
1500, Maffei had recently experienced the French invasion of Italy in 1494, and the 
rampant bloodshed which had rocked the peninsula under the Borgia pope Alex-
ander VI in 1492–1503. Earlier, in 1478, only the personal intervention of Lorenzo 
de Medici had saved Maffei from the retributive massacre that drenched Florence 
in blood after the Pazzi Conspiracy, a failed attempt to wipe out the Medici fam-
ily, in whose aftermath the pro-Medici mob turned on Raffaele Maffei because 
his brother Antonio had been one of the primary assassins who actually held 
a knife to Lorenzo’s throat.39 Maffei had also seen the prosecutions of many fel-
low scholars: the renowned philologist Pomponio Leto (1428–1498), imprisoned 
and tortured in 1468 along with twenty of his students when his academy was 
accused of paganism and conspiracy against the pope; Maffei’s personal acquain-
tance Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), condemned for heresy in 1487–
1488 and saved, like Maffei, only by the intervention of Lorenzo de Medici40; and 
38 The only other major Renaissance discussion of Pythagorean women seems to be in the 1532 
Declamation on the Nobility and Preeminence of the Female Sex by Cornelius Agrippa (1487–1535); 
cf. Joost-Gaugier 2009, 45. Even Plato’s Pythagorean mother Perictione, known in the Renais-
sance through references in Iamblichus (VP 267) and works attributed to her preserved by 
Stobaeus (Florilegium 1.62–63, 79.50, 85.19), passed unmentioned by Plato’s many enthusiastic 
Renaissance students and biographers, much as she usually does today; Pomeroy 2013, 43.
39 Hibbert, 2012, 136–138, 141.
40 Pico was also an associate of the Johannes Reuchlin, discussed above. 
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the Dominican firebrand intellectual and political leader Savonarola (1452–1498), 
burnt at the stake with two of his followers in 1498. In such times it is both con-
solation and optimism for Maffei to affirm that, despite torch-bearing mobs and 
Pythagoras’ death in exile, the philosopher was revered by the people, and the 
influence of his thought was everlasting. With an encyclopaedist’s thoroughness, 
Maffei finishes the entry by dutifully mentioning Pythagoras’ vegetarianism and 
his belief in reincarnation, details omitted by the humanists who were editing 
volumes focused on Pythagorean texts, and who were therefore more nervous 
about being accused of promoting an ancient with such suspect opinions. 
In the imitation by the German Neander in 1559, the stakes and situation are 
quite different, even if the facts and sources are the same. Much of his account of 
Pythagoras’ philosophical pilgrimage follows Maffei verbatim, but Neander adds 
the claim that Pythagoras’ voyage founded a tradition of philosophical pilgrim-
age, imitated by Plato, Euripides, Solon, Apollonius of Tyana, Cicero, Jerome, and 
Galen. Women are absent from his account, but the school and its goals are still 
extremely monastic: Pythagoras “exhorted that land’s youths and citizens with 
the best teachings to the pursuit of honesty, uprightness, and frugality, and other 
virtues.” Dropping Maffei’s description of the persecution, Neander substitutes 
an extended comment on the rules which Pythagoras imposed on his students, 
specifying that Pythagoras himself lived by the same strictures. Neander’s use of 
praescripta as well as legibus implies a written corpus of laws, phrases no one in 
the Renaissance could read without thinking of the Rule, or various Rules, which 
were the defining heart of Christian monastic orders. Neander lists authors who 
supposedly describe this Pythagorean Rule: Diogenes Laertius, the Suda, Phi-
lostratus, Porphyry, Simplicius, Cicero, Plutarch, “among Greek Fathers Clement 
of Alexandria and Philo Judaeus,” and, as a finale, Erasmus and Lilius Tifernas. 
Neander has created a Protestant genealogy of sages, skipping the now-tainted 
Catholic Middle Ages.
In the mid-sixteenth century, one of the great challenges faced by moderate 
Protestantism was the desire to retain popular Catholic practices whose tradition-
al justifications had been stripped away. Pilgrimage and monastic life retained a 
powerful appeal, but their place in religious life was harder to justify when saints 
like Francis were being erased from the canon. Imitating Luther, many Protes-
tants looked earlier, to Augustine and early Fathers, and here Neander nomi-
nates Pythagoras as an even earlier father, and precedent. So, as across Protestant 
Europe non-icons were decorating altars with allegories instead of saints, and 
non-relics like books were becoming centres of processions and ceremonies, so 
the non-saint Pythagoras served, for Neander, as an alternative non-Catholic or-
igin myth for pilgrimage and monastic life. In his finale, Neander turns to the 
novel and controversial suggestion that Pythagoras might not be the author of 
the Golden Verses. He says the question is uncertain, but suggests that, if Pythag-
oras is not the author, then Golden Verses were so pious that the ancients, looking 
about for their possible author, judged that Pythagoras was the only sage whose 
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“very holy life” could have produced such pure and sparkling aphorisms. Even if 
the works are spurious, their attribution to Pythagoras only proves that his real 
writings were even better.
A sincere and deep delight shines through in all these treatments of Pythag-
oras. Aurispa, Filelfo, Ficino, Maffei, Reuchlin, Neander, and Arcerius present a 
monastic, proto-Christian Pythagoras, not only because it advanced their classi-
cizing or reforming agendas, but because they shared the same fascinated admi-
ration for Pythagoras that they described in his contemporaries. As they cobbled 
together what they could from garbled manuscripts, fragmentary references, and 
doubtful attributions, the very absence of consensus among ancient accounts of 
Pythagoras made it easier for them to resolve the contradictions using the ideal 
they wanted to find: they wanted a founding mystic like Dominic or Francis, who 
could make philosophy and theology one, and whose moral perfection could per-
manently settle all fears about potential contradictions between the ancient theol-
ogy humanists loved and the Christian faith that they also sincerely believed in. 
Their Pythagoras feels monastic – rather he is monastic in their eyes – because his 
values and goals were the same as monasticism’s, whether he called the divinity 
God, the Monad, or Apollo. If official histories of the Church had space in them 
for the founding legend of the Carmelite order – that it descended from hermetic 
communities founded by the prophets of ancient Israel long before the Incarna-
tion and Crucifixion – then there was space for a Pythagorean monastic order 
to be part of the same sacred tradition. Augustine followed Plato, who followed 
Pythagoras, who followed Moses as comfortably as Isaac followed Abraham, all 
steps on a divinely-planned road to the good life. 
While they are deeply monastic and deeply sincere, these readings of Pythag-
oras are all also distinctly humanist in a particular way which is clearest in an-
other treatment, the last in our set, the brief 1503 Symbola Pythagorica by Filippo 
Beroaldo the Elder (1453–1505).41 Here Beroaldo explicates the hidden meanings in 
Pythagorean sayings one by one, beginning with a brief treatment of Pythagoras’ 
life, again focusing on how Pythagoras taught virtues like plain dress, abstaining 
from rich meals, and restraining the tongue. Beroaldo’s explication of Pythagore-
an doctrine – more his own original creation than Pythagoras’ – includes a deeply 
touching treatment of the powers of grief and friendship, mourning the loss of 
his intellectual partner of thirty years Minus Roscius. Another highlight of the 
treatise is a cunning juxtaposition in which Beroaldo first elaborates the dangers 
of being too candid around rulers whose wrath must always be feared, then em-
barks upon a lengthy praise of liberty and a graphic portrait of the inhumane 
degradations of servitude, a pair which feels like a not-very-veiled attack on mon-
archy until it culminates in the claim that, in this world of cares and hierarchies, 
even kings are slaves to the passions, and the only true liberty lies in wisdom. 
41 An English translation is included as Appendix B of Joost-Gaugier 2009, 248–265.
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The finale of Beroaldo’s little commentary is our only Renaissance imitation of 
the lengthy section of Diogenes Laertius which lists many suggestions of why Py-
thagoras refused to eat beans. Beroaldo first plays with the idea that Pythagoras 
used beans as slang for testicles, so his rejection of beans was a recommendation 
of chastity, which here finally joins poverty, silence, and obedience to complete 
the set of characteristically monastic virtues. But the even deeper meaning of the 
beans, Beroaldo tells us, is a reference to the black and white beans used for vot-
ing in ancient Greece. Here he reviews debates over the active and passive life (as 
Aurispa did in our very first humanist treatment of Pythagoras), summarizing 
both the Stoic argument that Providence gives us a divine duty to participate in 
society and state, and the Epicurean argument that politics and ambition are the 
enemies of tranquillity and the philosophical life. Does Pythagoras’ injunction 
against beans mean he sides with Epicurus against the active life? Beroaldo’s an-
swer is a beautifully syncretic conclusion in which everyone – Pythagorean, Stoic, 
and Epicurean – turns out to be right:
There are two kinds of commonwealth. One is the greater, higher, commu-
nal order of being, within which both gods and men are contained. The 
other is the lesser, particular polity to which the condition of birth assigns 
us… Some give their attention to both the greater and the lesser common 
weal. They devote themselves to higher, universal wisdom, yet also carry 
on practical affairs of state or business. Others attend to the lesser order, 
as do senators, government officials, and civil servants. Still others serve 
primarily the greater order, as do philosophers and the most zealous of 
students… In this higher order we can be of service to a wider community 
more freely, extensively, and favourably than in the lesser, practical order 
of local business. An educated person seeks to help the most universal 
community, having regard for, not only those living, but also his descen-
dants and posterity.42
The synthesis is complete. Pythagoras prescribes abstaining from earthly politics 
in order to be of greater service to a higher politics beyond. The passive life is 
the active life, a greater active life of providential service, not to mundane earth-
ly polities, but to the universal commonwealth of souls. This greater common-
wealth perceived by the wise and pious – identical with Plato’s eternal realm of 
souls and with Augustine’s City of God – is what received the heartfelt service 
of Francis and Dominic, Seneca and Epicurus, Beroaldo and his beloved lost Ro-
scius. If these many spiritual public servants seem to disagree – Franciscan with 
Dominican, Stoic with Epicurean – it is only because such truths are difficult to 
articulate, hidden in esoteric depths which only rare golden sages like Pythago-
ras can depict in simple yet infinitely complex phrases like “abstain from beans.” 
42 Ibid., 264.
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This is humanism: an attempt to heal a fractured and war-torn political world 
by dedicating one’s self to scholarship and philosophical contemplation, a simul-
taneously active and passive life which is not contradictory, not paradoxical, but 
consistent with what Renaissance scholars saw as the shared goal of all wise peo-
ple. A humanist was the same ancient creature as Pythagoras and Francis, living 
the active life of a higher commonwealth. If the humanist was also a new crea-
ture, it was because the fractured world of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
required a new and special kind of service to the higher active life: reconstructing 
the lost past. Love of antiquity was love of wisdom, and while humanists studied 
the past to heal the present, they healed the present to serve the future, setting 
the stage for better eras just as Pythagoras had set the stage for Rome, and Chris-
tianity. In an age when only princely patrons could finance Aurispa’s voyages 
to the East, Ficino’s translations of Plato, or the universities where Neander and 
Arcerius taught and published, scholars could not realize their dream of a new 
antiquity without braving the snares and sorrows of political life. Humanists 
needed to believe there was no contradiction between political and philosophical 
goals, as much as they needed to believe there was no contradiction between pa-
gan and Christian, and these lives of Pythagoras – the linchpin sage in proving 
the unity of ancient theology – was the perfect ground for them to prove it to 
readers, to patrons, and above all to themselves. These biographical sketches are 
the fruits of a deeply pious Renaissance, pious but open-minded, secularizing 
only in retrospect when we as moderns look back at this interest in a figure we 
label mathematician and scientist, but whom humanists just as validly labelled 
monk and priest. From their own perspective they were not secularizing as they 
pulled lost knowledge from the pre-Christian past, rather they were sanctifying, 
healing, exposing a sacredness that they believed had always been, like the Py-
thagorean monad, one.
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Richard Reitzenstein, Pythagoras and the Life of Antony
Jan N. Bremmer – Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
In a book on forms and transfers of Pythagoras and the ascetic lifestyle that he 
was said to have promoted, a discussion of the influence of Pythagorean tradi-
tions on Athanasius’ Life of Antony should not be absent, as this biography had an 
enormous influence in the West, probably even more than in Egypt itself.1 The 
need for such a discussion is the more pressing, as this chapter in the Pythag-
orean tradition is missing from the recent studies of Pythagoras by Christoph 
Riedweg and Leonid Zhmud as well as from the new and rich history of Pythag-
oreanism edited by Carl Huffman.2 I will take my start at the beginning of last 
century when the relationship between Neo-Pythagoreans and Athanasius’ Life 
of Antony began to be discussed. I will look first at the origin of this discovery 
(§ 1), then discuss more recent developments (§ 2), and, finally, look again at the 
most important parallels adduced (§ 3). 
1 Reitzenstein, Pythagoras and the Life of Antony
The end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed 
a fascination for the origins of the Christian cult of the saints and, in a clear 
anti-Roman-Catholic approach, tried to reduce the origin of that cult to the Gre-
co-Roman cult of the heroes. This approach, which we can see clearly in the works 
of Hermann Usener (1834–1905) and Ernst Lucius (1852–1902),3 was taken up in 
a different form after the deaths of these scholars by Richard Reitzenstein (1861–
1931) and Karl Holl (1866–1926). In his Hellenistische Wundererzählungen, published 
in 1906,4 Reitzenstein had already given attention to the oldest hagiographic his-
tories, in particular Athanasius’ Life of Antony, but also, albeit still modestly, to the 
later Pythagoreans.5 In 1912 Holl published his important study, Die schriftstelle-
rische Form der Heiligenlegende, in which he argued that Athanasius’ Life of Antony 
was the prototype of the Greek lives of the saints, but also derived its model from 
1 For this surprising observation, see Choat 2013.
2 Riedweg 20072; Zhmud 2012; and Huffman 2014. These studies, together with Walter Bur-
kert’s seminal work (Burkert 1972), give all the available information about Pythagoras, but 
also note Dubois 2006.
3 Usener 1907; Lucius 1904. Cf. Consolino 1982. 
4 Reitzenstein 1906; cf. Bremmer 2013. For Reitzenstein, see E. Fraenkel / H. Fraenkel / Pohlenz 
1931, 160–168 (bibliography); Pohlenz 1931 (usually overlooked); Fauth 1989; Prümm 1985; 
Audring 2000 (on the young Reitzenstein); Marchand 2003 at 151–158.
5 Reitzenstein 44–45, 71 (Pythagoreans), 5–83 (Antonius).
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pagan biographies, perhaps from a Pythagorean treatise such as Philostratus’ Life 
of Apollonius of Tyana.6 The ground was thus prepared when Reitzenstein returned 
to the subject in 1914. The previous year he had begun a revision of his Wunder-
erzählungen but, remarkably, his work resulted not in the scheduled new edition 
of the book on Hellenistic miracle stories but in three new publications. First, he 
published a small but still important booklet on the martyrdom of Cyprian, a fig-
ure that must have drawn his attention in connection with the problem of the first 
Christian biography.7 Secondly, he issued a similar booklet on Athanasius’ Life of 
Antony. And, thirdly, he published a larger book on the history of the Christian 
monks and the terms “Gnostics” and “pneumatics,”8 which had already drawn 
his attention in his earlier book on the Hellenistic mystery religions.9 Although 
Reitzenstein also points to Pythagorean parallels and differences in his book on 
the early Christian monks (13, 15, 21 n. 3 diff., 94, 95, 105, 212: § 2), his treatise on 
the Life of Antony is the one publication that still plays an important role in the 
discussion of possible Pythagorean sources of Athanasius’ biography. So what 
did he argue?
Reitzenstein did not pay much attention to the problem of the sources or to that 
of the author of the Life. Although the authenticity of the work had been debated 
since the Reformation, he considered the matter settled in favour of Athanasius, 
as most scholars tend to do.10 Athanasius published his “biography” shortly after 
Antony’s death in AD 356. At the moment of writing, he was once again exiled, 
and the writing of the biography may have comforted him in the Egyptian desert. 
The most recent discussion of the issue, by Tim Barnes, notices a discrepancy in 
vocabulary between the Life and the rest of Athanasius’ work, and Barnes per-
suasively concludes that Athanasius made use of an earlier work, although he 
is unable to determine exactly what parts of the Life were owed to whom.11 For 
convenience’s sake, however, we will refer in the following to the author of the 
Life as Athanasius.
Clearly inspired by Karl Holl, Reitzenstein first analysed the structure of the 
Life before pointing to a striking parallel between a passage in the Life of Antony 
(14) and Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras (34, 35) to which I will return in the last 
section of this contribution (§ 3).12 However, in the best tradition of German Quel-
lenforschung, Reitzenstein argued that Porphyry derived his picture from Anto-
 6 Holl 2, 249–269. For Holl, see von Harnack / Lietzmann 1926; Karpp 1966, with further bibli-
ography.
 7 Reitzenstein 1913.
 8 Reitzenstein 1914 and 1916. Note the interesting letter of Theodor Nöldeke (1836–1930) in 
which he thanks Reitzenstein for his Athanasius: Maier 2013, 331–332.
 9 Reitzenstein 19273.
10 See the brief survey by G. J. M. Bartelink 20042, 27–35.
11 Barnes 2010, 160–170. For advocacy of Serapion, bishop of Thmuis, as this author, see Tetz 
1982, 1–30, reprinted in his Athanasiana 1995, 155–184; Barnes 2010, 163. For a balanced sur-
vey, see Rousseau 2001.
12 For Porphyry’s Life, see now Macris 2014.
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nius Diogenes’ The Incredible Wonders beyond Thule, a novel which he had already 
commented upon in his book on the Hellenistic miracle stories,13 and which we 
know only from an epitome in Photius and some papyri.14 According to Reitzen-
stein, Athanasius did not directly use this novel but rather its source, a work by 
Nicomachus of Gerasa (ca. AD 50–150), who almost certainly wrote a biography 
of Pythagoras and was well acquainted with the Pythagorean tradition.15 At this 
point the reader may become a bit dazed, but it must be granted to Reitzenstein 
that Porphyry quotes from both Antonius Diogenes (10–11, 32–33) and Nicoma-
chus (20, 59, cf. FGrH 1063 F 1–3), and the latter is also quoted by Iamblichus in his 
On the Pythagorean Life (henceforth VP: 252–253). In fact, Reitzenstein even noted 
that the characterization by Athanasius (14.7) of the desert as a city of monks, 
which has given the title The Desert a City to the classic work of Derwas Chit-
ty (1901–1971) on the development of eastern monasticism,16 must eventually go 
back to Nicomachus, as Iamblichus (VP 30) notes that the Pythagoreans “built 
a city in that which is called by all ‘Magna Graecia’.”17 For clarity’s sake I have 
rendered the verb πολίζω as “building a city,” but in their translation of Iambli-
chus’ work John Dillon and Jack Hershbell translate “built a community.”18 And 
indeed, Claudia Rapp has shown that over time polis becomes a metaphor for 
“community,” rather than a physical space. She concentrates on the Christian tra-
dition, but Iamblichus’ expression shows that the same development was already 
taking place earlier.19
Subsequently, Reitzenstein argued that we must see Apollonius of Tyana be-
hind these two Pythagoreanizing authors, Porphyry and Iamblichus.20 Here he 
follows the source analysis of Erwin Rohde, which has long been accepted but has 
recently almost certainly been refuted. Instead of the famous Pythagoreanizing 
philosopher whose life is described by Philostratus, the Apollonius mentioned by 
Porphyry and Iamblichus is more probably the Hellenistic philosopher and rheto-
13 Reitzenstein 1906, 17–18.
14 Reitzenstein 1914, 15–16; cf. Fusillo 1990 (text and Italian translation). Papyri: Stephens / Win-
kler 1995, 148–172, who also supply an English translation of Photius and other literary frag-
ments (121–129); PSI 10.1177vo (Oxyrhynchus? Second / third century); P.Oxy. 42.3012 (sec-
ond / third century); P.Oxy. 70.4760 (second / third century: where Paapis appears) and 4761 
(most likely from Antonius), and possibly Dublin, Trinity College Pap. C 3 v (second century); 
P.Palau Rib. Lit. 26 (second / third century); P.Oxy. 70.4761 (third century) and Geneva, Biblio-
thèque P.Gr. 187 (second century); almost all are rolls and almost all restricted to the period 
of the second and third centuries; the first is interesting in particular as it concerns a re-used 
roll. For a new study that takes into account the recent papyri, see Bernsdorff 2009.
15 Reitzenstein 1914, 15–17, cf. Burkert 1972, 98; Centrone / Freudenthal 2005, 688–690.
16 Chitty 1966.
17 Athanasius, VA 14.7: ἡ ἔρημος ἐπολίσθη μοναχῶν ~ Iamblichus, VP 30: πολίσαντες αὐτοὶ 
τὴν πρὸς πάντων ἐπικληθεῖσαν Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα.
18 Dillon / Hershbell 1991, 55.
19 Rapp 2011 and 2014.
20 Reitzenstein 1914, 17, cf. Rohde 1901, 2, 102–172, but note the objections of Burkert 1972, 100 n. 
11.
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rician Apollonios Molon.21 Having analysed the structure of the Life, Reitzenstein 
concluded that a biography of Pythagoras, which he unfortunately does not ex-
plicitly identify but which seems to be the one by Nicomachus, was the model for 
many chapters of Athanasius’ Life. Moreover, the way that Antony captured one 
of the wild animals that damaged his garden (VA 50.8–9) reminded Reitzenstein 
of two stories told about Pythagoras by Iamblichus (VP 60), viz. that Pythagoras 
domesticated a Daunian bear by feeding it barley cakes and nuts and exacted an 
oath from it never again to attack a living being, and that he also persuaded a bull 
in Tarentum that grazed on green beans to abstain from them in the future by 
whispering in the bull’s ear (61). Strangely enough, though, Reitzenstein did not 
note the fact that Porphyry (Life 23–24) has exactly the same material in the same 
order. As Iamblichus did not use Porphyry directly, we may safely assume that 
both went back to the work of Nicomachus already mentioned.22
Now Porphyry’s biography was known in the Alexandria of his time, as it was 
used by Cyril of Alexandria (ca. 376–444).23 Yet, if Athanasius did not use it, as 
Reitzenstein argues, he must have derived this material, perhaps indirectly, from 
Nicomachus. In passing we also note that Porphyry, via Nicomachus, depended 
on the Mythika of Neanthes of Cyzicus; the latter’s dating has now been moved 
earlier into the late fourth century BC and his book on Plato was still available to 
Philodemus, as a papyrus from Herculaneum has now shown – a recent insight 
with consequences for our evaluation of the later tradition that have still to be 
properly thought through.24
What can we conclude so far? It seems to me that Reitzenstein did conclusive-
ly demonstrate his point that Athanasius used Porphyry’s source for Antony’s 
coming forth from the desert (§ 3), and the anecdote about Antony and wild an-
imals (Life 50.8–9). Naturally, given the loss of so much literature, we cannot ex-
clude that Athanasius used other Pythagorean authors as well. As we have seen, 
Reitzenstein notes the dependency of Porphyry on Antonius Diogenes’ Incredi-
ble Things beyond Thule, but it seems less likely that Athanasius would have had 
knowledge of such a novel, as there are no indications in his work that this genre 
attracted him. Moreover, Antonius’ novel lacked the tone that would be relevant 
for Athanasius in his search for models. On the other hand, given that Athanasius 
almost certainly used a written source for his biography, the author of his source 
might well have had different interests from Athanasius: we simply do not know.
According to Reitzenstein, Athanasius did not depend on Porphyry but on 
the source of Antonius Diogenes, which would probably be Nicomachus, but we 
cannot be certain, as the exact dates of Antonius and Nicomachus are unknown. 
Although both of them seem to have lived in the first half of the second century 
21 Staab 2002, 229–237 and 2007, 195–217. 
22 Rohde 1901, 2, 125–126; Weinreich 1973, 178 (19261); Burkert 1972, 98 n. 5; Staab 2002, 224–228. 
For Iamblichus’ interest in Nicomachus, see also Vinel 2014.
23 Cf. Grant 1964, 274; Malley 1978, 259 n. 67; Rubenson 2013, 87.
24 Burkert 2000; Schorn 2007, 128–138 and Schorn 2014a.
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AD or even a bit before,25 we are insufficiently informed to say anything with 
certainty about a possible mutual influence. Yet Reitzenstein wanted to go further 
and identify a much larger Pythagorean influence in the Life of Antony, although 
he did realize that this was “noch etwas kühner” than his earlier suggestions.26 
However, we get into a game of obscurum per obscurius when Reitzenstein claims 
Pythagorean influence without being able to offer convincing parallels between 
Athanasius and specific texts that have survived. There is also the ars nesciendi, 
which was not Reitzenstein’s strongest point. Still, there can be no doubt that he 
demonstrated that Athanasius (or his source) used, directly or indirectly, a biog-
raphy of Pythagoras.
Pythagoras was not the only pagan figure whom Athanasius used as a model. 
Recently, it has been persuasively argued that Athanasius also made use of Lu-
cian’s biography of the Cynic Demonax. In fact, Athanasius transferred the whole 
last chapter of the Demonax (67) into his own biography word for word, albeit 
divided over the prologue and the end of his Life of Antony. In these passages 
Athanasius refers to his own memory and personal acquaintance with Antonius 
and declares that he wants to represent the monk’s character. Athanasius prob-
ably also used the Demonax for some other passages about the birth, education, 
and death of Antony, but his reworking of his source or mixing of it with other 
pagan texts makes identification less certain.27
2 Rubenson and Gemeinhardt
Let us now turn from Reitzenstein to two important recent studies that review 
once again the relationship between Pythagoras and Antony.28 The first is by the 
Lund church historian Samuel Rubenson in an article that aims to reappraise 
the appropriation by Athanasius of pagan biographies.29 Rubenson takes as his 
point of departure the fact that most students of the Life have limited themselves 
to the hunt for parallels, classical or biblical, but he also argues that one should 
first determine the purpose and aim of the text before discussing the Life as an 
example of a Christian appropriation of a classical biography. To that end he once 
again analyses the structure of the Life, arriving at a slightly different position 
from Reitzenstein and Bartelink. Rubenson notes that Antony is unaffected by 
the various events in his life and remains the same throughout his biography: he 
is depicted as secluded and detached from the world.30
25 Antonius Diogenes: Bowersock 1994, 37–41; Bowie 2002, 58–60; Tilg 2010, 126–127. Nico-
machus: Radicke 1999; Kahn 2001, 110–118; Staab 2002, 81–91; Centrone / Freudenthal 2005; 
O’Meara 2014 at 413.
26 Reitzenstein 1914, 17.
27 Overwien 2006, from whose abstract I take some formulations.
28 But see also Alexandre 1996; George 2002.
29 Rubenson 2006.
30 Ibid., 194–201.
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Rubenson first argues that research subsequent to Reitzenstein has neglected 
his findings, emphasizes the specifically Christian background of the early mo-
nastic tradition and rejects Reitzenstein’s attempts to find aretalogies in the back-
ground of hagiography,31 and then proceeds with a new analysis of the points 
of contact between the Life and the lost biography of Pythagoras as discovered 
by Reitzenstein. However, as we do not have the lost biography, Rubenson uses 
the beginning of Iamblichus’ biography until Pythagoras settles in a “so-called 
communal monastic life” (29: τὸ λεγόμενον κοινοβίους) to establish a series of 
concordances with Athanasius’ Life.32 Although one can quibble with Rubenson 
about details, there clearly are a number of similarities between both works, such 
as that both lose their father at an early age, flee the world when they are about 
eighteen, search out teachers, are loved by all, leave their teachers, stay about 
twenty years away from their worlds, settle in a cave, have to flee their admirers 
and, finally, settle down in a (kind of) ascetic life. On the other hand, there are 
also differences. Whereas Pythagoras is well educated, Antony refuses to go to 
school. Pythagoras travels everywhere he can find wisdom, but Antony ridicules 
such wisdom travellers. 
In other words, although there are similarities, Athanasius is not a slavish 
copier of his model, but keeps a firm eye on Christian virtues. Moreover, it is 
striking how much he stresses Antony’s lack of education and criticism of the 
pagan classical education (Life 1, 20, 73). Given the emphasis put on Pythagoras’ 
travels in Iamblichus and Porphyry, there can be little doubt that this part of Py-
thagoras’ biography was indeed at the back of Athanasius’ mind when he wrote 
Antony’s critique. Yet it is not only the travels but also the doctrine of transmigra-
tion that Athanasius has Antony dispute in strong terms (Life 74).
Rubenson persuasively concludes that it does not make sense to relate the Life 
to a distinct genre of biography,33 but that it is more fruitful to look for pagan par-
allels and, especially, their role in the overall argument of the Life. Moreover, we 
should also take into account the audience envisaged by Athanasius, although he 
unpersuasively, as we will see shortly, presumes that the intended audience did 
not have a high regard for Pythagoras nor – an even less persuasive assumption 
– knew the stories about him.34 In the end, according to Rubenson, both Antony 
and Pythagoras had a pure mind and lived in perfect accord with their natures, 
but Antony claimed a different source of power. His was God, the Christian God, 
and that decisively distinguished him from the pagan Pythagoras. That is why 
31 For aretologies, see now Bremmer 2013, 11–14; Jördens 2013.
32 Iamblichus, VP 29: καὶ ἐν πρώτῃ Κρότωνι ἐπισημοτάτῃ πόλει προτρεψάμενος πολλοὺς 
ἔσχε ζηλωτάς, ὥστε ἱστορεῖται ἑξακοσίους αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπους ἐσχηκέναι, οὐ μόνον 
ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κεκινημένους εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἧς μετεδίδου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον 
κοινοβίους, καθὼς προσέταξε, γενομένους.
33 On the now contested genre of ancient biography, see most recently Adams 2013.
34 Rubenson 2006, 194–201.
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Antony did not need to travel: his wisdom did not derive from mortals but from 
the immortal God and Christ.35
A rather different road is taken by the Göttingen church historian Peter Ge-
meinhardt, who has recently published both an article on the nature of the Life 
of Antony, and an interesting biography of Antony as the first monk.36 Gemein-
hardt takes as his point of departure Athanasius as bishop and focuses on the 
martyr narrative in the Life. He begins by arguing that the Life is the first Chris-
tian biography, preceded only by the memorial oration about the life of Cyprian: 
as we have seen, this assessment also motivated Reitzenstein’s interest in this 
early Christian text.37 At the same time, he correctly stresses that we are at the 
beginning of the “hagiographic discourse,” when the genre was still evolving.38 
We need not engage here with his arguments about the influence of the marty-
rological literature on the Life, but will limit ourselves to his observations on the 
Pythagorean influence. 
Gemeinhardt concedes that the theses of Reitzenstein and Rubenson have pri-
ma facie proved that the Pythagorean biographies did play a role in Athanasius’ 
picture of the saint, although the former sees Athanasius rather as a follower, 
the latter as an anti-Pythagorean. Yet Gemeinhardt rejects both these positions. 
Firstly, he asks whether Athanasius really was educated enough to be at home in 
the genre of the philosophical Lives. Possible quotations may have been derived 
from florilegia, although Gemeinhardt admits that the intended readership consti-
tuted the “gebildete Oberschicht.” In passing we must note that the existence of 
such a florilegium has not been demonstrated and would only shift the problem. 
For why would Athanasius read such a florilegium and not the real thing? This is 
unconvincing special pleading. But even if the similarities point to a real depen-
dence, Gemeinhardt doubts whether the few demonstrable quotations show a 
significant influence from the philosophical biographies. In his recent biography 
of Antony he goes even further and now doubts the existence of quotations at all: 
the similarities should be explained from a familiarity with the traditional ideal 
of the philosopher as an ascetic rather than the direct use of a text.39
Second, Gemeinhardt quotes with assent David Brakke’s view that “Athana-
sius self-consciously appropriates the language of paganism for the depiction of 
the ideal Christian. Antony the martyr has not only defeated the pagan gods but 
also taken on the characteristics of their inspired sages.”40 There seems to me to 
be some contradiction between these two positions, but Gemeinhardt is probably 
35 Ibid., 207–208.
36 Gemeinhardt 2012, 2013.
37 Reitzenstein 1913; cf. Schmidt 2001; Mühlenberg 2008 (19901).
38 Gemeinhardt 2012, 79–83; cf. the instructive and evolving studies of Van Uytfanghe 1993; 
2001; 2009 and 2011.
39 Gemeinhardt 2012, 90 and 2013, 25. For the ideal of the philosopher as ascetic, see also Fran-
cis 1995 and Finn 2009.
40 Brakke 2006, 33; cf. Gemeinhardt 2012, 90.
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inspired by the reference to Antony as a martyr and concludes: “Der prototy-
pische Christ wird mit Göttern und Dämonen fertig und inkorporiert die guten 
Seiten des paganen Weisen, weil er vor allem die Reinkarnation eines Typus des 
frühen Christentums ist: des Märtyrers.”41 In the rest of his article, then, Gemein-
hardt proceeds by elaborating on the martyrological side of Antony as perceived 
by him.
In the end, neither Rubenson nor Gemeinhardt shows a real interest in the 
pagan sources of Athanasius or his Vorlage. That is why we will return to this 
problem in our final section.
3 Antony: Anti-Pythagorean and Martyr?
As one can see from the preceding survey, there is still a considerable lack of con-
sensus regarding the influence of Pythagorean literature on the earliest Christian 
monk’s biography. So where should we go from here? Let me first start with the 
complicated question of the sources of the Life of Antony and of the surviving bi-
ographies of Pythagoras, those by Porphyry and Iamblichus, neither of which is 
discussed sufficiently by Rubenson or Gemeinhardt: it is significant that neither 
mentions the solid study of Gregor Staab about Pythagoras in Late Antiquity.42
As we have already noted (§ 1), both Pythagorean biographies depended on 
Nicomachus and on older Pythagorean literature that cannot always be identi-
fied with certainty, especially in the case of Iamblichus.43 Yet it seems that Atha-
nasius only used Nicomachus, as he does not seem to know either Porphyry or 
Iamblichus. Now the biography by Porphyry can be divided into two parts: life 
and teaching,44 and a similar structure can be seen, to some extent, in the Life of 
Antony too. Yet this similarity is not specific enough to conclude that Porphyry 
or his source was the main model after all. In the end one cannot but agree with 
what Averil Cameron writes about our Life and Eusebius’ Life of Constantine: “both 
are innovative, and the innovation in each case consists precisely in the creative 
adaptation and translation of existing patterns to new needs.”45
However, there is a problem with one of the biographies that has not received 
sufficient attention in the two recent studies that we have discussed. As we 
saw (§ 2), in his work on Pythagoras, Iamblichus uses the term τὸ λεγόμενον 
κοινοβίους (c. 29). The term seems fairly recent (“so-called”), but is all the more 
interesting because he also states shortly thereafter that the Pythagorean refu-
gees “led a lonely life in the desert” (35: μονάζοντες δ’ἐν ταῖς ἐρημίαις), which 
sounds very much like a “monastic” life style. Could it be that Iamblichus is al-
ready employing Christian terminology, as has been suggested by Walter Bur-
41 Gemeinhardt 2012, 90.
42 Staab 2002.
43 For the sources of Porphyry, see now Macris 2014.
44 See the detailed analysis of the structure by Staab 2002, 118–121.
45 Cameron 2000, 86; see also Rapp 2010.
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kert?46 In itself, this would not be wholly impossible as he lived well into the time 
of the Emperor Constantine (he died in 325), and the term “monk” (μοναχός) is 
already attested during his lifetime (first in AD 324).47
Yet the origins of both terms, κοινόβιος and μονάζω, have not yet been wholly 
satisfactorily discussed until now. Regarding κοινόβιοι, the first aspect to observe 
is that outside Iamblichus the term occurs at most once elsewhere in pagan lit-
erature. When discussing the influence of a constellation of certain planets on 
brothers in his Tetrabiblos (Apotelesmatica), Ptolemy notes that this “will also make 
them (the brothers) live together, if they are in harmonious aspect with the Lot 
of Fortune” (3.5.4, tr. Robbins, Loeb).48 Whereas Boer and Boll in their Teubner 
edition of 1940 preferred the reading κοινωνοὺς βίου of our best manuscript V 
for “live together,” Wolfgang Hübner in his new 1998 Teubner edition opts for 
κοινοβίους of the lesser manuscripts αβγ because this is also the reading of Hep-
haestion in his Apotelesmatica (2.6 Pingree), and the latter is known to have often 
copied Ptolemy almost literally. This combination seems a strong argument, even 
if some doubt remains as Hephaestion lived around AD 400 in Egypt and will 
certainly have known the monastic movement.
Not only, then, is this passage debated, but the place of κοινόβιος in Iambli-
chus is not without problems either, as the relevant passage has been deleted as 
a Randbemerkung by Deubner in his edition of the De vita Pythagorica (1937, second 
edition by U. Klein, 1975),49 and likewise in the editions of Michael von Albrecht 
(1963) and that of John Dillon and Jack Hershbell (1991). Moreover, it is unlikely 
that the term actually had become “ein fester Terminus,” as Reitzenstein asserts.50 
The expression τὸ λεγόμενον κοινοβίους rather suggests that the author was 
struck by the unusualness of the term (‘so-called’ κοινοβίους). Indeed, also in the 
passage of Jerome, which Reitzenstein adduces as the sole Latin parallel for the 
adjective, the Church Father has to explain the term coenobium for his readers, as 
he clearly could not presuppose familiarity with it among his readers.51 Admit-
tedly, like Reitzenstein, Ilberg, in the apparatus criticus of his 1910 CSEL edition, 
also notes regarding coenobium “adiectivum est.” Yet this is improbable as Jerome 
twice uses the term as a noun only shortly later in the same letter to Eustochium 
and again explains it to his readers.52 In other words, the term was still fairly 
unknown to his Latin readers. Given that the word otherwise exclusively occurs 
46 Reitzenstein 1914, 39–43; Burkert 2006, 206 and 305–306. Note also Hippolytus, Comment. in 
Danielem, 3.9.4: μονάζων ἐν ἐρημίαις (of King Nebuchadnezzar).
47 Judge 1977; Choat 2002.
48 Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos 3.5.4 Hübner: ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τῷ κλήρῳ τῆς τύχης, καὶ κοινωνοὺς βίου ~ 
Hephaestion 2.6 Pingree: ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τῷ κλήρῳ τῆς τύχης, καὶ κοινοβίους.
49 Cf. Deubner 1982, 524–525. 
50 Reitzenstein 1914, 39.
51 Jerome, Ep. 22.34: tria sunt in Aegypto genera monachorum: coenobium, quod illi ‘sauhes’ gentili 
lingua vocant, nos ‘in commune viventes’ possumus appellare, cf. Reitzenstein 1914, 39 n. 1.
52 Jerome, Ep. 22.35: veniamus ad eosqui pluressunt, et incommune habitant, id est, quos vocari coenobi-
um; 22.36: genus… quos anachoretas vocant, qui de coenobiis exeuntes… Note also that none of the 
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in later Christian literature or late manuscripts of pagan authors,53 the conclusion 
seems justified that we have here a gloss by a Christian reader that has been in-
serted into the text.
Now Willy Theiler (1899–1977), followed more recently by Constantinos Mac-
ris,54 has contested Deubner’s conclusion and suggested that Iamblichus may 
have derived the term from Timaeus of Tauromenium, who mentioned the Py-
thagorean expression κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων (FGrH 566 F 13a) and wrote about 
a “communist” experiment of the inhabitants of Lipara in sharing their goods 
(FGrH 566 F 164). And indeed, it is certainly true that Timaeus gave attention 
to the Pythagoreans, but the passage of Diodorus Siculus (10.3.5) which Theiler 
quotes as Timaean almost certainly does not derive from Timaeus.55 Moreover, if 
the term had actually been coined by Timaeus, we would have expected it to have 
turned up more often in the literature about Pythagoras and his followers in later 
times, when the Pythagorean lifestyle received plenty of attention. In the end, it 
seems fairly safe to conclude that κοινόβιοι was not used by Iamblichus and thus 
does not refer to Christian monastic life.
But what about the term μονάζοντες, in the meaning of “living in solitude”? 
This relatively recent term, which is not attested before the Hellenistic era, is not 
absent from pagan literature, especially from the grammarians,56 but hardly in 
the meaning of “living in solitude.” An interesting, albeit until now overlooked, 
passage is found in Cornutus (17) where it is said that those who are fond of 
learning (φιλομαθοῦντες) feel the need to be alone (μονάζειν) and want to with-
draw (ἀναχωρεῖν) into the desert (ἐρημία).57 Even earlier we find the term “mon-
astery” in Philo’s description of the Therapeutae,58 as did not escape Reitzenstein. 
Philo notes that “in every house there is a sacred room, which is called sanctuary 
(σεμνεῖον) and monastery (μοναστήριον), where, quite alone, they perform the 
Mysteries of the holy life.”59 It is clear, though, that the term μοναστήριον is not 
“offenbar früh technisch geworden,” as Reitzenstein suggests,60 as Philo does his 
best to explain the term, which looks like a recent neologism, just like the term 
σεμνεῖον is not attested before him. And indeed, somewhat later he repeats him-
authoritative dictionaries of late Latin (Blaise, Du Cange etc.) mentions the adjectival usage 
of coenobium.
53 This is the case in Gellius 1.9.12.
54 Theiler 1938; Macris 2004, vol. 2, 254–257. I am most grateful to Constantinos Macris for 
showing me his work.
55 See now the detailed investigation by Schorn 2014b, 217–218.
56 See, for example, Philoxenos F 568.4, 13 Theodoridis; Herodian 2.913 Lentz.
57 Cornutus 14.9: ἐπειδὴ χρείαν ἔχουσι τοῦ μονάζειν καὶ συνεχῶς εἰς τὴν ἐρημίαν ἀναχωρεῖν 
οἱ φιλομαθοῦντες. I quote the text from Nesselrath et al. 2009.
58 The Therapeutae have been often discussed. See most recently Deutsch 2006 and Tay-
lor / Hay 2010.
59 Philo, De vita contemplativa 25: ἐν ἑκάστῃ δέ ἐστιν οἴκημα ἱερόν, ὃ καλεῖται σεμνεῖον καὶ 
μοναστήριον, ἐν ᾧ μονούμενοι τὰ τοῦ σεμνοῦ βίου μυστήρια τελοῦνται. For the Mystery 
terminology in Philo, see Riedweg 1987.
60 Reitzenstein 1914, 41.
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self and notes that “each of them, retiring into solitude by himself, philosophizes 
by himself in the so-called monasteries.”61 The recent coinage of the term does not 
preclude the possibility of Pythagorean influence, but that influence is more one 
of logic, practice, and theology than of terminology.62
Looking back we can conclude that, unlike what has been suggested, there 
is no Christian influence of monastic terminology on Iamblichus. In fact, in his 
study of Pythagoras, Christoph Riedweg has noted an anti-Christian tendency in 
Iamblichus’ work, of which he observes that it “auch als paganer Gegenentwurf 
gegen das aufblühende Mönchstum und die christliche Lebensführung über-
haupt gelesen werden kann.”63 Admittedly, anti-Christian ideology need not pre-
clude the transfer of particular terminology; but obviously the more such termi-
nology becomes a centrepiece of Christianity, the more difficult will be its wider 
dissemination in audiences antipathetic to that thought-world. Riedweg’s obser-
vation, then, seems to be correct, although perhaps more relevant for the Chris-
tian lifestyle than for emerging monasticism. Consequently, we must be careful 
with the parallels between our Life and Iamblichus’ work on Pythagoras. On the 
other hand, there is no reason to deny that Athanasius and other Christian con-
temporaries could have noted similarities between their monks and the Pythag-
orean tradition and have reacted in their own ways to the perceived parallels.
Having looked at the seeming derivations of monastic terminology by Iambli-
chus, let us now turn to the case of real dependency of monastic hagiography on 
Pythagorean biography. Although Reitzenstein demonstrated this dependency, 
he did not take a more detailed look at the actual passage, and neither did Ruben-
son or Gemeinhardt. That is what we will do now. I start by juxtaposing the two 
passages: 
Life of Pythagoras
Very often, when he intended to go down into the inner shrine (adyton) of the 
gods and remain there for some time, he used food that stopped hunger 
and thirst… In this way he preserved his body in an unchanging condi-
tion, as if with a plumb line; not at one time well, and at another time sick, 
nor at one time fat, and at another lean. His soul also showed the same 
character through his countenance. For he was neither put in a good hu-
mour by pleasure any more nor dejected by sorrow, neither was he man-
ifestly subject to joy or grief, and no one saw him even either laughing or 
crying.64
61 Philo, De vita contemplativa 30: ἕκαστοι μονούμενοι παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς ἐν τοῖς λεχθεῖσι 
μοναστηρίοις φιλοσοφοῦσι.
62 For logic and theology, see Centrone 2014 at 325–327.
63 Riedweg 2007, 48, also 16, 19, 166, but note that Staab 2002, 317–318 observes that Iamblichus’ 
exhortation “following the deity” (86, 137) is typically Christian; see also Dillon 2002; DePal-
ma Digeser 2012.
64 Porph. VP 34: τά γε μὴν πλεῖστα ὁπότε θεῶν ἀδύτοις ἐγκαταδύσεσθαι μέλλοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα 
χρόνου τινὸς ἐνδιατρίψειν, ἀλίμοις ἐχρῆτο καὶ ἀδίψοις τροφαῖς … ὅθεν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ σῶμα 
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Life of Antony
And so for nearly twenty years he continued training himself in solitude, 
never going forth, and but seldom seen by any. After this, when many 
were eager and wishful to imitate his discipline, and when others of his ac-
quaintances came and had cast down and wrenched off the door by force, 
Antony came forth, as from an inner shrine, initiated in the Mysteries and filled 
with the spirit of God. Then for the first time he was seen outside the bar-
racks by those who came to see him. And they, when they saw him, were 
astonished at the sight that his body had kept the same condition: it was 
neither fat, like a man without exercise, nor emaciated from his fastings 
and battle with the demons, but he was just the same man as they had 
known him before his withdrawal. Again, the disposition of his soul was 
pure, for it was neither contracted as if by grief, nor relaxed by pleasure, 
nor possessed by laughter or dejection. He was not troubled when he saw 
the crowd, nor overjoyed at being welcomed by so many. But he remained 
himself as someone governed by reason and steadfast in his natural state.65
This is a highly important passage in the biography of Antony, one of its high-
lights. It is now, after twenty years of solitude, at age 55, that Antony reappears 
and founds his community of monks. And it is precisely here that Athanasius 
uses a passage that also occurs in Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras.66 In fact, Pythag-
oras, too, is “about 56 years old” when he finishes his travels abroad and returns 
to Samos.67 The coincidence is hardly chance, and the most likely explanation is 
that in this detail too Athanasius or his source had used the biography of Nico-
machus, which was also an important basis for Porphyry and Iamblichus (§ 1). 
But – and this is highly significant – Athanasius’ account is not a mechanical 
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ στάθμῃ τὴν αὐτὴν ἕξιν διεφύλαττεν, οὐ ποτὲ μὲν ὑγιαῖνον ποτὲ δὲ νοσοῦν, 
οὐδ’αὖ ποτὲ μὲν πιαινόμενον καὶ αὐξανόμενον ποτὲ δὲ λεπτυνόμενον καὶ ἰσχναινόμενον, 
ἥ τε ψυχὴ τὸ ὅμοιον ἦθος ἀεὶ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως παρεδήλου. οὔτε γὰρ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς διεχεῖτο 
πλέον οὔθ’ ὑπ’ ἀνίας συνεστέλλετο, οὐδ’ ἐπίδηλος ἦν χαρᾷ ἢ λύπῃ κάτοχος, ἀλλ’ 
οὐδὲ γελάσαντα ἢ κλαύσαντά τίς ποτ’ ἐκεῖνον ἐθεάσατο.
65 Athanasius, VA 14.1–4, ed. Bartelink: Εἴκοσι τοίνυν ἐγγὺς ἔτη διετέλεσεν, οὕτω καθ’ἑαυτὸν 
ἀσκούμενος, οὔτε προϊὼν, οὔτε παρά τινων συνεχῶς βλεπόμενος. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, πολλῶν 
ποθούντων καὶ ζηλῶσαι θελόντων τὴν ἄσκησιν αὐτοῦ, ἄλλων τε γνωρίμων ἐλθόντων 
καὶ βίᾳ τὴν θύραν καταβαλόντων καὶ ἐξεωσάντων, προῆλθεν ὁ Ἀντώνιος ὥσπερ ἔκ τινος 
ἀδύτου μεμυσταγωγημένος καὶ θεοφορούμενος. Kαὶ τότε πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῆς παρεμβολῆς 
ἐφάνη τοῖς ἐλθοῦσι πρὸς αὐτόν. Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν, ὡς εἶδον, ἐθαύμαζον ὁρῶντες αὐτοῦ τό 
τε σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ἕξιν ἔχον, καὶ μήτε πιανθὲν, ὡς ἀγύμναστον, μήτε ἰσχνωθὲν ὡς ἀπὸ 
νηστειῶν καὶ μάχης δαιμόνων, τοιοῦτον δὲ οἶον καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως ᾔδεισαν αὐτόν. 
Tῆς δὲ ψυχῆς πάλιν καθαρὸν τὸ ἦθος. Oὔτε γὰρ ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνίας συνεσταλμένον ἦν, οὔτε ὑφ’ 
ἡδονῆς διακεχυμένη, οὔτε ὑπὸ γέλωτος ἢ κατηφείας συνεχόμενη. Oὔτε γὰρ ἑωρακὼς τὸν 
ὄχλον ἐταράχθη, οὔτε ὡς ὑπὸ τοσούτων κατασπαζόμενος ἐγεγήθει· ἀλλ’ ὅλος ἦν ἴσος, ὡς 
ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κυβερνώμενος καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἑστώς.
66 This is well seen by Hägg 2011 at 23–24.
67 Iamblichus, VP 19: εἰς Σάμον ὑπέστρεψε περὶ ἕκτον που καὶ πεντηκοστὸν ἔτος ἤδη 
γεγονώς.
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transposition as Reitzenstein claimed.68 On the contrary, he uses the description 
of Pythagoras but gives it a special significance. Whereas the description of Py-
thagoras focuses on his regular diet and the containment of hunger and thirst as 
well as a state of ataraxia,69 in the case of Antony it is a specific moment in his life. 
One may grant Reitzenstein that the description of Antony’s ataraxia is somewhat 
out of place here and more or less mechanically copied by Athanasius. Yet it is not 
wholly misplaced, as laughter, for example, was an emotion most monks tried to 
do without.70 In that respect, the Life may also have had a prescriptive influence.
Moreover, this moment in Antony’s Life is accentuated by the metaphor of the 
Mysteries. This is rather remarkable given the resistance to the Mysteries of Chris-
tian apologists, such as Clement, Arnobius, and Firmicus Maternus, but after the 
victory of Constantine we observe a virtually immediate appropriation of Mys-
tery language, as is the case here.71 The mention of the adyton may have remind-
ed the Egyptian readers of the Life of the secret and subterranean chambers of 
Egyptian temples, but the reference in Porphyry probably goes back to the source 
of Antonius Diogenes, and adyta were not absent from Greek Mysteries either.72 
In any case, we can hardly miss the fact that according to Iamblichus (VP 19) Py-
thagoras also spent twenty-two years in the sanctuaries (ἀδύτοις) of Egypt where 
he was being “initiated … in all the Mysteries of the gods” (μυούμενος … πάσας 
θεῶν τελετάς). Yet Antony emerges θεοφορούμενος, “inspired by the spirit of 
God.” This is the other important difference with Pythagoras. What Antony does, 
he does with the help of God, not by his own force. In that respect Rubenson was 
absolutely right that there is a certain anti-Pythagorean slant in the Life.73
When we accept this creative usage of Pythagorean material, we can better 
accept that Athanasius both appropriated and transformed Pythagorean themes. 
In other words, we can see his Life, on one level, as an attempt to use a pagan 
sage whose influence was paramount in Late Antiquity and whose traditions dis-
played clear similarities with the lifestyle of the earliest Christian monks. On the 
other hand, Athanasius was not a slavish follower of his sources. In this respect 
Reitzenstein was probably still too much a child of his time and the intellectual 
climate of the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule, which looked for continuities with the 
pagan world rather than differences from a Christian point of view.74 That is why 
he did not notice Antony’s rejection of school education (1) and his rejection of 
travel (20), whereas Pythagoras’ travels were a well known topos of his biogra-
phy.75
68 Reitzenstein 1914, 17.
69 Cf. also Iamblichus, VP 10.
70 Bremmer 1992, 207–208; for derisive laughter, though, see Elm 2013.
71 Bremmer 2014, 161–164.
72 Graf 1997, 89–91 (Egypt); Bremmer 2009, 297–298.
73 The theme is further elaborated by Rubenson 2013, 85–91.
74 Simon 1975; Wiens 1980; Krech 2002, 124–126; Janssen 2011.
75 Melloni 1969, 76–114.
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
240 Jan N. Bremmer
But Rubenson overlooked that André-Jean Festugière (1898-1982) had already 
noted the anti-Pythagorean slant of the Life as well and had elaborated on the 
differences from Iamblichus’ On the Pythagorean Life (VP) in greater detail.76 As 
Iamblichus went back to the same older sources that were used by Porphyry or 
can be paralleled in the latter, it seems important to note these differences here. 
Pythagoras is considered a “child of god” (VP 10) but Antony is called θεοφιλής, 
“God loving” (4.4, cf. Bartelink ad loc.). Whereas the miracles of Pythagoras are 
related to demonstrate his divinity (VP 138–143), Antony is careful to stress con-
tinually that the miracles come from God (56, 58–59, 62, 83–84). Pythagoras is free 
from the necessities of the body: he needs no food, no drink, no sleep (VP 16). Ant-
ony has not reached that degree of perfection, but he also feels ashamed that he 
has to eat or sleep and does so away from his fellow monks (45). Yet Pythagoras, 
and Abaris already before him (Iamblichus, VP 141), do not want to be seen to eat 
in order to look like the gods, whereas Antony does not want to do so because it 
reminds him painfully that he is human and thus unable to unite with God. 
Conclusion
We have seen that since Reitzenstein scholars have realized that Athanasius made 
use of Pythagorean writings in order to shape his biography of Antony. There has 
been less acknowledgement of the fact that in this process he not only took over 
themes from the Pythagorean tradition, but also represented his protagonist as 
a kind of anti-Pythagoras. Gemeinhardt (2012) has recently stressed the impor-
tance of martyr terminology and themes in the Life. This is certainly valid and 
identifies a significant feature of the biography. Yet by denying the Pythagorean 
background, he misses an important aspect. The biography stresses that God did 
not want Antony to suffer martyrdom, but had chosen to make him the mas-
ter of a great number of people in the ἄσκησις (46.6). In other words, from the 
point of view of Athanasius, who wrote well after the end of the persecutions, 
the ἄσκησις was more important than martyrdom. But precisely in the area of 
ἄσκησις the Christians had competitors in the traditions and, perhaps, practices 
of the Pythagoreans. That is why Antony had to be represented as recognizable in 
comparison with Pythagoras himself and his followers, but also as very different. 
When looking at the Pythagorean tradition of ἄσκησις we should not neglect the 
transformations of that tradition in the world of the early Christian monks.77
76 Festugière 1971, 455–461, a study not mentioned by Rubenson 2006 or Gemeinhardt 2012.
77 I am most grateful to audiences in Berlin (2013) and Zürich (2014) for comments, to Constan-
tinos Macris for his critique of my first version, to Rachel Yuen-Collingridge for her thought-
ful correction of my English and to Jitse Dijkstra for his scrutiny of my final version.
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The Pythagoreans on Medicine: Religion or Science? *
Stavros Kouloumentas – Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
The members of the Pythagorean communities, especially the so-called akousma-
tikoi, advocated a lifestyle different from the current norms, held their own be-
liefs concerning the post-mortem fate of the soul, and were involved in public 
affairs.1 Moreover, several Pythagoreans, who are commonly referred to as the 
mathematikoi, contributed to various sciences, including mathematics, astronomy 
and music. These two different facets of Pythagoreanism, the religious and mys-
tical and the scientific and rational, often intersect and complement each other, 
thus posing a number of questions with respect to the Pythagorean contribution 
to medicine and the transfer of knowledge between intellectual fields. Were the 
Pythagoreans interested in purifying the body or exploring microcosmic struc-
tures and processes? To what extent did moral norms, religious and eschatologi-
cal beliefs, and political ideas influence their medical doctrines? Did they merely 
conceptualize health as a physical equilibrium, or did they also comment on its 
importance for the community to which one belongs? Did they try to prevent 
and cure disease by applying their own practices, or did they adopt the current 
methods in preserving and restoring health?
I suggest that the medical doctrines of the Pythagoreans have a significant dif-
ference from those formulated by other contemporaneous thinkers from Magna 
Graecia. Unlike Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Hippo and Empedocles who attempted 
to explain a number of biological functions in rational terms, the Pythagoreans, 
with the exception of Philolaus, did not tackle key questions pertaining to medi-
cine, such as the constitution of the body, the aetiology of health and disease, and 
the processes of reproduction and sex differentiation. Rather, they were mostly 
interested in the interface between medicine and the rules that should govern 
life. Their medical doctrines were thus based on a set of beliefs inextricably con-
*  The completion of this paper was possible thanks to the support of the research programme 
“Medicine of the Mind – Philosophy of the Body: Discourses of Health and Well-Being in 
the Ancient World” which is funded by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and is 
directed by Philip van der Eijk. I am grateful to Hynek Bartoš and Constantinos Macris who 
commented on earlier versions of this paper.
1 This paper focuses on the early phase of Pythagoreanism, a period spanning from the end 
of the sixth century to the first half of the fourth century BC. It refers to medicine in a broad 
sense, namely as an intellectual field in which several thinkers put forward theories con-
cerning the body, well-being and other interrelated topics, although they were not practis-
ing physicians.
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nected with the Pythagorean way of life and their core ideas concerning purifica-
tion, proportion, social organization and numbers.
The texts that support this thesis are gleaned from sources which are generally 
regarded as reliable.2 I first survey a set of maxims which constitute the earliest 
known pieces of Pythagorean lore and prescribe dietary restrictions (section I). I 
then turn to some fragments deriving from Aristoxenus’ treatises on the Pythag-
oreans, which record practical rules for a healthy life and healing doctrines (sec-
tion II). Finally, I examine the doxographical section preserved in the Anonymus 
Londinensis, which summarizes how Philolaus described the respiratory process 
(section III).
1 Dietary restrictions
The disciples of Pythagoras, who is sometimes considered the inventor of a regi-
men suitable for athletes or even a doctor,3 advocated a lifestyle governed by pro-
hibitions and obligations, as can be seen from various maxims that were hand-
ed down orally and were supposed to contain the original words of the master. 
These concise pieces of wisdom can be divided into three groups: (a) maxims that 
indicate what a thing is; (b) maxims that specify what is the superlative form of 
things; (c) maxims that stipulate what one must do or must not do (Iamb. VP 82).
Maxims pertaining to medical topics can be found in all the groups, but it is 
sufficient for the purposes of this paper to concentrate on the third group, which 
comprises most of the extant material.4 Dietary restrictions are applicable to a 
range of foods, including the meat of non-sacrificial animals, beans, certain spe-
cies of saltwater fish or even plants, and parts of animals, such as the heart, the 
womb and the brain (D. L. 8.18–19, 33–34; Porph. VP 42–45; Iamb. VP 85, Protr. 21; 
Aul. Gel. NA 4.11). These maxims are presented in the concise format “do not 
eat / do not touch / abstain from X” and are sometimes followed by some explana-
tion, but they offer no guidance on what one should eat. In fact, they are mingled 
with various prohibitions on clothing, conduct and activities, as well as ritual 
prescriptions. Is there a rationale behind them or an indication of some interest 
2 I do not deal with the doctor Democedes and two medical theorists, Alcmaeon and Hippo, 
who are sometimes associated with Pythagoreanism (see, for example, Zhmud 2012, 347–
385). In my view, they are independent thinkers (on the criteria for identifying individuals as 
Pythagoreans I follow Huffman 2008a, 292–301). I also exclude from this paper the biograph-
ical evidence pertaining to Pythagoras, which is mostly based on legends (Burkert 1972, 
97–120), and the Pythagorean Memoirs of Alexander Polyhistor, which blends Pythagorean 
material with Presocratic, Academic and Stoic doctrines.
3 Burkert 1972, 293.
4 A maxim from the first group defines health as retention of form and disease as its de-
struction (D. L. 8.35). This striking definition cannot derive from the earliest collections of 
maxims, since the term eidos has Platonic overtones and probably designates the ideal shape 
of the body (Burkert 1972, 168, n. 18). A maxim from the third group, formulated in a ques-
tion-and-answer format, describes medicine as the peak of wisdom (Iamb. VP 82). This idea 
seems to be related to the report that the Pythagoreans considered medicine, music and 
divination as the most revered sciences (Iamb. VP 163).
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in the properties of each food and its effects on the body? Let us examine two 
famous maxims to answer this question.
There are conflicting reports about the ban on eating meat, which indicate that 
it was modified in the course of time and interpreted variously.5 The ban is pre-
sumably connected with Pythagorean beliefs about the soul, which is supposed 
to be immortal and to transmigrate into different kinds of living beings (Porph. 
VP 19), and with the importance of animal sacrifice in their daily programme 
(Isoc. Bus. 28; Iamb. VP 82), rather than with the adoption of strict vegetarianism 
as a rule for a healthy life. This is confirmed by the fact that the relevant maxims 
did not command full abstinence from animal products, but specified what types 
of meat should not be consumed in accordance with religious criteria. For exam-
ple, one is not allowed to taste parts of animals and species of fish that are sacred 
(Porph. VP 42–45; Iamb. Protr. 21), eat the flesh of animals that are not sacrificed 
(Iamb. VP 85), or touch a white cock, since it is a sort of suppliant who announc-
es the months and its colour represents the good (D. L. 8.34). The formulation of 
these interrelated bans, whose content can be paralleled in Greek mystery cults,6 
suggests that the Pythagoreans (or at least some of them) did consume meat, as 
Aristoxenus confirms when he notes that Pythagoras abstained only from plough 
oxen and rams and enjoyed other types of sacrificial meat (Aristox. fr. 29a). There-
fore, the ban is not constructed to prohibit a harmful food but to specify the con-
ditions under which it can be consumed.
Another famous ban is connected with beans, which are often mentioned in 
Greek cult and mythology but are never described as playing a crucial role for 
the functioning of the body in the Hippocratic treatises. Already in antiquity 
several authors speculated about the meaning of this maxim and interpreted it 
in different ways. Consider, for instance, the explanations given by Aristotle in 
his lost work On the Pythagoreans: (a) beans resemble testicles; (b) they are sim-
ilar to the gates of Hades for they are the only plant that has no joints; (c) they 
are destructive; (d) they resemble the nature of the universe; (e) they are used in 
allotting political offices (D. L. 8.34). Explanations (a) and (b) are centred on the 
structural similarities of beans to sexual organs and the mythical entrance to the 
underworld respectively. Explanation (c) contains a vague reference to the de-
structive effects of beans which may pertain to physiology or ethics. Explanation 
(d) suggests that the shape and / or the effects of beans reflect cosmic structures, 
since the Pythagoreans describe the universe as a sphere with a fire at its centre 
which draws in air, time and void from the unlimited expanse. Explanation (e) is 
based on a common function of beans in democratic circles, which were hostile 
to the Pythagoreans.
Leaving aside the controversies surrounding the meaning of this ban, two 
things cannot be disputed. First, the maxim itself contains no justification for the 
5 Zhmud 2012, 234–237.
6 Burkert 1972, 177–183.
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dietary restriction. The concealed meaning, if any, was intelligible only to those 
initiated in Pythagoreanism and the outsiders had to speculate about its inter-
pretation. This intentional ambiguity is connected with the tendency of the Py-
thagoreans to maintain secrecy regarding their doctrines (Iamb. VP 72). Wisdom 
was thus limited to a closed circle of initiates, especially those who were higher 
in rank, and was not diffused in public. Second, in Aristotle’s view, the maxim is 
rooted in superstitions or hidden beliefs and not in a semi-scientific investigation 
into the effects of beans on the body. The reference to the destructive force of 
beans suggests that an explanation on hygienic grounds (allergy, digestion prob-
lems, sterility) was considered to be possible, although Aristotle did not comment 
on this issue.7 Later authors, however, assumed that beans were banned because 
they are not easily digestible (Callim. fr. 553) or because they disturb our mental 
tranquillity (Cic. Div. 1.62), but these are mere speculations which are in conflict 
with Aristoxenus who notes that, according to Pythagoras, beans have a soften-
ing and laxative effect on the body (Aristox. fr. 25). 
Contrast this Pythagorean prohibition to the content of On Regimen, a Hip-
pocratic treatise which attempts to account for the efficacy of foods, drinks and 
drugs by referring to the properties of each stuff, the way in which it interacts 
with its environment, and the factors that affect its power. The section dealing 
with beans is illuminating:
Beans are nutritious, astringent and flatulent. They are flatulent because 
the passages do not admit the abundant nourishment which is brought in, 
and they are astringent because they have a small residue from its nour-
ishment. Peas are less flatulent, and are excreted better (Vict. 2.45).
Unlike the Pythagoreans who simply banned beans for reasons which remain 
obscure, the medical author commences by mentioning the main properties of 
this food, and then justifies his claims by providing an explanation that leaves no 
room for speculation. He focuses on the processes of digestion and excretion of 
beans, and compares their features to other legumes. Beans are thus placed in the 
realm of human physiology and nourishment, like other stuffs examined in On 
Regimen. Moreover, the medical author presents his ideas in a clear-cut format, 
thus attempting to illuminate any reader who is interested in dietetics, either the 
professional physician or the layman.
These considerable differences in the content and approach between the Hip-
pocratic treatise and the Pythagorean prohibition indicate that the latter can 
hardly be placed in a medical context. In fact, dietary restrictions, along with oth-
7 Grmek 1983, 210–244, suggests that this ban is connected with favism, a genetic allergy to 
the broad bean which is common in southern Italy, the homeland of most Pythagoreans. If 
this is the case, the ban had a practical expedient and was founded on the observation of the 
effects of beans on the body. We cannot, of course, exclude this possibility, since religious 
injunctions are often intermingled with precepts dealing with dietetics and hygiene, which 
are an important prerequisite for achieving purity.
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er instructions, constitute a sort of sacred code designed to maintain the purity 
of the members of the sect: 
Purity is obtained through purifications, ablutions, sprinklings, and from 
not having contact with a corpse, a woman who has just given birth, and 
any other contamination, and from abstaining from the meat of dead 
animals, mullets, black-tails, eggs, birds born from eggs, beans and all 
foods forbidden by those who are in charge of celebrating rites in temples 
(D. L. 8.33).
Cathartic rites and abstention from certain types of food are part and parcel of 
a distinct way of life, whose ultimate goal is the purification of the body from 
inherited sins. The expert who bans harmful stuffs can be associated with the 
religious sage who is castigated at the beginning of On Sacred Disease rather than 
a Hippocratic author. 
One may, of course, note that the maxims are traced in the early phase of Py-
thagoreanism in which life sciences, such as medicine, dietetics and embryology, 
had not been developed and detached from religion. The concise pieces of wis-
dom embodied in some maxims, especially those dealing with the definition of 
beings and their superlative form, motivated the talented members of the sect to 
elaborate on gnomic utterances and to contribute to various disciplines. Even if 
we think of a gradual transition from the religious and mythological lore of the 
time of Pythagoras, the legendary master, to a period of scientific progress and 
diffusion of knowledge which culminates with Archytas, the great mathemati-
cian, it is clear that the Pythagorean way of life influenced the discourse about 
well-being to a great extent. 
2 Aristoxenus on Pythagorean medicine
The best source for tracing this interconnection is Aristoxenus, who was linked 
with the last Pythagoreans before joining the Lyceum, and composed several 
treatises on Pythagoreanism, including On Pythagoras and His Associates, On the 
Pythagorean Way of Life, and the Pythagorean Precepts.8 Aristoxenus normally gives 
an idealized picture of the Pythagoreans, and tries to demonstrate that they lived 
in accordance with their moral principles. It is thus widely held that Aristoxenus 
integrates Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines into the Pythagorean Precepts.9 How-
ever, Huffman, who has recently assessed the extant fragments, argues that the 
treatise reflects genuine Pythagorean ideas of the late fifth and early fourth cen-
tury BC, despite some doctrinal similarities to contemporary texts, and provides 
8 Aristoxenus’ fragments are cited from Wehrli 1945, whose criterion is whether an author 
mentions Aristoxenus by name. Diels, however, thinks that several sections of Iamblichus’ 
On the Pythagorean Way of Life, which contain no reference to Aristoxenus but comment on 
the Pythagoreans as a group, derive from the Pythagorean Precepts. He collects them in the 
D-section of the chapter dealing with the “Pythagorean school” (DK, vol. I: 467–478).
9 Wehrli 1945, 59; Burkert 1972, 107–108; Zhmud 2012, 65, n. 17.
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evidence for a conservative strand in Greek ethics.10 The moral system has a co-
herent and rational structure and supplies the commands with some argumenta-
tion, thus differing from the bizarre maxims. Building on Huffman’s arguments 
about the authenticity and significance of the Pythagorean Precepts, let us examine 
the scattered references to topics pertaining to medicine.
According to Aristoxenus, Pythagoras stipulated that the lifestyle of his dis-
ciples should be constructed in such a way that prevents immoderation in all 
aspects of private and public life:
We should avoid by all means and banish by fire, iron and all sorts of de-
vices disease from the body, ignorance from the soul, extravagance from 
the belly, strife from the polis, discord from the house, and immoderation 
from everything (Aristox. fr. 17 = Porph. VP 21; cf. Iamb. VP 68–70).11
Underlying this emphatic statement is the belief that disease is not merely a sort 
of imbalance or strife between the bodily constituents, as was common in med-
ical authors (Nat. Hom. 4, Vict. 1.2), but also that it is the physical counterpart of 
a harmful condition which pervades the entire human sphere. The disorderly 
functioning of the body and the soul, the excessive consumption of food and 
drink, and family or social conflict are described as different manifestations of 
this immoderation which must be eliminated by forceful means. These examples 
suggest that health is understood as the preservation of balance and peace in the 
body, although the nature, number and relationship of the bodily constituents 
which should be moderated are not specified. 
How can we preserve health? Some clues can be found in fragments dealing 
with the political ideas of the Pythagoreans. They thought that anarchy is the 
greatest evil in society, and so suggested that authorities should supervise civic 
life. For this very reason, they distinguished the rulers from the people, and de-
scribed their proper relationship and respective virtues. They also divided the 
people into four age groups (children, young men, mature men, the elderly), and 
stipulated appropriate activities for each of them (studying, participating in civic 
life, administering public affairs, advising). The necessity for supervision of all 
stages and aspects of life, especially those related to children, was a key feature 
of this social organization:
They said that it is necessary, even from one’s youth, to have a balanced 
diet, teaching that order and moderation are fine and advantageous, but 
disorder and immoderation are shameful and disadvantageous (Aristox. 
fr. 35 = Stob. Ecl. 4.1.49).
10 Huffman 2006, 2008b.
11 The text cited here is not the entire fragment, which provides biographical details concern-
ing Pythagoras and may derive from On Pythagoras and His Associates (Wehrli 1945, 51–52). 
The preceding lines deal with Pythagoras’ contribution to the civic stability of Magna Grae-
cia, and conclude with a sort of dictum that summarizes his doctrines.
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A balanced diet has a twofold function: it contributes to physical equilibrium, 
and serves didactic purposes. Whereas the first function was universally ac-
knowledged by medical authors (Aër. 1, Nat. Hom. 16, VM 3), the second function 
seems to be a genuine Pythagorean idea. A balanced diet makes it clear that order 
and proportion are beneficial to individuals, whereas their opposites bring about 
problems. Hence the constraint on the desire to eat and drink excessively is a 
means of understanding the significance of moderation. The latter is envisaged as 
a universal principle with positive effects in different domains, since the Pythag-
oreans tried to find out proportions in music, astronomy, mathematics and poli-
tics in order to specify the relation of all particulars that compose a unified whole. 
There are several reports that the Pythagoreans constructed their own diet as 
part of a carefully-structured daily programme suited to maintaining health and 
serenity: they preferred to eat bread and honey (Aristox. fr. 27), avoided drinking 
wine during the day (Iamb. VP 97), and had a light dinner (Iamb. VP 98). It is also 
clear that special emphasis was laid on the proper place of sexuality: 
In general, they thought that the so-called precocious should be avoid-
ed, for the beings which are precocious in plants or animals do not bear 
good fruits, <but it is necessary to have> some time before bearing fruits 
so that the seeds and fruits arise from bodies which are strong and com-
plete. There are many things in life which are better learned late, as in the 
case also with the business of sex. It is necessary then, that they be kept 
so busy with training while still children, that not only do they not seek it 
but, if possible, that they not even know of such intercourse until they are 
twenty. Even when the children reach this age, they should rarely engage 
in sex. For this contributes considerably to the good health both of those 
that are begetting and of those who are going to be borne. He said also that 
one should not associate with women for reproduction when one is full of 
food or drunk. For he does not think that well proportioned and beautiful 
things arise from a base, discordant, and disordered union, but things that 
are not at all good (Aristox. fr. 39 = Stob. Ecl. 4.37.4).
The process of reproduction is examined from a moral perspective. The fragment 
commences with an observation drawn from the natural world: living beings fail 
to produce fine fruits and offspring in a premature stage. Their best products are 
generated when they reach their proper age and completion. Inasmuch as the bi-
ological processes of all living beings are subject to the same norms, we can infer 
that nature instructs humans to beget children when they are mature.
This conclusion is supplemented with various observations which impose 
constraints on sex. Children are not allowed to have sex or even acquire any 
knowledge about it. Rather, they are encouraged to participate in athletics (Iamb. 
VP 209) and focus on their studies (Aristox. fr. 35). Even after maturity sex should 
not be a regular activity in order to maintain the health of individuals and that 
of their offspring. The circumstances under which one should beget children are 
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specified: the male should not have sex if he has consumed much food and drink. 
Moreover, he should avoid a woman who wears gold jewellery, an indication of 
luxury (Iamb. VP 84). There is clearly a concern for the avoidance of excess, as 
noted above (Aristox. frs. 17, 35), and the control of desires that are supposed 
to be vicious when they display “shamefulness, immoderation and bad timing” 
(Aristox. fr. 37). However, this is not based on an empirical investigation of the 
side-effects of excessive sex but on the assumption that the process of procreation 
has an decisive impact on the nature of the offspring. Hence sex is not conceived 
as a natural need but as an action that guarantees the reproduction of humans, as 
can be confirmed by a maxim which stipulates that one ought to beget children 
in order to leave behind someone to worship the gods (Iamb. VP 83). These texts 
provide evidence for a lifestyle with prevention rather than cure as the founda-
tion of a healthy life. 
We also possess some evidence for the practical application of medicine which 
can be juxtaposed with the techniques developed by medical authors.12 According 
to Aristoxenus, the Pythagoreans thought that the healing of the body through 
medicine is on a par with the purification of the soul through music:13
The Pythagoreans, as Aristoxenus said, used medicine for purifying the 
body and music for purifying the soul (Aristox. fr. 26 = Cramer, Anecd. 
Paris. I 172).
It is clear from this brief statement that an individual is understood as consisting 
of two interconnected parts, the physical and the psychic, which represent re-
spectively the temporary residence of the soul and the divine particle of the body. 
Both parts are supposed to suffer from a sort of contamination which can be re-
moved with the aid of different arts. Inasmuch as medicine is defined as the art 
dealing with the body, its connection with catharsis is worth exploring. The con-
cept of catharsis is quite prominent in the Hippocratic treatises, referring to vari-
ous treatments that involved cleansing poisonous liquids or stuffs and discharg-
ing harmful or excessive material from the body through evacuations.14 Catharsis 
is thus a technique to cure the body and is not associated with the purification 
of the soul. An entirely different idea is traced in Pythagoreanism. Catharsis is 
not one of the medical techniques but the ultimate goal of medicine. The task of a 
Pythagorean doctor overlaps with that of the religious sage who prescribes a set 
of customs which oblige their adherents to live in state of moral purity.
12 A dubious report from Iamblichus suggests that the Pythagoreans practised medicine in a 
systematic manner: they focused on dietetics, tried to specify a due proportion in exertions, 
food and rest, made distinctions concerning the preparation of foods, used poultices more 
than their predecessors but approved of drugs to a limited extent, minimized the use of 
surgery and cautery, used incantations to cure some illnesses, and believed that music con-
tributes to health (Iamb. VP 163–164).
13 On the use of music as a cathartic technique in Pythagoreanism see Provenza 2012.
14 On the concept of catharsis in Hippocratic medicine see von Staden 2008.
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The role played by odd and even numbers, a polarity found in the cosmology 
of Philolaus and the Pythagorean table of opposites, seems to be applied in med-
icine too:
For the unit is the beginning of number, and number is the sum of units. 
Numbers which are divided into equal parts are even, while those divided 
into unequal parts and having a middle point are odd. Hence they believe 
that the critical days of diseases and changes take place in odd days which 
have a beginning, a peak and a decline, because the odd number has a 
beginning, an end and a middle (Aristox. fr. 23 = Stob. Ecl. 1 Prooem. 6).
The observation, description and recording of the critical days of diseases is a 
recurrent theme in the Hippocratic treatises, since it was widely held that cer-
tain days are of particular importance for its development and special measures 
should be taken at this crucial stage.15 There was, of course, a wide diversity as 
to the date and sequence of critical days, the prognostic value of various signs 
which are obtained through the senses (fever, rigor, excretions), and the thera-
peutic prescriptions. As to the first question, the authors of On Diseases IV, On 
the Seventh-month Foetus, and On Regimen in Acute Diseases, for example, share 
the widespread view that odd days are crucial to the survival of the patient. The 
author(s) of Epidemics I and III, on the other hand, emphasize(s) the changes that 
occur on both even and odd days in recording numerous case histories, while 
the author of Prognostic proposes a complex numerical system, mostly but not 
exclusively based on odd numbers, in order to describe the days in which a febrile 
disease ends its attacks on the patient. Despite these disagreements as to the pre-
cise time of critical days, the medical authors often attempt to draw conclusions 
in conjunction with a number of observational data, such as the nature of disease, 
the presence of certain symptoms, the constitution and habits of the patient, and 
the external factors.
The Pythagoreans, on the other hand, seem to undervalue the empirical foun-
dation of medicine. Their explanation is based on the assumption that numbers 
reveal the true nature of beings and can thus be identified with certain concepts 
(Arist. Met. 985b26–31), such as justice which is thought to be the first square 
number and due season which is connected with the number seven (Alex. Aphr. 
in Met. 38.10–39.3). Inasmuch as an odd number has a threefold division, its struc-
ture resembles the general pattern of progression of any disease, which always 
has a beginning (an initial stage of bodily disorder that produces specific signs), a 
peak (the time in which bodily disorder reaches the highest point), and an abate-
ment (recovery and survival or deterioration and death). Observing these struc-
tural similarities between a set of numbers and disease, the Pythagoreans sug-
gest that odd days are important for determining the final stage of any disease. 
15 On critical days in Hippocratic medicine see Langholf 1990, 79–135.
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However, this is pure speculation which is founded on a naive number symbol-
ism and disregards a number of observational data.
3 Philolaus’ embryology
It can be argued that the fragmentary texts examined above reflect the efforts of 
Aristoxenus to stress the rational elements of the Pythagorean way of life and its 
interconnection with the doctrines put forward by the so-called mathematikoi. In-
deed, Philolaus, the sole Pythagorean of whom we possess a sufficient number of 
fragments, seems to shift the Pythagorean interest in the physical equilibrium in 
a new direction by describing the construction of the body with reference to his 
metaphysical principles and by providing an aetiology of disease in terms of the 
transformations of the bodily constituents and other contributory causes (44 A 
27 DK). He thus offers a rational account comparable to the material found in the 
earliest Hippocratic treatises and the medical doctrines attributed to Alcmaeon, 
Hippo and Empedocles.16
Although Philolaus represents a sophisticated version of Pythagoreanism, his 
embryology contains a striking analogy which seems to be related to a moral 
norm advocated by the Pythagoreans.17 According to an anonymous doxographer 
who offers summary accounts of the doctrines of his predecessors concerning 
the constitution of the body and the factors that affect its functioning, Philolaus 
describes the respiratory process as follows:
With regard to its construction he makes use of the following reasoning. 
Ηe says that, immediately after birth, the living being draws in the exter-
nal air which is cold. Then it sends it out again, like a debt. Indeed, it is 
for this reason that there is a desire for the external air, so that our bodies, 
which are too hot, by the drawing in of air which is brought in from out-
side are cooled by it (44 A 27 DK).
In the preceding lines, Philolaus argues that the foetus has no share of cold, since 
the material that constructs it (sperm) and its location during the gestation period 
(the womb) are connected with heat exclusively. The first act of a newborn infant 
is to establish a moderate temperature within its body by drawing in the external 
16 Manetti 1990, 222–233. Philolaus’ testimonies and fragments are quoted from the handbook 
of Diels-Kranz.
17 Philolaus provides a rational model of the universe but also integrates moral and religious 
ideas deriving from Pythagoras into cosmic structures (Huffman 2013, 74–76). The following 
examples can be cited: (i) he describes the central fire as the “garrison and tower of Zeus” 
(44 A 16 DK and 58 B 37 DK), thus identifying it with the fire that Prometheus tried to steal 
from Zeus’s fortress; (ii) he notes that the moon is inhabited by living beings which are supe-
rior to humans (44 A 20 DK), an idea which is probably related to the maxim that identifies 
the sun and the moon as “the islands of the blessed” (Iamb. VP 82); (3) he locates the origins 
of cognition and life in parts of the body (44 B 13 DK) which should not be eaten.
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air and then discharging it. The newborn infant is thus cooled to the appropriate 
degree, and survives through this constant intake and release of air.
Two points should be noted in relation to this description. First, the generation 
of living beings is analogous to the creation of the universe to some extent, since 
in an early cosmogonic stage the central fire draws in air, time and void from the 
unlimited expanse after it is constituted in the centre of the universe (44 B 7 DK 
and 58 B 30 DK). Second, the respiratory process can be interpreted as a micro-
cosmic application of the fundamental principles that compose the universe: “un-
limiteds,” namely continua which are not defined by any structure or quantity, 
such as space, time and heat; “limiters,” namely structures which set a limit to the 
continua, such as the number ratios that confine the sound and produce a musical 
scale; and “harmony,” namely the combination of the former principles (44 B 1–2, 
B 6 DK). As far as the living beings are concerned, hot seems to be conceived as 
the “unlimited,” inasmuch as it is the sole constituent of the foetus, and cold as 
the “limiter” for it is imposed upon the innate heat after birth. Alternatively, we 
may think that the external air is the “unlimited,” inasmuch as it assumes this 
role in the cosmogony, and the “limiter” is the body in which it is confined, or 
that hot and cold are both “unlimiteds” and the respiratory process is the “limit-
er” which controls their dominion within the body. These issues cannot be anal-
ysed in detail here,18 but there is a point which deserves some discussion.
According to Philolaus, the introduction of a share of cold into the hot body 
is a sort of loan taken by the external air, which is repaid directly to the creditor 
at regular intervals. This continuous transaction between the living being and 
the unlimited expanse, as long as the former is alive, is described with the words 
kathaperei chreos. We have good reasons to think that these words go back to Philo-
laus. First of all, the respiratory process is thought to mirror a familiar process, 
the exchange of goods and services in monetary terms, since early philosophers 
and medical authors often depict the functioning of the body in terms of images 
and concepts connected with human activities.19 This analogy is formulated in 
poetic words which are not attested in Peripatetic authors who refer to the bind-
ing norms of anagke when they report the doctrines of their predecessors (con-
trast 22 A 5 DK to 22 B 80 DK). Indeed, in the earliest surviving pieces of Ionian 
philosophy the concepts of necessity and retributive justice are intertwined to 
indicate either the mutual encroachments of cosmic opposites in Anaximander 
(12 B 1 DK), or the continuous strife that governs all cosmic processes in Her-
18 Huffman 1993, 43–47, 289–306. Sedley 1995, 22–26, suggests that the balance of hot and cold 
in the body results in the ensoulment of living beings, since the term used to describe the 
cooling of the body with the aid of the external air (katapsychousthai) alludes to the soul (psy-
che) which is depicted as a harmonious blending of cosmic elements by Philolaus’ pupils in 
the Phaedo. This doctrine is reported by Aristotle as one of the Pythagorean beliefs about the 
soul and is attributed to Pythagoras and Philolaus by Macrobius (44 A 23 DK), but that may 
be an inference drawn from Plato.
19 Lloyd 1966, 172–420.
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aclitus (22 B 80 DK). In this respect, the norms of retributive justice cannot be 
distinguished from those of necessity which signify the regular and ordained 
course of events.
But what exactly happens in the hot body after the insertion of a share of cold? 
The summary account of the Peripatetic doxographer contains no information 
and so we can only speculate. Philolaus stresses the fact that our bodies are com-
posed of heat even after birth. This means that when a portion of external air 
enters the hot body it is assimilated to the innate heat, although it lowers the 
bodily temperature to some extent. This transformation is a kind of injustice for 
the creditor loses some of its property and should be compensated. A portion of 
the innate heat thus returns to the unlimited expanse where it is assimilated to 
the external air and so forth. Although it is not clearly spelt out in the summary 
account of Philolaus’ embryology, I suggest that a kind of reciprocity, comparable 
to the notion of retributive justice attributed by Aristotle to the Pythagoreans (58 
B 4 DK), regulates the respiratory process. In analysing the forms of “particular 
justice” in the Nicomachean Ethics V, Aristotle points out that the Pythagoreans de-
fined justice as mere arithmetic reciprocity, without raising any questions about 
the nature of the wrongdoing. In fact, they thought that one should suffer exactly 
the injury done, namely “an eye for an eye.” This seems to be the system of justice 
underlying the respiratory process: a wrongdoing is corrected through a straight-
forward compensation to the injured party, namely “some hot air for some cold 
air.” If this is the case, Philolaus seems to be adapting a moral norm to his philo-
sophical system in order to illustrate a microcosmic process.
4 Conclusions
As far as we can judge from the fragmentary texts discussed in this paper, the 
Pythagoreans, with the exception of Philolaus, did not consider medicine to be 
a branch of natural philosophy with its own agenda and method. Rather, the 
discourse about well-being is built on their core ideas concerning purification, 
proportion, social organization and numbers, a nexus of notions that are adapted 
to different contexts and reworked in the Pythagorean tradition. They supplied 
the members of their sect with dietary restrictions reflecting superstitions and 
hidden beliefs, followed a lifestyle structured in accordance with their conserva-
tive ethics, and tried to cure diseases by purifying the body and finding number 
symbolisms. Even Philolaus, who represents the scientific aspect of Pythagore-
anism, seems to integrate a moral norm into his embryology in order to illustrate 
a microcosmic process. Thus Pythagorean medicine, as it develops from bizarre 
maxims to a carefully constructed programme for the young members of the 
community, offers an excellent example of the codification of medical theories 
and practices in harmony with a philosophical system which, despite its diversity 
and gradual transformation in the course of time, lays special emphasis on how 
one should live. 
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Pythagoreans and Medical Writers  
on Periods of Human Gestation
Andrew Barker – University of Birmingham
1 Introduction
Many Greek and some Latin writers refer – usually with cautious qualifications 
or trenchant criticism – to the idea that children born at seven or nine months 
after conception will survive, but those born at eight months will not. This paper 
considers an important group of passages from writings of the imperial period, 
which present recognizably Pythagorean attempts to defend these doctrines. I 
shall argue that they draw on two very different kinds of source, each with its 
own distinctive assumptions about the nature and basis of knowledge, and that, 
though the substance of their arguments has Hellenistic or later origins, their 
principal starting-points are pre-Aristotelian. Later medical and biological re-
search is wholly ignored in these authors.
I focus mainly on four passages, two from the Theologoumena arithmeticae (of 
which one is attributed to Nicomachus1), one from Aristides Quintilianus De mu-
sica, and one from Proclus. They offer the fullest accounts of the Pythagorean 
explanations, and seem to represent a consolidated body of mainstream Pythag-
orean ideas. Their explanatory strategies are very similar; differences of detail 
show that they are not merely copying from one another, but they all fit smoothly 
into the same general pattern of thought. Fairly substantial accounts incorporat-
ing some of the same material as the mainstream versions appear in Plutarch, 
pseudo-Alexander, Anatolius, Censorinus, and elsewhere.2 Philo of Alexandria 
and Theon of Smyrna also assert the viability of 7-month births,3 and summary 
1 In most cases we cannot check the accuracy of citations in the Theol. ar. by reference to texts 
transmitted independently. Where we can (as in the case of Theol. ar. 42–43, corresponding 
to Anatolius De dec. 10.6–11.4), it is clear that the author has paraphrased and slightly abbre-
viated the passage rather than quoting it verbatim. I shall nevertheless refer to the writer of 
the passage that concerns us as “Nicomachus,” even though it may not be presented exactly 
as he wrote it.
2 Plut. De an. procr. 1017e–1018b; [Alex. Aphr.] Pr. 2.47; Anatolius De dec. 8.15–28, 10.13–11.3, 
11.24–27, 14.9–10, 14.17–15.2; Cens. De die nat. 7.5–6, 9.1–3, 11.1–6.
3 Philo De op. mundi 124, Legum alleg. 1.9–10; Theon Sm. 104.1–5. For important additional ref-
erences and detailed discussion see Parker 1999. Parker’s perspective is rather different from 
mine, but I strongly recommend his article to anyone interested in this topic. Regrettably 
and no doubt culpably, I became aware of it too late to take it into account when writing this 
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versions of the Pythagorean explanations appear in a number of Christian writ-
ings, in astrological treatises, and in various other texts.
2 Numbers, ratios, and musical structures
Nicomachus introduces his discussion as follows:
That the most important cause of generation is the hebdomad4 is shown by 
the fact that through it 7-month children are no less viable than 9-month 
children; but the 8-month children placed in between them are destroyed 
by natural necessity. The Pythagoreans addressed these facts through the 
following sort of calculation, approaching them through arithmetical ra-
tios and diagrams.5
Nicomachus implies, correctly, that the Pythagorean approach was largely math-
ematical, based on arguments borrowed from arithmetic and geometry. But two 
qualifications are in order. First, geometry and arithmetic are not treated on an 
equal basis. Arithmetic takes pride of place; geometrical reasoning and diagrams 
have only a subsidiary role. Secondly, though the arithmetic itself is sound, it 
only becomes relevant to the topic of human gestation through its links to anoth-
er discipline, harmonics. The writers repeatedly draw attention to this connec-
tion; Nicomachus does so, for example, when he presents his first specimen of 
Pythagorean reasoning:
By putting together the fundamental cubes of the two smallest numbers, 2 
and 3, which are 8 and 27, they make 35, in which one can very clearly see 
the ratios of the concords through which harmonia is perfected. For all com-
ing-to-be (genesis) arises from opposites, wet and dry, cold and hot, and 
opposites do not agree or come together to compose anything without har-
monia. And the best of harmoniai, which contains all the concordant ratios, 
is that correlated with the number 35, which not only fills out solidity and 
completion for the two cubes just mentioned, which are equals multiplied 
by equals multiplied by equals,6 but is also the sum of the first three per-
fect numbers, those equal to [the sum of] their own parts, in potentiality 1, 
and in actuality 6 and 28.7
paper; and I am grateful to Leonid Zhmud for drawing it to my attention and sending me 
a copy.
4 That is, the number 7. Locutions such as “dyad,” “tetrad,” and so on are common in texts 
dealing with these matters, but are rarely more than synonyms for the relevant numbers; in 
so far as there is a distinction, it is more rhetorical than substantive. For the sake of clarity, 
in the translations below I have almost always used the numerals instead of the more por-
tentous expressions.
5 Theol. ar. 63.1–7.
6 This is the definition of a cube given in Eucl. El. 7 Def. 20.
7 Theol. ar. 63.7–18. In the sense used here and in the other texts to be considered, a perfect 
number is a number which is equal to the sum of its factors (cf. Eucl. El. 7 Def. 23). Thus 6 
= 1+2+3, and 28 = 1+2+4+7+14. The number 1 has no factor except itself (1x1=1), and since it 
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Here Nicomachus immediately follows his first arithmetical construction of the 
number 35 with statements (strongly reminiscent of Philolaus8) connecting it with 
harmonia; and these statements suggest that it is only this connection that gives it 
a bearing on matters to do with childbirth. All genesis arises from opposites, and 
opposites will not come together to compose any integrated whole unless their 
combination is governed by harmonia. 35 is significant in this context because it is 
“the best of harmoniai,” containing all the concordant ratios, and hence is the best 
catalyst for the integration of opposites, without which no genesis can occur. The 
success of a foetus’s development, as of any process of generation and coming-to-
be, depends on its conformity to musical patterns of organization.
Nicomachus’ comment that 35 “fills out solidity and completion” for the cubes 
of 2 and 3 hints at a connection between these cubes and Plato’s construction of 
the World Soul in the Timaeus, where they are the final terms of his opening se-
quences of doubles (1, 2, 4, 8) and triples (1, 3, 9, 27). Cubes are “solid” numbers,9 
and with the two cubes Plato’s sequences reach completion. Adrastus of Aphro-
disias uses the notion of “solid numbers” when explaining why Plato’s quasi-mu-
sical system extends so far beyond Aristoxenus’ estimate of the range of human 
voices or instruments. Aristoxenus, he says, writes “with a view to our own us-
age,” whereas “Plato has an eye to nature, since it is necessary that the soul, being 
constituted in accordance with harmonia, should advance as far as the solid num-
bers and be attuned through two means, so that it can pass through the whole 
of the complete, solid cosmic body.”10 The Pythagoreans’ debt to the tradition of 
commentary on the Timaeus will become obvious as we proceed.
Nicomachus’ next remark is designed to clarify his statement that 35 “contains 
all the concordant ratios:” “It is also the sum of the numbers which express all the 
concordant relations in their lowest terms, 6, 8, 9 and 12.”11 But this “clarification” 
is very brief and allusive, and the details are set out more fully in the unattributed 
passage of the Theol. ar:
The progression from the monad is continuous up to the number 6, and 
music is continuous from the number 6 to the doubles; and from these aris-
es the attunement which extends to all wholes, to the viability of 7-month 
and 9-month births, and more. For if, following the two life-giving routes, 
the doubles and the triples, the progression runs by doubles from 6 
through 12, or by triples through 18, each interval is filled up in such a way 
as to include two means, one exceeding and exceeded by the same part of 
the extreme terms themselves, the other exceeding and exceeded by an 
is equal to itself Nicomachus treats it too as a perfect number, though only “potentially” 
(δυνάμει, contrasted with ἐνεργείᾳ). I am not sure how this superficially Aristotelian qual-
ification is to be understood.
 8 44 B 6 DK = frs. 6 and 6a Huffman.
 9 Cf. e. g. Plat. Theaet. 148b, Arist. Pol. 1316a8.
10 Adrastus ap. Theon Sm. 63.24–65.8.
11 Theol. ar. 63.19–21.
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equal number, and acquires the ratios of hemiolic and epitritic intervals; 
and in each case the generation of life is evident and will naturally come 
into being. For in the case of the double, 6 and 12, when 8 and 9 are insert-
ed as means, producing the results I have mentioned, the sum of them all 
together, 35, multiplied by 6, produces the time of 7 months, 210 days; and 
in that of 6 and 18, when 9 and 12 are inserted as means, creating in turn 
the same harmonic relation, when added together they produce 45, which 
when multiplied by 6, as before, produce the number for 9 months, which 
is 270. Thus both these life-giving lengths of time depend on the number 6, 
as if it were soul-like. For these reasons, then, Plato’s first portion in the 
generation of the soul is very reasonably expressed as 6, its double as 12, 
its triple as 18, and so on up to its 27-times multiple, 162. For these are the 
smallest terms in which the nature of the two means can be seen, together 
with that of the epogdoic ratio which lies between them.12
The last sentence of this extract brings out the relevance of the numbers which 
Nicomachus mentioned, 6, 8, 9, 12, and of 6, 9, 12, 18 too. In Plato’s construction of 
the World Soul, now treated explicitly as the basis of these ideas, the arithmetic 
and harmonic means are inserted between adjacent terms in the series of doubles, 
1, 2, 4, 8, and the series of triples, 1, 3, 9, 27. But the means cannot be expressed 
as integers unless the original terms are multiplied by some factor, and 6 is the 
smallest multiplier that will serve the purpose. In each series, the ratios between 
all pairs of adjacent terms are the same, and hence the relation between the first 
two terms in each series, 1, 2 and 1, 3, can exemplify them all. 2 : 1 = 12 : 6, and 3 : 1 
= 18 : 6. The means can now be inserted: 8 and 9 are the harmonic and arithmetic 
means between 6 and 12; and 9 and 12 are the harmonic and arithmetic means 
between 6 and 18.
Thus when Nicomachus says that the number 35 “contains all the concordant 
ratios,” he means that they are contained in the ratios between the terms of the 
series 6, 8, 9, 12, and hence, implicitly, in 35, their sum. In Greek theory, the fun-
damental concords are the octave, the fifth, and the fourth. There are no others 
within the octave, and all larger concords are formed by combining one of the 
fundamental concords with an octave or a multiple of the octave. The octave’s ra-
tio is 2 : 1, represented in this sequence by 12 : 6; that of the fifth is 3 : 2 = 9 : 6 = 12 : 8; 
that of the fourth is 4 : 3 = 8 : 6 = 12 : 9. The ratio 9 : 8, the “epogdoic” ratio mentioned 
at the end of the excerpt, does not correspond to a concord; it is the ratio of the 
whole tone (or “major second”), defined as the difference between a fifth and a 
fourth. Thus the structure mapped out by the terms 6, 8, 9, 12 represents that of 
an octave with two intermediate notes inserted between its boundaries, sepa-
rated by a tone and marking off the interval of a fourth at each end. This pattern 
of intervals has impeccable musical credentials, since it gives the basic skeleton 
12 Theol. ar. 51.4–52.5.
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of the octave-structure which Greek theorists regularly treat as paradigmatic; to 
complete an octave scale one need only add two subordinate notes inside each of 
the fourths, to form tetrachords. (All the ratios between terms in the sequence 6, 
9, 12, 18 are ratios of concords, and 18 : 6 = 3 : 1, the ratio of an octave plus a fifth. 
But systems spanning an octave and a fifth have no special role in Greek theory 
or practice.)
The anonymous writer also explains why the number 35 is connected with the 
viability of 7-month births. It is because 35 multiplied by 6 is 210, the number of 
days in seven months (of 30 days each). Similarly, when 45, the sum of the terms 
in the sequence 6, 9, 12, 18, is multiplied by 6, the result is 270, the number of days 
in nine months. He expresses the significance of the number 6 by saying that it is 
“soul-like,” ψυχοειδής;13 other authors of this period represent it as the number 
of marriage, γάμος, since it is the product of 2 and 3, the first female and the first 
male numbers, or because it is the first perfect number (as defined in n. 7 above), 
or for both reasons.14 In the following passage Aristides Quintilianus calls it “the 
first symbolon of genesis:”
Let us now show how the coming-into-being of rational creatures is also 
in sympathy with the musical proportions. We shall find that a pregnancy 
that comes to fruition after seven monthly cycles corresponds to the har-
monic ratios. For if we take the number 6, the first symbolon of genesis, and 
put together the sequence of numbers which exhibit in relation to it the 
harmonic proportions, the epitritic (4 : 3), the hemiolic (3 : 2) and the double 
(2 : 1), the numbers in our sequence will be the following: 6, 8, 9, 12. If we 
add these numbers, they make 35, the number in the course of which, so 
they say, 7-month children are thoroughly formed; and if we multiply 35 
by 6 we make 210, equal to the number of 7-month children’s daily cycles.15
Most of this is already familiar from Nicomachus and the anonymous writer in 
the Theol. ar. The only new feature is that the number 35 is given added signifi-
cance by Aristides’ statement that – “so they say” – a child that will be born after 
seven months is fully formed after 35 days. Who “they” are is unclear; we shall 
return to the matter in connection with a passage of Proclus.
Aristides turns next to the number 45. At the end of the passage quoted below 
he relates it to the 9-month period of gestation in the same way as the Theol. ar., 
but he begins by deriving the number itself in a different way:
Next, if we add to the same terms the rhythmical ratios, equal, double, 
hemiolic, and epitritic, beginning from the unit, the numbers will be 1, 
13 Similarly Nicomachus at Theol. ar. 63.21–25: “this musical and most fulfilling number, 35, 
when formed as a rectangle bounded by two odd-numbered sides, 5 and 7, becomes psycho-
gonic if it is extended into the third dimension by being multiplied by 6, for 6 has the greatest 
affinity with the soul.”
14 See e. g. Anatolius De dec. 10.13–18, Proclus in Remp. 35.20–22.
15 Aristid. Quint. 3.18, 117.18–118.2 Winnington-Ingram.
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2, 3, 4. Of these the unit, which has no number preceding it in order, will 
stand to itself in equal ratio; 2 stands to 1 in double ratio, 3 to 2 in hemiolic, 
and 4 : 3 in epitritic. By adding these numbers together we complete the 
number 10, and by adding this to 35 we shall make 45, the number in the 
course of which they say that 9-month children are formed. If we multiply 
45 by 6, as this is a perfect number, we shall get the number which belongs 
to 9-month children, 270; for that is the number of daily cycles after which 
these children are born alive.16
Aristides himself may have devised the strategy of reaching 45 by adding the 
terms of the rhythmic ratios to the original 35. I have found it nowhere else, and 
it would be entirely characteristic of this author. His principal focus in the De 
musica is of course on music rather than metaphysics, and allusions to rhythms 
as well as melodic relations come naturally in that context. They also give an air 
of musical completeness to the profile of the number 45, by representing it as the 
number in which the melodic and rhythmic ratios are combined. We may note 
that Aristides is unusual even among specialists on musical theory, in that he 
devotes as many chapters of technical exposition to rhythmics – which most such 
writers ignore or treat very cursorily – as he does to harmonics.17
He next offers an obscure explanation of the non-viability of children born at 
eight months, a topic best approached through a passage of Proclus, who begins 
by asserting that the doctor Herophilus rejected the possibility of viable births at 7 
months, but that the Pythagoreans accepted it. After a brief excursus on astrologi-
cal explanations of the viability of 7-month births, which he attributes to Zoroaster, 
he says that Empedocles also asserted that there are two periods of gestation, de-
scribing women as δίγονοι, mentioning the number of days by which the two peri-
ods differ, and asserting that 8-month periods are ἄγονα, unfruitful.18 “And that is 
to be expected” (καὶ εἰκότως), he continues; and here, to explain why Empedocles’ 
view is entirely reasonable, he adds his exposition of the Pythagorean explana-
tions. He does not attribute them to Empedocles himself; he has independently 
appended everything from the phrase καὶ εἰκότως onwards, in order to persuade 
his readers that Empedocles’ position can be defended. Here is the passage.
And that is to be expected. For the primary number of 7-month births, 35, 
is in the numbers 6, 8, 9, 12, whose extremes contain the double ratio and 
the octave; and the primary number of 9-month births is in the concor-
dant numbers 6, 9, 12, 18, whose extremes contain the triple ratio. Between 
16 Aristid. Quint. 118.2–16 Winnington-Ingram.
17 Harmonics occupies chapters 6–12 of Book 1 and rhythmics chapters 13–19. Aristides lists 
the rhythmic ratios in 1.14 (33.29–34.4 Winnington-Ingram), noting correctly that not every-
one accepts the ratio 4 : 3 as genuinely rhythmic (Aristoxenus does not: see Rhyth. 2.35), but 
subsequently incorporating it into his discussions.
18 Procl. in Remp. vol. 2, 33.9–34.28 Kroll.
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them there is no other concordant ratio,19 so that it is to be expected that 
since there is no concord, 8-month births are unfruitful. Further, when the 
numbers from 2 to 8 are added together they make 35, and those from 1 
to 9 make 45 (the appropriate origin for 8 is 2, since it is its cube, and for 
9 it is 1, since the ennead is a new “one”20), and there is no mean between 
them. Hence there is no number that makes 8-month births, whether it is 
considered arithmetically or <geometrically?>. For when 35 is multiplied 
by 6 it makes the 7-month period and when 45 is multiplied by 6 it makes 
the 9-month period, but when 40 is multiplied by 6 it makes the 8-month 
period [lacuna] turning back to the original numbers, 7, 9, and 8. Of these 
the first is made up of the numbers around the right angle of the triangle 
that will be specified, which are 4 and 3, female and male; the second is 
made up of the largest numbers, 4 and 5, female and male; and the third is 
made up of the largest and the smallest, which are 5 and 3, which are both 
males, and it is therefore to be expected that it is unfruitful. And 6, which 
is marriage, will be seen in the area [that is, the area of the triangle]. Hence 
it is to be expected that when it joins male with female it is fruitful, but 
when it joins males with one another it is unfruitful.21
Unlike other writers in this tradition, Proclus is not using the Pythagorean arith-
metic primarily to explain why 7-month births are viable, or to justify all the the-
ses which he claims he has found in Empedocles. The words καὶ εἰκότως, “And 
that is to be expected,” evidently refer only to the last of the allegedly Emped-
oclean theses, that 8-month periods of gestation are ἄγονα, unfruitful. Almost 
everything that follows is designed to show that this is true, and why. Proclus’ 
arguments are not hard to follow, but they offer an assortment of considerations 
with no clear connecting thread, perhaps plucked from several different sources, 
and the arguments used in this context by the other writers seem equally ran-
dom. Nicomachus says only that infants born at 8 months are “destroyed by natu-
19 The double ratio is that of the octave and the triple ratio is that of the octave plus a perfect 
fifth. One might expect that the octave plus a fourth, which lies between them, would also 
count as a concord. But Pythagorean theorists regularly assert that the ratios of concords 
must be either multiple (mn : n) or epimoric (n+1 : n); see for example Sect. can. 149.10–24 Jan. 
A significant consequence is that the interval of an octave plus a fourth, whose ratio is 8:3, 
cannot be a concord, though it was treated as such by the empirical theorists and in musical 
practice. Ptolemy disagrees with the Pythagoreans on this point; for his extensive discus-
sion see Ptol. Harm. 1.6, 13.1–23 Düring, and cf. 1.7, 15.18–16.12. Taking a cue from Plato at 
Resp. 531c1–7, one might argue that Proclus refers here to concordant ratios, not to the ratios 
of concordant intervals, and that the criterion of concordance between two numbers is not 
necessarily identical with that of concordance between two notes. But this defence is open to 
serious objections, and in any case Proclus is merely rehearsing what he found in Pythago-
rean musicological texts.
20 Proclus treats the word ἐννέα, 9, as if it were ἓννέον, “new 1.“ I have not found the original 
source of this fanciful etymology.
21 Procl. in Remp. vol. 2, 34.28–35.22 Kroll.
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ral necessity,” διαφθείρεσθαι… ὑπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀνάγκης,22 without any attempt 
to explain why their destruction is inevitable. Aristides Quintilianus makes one 
brief and enigmatic remark, immediately after deriving the number of days in-
volved in 7-month and 9-month births:
We can see that 8-month children are produced, through their participa-
tion in the smallest ratios, but because they do not participate in all of them 
they are never born alive.23
I have found no satisfactory way of interpreting Aristides’ statements about par-
ticipation in the ratios, but the points he has in mind are clearly not identical with 
any of those mentioned by Proclus.
The writer of the Theol. ar. seems positively embarrassed at the situation in 
which he finds himself. In his short section on the number 8,24 he first records 
a succession of its attributes all of which evoke its special excellence, and some 
of them assort very awkwardly with the doctrine about 8-month children. The 
number 8, he says, is panharmonios, containing all harmonic relations within itself 
(73.5―8); and it is “Cadmeian,” explained as an allusion to Harmonia the wife 
of Cadmus (73.8―10). In the old days, he continues, people called this number 
“mother,” perhaps because Rhea is the mother of the gods, “and the number 2 
was previously shown to belong to Rhea seminally, the number 8 in extension.”25 
One would therefore expect 8 to have a very positive relation to childbirth, and 
yet it does not. Perhaps, the writer tentatively suggests, it is because of the con-
nection with Rhea that this number is ἀλιτόμηνος, literally “missing the month,” 
and childbirth after eight months is fruitless and untimely:
Concerning Rhea, people tell the tale that Kronos obliterated the children 
born from her, or so the story goes,26 and concerning the number 8 they say 
that the pains of labour at eight months are fruitless, and for that reason 
are called “missing the month.”27
The principal material in all these writers’ accounts of 7-month and 9-month 
births derives from reflections on Plato’s construction of the World Soul in the 
Timaeus; and this helps to explain the lack of consistency in their explanations of 
the non-viability of 8-month infants. There was nothing helpful in the Timaeus, 
and they were forced to extemporize. Hence there is no orthodox tradition of 
explanations in connection with 8-month births, as there is for births at 7 and 9 
months. Two other features of the writers’ arguments must also originate in the 
22 Theol. ar. 63.4–5.
23 Aristid. Quint. 118.16–18 Winnington-Ingram.
24 Theol. ar. 72.1–74.22.
25 For the connection of Rhea with the number 2 see Theol. ar. 14.6–9. The phrase “in extension,” 
κατ’ ἐπέκτασιν, refers to the fact that 8 is the cube of 2.
26 Hes. Th. 453–467.
27 Theol. ar. 74.15–19.
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post-Platonic period. One is their treatment of the number 6 as a perfect number 
and as representing γάμος, marriage. In the early tradition, the number associ-
ated with γάμος is not 6 but 5, the sum rather than the product of the first male 
and the first female number;28 and, as Burkert noted, the Euclidean conception 
of a perfect number which our authors use in describing the number 6 is alien 
to pre-Aristotelian Pythagoreanism, which had its own quite different notion 
of arithmetical perfection, attributed only to the number 10. The number 6 was 
assigned no particular significance.29 Secondly, the ratios of the octave and its 
constituent minor concords had been known since the fifth century, but there is 
no trace of their expression through the numbers 6, 8, 9, 12 until the second half 
of the fourth. These numbers first appear in the Epinomis attributed to Philip of 
Opus, published, we suppose, around 345 BC.30 From the first century AD on-
wards they appear frequently, both in musicological texts and in philosophical 
writings of a Platonist or Pythagorean type, often (not always) in contexts ex-
plicitly connected with the Timaeus. We can conclude that the people who first 
devised the explanations of the viability of seven-month and nine-month infants 
took the essential components of their explanations from Hellenistic discussions 
of the Platonic World Soul, and that their originality lay only in their use of this 
material to account for supposed facts about periods of gestation.
3 Medicine and natural science
The opinions of medical specialists or natural scientists are hardly mentioned 
in the texts we have been examining. But there is one remarkable exception. The 
passage I quoted earlier Proclus ends with the following statements:
The preceding arguments are based on numbers. But the anatomikoi also 
mention the distinctions found in these numbers. They say that when the 
sperm has frothed (ἀφρωθῇ) for a period of 6 days, during the next 8 days 
it is transformed into blood, during the next 9 it becomes flesh-like, and 
during the remaining 12 days it acquires form; and when it has been pro-
gressively organized in this way it is born at 7 months. And in the other 
cases [i. e. those leading to birth at 9 months], similarly, it receives the same 
form in periods of 6, 9, 12 and 18 days. Thus the number 6 is their common 
origin, since it is this that makes each of them.31
The anonymous writer in the Theol. ar. must be referring to the same doctrines 
in an allusion to “the 6 days in which the seed froths and germinates;”32 and 
Nicomachus may have had a comparable theory in mind when he mentions “the 
6 days after which it has been shown that the fluid-containing membrane first be-
28 Arist. Metaph. 1078b23 with Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 39.8–13.
29 Burkert 1972, 431; Arist. Metaph. 986a8–9.
30 [Plat.] Epin. 990d–991b.
31 Procl. in Remp. 35.22–36.2 Kroll.
32 Theol. ar. 52.7–8.
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comes visible.”33 As we saw earlier, Aristides tells us that 35 is the number of days 
“in the course of which, so they say, 7-month children are thoroughly formed.”34 
The number 35 fits with the theory that Proclus records, as does the fact that it is 
only children due to be born at 7 months that are “thoroughly formed” at 35 days, 
and Aristides’ statement, like that of the anonymous writer, is almost certainly a 
partial reflection of the theory set out by Proclus.
The theory or theories reported in these passages, and especially in Proclus’ 
extended account, are evidently derived from medical and specifically gynaeco-
logical sources, whose authors must have claimed that they were based on empir-
ical observation. Nicomachus seems to point to scientists of the fourth and third 
centuries BC, asserting that, according to Strato of Lampsacus, Diocles of Carys-
tus, and “many other medical experts,”35 by the thirty-fifth day the embryo of a 
child that will be born at 7 months is fully formed. They say that it is very small, 
“about the size of a bee,” but that it is “clearly articulated, so that the head and 
neck and trunk and limbs in general are visible on it.” So far they agree perfectly 
with Proclus’ anatomikoi. But in other respects they describe the stages of forma-
tion in very different terms, and they were certainly not responsible for attaching 
the Pythagorean numbers to the various stages. The stages they identify are of 
7 days each. In 5 of them a 7-month child is fully formed; in 6 a 9-month child is 
formed, but only if it is female; for a 9-month male to be formed takes 7 such peri-
ods, 49 days.36 There are in fact no surviving texts which assign the Pythagorean 
numbers of days to the stages of foetal development except in the Pythagorean 
(or Platonist) sources themselves,37 and the theory is so carefully tailored to fit the 
arithmetical and musicological doctrines we have been examining that it cannot 
have been prompted by observations alone. The number of days assigned to each 
of the stages of development matches the Pythagorean sequence 6, 8, 9, 12, too 
perfectly to be coincidental.
Platonists of the imperial period were interested in medical issues, and in-
cluded a number of trained medical specialists.38 Embryology was a subject to 
which they paid particular attention,39 since it has a direct bearing on the relation 
between the developing body and the soul by which it is animated. The evidence 
33 Theol. ar. 64.7–9. I shall suggest shortly that this theory is not only comparable but identical 
with the one evoked by the anonymous writer.
34 Aristid. Quint. 117.27–28 Winnington-Ingram.
35 Strato belongs to the third century BC, and Diocles probably to the fourth, though the matter 
is controversial: see von Staden 1989, 44–46.
36 Theol. ar. 62.8–63.1 = Diocl. fr. 45a van der Eijk. 
37 My thanks to Vivian Nutton, Philip van der Eijk, James Wilberding, and Svetla Slaveva-Grif-
fin, with whom I have corresponded about this issue. I am very grateful for their help.
38 This is confirmed, with copious references to the ancient sources, in Wilberding 2014.
39 My thanks to James Wilberding for generously allowing me to see a pre-publication copy of 
the article mentioned in n. 38 above and a chapter of his forthcoming monograph on Neo-
platonist embryology. The fact that such a monograph can be written at all bears witness to 
the amount of relevant material available.
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suggests, however, that even when the investigators had some expertise in med-
ical disciplines, their work was based more on book-learning and philosophical 
reflection than on first-hand empirical research. In the present case we can prob-
ably identify the pair of treatises which gave Proclus’ anatomikoi the quasi-factual 
foundation for their theses, the Hippocratic De genitura and De natura pueri (dated 
by Jouanna40 around the end of the fifth century BC), especially the latter.41 We 
know that this essay attracted attention in Platonist circles from its citations in 
the epistolary treatise Ad Gaurum, nowadays generally attributed to Porphyry.42
There is no exact counterpart in the Hippocratic treatises of Proclus’ initial 
6-day phase in which the semen “froths.” But at the beginning of Genit. (vol. 7, 470 
Littré) it is described as frothing as it passes through the body during intercourse 
and ejaculation; and the formation of the fluid-containing membrane whose 
development Nicomachus assigns to the first 6 days43 is described at Nat. puer. 
12.37–45 (488),44 and frequently mentioned as the text continues. Perhaps Proclus’ 
source conflated the Hippocratic writer’s allusions to frothing with the detailed 
description of an aborted 6-day embryo given at Nat. puer. 13.1–22 (488–492). Be 
that as it may, the treatise provides almost exact counterparts of the other three 
stages in Proclus’ account. At 14.1–9 (492) the contents of the membranaceous sac 
are enriched with blood (though the blood is derived from the mother, and is not 
a transformation of the semen); at 15.1–2 (492) the blood is transformed into flesh; 
and at 17.1–9 (496–498) it is articulated into organs and limbs. The passages of 
Philoponus cited in n. 42 above apparently reflect the same sequence.
But if the sequence of stages listed by Proclus originates in the Hippocratic 
essays, the numbers of days attached to each of them does not. The fact that the 
aborted embryo discussed in Nat. puer. was 6 days old is purely accidental. It just 
happens to have been at that moment that the abortion was induced; and the 
writer assigns no particular lengths of time to the individual stages he describes. 
He specifies the maximum number of days that “usually” elapse before the foe-
tus is fully formed, but the numbers are different for females and males (42 for 
the former, 30 for the latter).45 Neither of them corresponds to the Pythagorean 
numbers. We are bound to conclude that Proclus’ anatomikoi were combining two 
quite different modes of enquiry or forms of understanding, one based on the 
arithmetical and harmonic analysis of the soul, the other derived from an ancient 
40 Jouanna 1999, 392.
41 The two essays are closely connected, but there is little evidence to support the view that 
they were originally parts of the same treatise. See Lonie 1981, 43; Müller 1998, 201–221.
42 See especially 10.3, 46.14–47.5 Kalbfleisch. Relevant aspects of the Hippocratic theory recur 
in several passages of Philoponus, notably Aet. mund. 374.19–23 Rabe, In Cat. 201.9–13 Busse, 
In Ph. 157.32–158.1, 322.9–14 Vitelli.
43 Theol. ar. 64.7–9.
44 References are by section and line numbers of Littré’s edition, followed (in brackets) by the 
page numbers of his vol. 7.
45 Nat. puer. 18.1–5.
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record of medical experience; and they combined them by the simple expedient 
of superimposing the former on the latter.
Hippocratic treatises were probably also the Pythagoreans’ source for their 
central thesis, that 7-month children are viable but 8-month children are not (the 
doctrines are set out in detail in De septimestri partu and De octimestri partu). No 
post-Aristotelian medical writers say such things without significant qualifica-
tions. Almost invariably they agree with Aristotle’s contention that 8-month chil-
dren sometimes survive, though not often.46 Like him, they accept that 7-month 
children may also live, but usually stress, as he does, that birth at this time is also 
very risky. Some of them, for instance Soranus, the most eminent gynaecologist 
of antiquity, describe in detail the problems that affect both the mother and the 
foetus at these times.47 But their explanations are strictly biological. They have 
nothing in common with the Pythagorean analyses, whose inflexible numerical 
formulae can admit no exceptions, and will not even allow them to recognize that 
infants born at seven months often fail to survive.
We must consider one further possible connection between the Pythagorean 
theories and texts in the Hippocratic corpus. Burkert thought that certain passag-
es in the latter are themselves borrowed from early Pythagorean musical theory,48 
and the Hippocratics certainly did use musical ideas and analogies. One of them 
asserts that if developing embryos achieve the right attunement, which has three 
concordant intervals, the fourth, the fifth, and the octave, they will live and grow. 
But “if they do not achieve the attunement, and the low do not harmonize with 
the high in the interval of the fourth, or of the fifth, or in the octave, then the 
failure of one makes the whole scale of no value.”49 One could imagine a Pythag-
orean saying something like this, but nothing in it is peculiarly Pythagorean; and 
Burkert was mistaken in thinking that the writer’s use of the terms syllabe for the 
fourth and di’oxeian for the fifth demonstrate a link with Philolaus; he too uses 
those terms, but they are not the special preserve of Pythagorean theorists.50 The 
treatise De septimestri partu contains a second key passage. The author has been 
explaining that the doctor must pay special attention to his pregnant patient on 
certain days, identified by numbers. But here too there is nothing Pythagorean 
about the numbers in question, which include all the odd numbers, though with 
special emphasis on the number 7, and include also the fourteenth, twenty-eighth 
and forty-second day among the even numbers. In the same context we find the 
following intriguing statement: “We must consider the matter like this: by triads 
46 In Egypt, according to Aristotle, 8-month births are normal (Hist. an. 584b6–14). For his over-
all position on these issues see Hist. an. 584a33–b25, De gen. an. 772a37–b12.
47 Soranus, Gyn. 1.55–46.
48 Burkert 1972, 272–274.
49 Hippocr. Vict. 1.8 (Burkert’s translation).
50 See Porph. in Harm. 96.21–97.8 Düring, which first cites sources attributing these usages to 
the Pythagoreans, but continues with (probably correct) explanations associating them with 
early musicians in general.
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and tetrads, the triads being conjoined, and disjoined two by two” (Septim. 9). 
Burkert seems to have misconstrued this, supposing that the tetrads are sequenc-
es of numbers, again designating days, distinct from and parallel to the triads. 
But this is not what is meant. Triads are conjoined, but it is then the triads them-
selves that are to be disjoined, two by two. That is, each pair of conjoined triads is 
to be disjoined from another such pair; and a tetrad is the combination of the four 
triads put together in this way. The arrangement described is clearly a musical 
structure. It corresponds exactly to the regular pattern of organization which we 
find in musical theorists of all persuasions, in which a pair of conjoined tetra-
chords, each of which contains a “triad” of three intervals, lies on either side of a 
disjunction. There is nothing exclusively Pythagorean about it.
If the writers who devised the Timaeus-based explanations took the theories 
they were explaining from these Hippocratic texts, they would have found no 
authentically Pythagorean doctrines in them, but they would have found numer-
ological and musical conceptions which had recognizable affinities with their 
own. These texts not only provided them with the supposed facts that called 
for explanation (the more nuanced later medical tradition being wholly ignored), 
but also gave hints about the way in which the issues might be approached in 
terms appropriate to their own manner of thought, through arithmetical calcula-
tions involving symbolically significant numbers, allied to musical theory in the 
mathematical style that the early Pythagoreans had pioneered. In drawing on 
Plato’s account of the World Soul for the basis of their explanations, they assim-
ilated the ancient medical doctrines to a system of thought concerning life and 
the soul which was a cornerstone of their metaphysics. By integrating them with 
the patterns of cosmic and psychic order revealed by the most elevated kinds 
of philosophical thinking, they transformed the quasi-empirical wisdom of the 
Hippocratics into knowledge of a different and loftier sort, as an element within 
a rationally coordinated universal episteme.
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Iamblichus on Pythagorean Dietetics
Hynek Bartoš – Charles University Prague
In Chapter 29 of his On the Pythagorean Way of Life Iamblichus writes that accord-
ing to his sources the Pythagoreans (φασι τοὺς Πυθαγορείους) honoured most 
among all the sciences music, medicine, and divination. He summarizes their 
contribution to medicine as follows:
τῆς δὲ ἰατρικῆς μάλιστα μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὸ διαιτητικὸν εἶδος καὶ εἶναι 
ἀκριβεστάτους ἐν τούτῳ. καὶ πειρᾶσθαι πρῶτον μὲν καταμανθάνειν 
σημεῖα συμμετρίας πονῶν τε καὶ σίτων καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, ἔπειτα 
περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν προσφερομένων σχεδὸν πρώτους 
ἐπιχειρῆσαί τε πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ διορίζειν. ἅψασθαι δὲ [χρὴ] καὶ 
καταπλασμάτων ἐπὶ πλείω τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, τὰ 
δὲ περὶ τὰς φαρμακείας ἧττον δοκιμάζειν, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τοῖς 
πρὸς τὰς ἑλκώσεις μάλιστα χρῆσθαι, <τὰ δὲ> περὶ τὰς τομάς τε καὶ 
καύσεις ἥκιστα πάντων ἀποδέχεσθαι.1
And of medicine they [i. e. the Pythagoreans] especially approved the kind 
pertaining to diet, and in this they attained great precision, and first tried 
to discover signs of due proportion in exercises, foods, and rest. Therefore 
they were more or less the first to attempt to treat systematically and to 
lay down rules about the preparation of foods. The Pythagoreans used 
unctions and poultices more than their predecessors, but approved less of 
1 Vit. Pyth. 29 (§ 163–164), ed. and trans. Dillon / Hershbell (translation slightly modified). 
The whole passage reappears almost verbatim in chap. 34 (§ 244), with one minor varia-
tion: Iamblichus speaks there about due proportion in drinks (ποτῶν), foods, and rest. The 
variation πόνων / ποτῶν in the two parallel passages is certainly not intentional and most 
probably indicates a corruption of the text. Some editors leave both variants as transmitted 
(Dillon / Hershbell 1991), some emend πόνων at § 163 to ποτῶν on the basis of the parallel 
in § 244 (Deubner / Klein 1975; Romano 2006; Brisson / Segonds 2011), others the other way 
round (von Albrecht et al. 2002). Convincing arguments in support of reading of πόνων 
over ποτῶν in both these passages have been put forward by Roselli 1997. For the purposes 
of my argument, I will discuss Iamblichus’ report with the reading πόνων as it appears in 
Ch. 29 (§ 163). It should also be remarked that in my analysis I omit the rest of § 164, in which 
Iamblichus writes (trans. Dillon and Hershbell): “They also used incantations for some ill-
nesses. And they believed that music contributed greatly to health if someone used it in 
proper ways. They also used selected verses of Homer and Hesiod for the improvement of 
the soul.” These topics, which are not paralelled in On Regimen and therefore irrelevant to 
my argument, are discussed in the contribution of S. Kouloumentas to this volume.
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drugs and used these mostly for ulcerations; they approved surgery and 
cautery least of all.
As recognized by modern commentators on this passage,2 the idea that health 
depends on due proportion between food and exercise, identified by Iamblichus 
as one of the Pythagorean contributions to the field of dietetics, is attested in the 
Hippocratic On Regimen, an anonymous treatise written in the late fifth or early 
fourth century BCE which has been transmitted as part of the so-called Corpus 
Hippocraticum.3 There are various ways to interpret the connection between the 
Hippocratic text and Iamblichus’ report. De Vogel, for instance, presupposes that 
the Hippocratic author “was influenced by the Pythagoreans in his theory of a 
συμμετρία of σίτα and πόνοι, as he was elsewhere.”4 This interpretation con-
forms to the traditional and still relatively popular view according to which Py-
thagoreans played a crucial role in the early history of dietetics.5 Based on this 
assumption, it would be reasonable to believe that the Hippocratic author, who 
clearly acknowledges his debts to previous dietetic tradition,6 draws on the same 
Pythagorean conceptions as are attested by Iamblichus. A. L. Peck, to give another 
example, therefore suggests that the most important concepts in the Hippocratic 
account, such as mixture (κρῆσις), balance, or harmony, “had their origin among 
Pythagoreans, and especially among those of them who studied medicine, and 
that department of it which they held to be of singular importance, dietetics.”7
The aim of my chapter is to challenge this Pythagorizing tendency by focus-
ing in detail on the concept of symmetry and related topics in On Regimen and 
in Iamblichus´ report. I shall proceed as follows. Firstly, I will make the case that 
the close parallels between the two texts suggest that Iamblichus’ report draws 
(probably not directly, but rather through an intermediate source or sources)8 on 
2 Wöhrle 1990, 46; Roselli 1997, 106–109; Brisson / Segonds 2011, 200.
3 For a discussion of the date of the treatise see Joly / Byl 2003, 44–49.
4 De Vogel 1966, 234.
5 Similar views can be found in studies on the history of ancient medicine in general (Jones 
1961, 1 ff. and 44; Schumacher 1963, 53–66 and 81–85; Kudlien 1967, 36 ff. and 54 ff.), or specif-
ically on Pythagorean medicine (De Vogel 1966, 232–244; Zhmud 2012, 347–379), on history 
of dietetics (Wöhrle 1990, 35 ff.), or in modern commentaries on the Hippocratic On Regimen 
(Palm 1933, 62–68 and 110 ff; Joly 1967, xi–xiii; Joly / Byl 2003, 46–52). For a more cautious, but 
still positive, assessment of the role of the Pythagoreans in the early history of dietetics, see 
Schiefsky 2005, 48–49: “And though it is not implausible that the early Pythagoreans accord-
ed great importance to dietetics, given their concern with leading a particular way of life 
and with principles such as number and harmony, the actual evidence for this is rather thin; 
they surely had no monopoly on the field.”
6 Vict. I,1 (Joly / Byl 122,7–21), cited and discussed below. In the case of On Regimen I refer to the 
revised CMG edition, while all other Hippocratic references in this chapter will be given to 
volume and page (and line, where necessary) in Littré 1839–1861 (hereafter L.).
7 Peck 1928, 124. 
8 Already Diels 1903, 292, who also reads the manuscript’s πόνων at § 163, suggested Aristox-
enus as the source of this passage and included it among the fragments of the Pythagorean 
Precepts of Aristoxenus. Some scholars agree with this view (Edelstein 1943, 20 n. 49; Dil-
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this particular Hippocratic text, a hypothesis that has not been discussed before, 
as far as I know. Secondly, I will show that nothing confirms, in either Iambli-
chus’ passage or On Regimen or any other extant piece of ancient evidence, that 
the concept of symmetry between food and exercise had been employed prior to 
On Regimen. To the contrary, I will argue that this concept represents an original 
and remarkably influential contribution by the author of On Regimen to the field 
of dietetics. And finally I will note some consequences of this reading for the re-
construction of the early history of Pythagorean medicine. 
Let me start with a few remarks concerning ancient Greek dietetics in general. 
The semantic field covered by the term diaita is very broad and therefore needs 
cautious handling. Any restrictions concerning human life can be labelled with 
this expression but not every kind of moderation has to do with health in the 
strict sense. There is no doubt, for instance, that ancient Greek religious rituals 
were often accompanied by restrictions concerning food, drink, sleep, or sexual 
activities, without the aim of achieving a healthy condition.9 This consideration is 
extremely important when evaluating the evidence for the Pythagorean “way of 
life” or the specific regimen of competitive athletes, which has often been treated 
in modern scholarship as evidence for the roots of ancient Greek dietetics.10 Ac-
cordingly, in this chapter I focus solely on medical dietetics, as I shall call it for 
the sake of clarity, which “was a relatively late development in Greek medicine.”11 
There is hardly any reliable evidence for a theoretically grounded medical di-
etetics before the second half of the fifth century BCE, when the first Hippocratic 
treatises on the topic were written12 and when “treatment of internal diseases was 
based on a dietetics which was itself based on physical theories about elements 
and their qualities.”13 This new dietetic approach, most typically consisting of 
foods, drinks, gruels,14 baths, and therapeutic walks, is now and again explicitly 
distinguished from other forms of therapy, such as purging of sputum, evacua-
tion of the bowels, venesection, and purges.15 Dietetics is often presented as an 
alternative to pharmacological therapy;16 though pharmaka are occasionally pre-
lon / Hershbell 1991, 239 n. 6, Timpanaro Cardini 1958, 286), others are more sceptical (for 
instance Wehrli 1967, 58, see also Zhmud 2012, 355 n. 32). 
 9 See Wöhrle 1990, 22–31.
10 For this view and references to previous scholarship see Zhmud 2012, 347–379. 
11 Lonie 1977, 237. See also van der Eijk 2005, 114, and Jouanna 2012, 137–153.
12 For an approximate date of the Hippocratic treatises, see Jouanna 1999, 373–416.
13 Lonie 1977, 236. 
14 As Lonie’s 1977 analysis reveals, the triad of solid food (sitia), slops or gruels (rhupemata), and 
drinks (pota) probably belonged to an older tradition on which the new theoretically based 
dietetics were built.
15 Progn. 15 (L II,146–148). In Morb. I.14 (= L VI.164) blood-letting is clearly distinguished from 
regimen; the author of the Appendix to Regimen in acute diseases distinguishes between regi-
men, fomentation, and drugs (Acut. (sp.) 56–57 = LII,508–510).
16 E.g. Mul. I,11 (L VIII,42), I,17 (L VIII,56), I, 66 (L VIII,136), II,115 (L VIII,248–250), II,118 
(L VIII,254–258); Aff. 22 (L VI,232–234); Loc. Hom. 23 (= L VI,314); Nat. Hom. 9 (L VI,54).
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scribed within a dietetic treatment,17 they are avoided where possible.18 Accord-
ingly, when Iamblichus reports that “the Pythagoreans used poultices more than 
their predecessors, but approved less of using drugs” and that “they approved of 
surgery and cautery least of all,” he is indicating nothing specifically “Pythagore-
an” but is rather describing common features of the dietetic approach in general.19
More peculiar is his claim that the Pythagoreans tried to identify “the signs 
of due proportion in work, foods, and rest” (σημεῖα συμμετρίας πόνων τε καὶ 
σίτων καὶ ἀναπαύσεως), which deserves closer inspection. It was a standard pro-
cedure in ancient medicine to pay attention to perceivable signs which indicate 
the condition of the human body, and the author of On Regimen is no exception. 
Though he rarely uses the expression σημεῖα,20 he often speaks about things “in-
dicating” (σημαίνει) healthy or pathological conditions, especially in the fourth 
book, which is devoted to diagnosis from dreams. In the other books of the trea-
tise, and most notably in Book 3, he usually employs the term τεκμήρια, and 
specifically the signs of imbalance between food and exercise.21
This brings us to the concept of balance expressed as symmetry. The adjective 
σύμμετρος or the adverb συμμέτρως are quite common throughout the Hippo-
cratic corpus,22 which suggests that the principle of moderation and due measure 
was deeply embedded in Greek medical thought. But, interestingly enough, the 
substantive συμμετρίη, which is the key term in later dietetic accounts, as attested 
for instance by Galen’s works on the topic, appears only in On Regimen and in no 
other medical text that can be dated to the classical period.23 This, I believe, is a 
clear indication that Iamblichus’ report may be drawing on this particular dietetic 
account. But there seems to be one dissimilarity: the author of On Regimen speaks 
specifically about the symmetry between food and exercise, while Iamblichus 
(or his source) adds a third factor, namely rest (ἀνάπαυσις). Rest (or inaction)24 
17 E.g. Nat. Hom. 9 (L. VI,54); Aff. 22 (L VI,234); Morb. II,72 (L. VII,108–110).
18 Vict. III,67 (Joly / Byl 194,10–15). See also Aff. 20 (L VI,230), or Plato (Resp. 459c) who views 
dieticians as second-rate specialists compared to the more enterprising and venturesome 
physicians curing by drugs.
19 Contra De Vogel 1966, 234.
20 Vict. I,22 (Joly / Byl 140,14), IV,89 (Joly / Byl 224,24).
21 E.g. Vict. III,70 (202.30), III,72 (204.11), III,85 (Joly / Byl 216,27–30).
22 E.g. Acut. (Sp.) 18 (L II,482,8); Fract. 8 (L III,444,9); Art. 78 (L IV,316,2); Mochl. 38 (L IV,382,15 
and 386,5); Aph. V,62 (L IV,556,1); Prorrh. II,11 (L IX,30,19); Superf. 8 (L VIII,482,8); Gland. 7 
(L VIII,562,6).
23 Apart from On Regimen (Vict. I,2 = Joly / Byl 124,11; I,32 = 148,31; II,66 = 190,26; III,67 = 194,3; 
III,83 = 216,4), among the Hippocratic writings it is attested only in Off. 25 (L III,334,7) and 
Ep. 16 (L IX,346,12), which are both most probably of Hellenistic or even later origin. Com-
pare Chrysippus’ definition of health as the good mixture (εὐκρασία) and proportion 
(συμμετρία) of hot, cold, dry, and moist in the body (Galen, PHP 5.2 = De Lacy 300.27–30, see 
also Chrysippus, fr. 471, ed. Arnim).
24 The term ἀνάπαυσις is not uncommon in Hippocratic treatises, e. g. VM, 11 (L I,594,12); 
Acut. 12,2; Aph. 4,13 (L IV,506,2); Nat. Hom. 9 (L VI,52,7) and 15 (L VI,66,19); Loc. Hom. 1 (L 
VI,276,8). The author of On Regimen occasionally employs the verb ἀναπαύειν (Vict. I,15 = 
Joly / Byl 138,1 and III,68 = 196,34), although he prefers to speak about ῥᾳθυμίη (Vict. I,36 = 
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is taken in the Hippocratic treatise to be the absence of exercise which, in the 
end, affects the body in a similar way as food does, that is it moistens, cools, and 
weakens the body,25 and so it can be recommended instead of (or together with) 
food, especially in cases where an excess of exercise needs to be counterbalanced. 
Accordingly, it is quite appropriate to epitomize the essence of the Hippocratic 
theory as a symmetry between exercises on the one hand and foods together with 
inaction on the other.26
As for the highest precision in the field of dietetics, which Iamblichus ascribes 
to the Pythagoreans, a number of Hippocratic treatises attest remarkable con-
cern with the exactness appropriate to dietetic diagnosis and therapy,27 although 
they bear no signs of Pythagorean influence. The author of On Ancient Medicine,28 
for instance, who advocates dietetics based on empirical experience, stresses the 
necessity of finding some “measure” or “standard” (μέτρον) such as “weight” 
(σταθμόν) or “number” (ἀριθμόν), and in relation to that he also mentions the 
difficulty in attaining exactness through sense perception (αἴσθησις).29 In On Reg-
imen we find numerous passages discussing the degree of akribeia attainable in di-
etetic diagnostics, among which the following in Ch. 2 deserves special attention:
If it were possible to discover for the constitution of each individual the 
due measure (μέτρον) of food and the right amount (ἀριθμὸς σύμμετρος) 
of exercise, with no inaccuracy either of excess or of defect, an exact dis-
Joly / Byl 156,24;IV,89 = 222,15; IV,93 = 230,10; III,72 = 204,13); IV,93 = 228,25; III,85 = 216,31; IV,89 
= 222,25); IV,89 = 222,29; IV,90 = 228,2).
25 Inaction (ῥᾳθυμίη) and exercise (πόνος) are taken in the dietetic theory of On Regimen as 
opposite factors having opposite effects on the body, as we can read for instance in Vict. 
II,60 (Joly / Byl 182,26): “Inaction moistens and weakens the body; for the soul, being at rest, 
does not consume the moisture of the body. But exercise dries and strengthens the body.” 
Ῥᾳθυμίη ὑγραίνει καὶ ἀσθενὲς τὸ σῶμα ποιέει· ἀτρεμίζουσα γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐκ ἀναλίσκει τὸ 
ὑγρὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος· πόνος δὲ ξηραίνει καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἰσχυρὸν ποιέει. See also Vict. III,85 
(Joly / Byl 216,31). Accordingly, the effect of rest is that of moistening, weakening, and also 
cooling, as we read in the following passage. When the author wants to give reasons for the 
idea that males of all species are warmer and drier and females moister and cooler, he claims 
that “females use a regimen that is moister and less strenuous“ Vict. I,34 (Joly / Byl 150,27): τὰ 
δὲ θήλεα ὑγρότερα καὶ ψυχρότερα διὰ τόδε… τὰ δὲ θήλεα ὑγροτέρῃσι καὶ ῥᾳθυμοτέρῃσι 
τῇσι διαίτῃσι χρέονται.
26 As was pointed out to me by S. Kouloumentas, a remarkable parallel can be found in Iambli-
chus’ detailed description of the Pythagorean way of life in Ch. 21 (§ 95–100), where he says 
that besides walks, baths, wrestling, and other exercises, the Pythagoreans were also con-
cerned with a balanced ἡρεμίαν τε καί ἡσυχίαν, which no doubt corresponds to ἀνάπαυσις 
in § 164. 
27 For example Acut. 6 (L II,268), Epid. III,3,16 (L III,102), Aph. I,4–5 (L IV,460–462).
28 Although several earlier scholars (e. g. Peck 1928, 113–124, Wellmann 1930, Wanner 1939, 
54 ff.) argued that the author of On Ancient Medicine was writing to defend a specifically 
Pythagorean tradition of dietetics, recent scholars have been rather sceptical about this as-
sumption (Schiefsky 2005, 48–49; Jouanna 1990, 22–34).
29 VM, 9 (L I,588–590).
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covery of health for men would have been made (εὕρητο ἂν ἡ ὑγείη τοῖσιν 
ἀνθρώποισιν ἀκριβῶς).30
The author seems to be seeking here almost mathematical exactness, which “has 
been attained by nobody,”31 as he claims, and which cannot be matched in his 
own account either.32 Accordingly, he adopts a more stochastic approach, which is 
said to be easy (ῥηΐδιον)33 and which consists of the diagnosis of excess, either in 
food or exercise, moistness or dryness, hot or cold, and then gradual restoration 
of health by counterbalancing the surplus by its opposite.34 On the whole one can 
conclude that discussions concerning akribeia were a commonplace in the dietetic 
tradition attested in the Hippocratic treatises, although the precision with which 
this question is treated in On Regimen is rather exceptional. 
To sum up, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that all the main charac-
teristics of Pythagorean dietetics listed by Iamblichus in the passage under con-
sideration were derived from one single source, namely from On Regimen, whose 
author not only promotes dietetics, but also attains great precision in this field, 
aims to discover signs of due proportion in exercises, foods, and rest, and pres-
ents “more or less the first” attempt to treat the subject systematically. Given this 
assumption, it is obvious to ask why Iamblichus (or anyone before him) would 
have chosen this and no other dietetic account as representative of Pythagorean 
dietetics. In what follows I shall try to suggest a few possible reasons.
Firstly, among the Hippocratic treatises and other extant medical texts from 
the classical era that discuss dietetics, On Regimen is not only the longest and 
most elaborated and systematic one, but it is also the best candidate to be iden-
tified as a Pythagorean text, especially when post-Platonic criteria are applied. 
Here I mean, for instance, the prominent role played by the concept of correspon-
dence (mimesis), which underlies the whole account of the nature of man in On 
Regimen. This includes the theory of three musical intervals (the fourth, the fifth, 
and the octave) employed in the embryological account (Vict. I,8) and correspond-
ing with the tripartite structure of the cosmos, marked out by the spheres of the 
stars, the Sun and the Moon (Vict. IV,89);35 the notion of everlasting and transmi-
grating souls, which seems to be implied in the dietetic account;36 or the fact that, 
alongside various dietetic procedures, prayers to gods are also recommended in 
this and no other extant medical text of the time (Vict. IV,89–90). 
Further possible evidence that could support the assumption that On Regimen 
represents a specifically Pythagorean approach to dietetics can be inferred from 
30 Vict. I,2 (Joly / Byl 124,17–20). See also Vict. III,67 (194,1–16; 124,24) .
31 Vict. III,67 (Joly / Byl 194,10–16).
32 Reasons for this are discussed in detail in Vict. I,2 (Joly / Byl 124,21–24).
33 Vict. III,66 (Joly / Byl 190,27).
34 See Vict. III,81 (Joly / Byl 212,27–214,11); and Vict. III,83 (Joly / Byl 216,5–15).
35 See Bartoš 2014; Bartoš 2015, 132–138.
36 See Bartoš 2009; Bartoš 2015, 212–217.
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the parallels with Plato’s Timaeus. In the section devoted to the diseases of soul 
Timaeus strongly recommends moderating and preventively maintaining the 
health of both body and soul by regimen (διαίταις) “to the extent one is free and 
has the time to do so (καθ’ ὅσον ἂν ᾖ τῳ σχολή).”37 He concludes with the idea 
that “there is but one way to care for everything (θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς 
μία),” which he specifies as providing to each individual the proper “nourish-
ment and motions” (τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις).38 This is only another way to express 
the key idea of On Regimen concerning health as a symmetry between food and 
exercise (or the symmetry between fire, which provides movement, and water, 
which provides nourishment).39 Plato’s Timaeus also defines health as a symmetry, 
though in comparison with On Regimen he innovates by introducing the sym-
metry between soul and body,40 which serves the specific goals of his ethical di-
etetics.41 However, seeing these and many other close resemblances between the 
Timaeus and On Regimen, it would not be difficult to come to the conclusion that 
Plato, “the greatest of the Pythagoreans,”42 and the author of On Regimen both 
represent a specifically Pythagorean approach to dietetics. 
And finally, in the Pythagorean collection of moral exhortations, the so-called 
Golden Verses, we read advice not to neglect “the health of the body,” but to give 
it “drink and food and exercises in due measure (μέτρον).”43 The Golden Verses 
were immensely popular in late antiquity and were often believed to preserve 
the original teachings of Pythagoras. Their remarkable influence can also explain 
why it was taken for granted, as for instance Diogenes Laertius attests, that Py-
thagoras himself warned against overstepping symmetry in exercises and meals 
(μήτε τῶν πόνων μήτε τῶν σιτίων).44
Accordingly, it would not be surprising if a Neopythagorean author such as 
Iamblichus, who aims to reconstruct the glorious history of the Pythagorean 
movement, treated the anonymous text of On Regimen as a convenient piece of ev-
37 Plato, Tim. 89c7–d1. While in the Republic (406a–c) Plato criticized dietetics for exactly this 
point, that is that the leisure time one has available could be spent entirely in dietetic care, 
here he ardently recommends dietetics to anyone who can afford it, which obviously reminds 
us of the passage in On Regimen addressing those who have enough freedom and leisure to 
arrange their lifestyle according to the needs of health (Vict. III. 69; Joly / Byl 200,23–28).
38 Plato, Tim. 90c6–7.
39 Vict. I,3 (Joly / Byl 126,9–10).
40 Some kind of symmetry or imbalance between body and soul, though spelled out in differ-
ent terms, is attested also in Democritus (for example 68 B 159, 187, 191, and 212 DK), Lysias 
(Pro inf. 3.3–4, ed. Albini), Isocrates (Orat., Ad Demonicum 1,12,6, eds. Mathieu / Brémond), or 
the Hippocratic Hum. 9 (L 5. 488.15–490.2).
41 Elsewhere (Bartoš 2009, 25–29; Bartoš 2015, 185–207) I discuss in detail the difference be-
tween Plato’s moralized version of dietetics and the moral-free version in On Regimen.
42 Peck 1928, 124. 
43 Carmen Aureum, 32–34: οὐ δ’ ὑγιείας τῆς περὶ σῶμ’ ἀμέλειαν ἔχειν χρή, ἀλλὰ ποτοῦ τε 
μέτρον καὶ σίτου γυμνασίων τε ποιεῖσθαι.
44 D. L. 8.9,94–97 ed. Dorandi. Here I read πόνων (with Μss B, P and F), which Dorandi emends 
(after Cobet) to ποτῶν.
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idence attesting the Pythagorean contribution to the field of medicine. It is note-
worthy, nevertheless, that Iamblichus in his report wisely avoids the evidently 
anachronistic view that Pythagorean dietetics began already with Pythagoras in 
the sixth century.45 He clearly speaks of “the Pythagoreans,” not “Pythagoras” in 
this passage. Nor does he assert that these Pythagoreans founded the field of di-
etetics, but rather that they were “almost the first” (σχεδὸν πρώτους), that is they 
belong to the first generations of authors to work on the theoretical foundations 
of the new therapeutic and preventive approach. 
According to my reading, the difference between Iamblichus’ story and the 
interpretation of De Vogel mentioned above is the following. Iamblichus (or his 
source), takes the author of On Regimen to be a Pythagorean who contributed to 
the field of dietetics by identifying the appropriate dietetic principles, by attaining 
a high degree of accuracy, and by applying a systematic approach which brought 
this field to perfection. According to De Vogel and other modern scholars, on 
the other hand, the Hippocratic author was not a Pythagorean but has merely 
borrowed some ideas from the Pythagorean tradition, among them the concept 
of health as symmetry between food and exercise. This interpretation, therefore, 
presupposes that this concept existed already before On Regimen, which is a hy-
pothesis which should and can be tested.
In the opening chapters of On Regimen the author makes sufficiently clear that 
he is drawing on a rich tradition of written treatises, and announces that he is 
ready to “learn what has been correctly worked out by the labour of others, and to 
make use of these results in so far as they severally appeared to be of use.”46 The 
current state of discussion is depicted as follows:
While many have already written on the subject, nobody yet has rightly 
understood how he ought to treat it. Some indeed have succeeded in one 
respect and others in another, but nobody among my predecessors has 
successfully treated the whole subject… The correct statements of my pre-
decessors it is impossible for me to write correctly by writing them in some 
other way… Accordingly, as I have said, I shall accept correct statements 
and set forth the truth about those things which have been incorrectly 
stated. I shall explain also the nature of those things which none of my 
predecessors has even attempted to set forth.47
What he means by the whole subject is specified in the second chapter. First he 
maintains that whoever wishes to write correctly on human regimen “must first 
acquire knowledge and discernment of the nature of man in general,” by which 
he means that it is necessary to recognize the primary constituents of man, de-
fined in his account as fire and water, and their mutual relationship in terms of 
45 See Nutton 2004, 347 n. 69.
46 Vict. I,1 (Joly / Byl 124,12–13), trans. Jones.
47 Vict. I,1 (Joly / Byl 122,7–21), trans. Jones.
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dominance, which he solves as a balanced alternation between the dominance 
of the fire over the water and conversely. Thereafter he mentions the necessity of 
taking into account the powers of all the foods and drinks of our regimen, and 
concludes with the following consideration:
Even when all this is known, the care of man is not yet complete, because 
eating alone will not keep a man well; he must also take exercise. For food 
and exercise, while possessing opposite qualities, yet work together to pro-
duce health. For it is the nature of exercise to use up the available [resourc-
es in the body], but of food and drink to replenish what has been depleted. 
And it is necessary, as it appears, to discern the power of the various exer-
cises, both natural exercises and artificial, to know which of them tends to 
increase flesh and which to lessen it; and not only this, but also the propor-
tions of exercises suitable to the amount of food taken, to the individual 
constitution of man, to the age of individual, to the season of the year, to 
the changes of the winds, to the situation of his dwelling-place, and to the 
constitution of the year.48
This is a brief but comprehensive summary of the ambitious dietetic program 
the author wants to pursue in his treatise. Some parts of it are obviously adopted 
from his predecessors, some are partly adopted but improved, and some repre-
sent an original contribution of this author, which he calls a heurema. The most 
explicit formulation of his discovery is expressed in Ch. 69, where he announces 
that “it comprises prognosis before illness and diagnosis of what is the matter 
with the body, whether food overpowers exercise, whether exercise overpowers 
food, or whether the two are duly proportioned (μετρίως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα).49 
For it is from the overpowering of one or the other that diseases arise, while from 
their being evenly balanced comes good health (ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἰσάζειν πρὸς ἄλληλα 
ὑγείη πρόσεστιν).”50
Several modern interpreters have rightly concluded that the symmetry be-
tween food and exercise is presented in the treatise as an essential part of the 
author’s discovery.51 Not only is it explicitly mentioned among the improvements 
upon the previous dietetic accounts, but the same features mentioned for food 
and exercise (“while possessing opposite qualities, yet work together”) reappear 
48 Vict. I,2 (Joly / Byl 124,4–14), trans. Jones (modified).
49 Vict. III,69 (Joly / Byl 200,30–202,4), trans. Jones.
50 Vict. III,69 (Joly / Byl 200,30–202,4).
51 Fredrich holds that the “Erfindung des Compilators” rests in the diagnosis concerning the 
prevalence of food or exercises (Fredrich, 1899, 192); according to Jones the discovery “is 
clearly identified with προδιάγνωσις, how to tell beforehand, by symptoms, whether food 
or exercise is in excess, and by so doing προκαταλαμβάνειν τὴν ὑγείην” (Jones 1931, xlii–
xliii). See also Peck 1928, 52–59. Joly / Byl 2003, 233, are of another opinion and hold that 
the idea of the balance between nutrition and exercise “n’est pas du tout personelle à notre 
author.” In support of their claim they refer to several other Hippocratic passages, which I 
quote in footnote 58 below.
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in the definition of fire and water, as we read at the beginning of Ch. 3: “Now 
all animals, including man, are composed of two things, different in power but 
working together in their use, namely fire and water.”52 Fire, which “can move all 
things always,”53 is the elemental representation of the activities of life, which can 
all be included in the overarching concept of ponoi; and water stands for all nu-
trition, for it can “nourish all things always.”54 There is no doubt that this specific 
account of fire and water supports the idea that health depends on due balance 
between nutrition and movement, that is food and exercise, and that this princi-
ple is the core of the dietetic theory which the author proudly announces as his 
own heurema. 
This internal evidence alone cannot guarantee that the author is not here over-
estimating his merits and, so to speak, adorning himself with borrowed plumes. 
But the external evidence for the dietetic discussion, as far as we can judge from 
the extant texts, seems to confirm his originality. Out of the dietetic factors men-
tioned in Vict. I,2 (Joly / Byl 124,4–14) and discussed above, all can be found in 
treatises that are most probably earlier than or contemporary with On Regimen. 
The constituents of the nature of man and their individual powers are discussed 
most systematically in the Hippocratic On the Nature of Man, including reflections 
on the general discussion of the day,55 but various elemental and humoral spec-
ulations are attested also in other Hippocratic treatises.56 The relevance of the 
study of the powers of food and the ways of moderating them by art is discussed 
in length in On Ancient Medicine and Regimen in Acute Diseases. Recommendations 
concerning baths and gymnastics are given in several Hippocratic treatises.57 A 
discussion of the individual constitution of man, including considerations con-
cerning different ages, can be found in the Hippocratic Regimen in Health. The 
seasons of the year and their relevance to diagnosis of each individual condition 
of the body as well as the changes of the winds, the situation of a person’s dwell-
ing-place, or the constitution of the year, are discussed most thoroughly in Airs, 
waters, places. On the whole, practically all the dietetic factors listed by the author 
of On Regimen had been discussed by his predecessors or contemporaries, but no 
52 Vict. I,2 (Joly / Byl 126,5–6), trans. Jones.
53 Vict. I,3 (Joly / Byl 126,9).
54 Vict. I,3 (Joly / Byl 126,9–10).
55 Nat. Hom. 1–3 (L 6.32–38).
56 To give some examples, bile and phlegm play an important role in De affectionibus and De 
morbis, I, while the author of De haemorrhoidibus posits bile, phlegm, and blood. The same 
three humours are combined with the element of water in De morbis, IV or with pneuma, as 
the author of Anonymus Londinensis (XIX.18–48, ed. Manetti) ascribes to Menecrates. Pneuma 
and air play a crucial role in On breaths, while the author of Fleshes posits heat as the driving 
force of all macrocosmic as well as microcosmic processes. The author of On Ancient Medi-
cine, on the other hand, rejects all such speculations as inappropriate to the field of medicine.
57 For example Acut. 65–68 (L 2.364–374), Nat. Hom. 9 (L 6.52–54), Aff. 19 (L 6.228) and 20 
(L 6.230).See also the passage in Epidemics (6.6.3.18 = L 5.302) in which the Hippocratic author 
criticizes Herodicus for an inappropriate use of vigorous exercises and hot baths.
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other author singles out food and exercise as the main dietetic factors58 and no 
one uses the expression συμμετρίη. There is, therefore, no reason to disbelieve 
the author when he boldly introduces this conception as his original invention.
To conclude, let me summarize the results of my analysis. Iamblichus’ pas-
sage identifies some concrete theoretical contributions of the Pythagoreans to 
the field of dietetics, which can be traced back to the classical era and attested 
in a specific extant treatise from that time, namely On Regimen. The author was 
obviously influenced by ideas which can be, in a sense, identified as Pythagore-
an, especially in his cosmological and anthropological theories, although he also 
employs ideas derived from other philosophical sources, including Parmenides, 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and most significantly Heraclitus.59 When it comes to 
his medical and dietetic views, he draws on previous dietetic tradition, which 
can be well documented in a number of extant medical treatises preserved in 
the Corpus Hippocraticum and which does not attest any specifically Pythagorean 
ideas. Despite his commitments to the previous tradition, the author is at the 
same time highly innovative and proudly announces his account as a heurema. 
The core of his heurema rests in identifying the principle of health as a symmetry 
between food and exercise, which he repeats many times throughout his treatise 
and which is embodied in his elemental theory of fire and water. Accordingly, his 
main contribution to the field of dietetics has little (if anything at all) to do with 
the Pythagoreans. 
As convincingly demonstrated by a number of modern scholars,60 Plato’s Ti-
maeus draws on several idiosyncratic ideas presented by the author of On Reg-
imen, such as the concepts of poroi and periodoi of the soul and related topics, 
which are not directly relevant to our discussion, but they clearly attest Plato’s 
acknowledgement of and interest in the peculiar ideas presented in the Hippo-
cratic treatise. And this historical link conveniently explains why Plato employs 
the same dietetic concepts as the author of On Regimen.
From the fourth century onwards, dietetics in general became extremely pop-
ular, especially among Greek intellectuals who accepted the idea that everyone 
58 As suggested by Joly / Byl 2003, 233, the closest parallels are to be found in the following 
Hippocratic treatises: In Breaths there is one kind of bad regimen characterized as “giving 
of more food, moist, or dry, to the body than the body can bear, without counteracting the 
bulky food by exercise” (Flat. 7 = L VI,98, trans. Jones: Πονηρὴ δέ ἐστιν ἡ τοιήδε δίαιτα, 
τοῦτο μὲν ὅταν τις πλέονας τροφὰς ἢ ὑγρὰς ἢ ξηρὰς διδῷ τῷ σώματι ἢ τὸ σῶμα δύναται 
φέρειν, καὶ πόνον μηδένα τῷ πλήθει τῶν τροφῶν ἀντιτιθῇ). See also Prorrh. II,1 (= L IX,6). In 
Epidemics we read about moderation in exercises, foods, drinks, sleep, and sexual activities 
(Epid. VI,6,2 = L V,324: πόνοι, σιτία, ποτὰ, ὕπνος, ἀφροδίσια, μέτρια). In Internal affections 
under specific pathological conditions it is recommended that the patient’s exertion be in-
creased together with gradual increase of food (Int. 21 = L VII,220: ταῦτα δὲ ὡς πλεῖστα 
τρωγέτω καὶ ὠμὰ καὶ ὀπτὰ καὶ ἑφθὰ, αἰεὶ πλείω ἑκάστης ἡμέρης, καὶ ταλαιπωρεέτω 
πρὸς τὰ σιτία τεκμαιρόμενος καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου πλέον). Compare Int. 43 (= L VII,274) and 44 
(= L VI,276). 
59 See Joly / Byl 2003, 25–34.
60 For example Peck 1928, 103–112; Olerud 1951; Sisko 2006; Jouanna 2007. 
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is to a great extent responsible for his own health and therefore should adopt 
at least some basic principles of dietetic prevention. The author of On Regimen 
clearly specifies that he has “discovered dietetics” especially for those who have 
the chance to “neglect everything to concentrate on taking care of their health” 
and who are at the same time “convinced that neither wealth nor anything else 
is of any value without health.”61 Plato in the Timaeus explicitly recommends di-
etetic prevention to every scientist (μαθηματικός) or the ardent devotee of any 
other intellectual discipline (διάνοια),62 and Celsus recommends the same to all 
with “weak constitution (imbecillis), among whom are a large portion of towns-
people, and almost all those fond of letters.”63 There is no doubt that there were 
among these towns people fond of letters also some Pythagoreans, who adopted 
the same dietetic principles as many of their contemporaries did. This may also 
explain how the dietetic principle recommending a well proportioned moder-
ation in food and exercises found its way into the Golden Verses, which for the 
most part express values shared by a wide consensus. In other words, later Py-
thagoreans appropriated the same dietetic principle as many other intellectuals 
of the time. But this is not the same as to say that it was the Pythagoreans who 
invented it, as is still commonly believed. As I suggest, Iamblichus’ story is most 
probably based on a Pythagorizing interpretation of one single treatise, which 
represents the crowning achievement of ancient Greek medical dietetics.64 If my 
interpretation is sound, it rather undermines the value of Iamblichus’ report for 
understanding the early history of Pythagorean dietetics, but it can, I believe, 
throw some light on the constitution, integration, and transfer of knowledge in 
the Pythagorean tradition.65
61 Vict. III,69 (Joly / Byl 200,23–28), trans. Jones (modified): Ταῦτα μὲν παραινέω τῷ πλήθει τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων, ὁσοισιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰκῇ τὸν βίον διατελεῖν ἐστὶ, μηδ’ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖσι τῶν 
ἄλλων ἀμελήσασι τῆς ὑγιείης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· οἷσι δὲ τοῦτο παρεσκεύασται καὶ διέγνωσται, 
ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελός ἐστιν οὔτε χρημάτων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἄτερ τῆς ὑγιείης, πρὸς 
τούτους ἐστί μοι δίαιτα ἐξευρημένη ὡς ἀνυστὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀληθέστατον τῶν δυνατῶν 
προσηγμένη. ταύτην μὲν οὖν προϊόντι τῷ λόγῳ δηλώσω.
62 Plato, Tim. 88c1–6.
63 Celsus, De Medicina, I,1,2, trans. Spencer.
64 Joly 1960, 12; Joly / Byl 2003, 24; Smith 1980, 440.
65 I am very grateful for helpful comments and criticism on the manuscript by S. Kouloumen-
tas and L. Zhmud. My research on this topic was supported by the Czech Science Founda-
tion (GAČR 13–00800S).  
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The Pythagoreans and the Therapeutic Effects  
of the Paean between Religion, Paideia, and Politics
Antonietta Provenza – University of Palermo
The ancient evidence for the early Pythagoreans and the therapeutic function that 
they associated with music is provided mainly by two Neoplatonist philosophers, 
Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234–305 AD) and Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 245–325 AD), the 
authors of two works devoted respectively to Pythagoras himself (Life of Pythago-
ras) and to the Pythagorean way of life (On the Pythagorean Way of Life).* 
Both sources aim to represent Pythagoras himself as the model for the bios phi-
losophikos,1 and his doctrines as forerunners of the Platonic ones,2 although, as 
is already evident from the titles, Iamblichus’ book is mainly focused on Pythag-
oras’ and his disciples’ Lebensform, presented as a model for people aspiring to 
perfect understanding of the divine dimension,3 while Porphyry’s book is clearly 
a biography, whose author focuses more on Pythagoras – the perfect model for 
contemporary philosophers – than on the way of life within the Pythagorean 
communities. Porphyry (VP 33) highlights the charming effects of rhythms and 
melodies, and also of “sung spells” (epodai),4 and moreover considers music a 
kind of θεράπεια (“therapy”) and παραμυθία (“consolation”), the former relating 
to the body, and the latter to the soul. In a different way – more deeply linked with 
the idea of medical and religious purification as a discharge of both emotions 
and physical ailments – Iamblichus calls the beneficial effects of music catharsis,5 
*  Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.  
1 The “philosophic way of life” exhibits some of the features of the monastic life, such as walk-
ing in lonely and quiet places, a way of living all together sharing in each other’s possessions, 
and communal reading (see Porph. VP 33 and Iamb. VP 96–98). These features have been 
highlighted by W. Burkert (Burkert 1982, 13–14), who rightly considers them as evidence of 
Iamblichus’ interest in setting the Pythagorean way of life alongside the Christian one. 
2 On the rather difficult question of the relationship between Plato and the Pythagoreans I 
refer the reader to McClain 1978, and to the very recent and important Horky 2013, the latter 
highlighting the influence on Plato’s thought of “mathematical” Pythagoreanism. 
3 See von Albrecht 2002, 259 and n. 27. As O’Meara emphasizes (O’Meara 1989, 39), Iamblichus 
seems to sketch Pythagoras’ personality by means of an “accumulation of evidences and 
signs” aiming at showing Pythagoras’ uniqueness.
4 See Porph. VP 30, κατεκήλει δὲ ῥυθμοῖς καὶ μέλεσι καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς τὰ ψυχικὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ 
σωματικά. Porphyry makes use of the word κάθαρσις in different contexts in his biography 
(see VP 29; 34; 39; 46), but the effects of music are never mentioned in them.
5 A wide-ranging and stimulating book on catharsis is Hoessly 2001. 
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stating that the early Pythagoreans made use of music against diseases affecting 
the body, but mainly against diseases affecting the soul, since music was believed 
to “purify” such evils, causing passions to be purged from both the body and the 
soul.6
In stories concerning the use of music for healing among the Pythagoreans, 
the idea of musical ethos is very often joined with the religious and medical idea 
of catharsis. This aspect already seems to emerge in the first testimony in which 
music therapy – and, in particular, therapy specifically defined as catharsis – is 
associated with the Pythagoreans, that is in Aristoxenus, fr. 26 Wehrli,7 which 
asserts that “the Pythagoreans, as Aristoxenus said, used medicine for the pu-
rification of the body, and music for that of the soul” (οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, ὡς ἔφη 
Ἀριστόξενος, καθάρσει ἐχρῶντο τοῦ μὲν σώματος διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς δὲ 
ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς).8
Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the author of several works concerning the Pythag-
oreans,9 is the most important source for both Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras and 
Iamblichus’ On the Pythagorean Way of Life. In his Pythagorean Precepts, Pythago-
reanism emerges as a way of life rigidly regulated on the basis of the precepts 
found in the akousmata,10 while the musical notion of harmonia11 shows itself in the 
moderate attitudes and behaviours associated with the Pythagoreans, for they re-
garded a reproach (νουθετεῖν) as a “retuning” of passions (πεδαρτᾶν).12 Concord 
(συμφωνία) and good proportion (εὐρυθμία), moreover, are central to precepts 
concerning the generation of healthy children.13
My aim in this paper is to focus on a few passages, both in Iamblichus’ and in 
Porphyry’s Pythagorean biography, concerning in particular the cathartic aspect 
of the performance of the paean among the Pythagoreans, and the therapeutic 
role of this musical genre against mania, namely its efficaciousness towards be-
haviours that can upset the individual’s balance, and threaten social order. In 
those passages the existence of a mutual transfer in Pythagorean knowledge be-
 6 See e. g. Iamb. VP 68; 110.
 7 See Wehrli 1967. 
 8 On this important piece of evidence on early Pythagoreanism, which shows a close relation-
ship with widespread religious and medical practices, see Provenza 2012.
 9 These works are a Life of Pythagoras (Πυθαγόρου βίος, also cited as On Pythagoras and His 
Disciples – Περὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων αὐτοῦ), On the Pythagorean Way of Life (Περὶ 
τοῦ πυθαγορικοῦ βίου) and Pythagorean Precepts (Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀποφάσεις); see Aristox. frs. 
11–41 Wehrli. Aristoxenus gave rise to the biographical tradition concerning Pythagoras. 
On biography as a genre within the Peripatos see Fortenbaugh 2007, 45–78 (in particular for 
Aristoxenus, 73–76). 
10 As far as this matter is concerned, I limit my references to von Albrecht 2002; Macris 2013. 
11 In a very famous akousma, harmonia is characterized as “the most beautiful thing” (Iamb. 
VP 82, τί κάλλιστον; ἁρμονία).
12 See Iamb. VP 197–198 = Aristox. fr. 30 (= 49) Wehrli = Archyt. Test. A7 Huffman.
13 Aristox. fr. 39 W. (= Stob. 4.37.4); Iamb. VP 211, ᾤοντο γὰρ ἐκ φαύλης τε καὶ ἀσυμφώνου 
καὶ ταραχώδους κράσεως μοχθηρὰ γίνεσθαι τὰ σπέρματα, “they believed that from inter-
course that is base, discordant, and disordered a bad offspring derived.” 
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
295The Pythagoreans and the Therapeutic Effects of the Paean 
tween music and politics emerges, closely related to the idea that kosmos and har-
monia show themselves both within the individual and in society. 
Paeans, ethos and eunomia. Thaletas’ cathartic songs and the Pythagoreans
The paean appears as the specific musical genre used by the Pythagoreans in 
order to effect a therapy of both emotions and illnesses, expressly defined as ca-
tharsis. Iamblichus refers to this kind of therapy in VP 110,14 describing a Pythag-
orean cathartic rite which took place in spring15 and involved listening to paeans 
for soothing and therapeutic purposes: a member of the community sat on the 
ground and played the lyre while others, seated in a circle around him, intoned 
some paeans, which allowed them to rejoice (εὐφραίνεσθαι) and to become “har-
monious and orderly” (ἐμμελεῖς καὶ ἔνρυθμοι). In other periods of the year too, 
as Iamblichus makes clear, Pythagoras used music as a medical remedy (χρῆσθαι 
δ᾿αὐτοὺς καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τῇ μουσικῇ ἐν ἰατρείας τάξει), explicitly 
calling music therapy (ἡ διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἰατρεία) “catharsis” and also using it 
against physical infirmities. 
A scholion on the Iliad (Schol. Vet. in Hom. Il. 22.391), in which mention is made 
of this musical catharsis taking place in spring, comments that “in ancient times, 
and down to the Pythagoreans, music was called, strangely, ‘catharsis’” (ἡ πάλαι 
μουσική… μέχρι τῶν Πυθαγορ<ε>ίων ἐθαυμάζετο καλουμένη κάθαρσις), with 
evident reference to Aristox. fr. 26 Wehrli.
According to the Pythagoreans, the lyre, the musical instrument involved in 
this rite, soothes anger and its violent outbursts, and is moreover able to heal 
sorrow, low spirits, distress, and real mental disorders. Porphyry (VP 32) says that 
Pythagoras, starting in the morning, harmonized his voice with the sound of the 
lyre and sang the ancient paeans composed by Thaletas (ἕωθεν… ἁρμοζόμενος 
πρὸς λύραν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φωνὴν καὶ ᾄδων παιᾶνας ἀρχαίους τινὰς τῶν Θάλητος). 
The use of the lyre to sedate anger seems then to be efficacious both for the per-
son playing it, and for people listening to its music, and also for a kind of “group 
therapy.”
The mention of Thaletas’ paeans in Porphyry’s account sheds some light on 
the social role the Pythagoreans attributed to music. Actually these songs both in-
spired Pythagoras’ disciples at the beginning of the day, and accompanied their 
daily tasks, taking care of their souls. These aspects can be connected with the 
14 Detienne (1962, 42 n. 2), in agreement with Delatte (1938, 24), considers Aristoxe nus to be 
the authority on this Pythagorean custom. Brisson and Segonds (1996, 183) are of the same 
opinion.
15 Cathartic paeans performed in spring set up a relationship between the rebirth and renewal 
of nature in that season and health (for spring as a season favourable to the beginning of 
illnesses, see e. g. Arist. [Pr.] I, 9 (860a 12–34) and 27 (862b 11–15)). Paeans for Apollo were 
traditionally performed during festivities in spring (see Theogn. 773–782 = Käppel 1992, 
test. 110. In winter, the cult of Apollo at Delphi was replaced by that of Dionysus; see Plut. De 
E ap. Delph. 9, 388e–389c = Käppel 1992, test. 89). The performance of “spring paeans” is also 
attested in Aristox. fr. 117 Wehrli (on which see 300–301).
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political aspect of Pythagoreanism, since, as we know from the Pseudo-Plutarch-
an treatise De musica (41.1146b–c), Thaletas came to Sparta from the Cretan city of 
Gortyn, after the Spartans had been informed by the Delphic Oracle16 that their 
city could only be healed by means of music (διὰ μουσικῆς ἰάσασθαι) from the 
plague (λοιμός) vexing it. Subsequently, Thaletas had a prominent role within 
the Spartan cultural landscape, and was the founder of the so-called second 
κατάστασις (“musical school”).17
The attribution to Crete of the origins of the musical tradition of the paeans, 
dances, and musical rhythms in use in Sparta is matched by the fact they were 
called κρητικά, as Strabo attests in a passage deriving from Ephorus.18 There is 
a further connection with Crete in the fact that it was the Delphic Oracle which 
suggested Thaletas to the Spartans as an expert on catharseis: when Apollo him-
self killed the dragon (δράκαινα) that had lived at Delphi,19 he travelled to Crete 
for purification.20
Affirming the utility of music for the polis and the attention paid to it by the 
cities that have the best laws (εὐνομώταται), the author of the pseudo-Plutarchan 
De Musica (42.1146b = Terp. test. 19 Gostoli) sets Thaletas, who healed the plague 
through music (διὰ μουσικῆς), alongside Terpander,21 who used his music to 
soothe the internal strife (στάσις) that afflicted Sparta itself. This pacifying role 
of Terpander can be considered a social catharsis. It is also sometimes represent-
16 The strong relationship between Crete and the Delphic oracle is highlighted in the Homeric 
Hymn to Apollo. 
17 Plut. [De mus.] 9, 1134b = Terp. test. 18 Gostoli.
18 FGrHist. 70 F 149 (18) = Strab. 10.4.18 = Käppel 1992, test. 108. Strabo (10.4.16) mentions Thale-
tas as the musician to whom the Spartans ascribed not only the paeans, but also many of the 
musical genres they used to perform (ᾧ καὶ τοὺς παιᾶνας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐπιχωρίους 
ᾠδὰς ἀνατιθέασι καὶ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων).
19 See Hom. Hymn. Ap. 287–374 (as for those verses and the fight between the god and the 
snake – the aition of the Pythian games – see Fontenrose 1959, 13–22). The same Homeric 
Hymn (389–519) reports the myth of Apollo appearing as a dolphin to some Cretan seamen 
and commanding them to become priests of his sanctuary. Those men followed the god to 
Delphi “singing a paean to the healer god like the paean singers in Crete, and those whom 
the divine Muse fills with honey-voiced song” (517–519, Κρῆτες πρὸς Πυθὼ καὶ ἰηπαιήον’ 
ἄειδον, / οἷοί τε Κρητῶν παιήονες οἷσί τε Μοῦσα  / ἐν στήθεσσιν ἔθηκε θεὰ μελίγηρυν 
ἀοιδήν, trad. Rayor [2004]).
20 See Paus. 10.6.6–7; 2.7.7 (after the killing of Python, Apollo and his sister Artemis ran away to 
Aegialeia to obtain purification, but in the place thereafter named Phobos they were seized 
with terror and fled to Crete, where they were finally purified by Carmanor); 2.30.3; Parker 
1983, 142–143. In the dialogue De defectu oraculorum (418b–c), Plutarch – referring to the stoic 
Cleombrotus – considers as false and ridiculous the story concerning the purification of 
Apollo from the contamination of the blood of the killing of Python (see on that Rescigno 
1995, 325–327 n. 142; Detienne 2002, 260–261, 266).
21 Active in Sparta in the first half of the seventh century BC, Terpander was born in Antissa, 
on the island of Lesbos. His name is linked with the institution of the citharodic competi-
tion within the Carneian festivals at Sparta (676–675 BC; see Hellanic. FGrHist 4 F 85a ap. 
Athen. 14.635e = Terp. test. 1 Gostoli). On Terpander and his environment see in particular 
the introduction of Gostoli 1990.
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ed with words that characterize mystic initiations,22 highlighting the ritual and 
mystic aspect of catharsis. This aspect, which makes Terpander a real kathartes, 
the holder of initiatory knowledge from which his poetic τέχνη derives, sets up a 
substantial link with Thaletas. Plutarch, in the Life of Lycurgus (4.1–2), attributes to 
Thaletas the same role of sedating στάσις which is associated with the melodies 
of Terpander in the Pseudo-Plutarchan De Musica. Plutarch himself states that the 
songs of Thaletas were in reality 
λόγοι … πρὸς εὐπείθειαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀνακλητικοί, διὰ μελῶν ἅμα καὶ 
ῥυθμῶν πολὺ τὸ κόσμιον ἐχόντων καὶ καταστατικόν, ὧν ἀκροώμενοι 
κατεπραΰνοντο λεληθότως τὰ ἤθη καὶ συνῳκειοῦντο τῷ ζήλῳ τῶν 
καλῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐπιχωριαζούσης τότε πρὸς ἀλλήλους κακοθυμίας, ὥστε 
τρόπον τινὰ τῷ Λυκούργῳ προοδοποιεῖν τὴν παίδευσιν αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνον). 
discourses that exhorted people to obedience and concord, through mel-
odies and rhythms that had in themselves a great ability to inspire order 
and moderation. Listening to them, men, without realizing, grew calm 
with respect to their character, and grew accustomed to seeking the beau-
tiful, breaking away from the usual mutual malevolence, so that in a sense 
the songs of Thaletas prepared for Lycurgus the system of education to 
which he submitted the Spartans.23
Thaletas therefore paves the way for the important legislation of Lycurgus, while, 
on the other hand, like Terpander, he puts an end to the internal strife in Sparta, 
showing that music is also able to influence political life.24
This connection between Thaletas’ paeans and Spartan institutions is funda-
mental to understanding how recourse to such songs by Pythagoras would have 
been closely connected to the political and legislative project that he developed in 
Magna Graecia25 with the aim of inducing moderation and social harmony. Both 
Porphyry (VP 21) and Iamblichus (VP 33–34), based on Aristoxenus’ Life of Pythag-
22 In an epigram in the Greek Anthology (2.1.113–115), Terpander’s songs and dances are said 
to be “initiatory” (μύστιδα μολπήν) and performed with a “mystic lyre” (μυστιπόλῳ 
φόρμιγγι); see Franklin 2006, 59. 
23 See also Plut. Agis, 10.6 = Terp. test. 17 Gostoli: extraordinary honours were bestowed upon 
Terpander and Thaletas in Sparta, although they were foreigners, since they shared the same 
ideals as Lycurgus, manifesting them both in their musical compositions and in speculative 
thought (ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Λυκούργῳ διετέλουν ᾄδοντες καὶ φιλοσοφοῦντες).
24 Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 1.16.78 [2.51, 3–5 Stählin] = Terp. test. 40 Gostoli) states that 
Terpander “set to music the Spartans’ laws” (τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων νόμους ἐμελοποίησε); see 
on this point Gostoli 1995, 106.
25 Among the Western Greek poleis governed by the Pythagoreans, Tarentum gained special 
prominence in the first half of the fourth century (especially from 379 BC, when Croton was 
conquered by Dionysius I). The Pythagorean Archytas was strategos in that city for seven 
years running (see Archyt. test. A1 Huffman= D. L. 8.79. Archytas was born between 435 and 
410 BC and died about 350. For his chronology, see Huffman 2005, 5–6).
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oras (Πυθαγόρου βίος),26 state that in southern Italy and Sicily Pythagoras carried 
out the work of liberating the enslaved cities, also inspiring in them the desire 
for freedom itself. Among the cities mentioned are Croton, Sybaris, Catania, Rhe-
gium, Himera, Agrigentum, and Tauromenium, upon which towns Pythagoras 
is said to have imposed the laws of Charondas of Catania27 and of Zaleucus of 
Locri.28 Over and above the panegyric and propagandistic intent, the placing in 
the Pythagorean sphere of these two important legislators – as we already find in 
Aristoxenus (frs. 17 and 43 Wehrli = D. L. 8.15) and is confirmed by Iamblichus (for 
instance, in VP 172), although they lived before Pythagoras himself – appears to 
be instrumental to representing Pythagorean politics as anti-tyrannical. Further, 
it also presents the most important figures in southern Italy as a “product” of the 
Pythagorean way of life,29 which, as Iamblichus himself affirms (VP 166), gener-
ated many philosophers, poets, and legislators (πλείστους παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἄνδρας 
φιλοσόφους καὶ ποιητὰς καὶ νομοθέτας γενέσθαι), and turned that previously 
obscure land into Magna Graecia.30
The importance of these legislators also emerges in a passage of Aristotle’s 
Politics (1274a25–30) where reference is made to their links with Crete. Indeed 
Aristotle affirms that, according to some, Onomacritus of Locri, the first import-
ant legislator, went to Crete, where he practised the mantic art (τέχνη μαντική). 
On this occasion Thaletas seems to have become his companion (ἑταῖρος), while 
Lycurgus and Zaleucus appear as disciples of Thaletas, and Charondas becomes 
a disciple of Zaleucus. 
Hence a tradition existed that linked μαντική not only to catharsis, but also to 
politics and legislation (νομοθεσία) and which, at the same time, tended to high-
light the bonds between Crete and Pythagorean Magna Graecia. This tradition 
seems to have included the aspect of musical catharsis and its repercussions for 
the community – and thus also political repercussions – which can be glimpsed 
in the episode of the arrival of the musician Thaletas in Sparta in the second 
quarter of the seventh century BC. The sources also highlight the relationships 
between Thaletas and the cultural environment of Magna Graecia, particularly 
Locri. In this connection, the author of the Pseudo-Plutarchan De Musica (9.1134b) 
reports that, while the first musical school (κατάστασις) in Sparta seems to have 
been created by Terpander, the second was established by Thaletas of Gortyn, 
together with Xenodamus of Cythera, Xenocritus of Locri, Polymnestus of Colo-
26 See Aristox. fr. 17 Wehrli = Porph. VP 21. Sources report Περὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων 
αὐτοῦ (On Pythagoras and his followers) as an alternative title for this work.
27 Charondas (sixth century BC) was considered to have laid the laws both of his own city and 
of the Chalcidian colonies in Magna Graecia. See Plat. Resp. 599e; Arist. Pol. 1274a23–25.
28 Zaleucus lived before Charondas, in the seventh century BC. The first written laws may date 
back to him (see Ephor. FGrHist. 70 F 138–139).
29 The inclusion of Zaleucus and Charondas in Iamblichus’ catalogue stems from a fifth-centu-
ry tradition due to the Pythagorean lawgivers of Locri and Rhegium (see Zhmud 2012, 114).
30 This passage can be related to Aristoxenus, frs. 17 and 43 Wehrli.
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phon, and Sacadas of Argo.31 This testimony therefore sets up a close connection 
between Thaletas and Xenocritus of Locri,32 showing the link between the Cretan 
musician and the sphere of Magna Graecia.
These elements prove very useful for an interpretation of Porphyry’s reference 
(VP 32) to the fact that Pythagoras used the ancient paeans of Thaletas for a ca-
thartic purpose: the antiquity of these songs and the prestige of the tradition,33 
which linked them to a difficult moment in the history of Sparta, seem to fit well 
both with the eunomic appeals of Pythagoreanism and with its link to Apollo 
and the oracle of Delphi, the “guarantor” of the activity of Thaletas. In this con-
nection, Pythagoras was often set alongside Apollo,34 and a belief had also spread 
that he was the son of the god.35 Moreover, Apollo and the Delphic cult are pres-
ent in the very name of Pythagoras,36 and Aristoxenus (fr. 15 Wehrli = D. L. 8.8) is 
alleged to have stated that the Sage received most of his ethical teaching from a 
Delphic priestess named Themistocleia (“she who is famous for her pronounce-
ments”). 
Against this background, the testimony about Iamblichus’ cathartic paean 
(VP 110–111) mentioned above and that of Aristoxenus (fr. 117 Wehrli), which will 
be considered next, can be contextualized; they belong in the context of a strong 
call for political harmony, in which μουσική – and therefore φιλοσοφία itself – 
was instrumental to political action, favouring equilibrium and harmony. It is 
thus not by chance that Pythagoras uses the paeans to cure the agitated states of 
mind of his disciples, favouring internal harmony, which in turn is a guarantee 
of upright action.
31 Thaletas, Xenodamus and Xenocritus composed and performed paeans, although Xenoda-
mus may have been mainly famous as an author of hyporchemata (Pratinas, mentioned in the 
same passage, seems to have considered him as such). The Pseudo-Plutarchan De Musica 
(10.1134d10–e1) mentions other musical genres also for Thaletas and Xenocritus.
32 The author of De musica says that Xenocritus was the author of “heroic subjects implying an 
action” (ἡρωϊκῶν … ὑποθέσεων πράγματα ἐχουσῶν, this description may hint at dithyram-
bic compositions). The Locrian musician is for us little more than a name in the landscape of 
Greek archaic poetry; for the sources on him I refer the reader to Fileni 1987. 
33 The author of the Pseudo-Plutarchan De musica (10.1134e) sets up a relationship between 
Thaletas’ songs and Olympus’ auletic melodies (to Olympus the same source [29.1141b] as-
cribes the real beginning of Greek music).
34 See Iamb. VP 30, where it is said that there was a widespread belief in the cities of southern 
Italy that at that time Apollo had appeared in human form – Apollo Pythius, for some, for 
others Apollos Hyperboreus, or Paean – or else that one of the demons who lived on the 
Moon had appeared, or one of the gods of Olympus, in order to help correct men’s lives (εἰς 
ὠφέλειαν καὶ ἐπανόρθωσιν τοῦ θνητοῦ βίου) and donate to mortal nature the salvific in-
citement of happiness and philosophy (ἵνα τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας σωτήριον 
ἔναυσμα χαρίσηται τῇ θνητῇ φύσει), the greatest asset sent by the gods through Pythagoras.
35 Iamblichus (VP 7) refutes this opinion.
36 Iamb. VP 5–9.
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Cathartic paeans for women’s madness
The stress on the need to inspire self-control in individuals as a guarantee of cor-
rect interaction inside the community is also evident in a testimony by Aristox-
enus (fr. 117 Wehrli) in which the beneficiaries of treatment through paeans are 
some women inexplicably struck by a deleterious form of mania, whose behaviour 
risks jeopardizing the community order, and therefore the social expectations of 
their role. 
The reference in Iambl. VP 110–111 to the internal order established by per-
formance of the cathartic paean, expressed by the adjective ἔνρυθμοι, provides 
a useful key to the interpretation of this text, in which there is a more obvious 
reference to perturbed behaviours, inspired by madness and cured by paeans, 
likewise performed in spring. The testimony is an anecdote, reported by the para-
doxographer Apollonius (Mir. 40), in which it is said that Aristoxenus in the biog-
raphy of Telestes37 reports a very strange fact (ἄτοπον) regarding women in Locri 
and Rhegium: they were in such a condition of agitation that when they heard 
someone call them while they were having lunch they suddenly jumped up, 
without it being possible to hold them back, and rushed outside the walls of the 
city. After consulting the oracle about a remedy for this unusual behaviour, the 
people of Locri and Rhegium received the divine answer that they were to “in-
tone twelve vernal paeans a day for sixty days” (παιᾶνας ᾄδειν ἐαρινοὺς δώδεκα 
τῆς ἡμέρας <ἐπὶ ἡμέρας> ξ᾿ ),38 and after this there arose many authors of paeans 
in those places (πολλοὺς γενέσθαι παιανογράφους ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ).
This episode reveals a strong apologetic intent related to the cultural suprem-
acy of Magna Graecia, a site of Pythagorean communities, and specifically to the 
cities of Locri and Rhegium. Concerning Locri it has been noted that such pro-
paganda tended to present relations of close cultural proximity to Crete, which 
is believed to have influenced both its musical tradition, through the contiguity 
of Thaletas of Crete and his pupil Xenocritus of Locri, an author of paeans who 
appears to have distinguished himself in Sparta within the second κατάστασις,39 
and its political organization, thanks to the legislator Zaleucus, who is said to 
have learned the mantic art in Crete. 
From the religious point of view – the sphere in which the ἐκστάσεις of wom-
en are cured – the episode is also placed in the collective and public dimension 
linked to the cult of Apollo, to whom choral hymns are addressed. As in the 
case of the paeans addressed to this divinity in Book I of the Iliad,40 the anecdote 
37 Perhaps the famous author of dithyrambs from Selinus, a leading exponent of the New Music.
38 The text is corrupt: παιᾶνας ἄιδειν ἐαρινοὺς †δωδεκατης† ἡμέρας. I accept West’s conjec-
ture (see West 1990) – also accepted by Käppel (1992, test. 139) – reading δώδεκα τῆς ἡμέρας 
<ἐπὶ ἡμέρας> ξ .᾿ West quotes Hom. Il. 1.472 as evidence for the singing of paeans for a pro-
longed time with cathartic aims.
39 See above, 298–299.
40 472–474, οἳ δὲ πανημέριοι μολπῇ θεὸν ἱλάσκοντο / καλὸν ἀείδοντες παιήονα κοῦροι 
Ἀχαιῶν / μέλποντες ἑκάεργον· ὃ δὲ φρένα τέρπετ’ ἀκούων, “for the whole day the young 
Achaeans appeased the god with song and dance, intoning a beautiful paean, honouring 
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about the women also concerns the cathartic-religious sphere of music therapy: 
recovery is effected by the god, who through the song is “persuaded” to act and 
heal them. The prolonged repetition of the paeans therefore appears like a form 
of ritual “penitence.” This testimony is not without propagandistic intent, high-
lighted, as Marie Delcourt has shown,41 by the reference to the oracle of Delphi, 
which seems to imply the primacy of Magna Graecia in the production of paeans. 
Further, in this testimony sociologically important elements emerge that link 
the tradition of the paean, on the one hand, with the rituality of some aspects 
of daily life, and, on the other, with the manifestation of mania as a “centrifu-
gal” and destabilizing element of social life, particularly in the case of women, 
who adopt disruptive and dangerous behaviours.42 As regards this aspect, the 
anecdote makes reference to the segregated life of women within the domestic 
sphere.43 In the case of the women in Aristoxenus, fr. 117 Wehrli, catharsis does 
not take place within the Dionysiac mysteries, which encompassed a manifesta-
tion of female madness with the aim of favouring its ideological opposite,44 but in 
that of the cult of Apollo,45 to whom paeans are addressed to ward off evils from 
the community. The use of the paean in relation to the subversive and “anti-mu-
sical” behaviour of the women of Locri and Rhegium therefore re-establishes the 
disturbed order. The reference to Magna Graecia in the tradition of this musical 
genre seems to be intended to confirm Pythagoreanism’s drive towards order. 
Conclusions
The anecdotes on the use of the paean, like the testimonies in which reference 
is made to the ideals of good government, thus bring out the devotion of the 
Pythagoreans to an ideal of life based on measure and stability, which is also 
pursued through the cathartic use of music, considered effective for amending 
characters and habits. The reference to the paean in relation both to the pacifying 
activity of Thaletas in Sparta and to the beneficial work of the legislators active 
in Magna Graecia, therefore, constitutes an effective appeal to the conservative 
with song the god that casts arrows; and his heart was glad to hear.” This is the first piece of 
evidence concerning the paean, which established itself from the beginning as the musical 
genre used for healing diseases – especially epidemic ones – by means of appeasing the god 
that caused the disease itself (Apollo had sent a plague to the Achaeans because of Agam-
emnon’s offence against Chryses, Apollo’s priest and the father of Chryseis, Agamemnon’s 
slave, whom the priest wishes to ransom).
41 See Delcourt 19982, 234–235. 
42 See Guidorizzi 1995, which analyses this piece of evidence in the light of the medical concep-
tion of female madness; Fortenbaugh 2012, 170–171; Provenza 2012, 107–108.
43 For this aspect I refer the reader to the useful reflections in Seaford 1994, 301–311. On women 
among the Pythagoreans, their role, and education, see Pomeroy 2013.
44 A very famous example of women’s madness in the Dionysiac rites is represented in Eurip-
ides’ Bacchae. Among the many studies on women and the Dionysiac rites, see Goff 2004.
45 A valid parallel in this regard is found in Theopomp. FGrHist IIb, 115 F 77 (= Schol. in Ar. 
Pacem 1071 = Suda s. v. Βάκις), which refers to an Apollonian bard who purifies the madness 
of women in Sparta.
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drives of Pythagoreanism, promoters of a social order linked to the strong con-
demnation of every type of excess. This fundamental feature of Pythagorean pol-
itics is also highlighted in two almost identical passages in the De vita pythagorica 
of Iamblichus (34) and in the Vita Pythagorae of Porphyry (21–22), who indicates 
Aristoxenus as his source (fr. 17 Wehrli); these have already been mentioned with 
reference to Charondas and Zaleucus.46 Shortly after affirming that Pythago-
ras had entirely succeeded in eliminating struggles and discord (Iambl. VP 34, 
στάσιν καὶ διχοφωνίαν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἑτεροφροσύνην; Porph. VP 22, στάσιν) not 
only among his disciples and their descendants for many generations, but also in 
the cities of Italy and Sicily, both in their mutual relationships, and inside each of 
them, the two Neoplatonic philosophers in this connection attribute to Pythago-
ras a discourse on the absolute need to eradicate with every means “illness from 
the body” (ἀπὸ μὲν σώματος νόσον), “ignorance from the soul” (ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχῆς 
ἀμαθίαν), “excess from the abdomen” (κοιλίας δὲ πολυτέλειαν), “sedition from 
the city” (πόλεως δὲ στάσιν), “discord from the house” (οἴκου δὲ διχοφροσύνην), 
and “together the lack of measure from all things” (ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντων ἀμετρίαν). 
The communities of Pythagoreans therefore pursued a radical change in the life-
style of the cities in which they took on a dominant political role, favouring the 
diffusion of principles of moderation.47
The close collaboration between medicine and music, “the wisest thing” and 
“the most beautiful thing”48 according to the akousmata, both of which are pro-
moters of catharsis in Aristoxenus, fr. 26 Wehrli, therefore produces temperance 
and dignity in individuals, and also becomes instrumental, within the whole so-
ciety, to the establishment of harmony bringing stability and order.
46 See above, 298.
47 This aspect appears to be illustrated in a paradigmatic way by an anecdote reported by 
Aristoxenus (fr. 30 [= 49] Wehrli = Iamb. VP 197–198 = Archyt. test. A7 Huffman, see Huffman 
2005, 287–292) about the Pythagorean Archytas: returning from a military campaign Ar-
chytas was angry, noting that the overseer and the slaves on his farm had not worked in his 
absence, and told them to consider themselves lucky for his anger, since if he had remained 
calm, they could never have avoided punishment (εὐτυχοῦσιν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς ὤργισται· εἰ γὰρ 
μὴ τοῦτο συμβεβηκὸς ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοὺς ἀθῴους γενέσθαι τηλικαῦτα ἡμαρτηκότας).
48 Iamb. VP 82, τί σοφώτατον τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν; ἰατρική. τί κάλλιστον; ἁρμονία.
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“Are Flute-Players Better than Philosophers?” 
Sextus Empiricus on Music, against Pythagoras
Emidio Spinelli – University of Rome ”La Sapienza”
1
I wish to examine what is perhaps only a small fragment of the long history of 
the reception of Pythagorean doctrines, yet one that may provide evidence for 
the endurance in the imperial age, in a Pyrrhonian-Sceptic context, of interest in a 
certain way of portraying Pythagoras and a certain cliché surrounding his figure. 
In the case of Sextus Empiricus we can perhaps speak of a sort of ideological use 
of his sources on Pythagoreanism: his interest is possibly distorted, and is not to 
be taken at face value, but it nonetheless merits some consideration, especially to 
shed light on the more general question of the transformation of some key con-
cepts within the Pythagorean tradition.
My paper has two aims: 
–  Firstly, I shall provide some quantitative data on the presence of Pythagoras 
within Sextus Empiricus’ corpus, with the aim of identifying the contexts in 
which he is explicitly invoked (possible implicit allusions form an issue too 
complex to tackle here). I shall try especially to identify and elucidate musical 
references.
–  Secondly, without entering into the overall structure of Sextus’ attack on the 
“liberal arts,”1 or the philosophical aim he is pursuing in his confutation of 
any τέχνη that purports to rest on a completely dogmatic basis, I will focus on 
a peculiar chapter in Pythagorean Wirkungsgeschichte. This is represented by 
the critical observations that Sextus Empiricus presents in two passages of his 
treatise Against the Musicians (=M 6), with regard to the ethical standing and 
moral / medical power that Pythagoras apparently assigned to music.
This polemical spirit is to be viewed against the broader background of the Pyr-
rhonian plan to confute the concept of music, its theoretical claims, and the field 
of action assigned to it by dogmatic philosophers. Sextus’ attack may therefore 
1 See Spinelli 2010. 
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be regarded as a fresh stage in a long-running battle.2 A remote “archetype” for it 
is PHibeh 13 (probably the work of Alcidamas), with its explicit opposition to the 
theoretical and moral claims of music (which are in this case set in contrast to the 
superiority of rhetoric). A closer antecedent may be found in a series of Epicurean 
objections that have been recorded in Philodemus’ De musica (although no defini-
tive solution can be offered here and perhaps some serious doubts may be raised: 
see infra, §§ 3 and 4).3
2
We can start with something that has never been done before, namely to count 
and statistically evaluate Pythagoras’ presence in Sextus Empiricus’ references 
and citations. 
We leave aside the occurrences of the term Πυθαγορικός, which is used both 
as an adjective and in a substantivized form in the plural (οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, vel 
sim.), since these references are not directly relevant to an enquiry into Sextus’ 
view of Pythagoras himself. We will, however, mention the adverbial and com-
parative form of the adjective, πυθαγορικώτερον: it occurs in M 4, 11, as a useful 
way of describing Plato as a philosopher who defended the concept of “one” in a 
rather Pythagorean fashion. Notwithstanding this exclusion, a few brief remarks 
on these forms are in order, as in certain cases they provide some interesting and 
theoretically valuable hints. 
We may note the special function of the formula Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες, which 
is used to introduce doctrines of considerable importance, for instance at M 10, 
270.4 The doctrine described here clearly reflects a later development, one strong-
ly influenced by the Academic tradition and in particular – as Leonid Zhmud 
has rightly noted – due to “the tendency to attribute to Pythagoreans and (much 
less frequently) to Pythagoras the Platonic teaching of the One and the indefinite 
dyad [that] first appears in pseudo-Pythagorean literature of the first century and 
in Neopythagoreanism.”5
Another significant doctrine introduced by the formula Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες 
occurs in Against the Musicians (M 6, 30). This passage, in a general way (and per-
haps due to a late re-interpretation) attributes to the “Pythagorean fraternity” the 
idea that “the cosmos is ordered according to harmony.”
One should also take into account that the formula plur. gen. nominis proprii + 
παῖδες is not unusual in Sextus’ usus scribendi. A striking example is in Against 
the Ethicists (M 11, 24), where we find the expression Στωικῶν παῖδες, possibly 
an allusion to later Stoics, and in particular Mnesarchus. By naming the παῖδες 
2 For Sextus’ programme in M 6 see §§ 1–6, and Davidson Greaves 1986; Delattre 2007a, 100; 
Spinelli 2008; Bett 2013.
3 See Brancacci 1988; also Barker 1989, 457–458, n. 1; Rispoli 1992, 216–217, n. 3.
4 It is already explicitly attributed to Πυθαγόρας alone in M 10, 261, then to οἱ Πυθαγορικοί in 
M 10, 262 and 291, and finally to τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν στάσις in M 10, 282.
5 Zhmud 2012, 423, here n. 33. 
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(that is, “sons,” or according to some translators “disciples” / “followers”) of a giv-
en philosophical sect, this formula is intended to suggest to the reader that the 
doctrines under discussion were not developed by the founder or original core of 
the school but rather stem from later developments, either by reframing or even 
newly forming ideas. In the two cases just mentioned, for instance, Sextus (or his 
source) does not believe that these ideas may legitimately be associated with the 
name of Pythagoras himself.
If we now turn to consider explicit occurrences of the name of Pythagoras, we 
need to exercise particular caution. For in this case too we must draw a distinc-
tion between the mere mention of the philosopher’s name and the more complex 
formulas within which it is set. 
For example, when – on two occasions – Sextus mentions Pythagorean doc-
trines by placing them under the authority of οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου, it seems 
he is referring to what had by then become standard doctrines, ones which Py-
thagoreans accepted almost by default. These include the idea that numbers are 
“elements” of the κόσμος, and that they cannot coincide with “numerables” or 
ἀριθμητά.6
A very different case is provided by those passages – no less than seven – in 
which distinctly Pythagorean doctrines are introduced by the formula οἱ περὶ 
(τὸν or τὸν Σάμιον) Πυθαγόραν – the latter formula occurring only in M 10, 248, 
as we shall see very soon. When Sextus uses the phrase οἱ περί + acc. nominis pro-
prii, he is usually making a direct reference to the thinker whose name is given in 
the accusative.7 Often, however, this reference also reflects Sextus’ awareness of 
the fact that the particular thesis in question, while traceable to a specific philos-
opher, is now shared by the whole αἵρεσις that derives from or depends on him. 
This would also appear to be the case with those passages attributing well-estab-
lished doctrines to Pythagoras, or rather to οἱ περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν.
The first thesis to be considered is very famous. It posits – often in the context 
of doxographic lists of varying length or completeness – numbers as the principles 
of all things. Numbers are presented – not without some inconsistency – as being 
either material or incorporeal.8 Ιn a most interesting passage (M 10, 248), how-
ever, numbers are simultaneously presented as principles (ἀρχαί) and elements 
(στοιχεῖα) of wholes (τῶν ὅλων). This thesis introduces a long section in Sextus’ 
Against the Physicists (M 10, 249-284), in which – as previously noted – we find Pla-
tonic arguments and conclusions that derive from a late pseudo- or Neopythag-
6 See PH 3, 152 and 163: this latter passage builds on a thesis attributed to οἱ Πυθαγορικοί a few 
paragraphs earlier, in PH 3, 157.
7 For other references see Spinelli 2000, 53, n. 18 and Vogt 2015, 54, n. 13. 
8 As material in PH 3, 32, where the Pythagorean position is distinguished from that of οἱ 
μαθηματικοί, who consider as principles τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων; to the contrary, they 
are presented as immaterial in M 9, 364, where the Pythagorean stance is once again distin-
guished from that of οἱ μαθηματικοί and their πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων, which are nonethe-
less also incorporeal; more generally see now Betegh 2015.
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orean reinterpretation. It is nonetheless worth noting that in this introductory 
text the thesis in question is attributed to those οἱ περὶ τὸν Σάμιον Πυθαγόραν 
who are, significantly, compared to “the most knowledgeable of the physicists” (οἱ 
ἐπιστημονέστατοι τῶν φυσικῶν), possibly because, as we read soon afterwards 
(M 10, 250), they “say that genuine physicists, who research questions about the 
all, have to begin by examining into what things the all admits of being broken 
down.”9
In another occurrence (M 10, 45), describing the different sides in the “dis-
sonance” or διαφωνία concerning the existence or non-existence of motion, the 
name of Pythagoras (always presented through the label οἱ περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν 
and presented as a champion of the actual subsistence of motion) is associat-
ed with the evidence provided by “everyday life,” by βίος. Ιn this passage, in 
particular, he is reckoned among the majority of physicists (such as Empedo-
cles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, “and a great 
many others”) who support the idea that motion indeed exists or subsists. Aside 
from this passage, however, we also find a number of other interesting ones. 
Again in Against the Physicists, for instance (M 9, 127 and 130), in a rather hap-
hazard manner and without drawing any subtle distinctions, Sextus places οἱ 
περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν alongside Empedocles (other important fragments of whom 
are quoted verbatim: 31 B 136 and 137 DK) and alongside “the rest of the Ital-
ian crowd.” In this case, Sextus more or less correctly attempts to present as a 
“common opinion” of this group of thinkers the idea that there exists a sort of 
profound “communality” (κοινωνία) between men, the gods, and non-rational 
animals – a concept which lies at the basis of well-known dietary taboos (namely 
abstention from the murder of animals and the consumption of flesh). Not only 
that, but Sextus further stresses this view in M 9, 128 through a verse10 which may 
have been fabricated in the Hellenistic age, in a pseudo-Pythagorean context, and 
placed under the authority of Pythagoras.11
We may now turn to the eight occurrences of the name “Pythagoras” alone, 
leaving aside for the moment both M 10, 261, which I have already mentioned, 
and the two passages from Against the Musicians which I shall be examining later 
(§§ 3 and 4).
For the sake of convenience, we may divide the remaining quotations from 
Sextus into three groups.
A. First we may record – but without assigning them any decisive originali-
ty – the two passages (M 7, 94 and M 4, 2) in which Sextus recalls the famous 
Pythagorean oath attested in several sources from the Hellenistic and impe-
 9 Both translations from Bett 2012, 125–126; on M 10, 248–309 and its possible source (Posido-
nius?) see also Brennan 2015, 327–329.
10 “Redden the altar of the blessed with hot bloodshed” (βωμὸν ἐρεύθοντας μακάρων 
θερμοῖσι φόνοισιν, tr.: Bett 2012, 28).
11 See Riedweg 2002, 159–161; on M 9, 127–131 see also Bett 2015, 49–50. 
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rial periods.12 This passage is centred around the idea that the followers of 
Pythagoras (who are, significantly, described as οἱ Πυθαγορικοί in M 7, 94, 
and who – in the light of M 7, 92 – are perhaps to be identified chiefly with 
Philolaus, or the οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων Πυθαγορικοί mentioned in M 4, 2) 
invoke Pythagoras as a divine figure worthy of being called upon in place of 
the gods to swear an oath, along with the equally famous τετρακτύς which he 
had discovered (arguably together with Hippasus) and “which traditionally 
symbolizes the connection between harmonics, arithmology, and religion.”13
B.  The citation in M 9, 64 deserves a separate mention. In a section of Sextus’ 
work presenting “the arguments from the agreement among all humans” in 
favour of the existence of the gods, the name of Pythagoras is mentioned in the 
context of a connection both with the opinions of ordinary or common peo-
ple (or “idiots,” etymologically: Sextus uses the expression ἰδιωτικὴ ὑπόνοια, 
M 9, 63), and with the statements made by poets (most notably Homer). Not 
only that, but Pythagoras’ name is mentioned again – significantly – in rela-
tion to “the mass of physicists.” Pythagoras’ name, therefore, is featured as 
part of a strange list which includes Empedocles, the Ionians, Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, the Stoics, and even Epicurus and “those of the Garden.” It seems to 
me that in this case too Sextus has not bothered to provide an accurate analy-
sis of the positions of such a varied range of thinkers, or to draw the necessary 
distinctions. Instead, he has chosen to set up a sort of “dogmatic theological 
party,” whose leading member, in his view, is Pythagoras.
C.  I have left two strange citations concerning Pythagoras until last. 
The first is the one that in my view raises the greatest problems in terms of re-
liability and accuracy. At the opening of the specific section of the first book of 
Against the Physicists, which is devoted to the investigation and refutation of the 
concept of body (see M 9, 366), Sextus presents a definition of the body “as what is 
capable of being acted upon or of acting.” This definition is perhaps reminiscent 
of the Stoic and more generally Hellenistic jargon with which Sextus is so con-
cerned in his polemics (but see Betegh 2015, 136, n. 10). We learn here, however, 
that the main proponent of this definition, or indeed its ἀρχηγός / “pioneer,” was 
none other than Pythagoras. I must confess that I find it very difficult to account 
for this attempt to cast Pythagoras in the role of πρῶτος εὑρετής of a notion of 
the body which was no doubt developed only much later. Indeed, it is rooted in a 
context shaped by Hellenistic materialistic physics that is very, very remote from 
Pythagorean doctrines on being. With much caution, we may suggest that, in an 
attempt to establish an unbroken line of historical development in the materialis-
tic approach to the body, Sextus’ source (a Stoic, perhaps) chose to trace his own 
12 See for example Aët. I 3, 8 = 58 B 15 DK and for other occurrences Zhmud 2012, 301, n. 53. 
13 Zhmud 2012, 300; see also Barker 1989, 30–31.
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philosophical pedigree back to an important, almost legendary figure such as 
Pythagoras, regardless of whether this theoretical backdating was correct or not.
The second odd passage occurs in a section of Against the Grammarians (M 1, 
303). Arguing against poets and in support of the antiquity of the Empedoclean 
saying simile simili cognoscitur, Sextus here frames Empedocles’ position within 
the context of an argument entirely devoted to φυσικὴ θεωρία. In particular, Sex-
tus connects it to a root idea developed ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου, but which in his view 
is also later to be found in Plato’s Timaeus. Doubts may legitimately be raised re-
garding this attribution, but I believe it is easier to explain why Sextus makes this 
association. The way in which the section under consideration is constructed as 
a whole gives the clear impression that Sextus (or his source: maybe Posidonius, 
while interpreting Plato's Timaeus? See also Blank 1998, 335–336) is making inde-
pendent and no doubt original use of the material at his disposal, with the aim of 
establishing – disserendi causa – a powerful alliance of philosophical personalities 
(Pythagoras-Empedocles-Plato) that stands against the explicative claims illegiti-
mately made both by those who are technically γραμματικοί and, once again, by 
those who are simply “idiots” / common people.
No matter how we regard these accounts and the doubts they may raise, it 
seems to me that they represent a reliable background against which one can now 
consider the structure and specific arguments of two passages from Against the 
Musicians which I intend to examine in most detail.
3
In order to understand better the specific objections that Sextus raises against 
Pythagoras, I must first make a few remarks concerning the musical aspects of 
ancient Pythagoreanism. 
Against the backdrop of the dialectical relation between philosophy and mu-
sical theory, which is well documented and certainly represents an important 
chapter in classical culture, it is perhaps possible to identify the more specific 
contribution made by the Pythagoreans. According to the helpful division sug-
gested by Zhmud, “three basic elements of that theory which the ancient tradition 
linked with Pythagoras continue to be associated with his name: (1) the mathe-
matical treatment of music, (2) the doctrine of a musical ethos, or the psychagogic 
and educative effects of music, (3) the famous ‘harmony of the spheres’ generated 
by the movement of the heavenly bodies.”14 I shall leave aside the first and third of 
these elements, which nonetheless are well attested in sources regarding Pythag-
orean authors, or at any rate authors closely connected to Pythagoreanism (Ar-
chytas, Philolaus, Plato, Aristoxenus and even later Ptolemy, Porphyry, Aristides 
Quintilianus and so on). These sources bear witness both to the mathematical 
approach adopted by the Pythagoreans and to their strong interest in astronomy. 
The second aspect, which is the one which I would like to stress, is possibly a 
14 Zhmud 2012, 286.
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more conjectural one, since it posits some kind of “connection between Pythago-
reanism and ideas of the ethos of music.”15 This is the ethical aspect of music, or 
rather its power to shape and substantially influence individual morals. In other 
words, I would here like to approach what Pythagoras himself – according to 
Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras (§ 111) – regarded from a strictly technical point of 
view as a form of κάθαρσις, a form of medical treatment based on music, as well 
as its power to eliminate negative passions, reshape moral attitude, and finally 
produce a good character or ἔθος.
In this respect, the evidence from Sextus’ Against the Musicians is particularly 
valuable, and appears to be part of a much wider doxographic tradition. We may 
begin with Sextus’ account of Pythagoras (M 6, 7): 
(7) First in order, let us begin with the things customarily babbled about 
music by the many. Now if, they say, we accept philosophy since it gives 
temperance to human life and restrains the passions of the soul, by much 
more do we accept music because it commands us not too violently but, 
with a certain enchanting persuasiveness, prevails over the same effects 
as does philosophy.16
The first point worth noting has to do with terminology. Sextus wishes to set 
out from what ordinary people usually say about music, without any real grasp 
of the subject, in an idle manner, babbling on without any persuasiveness. This 
is certainly the meaning that is always conveyed in Sextus’ prose by the verb 
θρυλεῖσθαι. Sextus also uses it in several other passages in order to discredit 
some of the Stoics’ doctrines.17
The second step of Sextus’ polemical strategy consists in comparing philoso-
phy and music, with the aim of formulating the same positive value judgement 
with regard to both, yet in such a way as to establish a clear hierarchy. According 
to the “many” whose ideas are here presented, we should certainly welcome phi-
losophy, on account of its capacity to restrain the passions of the soul and to nour-
ish temperance over the course of a person’s life.18 According to the same πολλοί, 
however, primacy in the ethical sphere is nonetheless to be assigned to music.19 
Music accomplishes the same goal as philosophy, namely to calm and purify, 
and does so by lending order without violence (the expression οὐ βιαστικώτερον 
ἐπιτάττουσα we find here is a unique formula in Sextus). Music possesses a per-
15 Ibid.
16 Translations of the passages in M 6 are from Davidson Greaves 1986. 
17 See, for instance, M 11, 109, 133 and 191 (other references in Janáček 2000, 77); accordingly, in 
our passage too are the Stoics the implicit target of Sextus’ polemic?
18 The verb σωφρονίζω used here occurs only in M 6, 10, 23 and 28; it seems to be a technical 
term applied to music, like others we will soon be examining.
19 See also Quint. Inst. or. I 10, 31; Plut. De virt. mor. 3, 441D–E; and some passages in Aristides 
Quintilianus’ De musica (2.3, 5 and 6).
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suasive power marked by gracefulness or even charm (as confirmed by the use of 
the verb θέλγω, another hapax in Sextus).
At this point, Sextus brings Pythagoras into the picture, as the primary exem-
plar of this attitude (or as ἀρχηγός, a “pioneer” again, not of any physical doc-
trine but of a moral standpoint).20 Pythagoras is featured as the protagonist of an 
anecdote worth relating in full:
(8) Thus Pythagoras, when he once observed how youths who had been 
filled with Bacchic frenzy by alcoholic drink differed not at all from mad-
men, exhorted the flute-player, who was joining them in the carousal, to 
play his aulos for them in the spondaic melos. When he thus did what was 
ordered, they suddenly changed and became as temperate as if they had 
been sober even at the beginning.
When faced with the wine-induced Bacchic frenzy and apparent madness of 
some youths (at a κῶμος, or Dionysiac procession), Pythagoras does not resort to 
sober and neatly structured philosophical theory, but adopts a more direct and 
practical solution: he prescribes a specific musical treatment for these youths. The 
moral remedy for this yielding to an irrational passion, then, is provided by mu-
sic, which was already viewed as an effective antidote to drunkenness by Aris-
toxenus – if we are to trust pseudo-Plutarch’s De musica (43, 1146F = fr. 122 Wehrli). 
To be more precise, Pythagoras orders the execution of a solo flute performance 
according to a specific tune, the spondaic. This typically Doric mode is suitable 
for libations and solemn religious events, and is further characterized by slow 
tempos and a relaxed rhythm, which exerts a soothing effect.21
On this text, one point must first be made about the terminology used. It is 
packed with words found in Sextus only here.22 The concentration of such terms 
can only be accounted for on the basis of a close dependence on the source from 
which the anecdote is drawn. But what is this source? I do not think it is possible 
to provide a certain answer to this question, but we can at least attempt to recon-
struct the presence of this anecdote about Pythagoras in a few other authors, and 
so set down some fixed points of reference for its circulation both in Greek and 
in Latin literature.
The text that provides the most detailed version of an episode similar to the 
one related in M 6, 8 is once again in Iamblichus (Life of Pythagoras, § 112). Howev-
er, it seems to me that we ought to search elsewhere, and in particular not after 
Sextus but before him.
20 See Martinelli 2012, 13–18.
21 See for example Dion. Hal, Comp. 17 and Arist. Quint., De musica 1, 15; on the moderate 
character of the Doric mode, see also Arist., Pol. VIII, 5 1340b3 and 7, 1342a28–b29 (useful 
comments in Brancacci 2013, 16–17).
22 We find: μέθη, ἐκβακχεύομαι, συνεπικωμάζω, σπονδεῖος, ἐπαυλῶ, αἰφνίδιον, and also oth-
er terms rare in Sextus, such as αὐλητής (used in M 7, 146, with reference to Speusippus and 
νήφω (only in PH 1, 100 and 109).
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In this case we may consider ourselves lucky, perhaps, since a similar tale to 
that of Sextus is attested in a fragmentary passage of Philodemus’ De musica (col. 
42, 39–45). This text is difficult to decipher, yet clear in its overall sense, if we 
accept the reconstruction proposed by Delattre.23 Once again, let me quote the 
passage in full, in Delattre’s French translation:
Quant à Pythagore, [il réussit à obtenir un comportament] plus docile [de 
jeunes gens] qui étaient ivres, en invitant [une] joueuse d’aulos [à jouer] un 
air spondaique [en vue de susciter en eux les affections contraires] <à celles 
que leur causait l’ivresse> …
This passage from Philodemus seems far more complex that the one from Sextus, 
and clearly differs from it in certain respects (starting from the gender of the 
flute-player, here a female). What matters for our purposes is the fact that here 
too the passage known from Sextus is connected to an Epicurean source. In oth-
er words, we could suppose that – not least in order to attack the alleged moral 
usefulness of music, as defined by Pythagoras – Sextus drew upon Epicurean 
material, and specifically from Philodemus’ writing.24 It is clear, however, that if 
this were so Sextus did not simply copy from Philodemus’ De musica.
However, the structure of Sextus’ text, the many unique terminological occur-
rences included in it, and its Bacchic overtones rather suggest a different scenario, 
namely the existence of a common source, followed more closely by Sextus. This 
impression is strengthened by a comparison with the Latin version of the same 
episode regarding Pythagoras. This is a short and sketchy passage by Quintilian, 
which in turn almost certainly depends on Cicero’s De consiliis suis.25 After stress-
ing the need to acquire “the knowledge of the principles of music, which have the 
power to excite or assuage the emotions of mankind,” Quintilian writes (Inst. or. 
I 10, 32):
(32) We are told that Pythagoras on one occasion, when some young men 
were led astray by their passions to commit an outrage on a respectable 
family, calmed them by ordering the piper to change her strain to a spon-
daic measure, . . .
23 This is his Greek text: Πυθαγόραν δὲ [….. ….\ [εὐ]αγωγότερον [νεανιῶν ..\ μεθυ]όντων 
καλέ[σαντα τι\να αὐλ]ητρίδαν [….. ἐπὶ\ τὸ τἀ]ναν[τία] πά[θη ἐμποιεῖν\ …..]ους τὸ 
σπ[ονδεῖον\ μέλος] καὶ τοῦτον [….. .. \\ (for the translation see Delattre 2007b, 69).
24 For the Epicurean “flavour” of some of Sextus’ attacks see Gigante 1981, 215–221; see also 
Rispoli 1991, 1992, 2000, and 2005; Blank 1998; Delattre 2006 and 2007b; Bett 2013. On the rela-
tionship between Sextus’ approach and other authors / groups interested in ancient musical 
doctrines (besides Philodemus, also Aristotle, Aristides Quintilianus, Plutarch, the tradition 
centred around Aristoxenus’ theories), see Davidson Greaves 1986, 24–35.
25 Fr. 3 (in August., Contra Iul. 5, 23); it was later taken up by Boethius as well (Inst. mus. I 1), 
whose version seems however more similar to Iamblichus’ report (above, 312); for other, 
shorter occurrences of the same episode see Ammonius (In Porph. 13, 24–28) and Elias (In 
Porph. 31, 11–13).
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Here too we find some discrepancies (the Bacchic context is perhaps only implcit 
and is explicitly replaced by a more general picture of a private or family quarrel). 
Nevertheless, the background is still provided by the ethical and medical-moral 
value attributed to the use of the spondaic rhythm. We may therefore apply the 
same considerations as in the comparison between Philodemus and Sextus: could 
the latter be regarded as being more faithful to the original source of the anec-
dote, which sought to emphasize the Dionysian framework of the whole episode 
and stress the ethical and religiously sanctioned value of the musical modes suit-
ed for sacred libations, namely spondaic tunes?
Despite the divergences, the evidence considered so far appears to agree in 
attributing this episode to Pythagoras, the legendary thinker – especially given 
the role assigned to music as an outstanding (and exceptionally effective) tool, 
capable of having positive therapeutic effects in the treatment of the passions 
of the soul, particularly negative and irrational ones. Unfortunately, however, 
things are not that simple. In a passage from Galen, a similar episode, and one 
very close to Philodemus’ version (including its portrayal of the flute-player as a 
woman), associates the anecdote not with Pythagoras but with a figure connected 
to Pericles’ circle and well known to Socrates and hence Plato: Damon of Athens.26 
Damon’s allegiance to the Pythagorean school, though, is a conjecture that may 
well be unfounded.27 Nonetheless, let us read this passage (37 A 8 DK):
Damon, a musician, was once present as a female flute-player was play-
ing according to the Phrygian style and some youths, intoxicated by wine, 
were engaging in senseless behaviour. He then ordered her to play accord-
ing to the Doric style, and they immediately ceased their immoderate ag-
itation.
How are we to solve this quandary? Is it simply a matter of names getting mixed 
up? I do not see this as a reasonable solution. A different explanation has been 
suggested by Lasserre, who believes that the whole episode and anecdote was 
originally attributed to Damon and that only later – through a (possibly conscious) 
act of projection – Damon’s name was replaced with the more famous and import-
ant one of Pythagoras.28 This explanation could apply in the case of Sextus, who 
never mentions Damon and does not appear even to be aware of him. But how 
could this apply to Philodemus, who knows Damon well and even mentions his 
theories with regard to the moral value of music – for instance, music played with 
a cithara – as a way of fostering virtues (such as bravery, wisdom, and justice)?
Perhaps we ought to suspend our judgement with regard to these two conflict-
ing attributions; perhaps, against the background of a Pythagorean doctrine that 
also focuses on the “psychagogical” effects of music, we might accept that both 
26 On Damon and his musical theories see e. g. Brancacci 2008, Chs. 1–2.
27 See Wallace 1995, as well as Zhmud 2012, 118. On the sources for the alleged links between 
Damon and Pythagoreanism, see West 1992, 246–247.
28 See Lasserre 1954, 62–63.
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Pythagoras and Damon had identified certain musical rhythms (the specifically 
spondaic rhythm in the one case, and the more generally Doric rhythm in the 
other) as a means of bringing about subjective as well as objective moral improve-
ments. Alternatively one could draw the opposite conclusion to Lasserre’s, and 
assume that Damon followed in the footsteps of Pythagoras and picked up or 
extended some of his doctrines. 
4
Moving away now from the quagmire of the various issues raised by M 6, 7–8, let 
us briefly examine the criticism which Sextus formulates against the position he 
attributes to Pythagoras. We must here turn to § 23 of Against the Musicians, where 
we read:
(23) And Pythagoras, in the first place, was foolish in wishing to give tem-
perance at the wrong moment to those who were intoxicated instead of 
avoiding [intoxication]. In the second place, by correcting them in this 
manner, he concedes that the flute-players have more power than the phi-
losophers with respect to the correction of ethos.
In order to refute the allegedly Pythagorean idea that music has a moral value, 
Sextus follows two approaches of different philosophical weight. The first con-
sists in simply accusing Pythagoras of not having applied his musical treatment 
at the right moment (as suggested by the adverb ἀκαίρως, again a hapax in Sex-
tus). But the accusation probably runs deeper than this. First of all, it is in line 
with a Pyrrhonian objection that had already been formulated not long before 
(M 6, 21–22). Richard Bett sums this objection up as follows: “even if a particu-
lar piece of music may temporarily calm someone, this is due to its distracting 
the listener, not altering his emotional state in any genuine or long-term way.”29 
Aside from this, however, we may argue perhaps that Sextus’ attack operates on 
a more broadly medical plane. Pythagoras has failed in his treatment because he 
has not been able to free the drunken youths from their senseless passion deep 
down, by truly drawing them away from the evil that has struck them and erad-
icating it completely (according to a holistic approach, we might say: for this is 
the strong meaning which on several occasions Sextus appears to assign the verb 
ἐκκλίνω).30 Pythagoras has only extrinsically (or allopathically, if you like) coun-
tered moral suffering through its opposite: a soothing remedy capable of blocking 
the symptoms without destroying the disease of the soul at its root. In Sextus’ 
eyes, therefore, Pythagoras appears to deserve a markedly disparaging adjective, 
one used by Sextus himself in his harshest and most radical criticism: Pythagoras 
has shown himself to be foolish / μάταιος.
29 Bett 2013, 170–171.
30 Other passages in Janáček 2000, 77.
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In the latter part of the text, Sextus seems to adopt a different position in his 
criticism. He takes for granted that Pythagoras ought to see philosophy as supe-
rior to music, and so Sextus can implicitly recall the opposite hierarchy which 
he had established, in a preliminary and almost programmatic manner, in § 7. If 
playing the spondaic tone on a flute achieves better and more morally effective 
results than the use of philosophical theories, this boxes Pythagoras into a cor-
ner, for he must then admit that music is superior to philosophy. In the matter of 
correcting the moral inclinations of someone who is dangerously straying from 
the straight path, then we had better forget about professional philosophers and 
find some flute-players.
So this whole argument is aimed directly against Pythagoras.31 Faced with the 
need to establish a moral path capable of eradicating evil passions and of replac-
ing them with a healthy moral disposition, we have no need at all of Pythagoras’ 
philosophical doctrines or theoretical speculations, since – by Pythagoras’ own 
admission – a slow, solemn piece of music, played in the appropriate rhythm and 
tone, will prove far more effective.
I wonder then, half seriously and half in jest: would it not be better to take 
books away from drunkards and those in the grip of other destructive passions, 
and immerse them instead in the warm atmosphere of a sweet and relaxing bal-
lad of cool healthy jazz? Might Charlie Parker’s Laura or the marvellous version 
of My funny Valentine played by Gerry Mulligan / Chet Baker’s famous “pianoless 
quartet” not yield better results than many dull moral treatments?
All joking aside, this refutation by Sextus brings up many of the same issues 
of Quellenforschung as those raised by the previous passages. Is this text Sextus’ 
own work? Or is he drawing upon some previous source (as seems more reason-
able to suppose, given the way in which Sextus usually constructs his polemical 
texts)? In this connection too, the name of Philodemus has been invoked, on some 
good grounds, such as similarities between the two authors’ underlying argu-
ments,32 and especially some undeniable affinities in their choice of terms: take, 
for instance, the double occurrence of the verb ἐπανορθοῦμαι and the formula 
ἐπανόρθωσις ἠθῶν (both used only here in Sextus), where the latter expression is 
also explicitly used in Philodemus’ De musica.33 Delattre has restated his view that 
Sextus must have drawn upon Philodemus’ writing.34 While his hypothesis re-
mains a legitimate and even attractive one, I believe it is safer to argue – to quote 
Bett again – that, “the question whether Sextus is making direct use of Philo-
demus in this part of Against the Musicians, or simply drawing on material that 
Philodemus also consulted, is not likely to be answered in any definitive way.”35 
31 And perhaps against Plato’s Republic? Or even against a tradition that is represented later by 
Aristides Quintilianus’ systematic treatment of musical theories (see Brancacci 2013, 28)?
32 In Philodemus’ De musica see especially coll. 78; 130–131 e 142 Delattre.
33 See col. 144, 24 Delattre.
34 See Delattre 2006.
35 Bett 2013, 171.
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Whatever the exact relation between the two authors, it cannot be presented in 
terms of a passive dependence of Sextus upon Epicurean material. If Sextus ever 
made use of this material, he knew how to reframe it, abridge it, and redeploy it 
in an original way. 
All this may suffice to demonstrate that Sextus was no slave to his sources, 
and may help us ditch the annoying label of “stupid copyist” that is all too often 
applied to him.
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Greek Arithmology: Pythagoras or Plato?
Leonid Zhmud – Russian Academy of Sciences, Saint Petersburg
1 The problem
There is a genre of ancient Greek and Latin writings which are usually called 
arithmological. Their best known example is the Theology of Arithmetic, a short 
anonymous treatise of the fourth century AD dealing with the wonderful prop-
erties of the first ten numbers. This treatise, mistakenly attributed to Iamblichus, 
heavily relies on two earlier works, an extant On the Decad by Iamblichus’ teacher 
Anatolius and a lost Theology of Arithmetic by the Neopythagorean Nicomachus 
of Gerasa. Several quotations from this work will suffice to give an idea of the 
overall character of the genre: 
The Pythagoreans called the monad ‘intellect’ (nous) because they thought 
that intellect is akin to the one; for among the virtues, they likened the 
monad to moral wisdom; for what is correct is one…
The dyad is also an element in the composition of all things, an element 
which is opposed to the monad, and for this reason the dyad is perpetually 
subordinated to the monad, as matter to form…
The triad, the first odd number, is called perfect by some, because it is 
the first number to signify the totality – the beginning, middle, and end. 
When people exalt extraordinary events, they derive words from the triad 
and talk of ‘thrice blessed’, ‘thrice fortunate’. Prayers and libations are per-
formed three times. Triangles both reflect and are the first substantiation 
of being plane; and there are three kinds of triangle – equilateral, isosceles, 
and scalene (Waterfield 1988, 39, 42, 51). 
Such and similar comments on the philosophical, theological, and mathematical 
properties of the first ten numbers constitute the bulk of the arithmological works 
or passages. 
Though the term “arithmology” is widely present in the scholarly literature, 
its meaning sometimes tends to be rather fluid. To avoid misunderstandings I 
would like to remind readers of the original and still normative sense of the term. 
It was coined by A. Delatte (1915, 139), who, in his book on Pythagorean literature, 
defined arithmology as “a genre of notes on the formation, significance, and im-
portance of the first ten numbers, in which sound scientific research is mingled 
with fantasies of religion and of philosophy.” Thus, from the very beginning the 
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term “arithmology” was attached to a specific genre of non-mathematical writings on 
the first ten numbers. It is in this meaning that arithmology was normally used af-
ter Delatte, for example by F. Robbins,1 who in the 1920s investigated most Greek 
and Latin arithmological texts, spanning from the time of Varro (116–128 BC) to 
the early Byzantine writers, and established their common ancestor, a pseudo-Py-
thagorean treatise, probably of the late second or early first century BC. Robbins’ 
results were generally accepted, giving wide currency to the term “arithmology;” 
whereas his and Delatte’s contention that this genre goes back to Pythagoras and 
the ancient Pythagoreans, only strengthened an already dominant opinion on 
this question. To be sure, Delatte admitted that the first specimen of the genre 
was a short treatise On Pythagorean Numbers by Plato’s nephew and successor Spe-
usippus, and Robbins substantiated his claim by referring to the fragments and 
book titles of Philolaus and Archytas, which are now universally considered to 
be spurious.2 K. Staehle (1931, 3–5), in his useful study of Philo’s arithmology and 
the later parallels to it, was inclined rather to regard the Early Academy as the Sitz 
im Leben of arithmology, but did not develop this idea. It is therefore the purpose 
of this paper to argue that: 
1)  the late Hellenistic pseudo-Pythagorean treatise (hereafter Anonymus Arith-
mologicus, An. Ar.) offered Platonism disguised as authentic Pythagoreanism, 
thus sharing a common feature with most pseudo- and Neopythagorean writ-
ings of the first century BC – first century AD;3
2)  arithmology as a system was created in the Early Academy; the principal im-
petus for its formation came from Plato, especially from his unwritten doc-
trine of the ten ideal numbers; 
3)  the interest of the Pythagoreans in significant numbers belonged to tradi-
tional Greek number symbolism; even if it influenced Plato and his students, 
which is not certain, it was different in kind from arithmology.
2 What is arithmology? 
When writing about arithmology, it is convenient to start with some general re-
marks on its nature. As a literary genre arithmology is easily distinguishable 
from a much more general cultural phenomenon usually called number symbol-
ism (the Zahlensymbolik of early nineteenth-century German philosophy), which 
in ancient Greece gave rise to many diverse practices, such as medical prognos-
tics based on odd and even numbers, embryological calendars, isopsephy, and 
so on.4 Some scholars, however, do not see much difference between arithmol-
1 Robbins 1920, 309 n. 1; Robbins 1921. Staehle 1931, 1–2, also endorses Delatte’s definition.
2 Delatte 1915, 140; Robbins 1926, 90. 
3 See on this my paper “What is Pythagorean in the pseudo-Pythagorean literature?” (in 
preparation).
4 Another term for this phenomenon, “numerology” (coined in 1907), covers an even vaster 
area, dealing with the mystical properties of numbers, which includes many modern para-
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ogy and number symbolism and use the terms interchangeably;5 others define 
them, respectively, as “the body of lore” and as “the method whereby such lore is 
used,”6 which is not particularly helpful. What is important, of course, is not the 
terminology as such, but the need to draw a distinction between a very general 
psychological habit and its specific literary embodiment. Number symbolism is 
rooted in human nature7 and therefore universally widespread. It goes back to 
preliterate times,8 whereas arithmology appears in ancient Greece in a specific 
period and milieu, so that every ancient arithmological text or passage displays 
manifest affinities with its distant forefather. Thus, all fully preserved Greek 
arithmological texts, either long or short, start at one and go up to ten; arithmo-
logical fragments presuppose the same structure. The only prominent exception 
is Philo of Alexandria: in his lost work On Numbers he commented on practically 
every number mentioned in Jewish Scripture; still, most of his speculations are 
confined to the first ten numbers (Staehle 1931).
Traditional number symbolism, be it ancient Near Eastern or Greek, concen-
trates on individual significant numbers, such as three,9 seven, or nine,10 which ac-
quired their special significance before and apart from any philosophy. In the 
framework of number symbolism, numbers are not yet related to the decad, they 
possess their own independent meaning, whereas arithmology organizes them 
into the system of the first ten numbers, and treats both their purely mathemati-
cal properties and their philosophical and theological implications. In arithmol-
ogy every number becomes a member of the arithmetical progression from one 
to ten: one is the beginning of numbers, two is the first even number, three is the 
first odd number, four is the first square number, and ten is the perfect number, 
comprising the whole nature of numbers. Whereas number symbolism focuses 
on various correspondences of the numbers with the things of the outer world 
(three Moirai, four seasons, seven stars of the Bear, nine Muses), arithmology, 
retaining this focus, also displays a keen interest in those properties of numbers 
that are easily amenable to paramathematical interpretations: odd, even, prime, 
composite, and so on. Two is the first female number and three is the first male 
number, for even and odd is associated with female and male, five is marriage, 
seven is the Maiden Athena, for inside the decad it neither produces nor is pro-
duced, and so on. Thus, numbers constitute in arithmology an independent level 
mathematical fancies such as pyramidology, etc. See a critical study by an eminent mathe-
matician: Dudley 1997. 
 5 As, e. g., Burkert 1972, 466 n. 2; Kalvesmaki 2013, 5. 
 6 Runia 2001, 26–27.
 7 In a famous paper the cognitive psychologist George A. Miller explained the ubiquity of 
seven by the capacity of human memory (Miller 1956). See also Zvi 1988.
 8 Rich material was collected by Burkert 1972, 466–474.
 9 The fundamental monograph on the triad is Usener 1903. See also Lease 1919, who brings an 
impressive number of examples among which is “even grammar with its 3 persons, 3 num-
bers, 3 voices, 3 genders, 3 degrees of comparison, 3 kinds of accent, etc.” (67); Mehrlein 1959.
10 Ancient Near East: Dawson 1927; Reinhold 2008. Greece: Roscher 1904; Roscher 1906.
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of reality, which demonstrates that this genre could not have originated until 
Plato developed his theory of the two worlds, the visible and the intelligible, the 
physical things and the Forms, and until his heirs Speusippus and Xenocrates 
replaced or identified the Forms and ideal numbers with mathematical numbers.
Understandably, arithmology does not dismiss the traditional meaning of in-
dividual significant numbers but incorporates it into its own system. Thus the 
description of the triad quoted above from Theology of Arithmetic (above, 321) goes 
back to Aristotle’s account of the Pythagorean belief in the triad as the number of 
an “all” (Ph. 268a10–20), a belief that certainly derives from the prehistoric lore. 
Solon’s famous elegy on the seven-year ages of man’s life (fr. 17 Diehl) was often 
quoted or alluded to in the arithmological writings. The so-called embryological 
calendars, which is to say calculations of the development of the foetus, based on 
the same number as in Solon’s scheme, were known in Greek medicine and phi-
losophy from the fifth century BC (see below, 339). Later this practice was partly 
incorporated into arithmological literature,11 and partly developed by medical 
writers.12 With time, arithmology accumulated many of these traditional beliefs, 
but what is important to bear in mind is that it has never ousted number sym-
bolism from its traditional niche. Number symbolism continued to live its own 
life and produce literary specimens of its own kind, such as, for example the 
late pseudo-Hippocratic treatise De hebdomadibus (Roscher 1913). The first part 
of that tract (ch. 1–11) pays particular tribute to seven without, however, making 
it a member of a numerical series leading to ten, or even mentioning any other 
number. Such an approach is typical of number symbolism, not of arithmology.13 
Contrary to De hebdomadibus, Varro, who participated in the Neopythagorean 
movement and definitely used An. Ar.,14 says in an introduction to his Hebdomades 
that, if one adds numbers from 1 to 7 they will make 28, which number is equal 
to the lunar cycle, that is, to four weeks in seven days.15 This is what one should 
normally expect of an arithmological text.
The last general remark on arithmology concerns its similarity to the doxog-
raphical genre. Both genres owe their birth to the treatises of the fourth century 
BC: doxography to the Opinions of the Natural Philosophers by Theophrastus, who 
heavily relied on Aristotle, and arithmology to On Pythagorean Numbers by Speu-
sippus, who was no less heavily dependent on Plato. The history of both genres 
11 Barker (in this volume).
12 For the general history of this practice, see Parker 1999.
13 The Hellenistic date of De hebdomadibus, defended in the thorough study by Mansfeld 1971, 
remains the most plausible; since connections with first-century BC arithmology have re-
mained unproven, the tract could well have been written in the second century BC. Runia 
2001, 280, on different grounds, also suggests the second century BC.
14 Palmer 1970, 19–21. He wrote On the Principles of Numbers and Atticus de numeris (Cens. De die 
nat. 2.2).
15 Aul. Gel. 3.10.6; cf. 10.13. In Anatolius the same statement sounds like a formula: “When 
added up from the monad the 7 produces the 28, a perfect number which is equal to its own 
parts” (11.12–13).
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in the third–second centuries is completely unknown, but in the first century BC, 
the time of the great philosophical revival and change, they re-emerge: one as the 
anonymous doxographical compendium called by H. Diels the Vetusta placita, and 
another as the Anonymus Arithmologicus. Both works represent the decisive turn 
to philosophy of the classical age; both give rise to a vast family of similar writ-
ings. In the same way as doxography, arithmology consists not only of complete 
writings but more often of passages or parts of texts, the characteristic features of 
which allow us to identify them in writings of other genres, be it commentaries, 
philosophical treatises, popular introductions, and so on. The crucial difference 
between the two genres is apparent: doxography constitutes our most important 
source for the Presocratics and is a subject of ongoing research and vivid debates, 
whereas arithmology exists on the margins of the study of Greek philosophy. 
“The history of arithmology still remains to be written,” as it was in 1971, when 
J. Mansfeld wrote these words.16 It is far from my intention to write such a history; 
I shall only attempt to clarify some important issues pertaining to arithmology 
and its history, starting from An. Ar. and going back to the Pythagorean prede-
cessors of Speusippus.
3 The pseudo-Pythagorean writings of the third–second centuries BC
An. Ar., reconstructed in its main features by Robbins, belongs to the pseudo-Py-
thagorean apocrypha. To what degree does this guarantee that its teaching de-
rives from pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism? The problem concerns not only An. Ar. 
but pseudo-Pythagorica in general, and has given rise to two opposing theories: 
one sees continuity between ancient and Hellenistic Pythagoreanism and anoth-
er insists on a rupture between them.17 After a long discussion it is now widely 
agreed that pseudo-Pythagorean treatises were fabricated throughout the Helle-
nistic period and the early Roman empire without any discernible link to the orig-
inal writings of the Pythagoreans of the fifth and fourth centuries, not to mention 
Pythagoras’ own teaching. When reading pseudo-Pythagorean writers, one gets 
the impression that they neither knew the works of their proclaimed predeces-
sors, nor were interested in them. That is why the corpus of pseudo-Pythagorica 
is almost completely useless for any historical reconstruction of the teachings of 
the ancient Pythagoreans. Revealingly, it contains not a single authentic quota-
tion of Alcmaeon, Philolaus, Archytas, Ecphantus, or any other ancient Pythago-
rean. Therefore, if a Hellenistic treatise claims to be written by Pythagoras or by 
any of his ancient followers, we should hardly expect to find in it an authentic 
Pythagorean teaching. From the turn of the first century BC, pseudo-Pythagore-
an apocrypha (especially those written in Doric) increasingly relied on Academic 
and Peripatetic interpretations of Pythagoreanism, or directly on the theories of 
Plato and Aristotle. This is exactly what we find in An. Ar. The tendencies of the 
16 Mansfeld 1971, 156. Cf. Runia 2001, 28.
17 For a bibliography of the problem see Zhmud 2012, 6 n. 11; Centrone 2014.
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two previous centuries, however, were very different. Though the chronology 
of the pseudo-Pythagorean writings is notoriously difficult and controversial, a 
substantial group of them, attributed to Pythagoras himself, are referred to by 
authors of the third–second centuries and thus can be more or less reliably dated. 
The first pseudo-Pythagorean apocrypha started to appear at the end of the 
fourth century, by which time the school itself had disappeared (after 350). Nean-
thes of Cyzicus, a historian of the late fourth century BC, mentions the letter to 
Philolaus, written by the alleged son of Pythagoras, Telauges (FGrHist 84 F 26). 
Neanthes himself considered the letter to be spurious; it seems to have been of 
biographical, not doctrinal character. The biographer Satyrus (late third century 
BC) tells the story that Plato bought from Philolaus “three Pythagorean books” 
published by him, containing the previously unavailable teaching of Pythagoras. 
This famous tripartitum in Ionic prose included the following books: Παιδευτικόν, 
Πολιτικόν, Φυσικόν (D. L. 8.6, 9, 15); Diogenes Laertius quotes the opening words 
of the Φυσικόν: “Nay, I swear by the air I breathe, I swear by the water I drink, I 
will never suffer censure on account of this work.” Sotion of Alexandria (ca. 200 
BC) in his Successions of Philosophers adds to the list of Pythagoras’ works two 
poems, On the Universe (Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου) and Hieros Logos, as well as On the Soul, 
On Piety, Helothales, the Father of Epicharmus of Cos, and Croton (D. L. 8.7). It is 
tempting to connect On the Universe with an astronomical poem which, accord-
ing to Callimachus, was falsely ascribed to Pythagoras (Burkert 1972, 307). Cato 
(De agric. 157) and Pliny (NH 24.158) relied on a forgery known as Pythagoras on 
the Effects of Plants; Thesleff (1965, 174–177) prints several passages related to this 
book. One more pseudepigraphon, entitled Κοπίδεζ (D. L. 8.8–10), also belongs 
to the corpus of diverse writings fabricated under Pythagoras’ name before the 
first century BC. Now, what is available from them is mostly the titles, while 
information about their content is very meagre. Nevertheless, no scrap of this 
information is related to arithmology and only one to number symbolism.18 Sim-
ilarly to other philosophers of the period, the Hellenistic Pythagoras is said to 
have written on physics, ethics, politics, and religion, and not on the Monad and 
Indefinite Dyad. He was at this point in his history still uncontaminated by the 
early Academic and Aristotelian interpretations of Pythagoreanism, which in 
the Hellenistic period were either unavailable or were for a long time forgotten 
as irrelevant. 
18 According to the tripartitum, the life of a man is divided into four parts of twenty years 
– a child, an adolescent, a youth, and an adult – which corresponds to the four seasons 
(D. L. 8.8–10). An analogous passage is to be found in an anonymous biography of Pythag-
oras in Diodorus Siculus. It is based chiefly on Aristoxenus (Zhmud 2012, 72), in whose Py-
thagorean Precepts the various obligations of the same four age groups were discussed (fr. 35). 
The tripartitum and the Anonymus Diodori used the same source. – According to the same 
tripartitum, after 207 years in Hades Pythagoras has returned to the land of the living (D. L. 8, 
14). What does this number mean is unclear. Cf. Rohde 1925, 599–600; Thesleff 1965, 171.21.
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Attempts to find traces of Pythagorean arithmology in the Jewish historian 
Aristobulus (mid-second century BC)19 have been unsuccessful. Aristobulus 
wrote in the framework of the traditional number symbolism related to the num-
ber seven,20 quoting many Greek poets from Homer to Solon on this account, but 
characteristically not Pythagoras (or the Pythagoreans), although he maintained 
that the Greek sage took his philosophy from the Jews (fr. 3a, 4a Holladay). The 
alleged Pythagorean connection rests solely on a late quotation in Philolaus’ spu-
rious work where, similarly to Aristobulus (fr. 5), seven is linked with light.21 A 
strained “Pythagorean” interpretation of a verse quoted by Aristobulus from “Li-
nus,” ἑβδόμη ἐν πρώτοισι καὶ ἑβδόμη ἐστὶ τελείη (fr. 5) does not add plausibility 
to this hypothesis either.22
The role of Posidonius (ca. 135 – ca. 50 BC) in the emergence and transmis-
sion of arithmology was grossly overestimated by A. Schmekel (1892, 409-439), 
who relied on the fact that two of his fragments are preserved in the context of 
arithmological speculations by Theon of Smyrna and Sextus Empiricus.23 By the 
1920s Schmekel’s critics had convincingly shown that Posidonius did not write 
an arithmological treatise.24 However it took much longer to conclude on the ba-
sis of his safely attested fragments that Posidonius most probably did not even 
know the tradition represented by An. Ar.25 His comment on the seven parts of 
the world soul in Plato’s Timaeus (fr. 291 E-K) focuses on the correspondences be-
tween the number seven and natural events, whereas mathematical and mystical 
properties of seven or any other number are not mentioned.26 He praises Plato 
for following nature and, basically, does not add anything new to what is said in 
the Timaeus (35b–36b). Posidonius’ comment obviously belongs to the same line 
of thought that regarded the number seven as φυσικώτατος; it was represented 
by Solon in the sixth century, Alcmaeon, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Hippon, and 
the Hippocratic doctors in the fifth, and Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus in the 
fourth (see below, 338). This conclusion has an important chronological corollary: 
19 Walter 1964, 155–158; Collins 1984, 1250–1253; Holladay 1995, 224–226. 
20 “All the cosmos of all living beings and growing things revolves in series of sevens” (fr. 5).
21 44 A 12, rejected by Burkert 1972, 247 and Huffman 1993, 357. Walter 1964, 155 n. 2, gave cre-
dence both to A 12 and to the even more spurious B 20. 
22 Holladay 1995, 193, 239 n. 166 follows an erroneous translation: “Seventh is among the prime 
numbers, and seventh is perfect.” 1) Though seven is a prime number (πρῶτος ἀριθμός), ἐν 
πρώτοις never means “among the prime numbers,” but only “in the first numbers that make 
up the ratios” (2:1, 3:2, etc.), which Euclid defines as “numbers prime to each other” (πρῶτοι 
πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοί, 7, def. 13; Holladay confuses them with the prime numbers). See 
Eud. fr. 142, Archytas A 16, and Zhmud 2006, 215–218. To be ἐν πρώτοις one needs two num-
bers, not one. 2) Neither in the Pythagorean nor in the early Academic tradition does seven 
figure as the perfect number.
23 Fr. 85 E–K = Sext. Emp. 7.93; fr. 291 = Theon. Intr. 103.16–104.1. 
24 See, e. g. Robbins 1920, 309–320; Staehle 1931, 13–15.
25 For attempts to revive the thesis of Posidonius as the transmitter of arithmology, see Burkert 
1972, 54–56; Mansfeld 1971, 156–204. Cf. above, 324.
26 See Edelstein / Kidd 1972–1988, commentaries on fr. 85 and 291.
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if Posidonius did not use An. Ar., as Robbins believed, there are no other grounds 
to date it to the late second century. In fact, its first traces appear in the mid-first 
century BC.
Hence, no articulated arithmological passage is to be found in the early Helle-
nistic pseudo-Pythagorean literature or in other authors of this period for whom 
a connection with the arithmological tradition has been proposed. This is quite 
remarkable, since the next century brought a veritable flow of such texts. Varro 
was only twenty years younger than Posidonius, but lived long enough to bor-
row both from arithmology and from doxography, which, revealingly, also shows 
acquaintance with An. Ar. in its account of Pythagoras’ philosophy. Many inde-
pendent lines of evidence point to the conclusion that, after the first innovative 
step made by Speusippus, arithmology disappeared from the historical scene for 
about two centuries, whereas number symbolism continued to reproduce old and 
accumulate ever newer confirmations of the power of significant numbers. An. 
Ar. can be accounted for only in the context of the decisive philosophical turn 
in the first century BC which gave rise to Neopythagoreanism and added to the 
pseudo-Pythagorean writings a heavy touch of Middle Platonic metaphysics. 
4 The first century BC
Starting from Antiochus of Ascalon’s (ca. 130–68 BC) revival of the teachings of 
Plato and the Early Academy, namely of Speusippus and Xenocrates, to which 
Aristotle was added as a true “early Platonist,” we constantly hear about sympho-
nia between fundamental doctrines of Plato and Aristotle (Karamanolis 2006). 
It is from the point of view of this symphonia that the alleged doctrines of the 
ancient Pythagoreans begin to be conceived. “The content of the pseudo-Pythag-
orean writings results from a blending of Platonist and Aristotelian doctrines 
which is typical of Platonism beginning in the first century BC” (Centrone 2014, 
336–337). Indeed, the most conspicuous feature that An. Ar. shares with the other 
pseudo-Pythagorean works of this time is Middle Platonism very superficially 
disguised as ancient Pythagoreanism. In this sense arithmology is just an off-
shoot of the interest aroused in Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, in the first 
place among Platonically inclined philosophers. They tried to satisfy this interest 
by means which became available precisely in that time. Among the principal 
sources they used were, firstly, the oral teaching of Plato as presented by Aristot-
le, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and other early Academics, and, secondly, Aristotle’s 
critical description of the Pythagorean theories in the Metaphysics as well as in 
other treatises and exoteric works. Thirdly, for the arithmological line of the tra-
dition, Speusippus’ On Pythagorean Numbers was of special significance, for it is 
here that the foundations of arithmology were laid. All these sources, as we see, 
belong to the second half of the fourth century BC, but it was not until two and 
half centuries later, that due to a new approach to them, a complex picture of an-
cient Pythagoreanism and its legendary founder emerged.
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This newly created Pythagoras came to possess a combination of distinctive 
features, a key part of which had existed previously, but not necessarily in con-
nection with his name. 1) First and above all, Pythagoras is concerned with num-
bers, which complies with the substance of the Pythagorean theories presented 
by Aristotle, though the latter never related them to Pythagoras himself. 2) So 
understood, Pythagoras is regarded mainly as the predecessor and teacher of 
Plato, along with Socrates, but more essential for Plato’s later metaphysics. This 
is again what we find in Aristotle and the early Peripatetics, but not, for that 
matter, in the early Academics. 3) The principal doctrine of this Pythagoreanism 
(as preliminarily Platonized by Aristotle) is identified as Plato’s theory of the two 
opposite principles, the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad, which is regarded as 
having been anticipated by Pythagoras. This point plainly contradicts the posi-
tion both of Aristotle and of the early Academics, for they never projected this 
Platonic theory onto Pythagoras or the Pythagoreans.27 This is, then, a completely 
new feature. 4) This dualistic theory is subjected to monistic interpretation, so 
that either the Monad is conceived as producing the Indefinite Dyad, or the third, 
highest principle is set above the basic opposites, as, for example, in the accounts 
of the Pythagorean theories by Eudorus of Alexandria (fl. about 25 BC) and Mod-
eratus of Gades (first century AD).28 Nothing of this sort is attested in the earlier 
sources. In order to elucidate the background against which the emergence of the 
arithmological genre is to be understood, I shall comment on each these points, 
proceeding in reverse order.
The tendency to attribute to Pythagoras or the Pythagoreans the Platonic doc-
trine of the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad appears for the first time in the Pythag-
orean Hypomnemata (turn of the first century BC),29 transmitted by the grammari-
an Alexander Polyhistor (worked in Rome after 82 – about 35). The Pythagorean 
theories of the Hypomnemata (D. L. 8.24–35) are fairly heterogeneous and eclectic 
and this concerns in the first place the doctrine of principles: 
The principle of all things is the Monad. Arising from the Monad, the Indefi-
nite Dyad serves as matter for the Monad, which is its cause (ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος 
ἀόριστον δυάδα ὡς ἂν ὕλην τῇ μονάδι αἰτίῳ ὄντι ὑποστῆναι). From the Monad 
and the Indefinite Dyad arise numbers, from numbers points, from points lines, 
from lines plane figures, from plane figures solid figures, from solid figures sen-
sible bodies, the elements of which are fire, air, earth, and water (8.25).
27 Burkert 1972, 62–65, 81–83; cf. Zhmud 2012, 421–432.
28 Eudorus: Simpl. In Phys. 181.7–30 = fr. 3–5 Mazzarelli; Moderatus: Simpl. In Phys. 230.34–
231.24. See Doerrie / Baltes 1996, text: fr. 122.1–2, commentary: 473–485. See also Archytas, 
De princ. 19–20 Thesleff. Syrianus’ commentary on the Metaphysics (166.3–8 Kroll) ascribes 
a similar triad – a highest principle above peras and apeiria – to Archaenetus (otherwise 
unknown), Philolaus and Bro(n)tinus (De intell. fr. 2 Thesleff), relying, therefore, on the pseu-
do-Pythagorean writings. See Merlan 1967, 84.
29 On the discussion of the dating, see Zhmud 2012, 423 n. 34. 
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As we see, the familiarly Platonic looking derivation of physical bodies from 
geometrical figures and numbers and ultimately from two highest principles has 
been revised here in the spirit of monism. This violated the original equality of 
the opposite archai by making the active Monad produce the Indefinite Dyad; 
the latter, respectively, became passive and material. Two basic tenets reveal the 
Stoic provenance of this way of thinking:30 the Stoics maintained the difference 
a) between two archai, an active incorporeal principle (τὸ ποιοῦν) identified with 
reason (nous) and God, and a passive corporeal principle (τὸ πάσχον), identified 
with matter, and b) between ungenerated and indestructible archai and physical 
stoicheia. To be sure, Stoicism retained the fundamental dualism of its archai, in 
the sense that God never produces matter itself. In the realm of numbers and 
numerical principles, however, it seemed much easier for the Dyad to arise from 
the Monad, for this is exactly what happens in arithmetic. In an overview of the 
Pythagorean doctrines in Sextus Empiricus it is said that when the Monad is add-
ed to itself it produces the Indefinite Dyad (Math. 10.261). The Anonymus Photii 
(late first century BC) offers a still more resolutely monistic and mathematized 
version, where the Dyad is pushed far into the background (238a8–11).
This kind of Stoicized Platonism is manifested even more clearly in what the 
Vetusta placita, compiled in the school of Posidonius, passed off as Pythagoras’ first 
principles: μονάς = τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἰδικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεός; ἀόριστος 
δυάς = τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος.31 In the later 
accounts some of the Stoic features recede to the margins, but they undoubtedly 
belong to the original setting of this Neopythagorean system. Its author remains 
unknown; to my knowledge, he has never been even tentatively identified. At any 
rate, the system must have been created by a single mind rather than simultaneous-
ly by several authors. E. Zeller put its appearance at the turn of the first century BC, 
and that dating remains the most plausible.32 A Middle Platonic–Neopythagorean 
milieu, where Pythagoras was regarded as the predecessor of Plato’s mathematical-
ly tinted metaphysics, and as the legendary sage whom Greek philosophy had to 
thank for all that was best in it, seems to provide the most natural context for this 
innovative doctrine. Thus, a decisive first step was made towards a new kind of Py-
thagoreanism which P. Merlan (1967, 91) aptly called “aggressive,” for it laid claim 
to priority in the well known doctrines of Plato and the early Academics, Aristotle, 
and the Stoics. Reflecting changes of the philosophical climate, in the next two cen-
turies this doctrine gained wide popularity, being attested in many pseudo- and 
Neopythagorean writings, as well as in biography and doxography.33
30 For further references to this subject see Zhmud 2012, 423 n. 35.
31 Aët. 1.3.8 = Dox. 281a6–12; cf. 1.7.1. In Aetius, for the sake of brevity, the idea that the Monad 
generates the Dyad is omitted, but it can easily be restored.
32 Zeller 1919 I, 464–467; III.2, 103–106. For further discussion, see Zhmud 2012, 423 n. 34. 
33 Pseudo-Pythagoreans (quoted by page and line of Thesleff 1965 edition): Anonymus Alex-
andri (D. L. 8.25); Anonymus Photii (237.17–23, 238.8–11); Bro(n)tinus (De intell. fr. 2); Calli-
cratides (fr. 1, 103.11); Pythagoras (Hieros logos in Doric prose, fr. 2, 164.24–26); Archytas (De 
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Now, in our sources this metaphysical system often appears accompanied 
by easily recognizable arithmological ideas. Though absent in the Hypomnemata 
(probably, because of their very concise exposition of principles) they are present-
ed in three other important accounts of Pythagorean philosophy: Aetius (i. e. his 
source, the Vetusta placita), the Anonymus Photii, and Sextus Empiricus. Aetius 
(1.3.8) and the Anonymus Photii (238.1–3) state, for example, that the decad is 
the nature of number since all people count to ten and then turn back to the one; 
that the four is the decad δυνάμει and therefore is called the tetractys, and so 
on. Aetius (1.3.8) and Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. 4.2; 7.94) quote two verses of 
the famous Pythagorean oath, where the tetractys, the “source of everlasting na-
ture,” is attested for the first time; the Anonymus Photii also refers to the tetractys 
(238.1–3). According to Robbins’ (1920, 310–315) convincing suggestion, the oath, 
clearly alluded to in Philo as well,34 formed part of an introduction to the pseu-
do-Pythagorean arithmological treatise. The existence of An. Ar. is, therefore, pre-
supposed in these sources. 
This is one side of the coin. On the other side, all the arithmological writings 
starting with Philo’s work On Numbers, the earliest and the most complete speci-
men of the genre (Staehle 1931, 1–11), contain conspicuous traces of the metaphys-
ical system described above. Those that occur most frequently among them are 
the following:35 the Monad by its nature is equal to God and reason (4a–c, h); it 
generates all the other numbers but is not generated in itself (5e); the Dyad “flows” 
from the Monad (8); the Dyad embodies the material principle (11b). This deep 
interpenetration of the doctrines leaves no doubt that arithmology as a genre 
and the Neopythagorean system of principles derive from the same philosophical 
milieu. They share a great deal in common, including their presuppositions and 
sources, on which we shall dwell later. By the early first century BC the system 
must have already been formed, for it is reflected in the Pythagorean Hypomnemata 
and the Vetusta placita.36 From such a perspective, An. Ar. looks like an offshoot of 
the newly developed number metaphysics, with a more narrow focus on number 
speculations of various kinds – in the same way as the book of Speusippus, the 
Urvater of arithmology, arose against the background of Plato’s number philos-
ophy. In the late fourth century Aristotle’s criticism, and the emergence of the 
new philosophical systems, Stoicism and Epicureanism, changed the atmosphere 
in the Academy and made number speculations obsolete. Middle Platonism and 
Neopythagoreanism successfully brought them back and made them an integral 
part of their philosophizing. 
princ. 19–20). Influenced by Neopythagoreanism: Eudorus (Simpl. In Phys., 181.7–30). Neopy-
thagoreans: Moderatus (ibid., 230.34–231.24); Numenius (fr. 52 Des Places). Doxography: 
Aët. 1.3.8 (= Dox. 281.6–12) and 1.7.18; Anonymus in Sextus Empiricus (Adv. math. 10.261–262).
34 See below, 341 n. 70.
35 Numbers in brackets refer to Staehle’s 1931 collection of the parallels to Philo’s arithmology. 
36 Centrone 2014, 336–337 follows Zeller 1919, III.2, 113–114, in suggesting Alexandria as the 
most probable site of its emergence. 
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5 Plato Pythagoricus
One of the central presuppositions of the system described above consists in fea-
turing Plato as the legitimate successor of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans in 
a fully positive way, in defiance of what was told about this connection before. 
To be sure, an influential theory developed by Burkert (1972, 82) states that it was 
already Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Heraclides who equated “the doctrine of 
their master Plato, and therewith also their own philosophical positions, with 
the wisdom of Pythagoras.” This theory implies that Speusippus and Xenocrates 
were the fathers of Neopythagoreanism, and they are so treated, for example, 
by J. Dillon.37 However the evidence available to us does not support the thesis 
that the early Academics projected Plato’s unwritten doctrine onto Pythagoras.38 
Indeed, Plato himself blurred over his dependence on the Pythagoreans, so why 
should the Platonists understate the originality of their teacher, who mentioned 
Pythagoras just once and even then only as an originator of the ‘Pythagorean way 
of life’ (Resp. 600a–b)? Revealingly, in the fourth century and later, Plato’s depen-
dence on the Pythagoreans (not yet Pythagoras himself!) is affirmed in a tradition 
that is either critical of him, in Aristotle and the Peripatetics, or openly hostile, in 
stories of his plagiarism from the Pythagoreans.
The idea of plagiarism evolved roughly in the following way.39 The historian 
Theopompus, a student of Plato’s chief rival Isocrates, in a special work against 
Plato, was apparently the first to accuse him of plagiarizing not the Pythagoreans 
– it is true – but Aristippus, Antisthenes, and Brison (FGrHist 115 F 259). This idea 
was taken up by Aristotle’s student Aristoxenus, who asserted that Plato copied 
his Republic from Protagoras (fr. 67 Wehrli). Whether he accused Plato of copying 
from the Pythagoreans, we do not know, but in the succeeding generation this 
version was popularized by Neanthes and Timaeus of Tauromenium (D. L. 8.54–
55). A slightly later version, that Plato had copied his Timaeus from Philolaus’ 
book, has reached us via Timon of Phlius (fr. 54) and the biographer Hermippus 
(D. L. 8.85), whereas Satyrus replaced Philolaus’ book with Pythagoras’ triparti-
tum, mentioned above.40 This made Plato entirely dependent on Pythagoras him-
self. Obviously, most of these stories come from the biographical tradition, which, 
beginning with its founder Aristoxenus (frs. 32, 62, 131), was very much disposed 
to inventing malicious anecdotes about Plato. Unsurprisingly, the attitude of the 
Early Academy was the direct opposite. The Seventh Letter attempts to prove, 
it seems, that Archytas (who never appears in the dialogues) was much weak-
er than Plato in philosophy and therefore could not have had any influence on 
him (Lloyd 1990). According to the Academic legend of the mid-fourth century, 
the famous problem of doubling the cube was solved by Archytas, Eudoxus, and 
37 Dillon 1996, 38; Dillon 2003, 204. 
38 For fuller discussion of the sources, see Zhmud 2012, 421–432.
39 See Brisson 1993; Dörrie / Baltes 1996, 473–485. 
40 Above, 326; see Schorn 2004, 358–364 (F 10).
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Menaechmus working under instructions from Plato and under his control.41 A 
contemporary Academic source, preserved in Philodemus’ History of the Academy, 
ascribes to Plato an even more significant role as architect of the mathematical 
sciences: “At this time mathemata were also greatly advanced, with Plato being 
the architect of this development; he set problems for the mathematicians, who in 
turn eagerly studied them.”42 The picture of Plato giving instructions to Archy-
tas, the latter’s student Eudoxus, and Eudoxus’ student Menaechmus was further 
embellished in Eratosthenes’ dialogue Platonicus. This, then, was the attitude of 
Plato and the Early Academy towards Pythagorean mathematics.
In the first century BC the situation radically changes, so much that Plato’s 
intellectual indebtedness to Pythagoras was not only willingly recognized but 
became a cornerstone of later Platonism. Cicero, following a new biographical 
vulgate, several times reports the same narrative: Plato came to Italy and Sicily 
in order to meet the Pythagoreans and to appropriate their dogmata, of which 
Socrates had not even wanted to hear; Plato became acquainted with Archytas, 
Echecrates, and Timaeus of Locri, got access to Philolaus’ book, learned all the 
Pythagorean teaching, first of all their mathemata, and made it more argumenta-
tive; out of love for Socrates, however, he ascribed this Pythagorean sapientia to 
his teacher.43 Therefore, Plato becomes an acknowledged diadochos of Pythagoras 
and a student of Archytas, in which role he figures in Pythagoras’ biography in 
the Anonymus Photii (237.5–7); Aristotle here turns into the next diadochos, which 
is logical from the perspective of the symphonia between him and Plato which had 
recently been asserted. This biographical pattern has undoubtedly been modified 
in order to adjust to the new interest in Plato’s number metaphysics, because it 
could be accounted for only by his heavy debt to Pythagoreanism. The natural 
consequences of this new approach can be seen in the retrospective projection of 
Plato’s (Stoically coloured) doctrine of principles, the Monad and the Indefinite 
Dyad, onto Pythagoras and, which is even more relevant for us, the appropriation 
of Speusippus’ and other Early Academic arithmological schemes in the process 
of creating the Neopythagorean arithmology. But before coming to this issue it 
is important to recall the exceptional role of Aristotle in the appearance of the 
image of Plato Pythagoricus, because, historically speaking, this image was not 
in fact new in the first century BC. 
6 Aristotle on Plato and the Pythagoreans
However sceptical an attitude one may have towards the story of Neleus of Scep-
sis’ cellar as the only place where Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ esoteric works 
were preserved, it is clear that in the third and second centuries BC they had 
fallen out of circulation. Even if some Hellenistic library did possess a copy of 
41 See Zhmud 2006, 82–108, with a bibliography of the question.
42 Dorandi 1991, 126–127; Zhmud 2006, 87–89.
43 Resp. 1.15–16; Tusc. 1.39; Fin. 5.86–87. Dörrie / Baltes 1996, 250–256, 526–536.
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what we know as Aristotle’s Metaphysics, there is no evidence whatsoever that it 
was read and produced a philosophical reaction.44 The growing awareness of Ar-
istotle’s importance during the first century BC was prompted, though not exclu-
sively, by two editions of his principal esoteric treatises, first by Apellicon of Teos 
(ca. 100–90), and then by Andronicus of Rhodes (ca. 70–60), of which the latter 
subsequently became canonical. The rediscovered corpus of Aristotle’s writings 
offered a philosophical portrait of Plato significantly different from that known 
from the dialogues. As distinct from Plato’s tendency to obfuscate his debt to his 
predecessors, Aristotle regularly presented him, especially in the doxographical 
overview in Metaphysics Α 3–7, as following the Pythagoreans in his Prinzipien-
lehre.45 To Aristotle, Plato’s unwritten doctrine of principles acquires its historical 
meaning only against the background of Pythagorean teaching and vice versa: 
the basic function of Pythagorean number doctrine lay in serving as the main 
source of Plato’s late metaphysics. The pithy words attested for the first time in 
Aetius, Πλάτων δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις πυθαγορίζει, can easily be put into Aristotle’s 
mouth, for he insistently pointed out the kinship between the doctrines of Plato 
and the Pythagoreans, while noting their differentia specifica. But sometimes, as for 
example in his report of Plato’s famous lecture on the Good, he portrays them as 
being practically indistinguishable, thus taking a decisive step towards the meta-
physical doctrine known to us from the first-century sources: 
Both Plato and the Pythagoreans assumed numbers to be the principles of 
the existing things, because they thought that that which is primary and 
incomposite is a first principle, and that planes are prior to bodies…, and 
on the same principle lines are prior to planes, and points (which mathe-
maticians call semeia but they called units) to lines, being completely in-
composite and having nothing prior to them; but units are numbers; there-
fore numbers are the first of existing things.46
It is easy to recognize that this Platonic and Early Academic derivation of points 
from units, which is to say numbers, and the further generation point – line – 
plane – body exactly corresponds to what the Pythagorean Hypomnemata and other 
philosophical and arithmological sources pass off as the doctrine of the Pythago-
reans. If we add to this the first principles of numbers, the Monad and the Dyad, 
mentioned a bit later, the match becomes perfect. 
Aristotle’s students adopted from him a tendency to see Plato as the follower 
of the Pythagoreans. Thus the statement of Dicaearchus, that Plato in his teach-
ing combined Pythagoras and Socrates (fr. 41), is a direct echo of the description 
of Plato in the Metaphysics (987a–b13).47 Eudemus in his Physics (fr. 60) compares 
Archytas’ idea, that the causes of motion are ἄνισον and ἀνώμαλον, with Plato’s 
44 Düring 1968, 192; Moraux 1973, 3–44; Gottschalk 1997, 1085; Sharples 2010, 24–30.
45 Met. 987a31. b10. b22, 990a30; see also 996a6, 1001a9, 1053b12.
46 Alex. In Met. 55.20–27 = De bono, test. and fr. 2 Ross. Cf. below, 337.
47 Cf. above 333 n. 43.
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Prinzipienlehre, with his preference going to Archytas; he also praises the Pythag-
oreans and Plato for relating ἀόριστον to motion. Theophrastus in his Metaphys-
ics (11a27–b10) lumps together Plato and the Pythagoreans by ascribing to them 
Plato’s doctrine of ἕν and ἀόριστος δυάς. Together with Aristotle’s De bono (fr. 2), 
this text constitutes the closest antecedent to what in Neopythagoreanism be-
came a standard view. 
Thus the first century BC was the moment at which all the relevant lines of 
influence intersected and supplemented each other, and a number of important 
developments took place that would eventually give rise to arithmology as a 
genre: the revival of a Platonism that included the theories of Speusippus and 
Xenocrates; the rediscovery of Aristotle, this time as a Platonist; the reappearance 
of Plato as the follower of the Pythagoreans, but now in a positive sense, and the 
corresponding transformation of Pythagoras into an author of Platonic and Early 
Academic number philosophy, which with some new features added became the 
metaphysical foundation of Neopythagorean arithmology – all this did not exist 
before the first century. This dooms to failure any attempt to connect arithmology 
directly with ancient Pythagoreanism. In order to find out whether or not an indi-
rect connection is possible, we have to go back again to the fourth century, namely 
to the Early Academy.
7 Tέλειος ἀριθμός and the birth of the arithmological system
Number symbolism does not possess any intrinsic limit to significant numbers. 
Though they naturally tend to concentrate within the first decad, other numbers 
like 12, 13, 30, 40, and 50 could be equally important. The number ten in itself, 
although important in counting, does not play any noticeable role in traditional 
number symbolism. Unlike three, four, or seven, the number ten is not a symbol 
of a particular notion, thing, or group of things. Its symbolism is purely mathe-
matical and its completeness, unlike the completeness of the three that stands for 
“all,” consists of embracing “the entire nature of numbers.” Beyond the world of 
numbers it does not seem to correspond to anything, so that the Pythagoreans, 
according to Aristotle, had to invent a new heavenly body for it! In this sense the 
birth of arithmology can be conceived as the process of limiting the traditional 
lore by a new conceptual framework imposed on it by an influential philosophi-
cal doctrine which attached great value to the number ten.
The doctrine in question is, of course, the unwritten doctrine of Plato, which 
comprises a theory of ten ideal numbers, or Forms-Numbers. Their generation 
serves as a model for the generation of all other numbers. When Aristotle refers to 
the theory of the ten archetypal numbers, he obviously has Plato in mind,48 and in 
Physics 206b27–33 he directly names Plato (μέχρι γὰρ δεκάδος ποιεῖ τὸν ἀριθμόν). 
This is why the decad was counted as the perfect, or complete number. To be sure, 
48 1073a17–22; 1084a12–b2: πειρῶνται δ᾽  ὡς τοῦ μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος τελείου ὄντος ἀριθμοῦ (a31); 
1088b10–11. On Plato’s teaching on decad, see e. g.: Dillon 1996, 4–5; Erler 2007, 427–428
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in Plato’s dialogues ten was not yet called a perfect number; τέλειος ἀριθμός 
refers in one case to the so-called nuptial number, and in the other to the great 
year.49 This suggests, inter alia, that before Plato there was hardly any doctrine on 
the decad as τέλειος ἀριθμός. It appears for the first time in Speusippus’ On Py-
thagorean Numbers, half of which was devoted to the marvellous properties of the 
decad (fr. 28). Speusippus rejected the theory of the Forms and replaced the ide-
al numbers with mathematical ones, and Xenocrates identified the ideal and the 
mathematical numbers, so that for them “mathemata have become a philosophy, 
although they say that mathemata should be studied for another reason” (Arist. 
Met. 992a31). A comparison of the basic features of arithmology, as reflected in 
Philo’s work On Numbers and the abundant parallels to it in the later texts, with the 
theories of Speusippus and Xenocrates reveals how much this genre owes to them.
Whereas An. Ar. comprised an introduction and ten chapters devoted to the re-
spective numbers, Speusippus’ work does not yet exhibit this form, which is clas-
sical for arithmological literature. Speusippus’ work consisted of two parts, the 
first of which dealt, according to the excerptor, with different kinds of numbers: 
linear, plane, solid, and so on, continuous and discontinuous proportions, and 
the five regular solids. In the second part appear other types of numbers, such as 
prime and composite, as well as multiple and epimoric ratios, and numerical pro-
gressions. At first sight, the subject looks more arithmetical than arithmological, 
but Speusippus’ treatment of it was mathematical only to a very limited extent. 
He could assert, for example, that in an equilateral triangle in a certain sense 
there is one side and one angle! Saying that in the decad there are equal numbers 
of prime (1, 2, 3, 5, 7) and composite (2, 4, 6, 8, 10) numbers, he makes one a prime 
number, although in that case all the other numbers become composite (see Euc. 7, 
def. 12, 14). Anyway, most of these things go back to Pythagorean arithmetic, har-
monics, and geometry (three regular solids were also constructed by them), and, 
if the title On Pythagorean Numbers is Speusippian (which is not certain: Tarán 
1981, 262), it most probably referred to mathematical material which he used for 
his own paramathematical purposes.50
In the second part, better known to us thanks to a two-page quotation from 
it, Speusippus sets out his variant of the Academic doctrine of the decad, thus 
laying the foundations for the arithmological system. Its most conspicuous fea-
ture is that he focuses not on the correspondences between numbers and things, 
but on numbers and geometrical figures themselves and the interconnections be-
tween them. Such an emphasis is perfectly understandable insofar as for Speusip-
pus numbers constitute the first layer of beings,51 with magnitudes coming after 
49 Resp. 546b–d; Tim. 39d3–4. In mathematics τέλειος ἀριθμός is equal to the sum of all its 
divisors, e. g. 6 = 1 + 2 + 3, but this meaning is not attested before Euclid (7, def. 22; 9, 36).
50 “It is intelligible, then, that he should have called the ‘linear’, ‘triangular’ etc. numbers ‘Py-
thagorean numbers’” (Tarán 1981, 263). On Speusippus’ independence from the Pythagore-
ans see Tarán 1981, 109, 260, 269–276; Huffman 1993, 361.
51 Arist. Met. 1083a23 = Speus. fr. 34, 1075b37–1076a3 = fr. 30; 1080b11–16 = fr. 33.
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them. He does not seem to be primarily motivated by traditional number symbol-
ism: the numbers three, seven, or nine do not interest him as such; instead he is 
fixated on four and ten, since they are the pillars of Platonic number metaphysics. 
Speusippus’ interest was primarily philosophical and this is what gave arithmol-
ogy a completely new dimension. In fact, his deliberate focus on mathematicals 
was too radical and refined to be directly followed in a popular philosophical 
genre. The author of An. Ar. had to take a considerable step back by returning 
again to traditional number symbolism and applying it to the conceptual frame-
work created by Speusippus. What we observe in the later arithmological texts is, 
as it were, Speusippus “lite:” they are not so heavily metaphysically loaded and 
contain much entertaining material on the parts of the human body, seven- and 
nine-month babies, and so on.
According to the Academic doctrine, ontological priority resides with that 
which can exist without another. Bodies are less substance than planes, planes 
than lines, lines than points, and points than units,52 since “a unit is substance 
without position, while a point is substance with position,” which is to say that 
the latter contains an additional property.53 Thus, numbers are by nature first. Re-
spectively, the line is derived from the point (a variant: is produced by a moving 
point, De an. 409a4–7), the plane from the line, and the body from the plane, and 
this derivation sequence is closely connected to the first four numbers, for Spe-
usippus, for example, associated the point with one, the line with two, the plane 
with three, and the pyramid with four. Schemes of generation of magnitudes are 
attested for Speusippus and Xenocrates,54 and Aristotle attributed to Plato the 
derivation of line, plane, and solid “after numbers” or even from numbers.55 In his 
tract Speusippus tirelessly connects the number four with the decad, being very 
enthusiastic about the transformation of the tetrad into the decad: 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. 
The number ten contains all kinds of number, he asserts, 
including the linear, plane, and solid numbers. For 1 is a point, 2 is a line, 
3 is a triangle, and 4 is a pyramid; all these are elements and principles of 
the figures like them. In these numbers is seen the first of progressions… 
and they have 10 for their sum. The primary elements in plane and solid 
figures are point, line, triangle, pyramid, they contain the number ten and 
are limited by it (fr. 28).
Arithmology echoes this scheme by regularly equating one with the point, two 
with the line, three with the triangle, and four with the pyramid.56 The dyad is 
52 Arist. Met. 1002a4–8, 1019a1–4; 1017b6–21; De bono fr. 2 (above, 334 n. 46).
53 Arist. APo 87a35–37 See also Met. 982a26–28 and above, 334. A point as a monad having 
position is an Academic formula (Burkert 1972, 67). 
54 According to Speusippus, a point is the arche of line (Tarán 1981, 268). Xenocrates fr. 117 Is-
nardi Parente.
55 De an. 404b19–24. See also Arist. Met. 1090b21–24 = Xenocr. fr. 38 Isnardi Parente.
56 6a–b (one), 14a–c (two), 19a–e (three), 26a–d (four). The numbers here refer to Staehle 1931.
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generated by the “flow” (ῥύσις) of the monad, the line by the “flow” of the point, 
and the plane by the “flow” of the line.57 The tetrad is the “origin” and “source” of 
the decad (47a–b). Seven within the decad is neither a quotient nor a divisor.58 The 
decad is most perfect, it encloses all types of numbers and numerical relations; all 
people count to ten and then turn back.59 This common stock of arithmology goes 
back to Speusippus. That the addition of odd numbers produces a square num-
ber, while the addition of even numbers produces an oblong number (13a), is once 
alluded to in Aristotle with reference to the Pythagoreans (Phys. 203a3–16), but 
his notice is very unclear; it is more likely that the source of this was Speusippus, 
who treated plane numbers in his book.
According to Aristotle, the matching of various types of cognitive activity to 
the first four numbers (νοῦς 1, ἐπιστήμη 2, δόξα 3, αἴσθησις 4) is derived from 
Plato, who put forward these types themselves.60 In the Timaeus (47e) the Demi-
urge is identified with nous. Xenocrates, following Plato, identified nous with τὸ 
ἕν (fr. 213) and with God, and Speusippus declared God to be nous (fr. 58). Arith-
mology invariably associates the monad with God and mind (4a–c, h), whereas 
other correspondences are more fluid. The doctrine that the dyad is the first fe-
male number and the triad the first male number also seems to originate with 
Xenocrates, who assigned such predicates as ἄρρεν–θῆλυ and περιττὸν–(ἄρτιον) 
to his first principles Μονάς and Δύας.61 Aristotle agreed with the Pythagoreans 
that three is τέλειος ἀριθμός, for it signifies totality (see above, 324); he could 
have been the source of this idea in arithmology. 
8 Pythagorean roots of arithmology?
If the conceptual foundations of the arithmological system were laid down by 
Plato and his students Speusippus and Xenocrates, what then was the historical 
role of the Pythagoreans in the formation of the intellectual tradition which is so 
firmly and universally connected with them? Pythagorean arithmology stands 
or falls with Aristotle’s account of Pythagorean number philosophy, for he was 
the only one who ascribed to the (unnamed and unknown) Pythagoreans such 
notions as the significance of the decad, the likening of types of cognitive activity 
to numbers, and so on. Other classical sources are silent on this. What is more 
important is that, in the authentic fragments of the individual Pythagoreans and 
in the reliable evidence on them, arithmology is not to be found, as distinct from 
the traditional number symbolism.62 One of the early responses to Solon’s elegy 
on seven-year periods has come down from Alcmaeon of Croton, who stated that 
57 8a, 14a–c, cf. Speus. fr. 52.
58 43a–k, cf. Speus. fr. 28, l. 30.
59 86a–c, 87a–b, 88–89a–k, 90a–b, 92.
60 De an. 404b19–24. On types of cognition in Plato: Phaed. 96b, Parm. 142a, 151e, 164a, Tim. 
37b–c, Phil. 21b; in Aristotle: APo 88b34–89a2, 100b4–17; De an. 428a3; Met. 1074b34–36.
61 Aët. 1.7.30 = fr. 213; Dörrie / Baltes 1996, 192–194; Dillon 2003, 99–107.
62 The fragments on the decad of Philolaus (A 11–13, B 11) and Archytas (B 5) are spurious.
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young men achieve sexual maturity at the age of twice seven (24 A 15). To this 
division of life into periods of seven years, Presocratic philosophy and Hippo-
cratic medicine added analogous notions regarding the development of the foe-
tus, divided into weeks and months. A similar combining of the embryological 
calendar with the division of life into periods of seven is found in Hippon, the 
Pythagorean natural philosopher of the mid-fifth century. In an attempt to take 
into consideration data derived from experience, in his calculations, in addition 
to the number seven, he makes use of the still more significant number three: 
<…> After the seventh month, our teeth begin to emerge and then they fall 
out in the seventh year; <…> But this maturity which begins in the seventh 
month is prolonged to the tenth, because the same natural law applies to 
everything, so that three months or years are added to the original sev-
en months or years to bring things to completion. So the child’s teeth are 
formed in the seventh month but not completed until the tenth; the first 
teeth fall out in the seventh year, the last in the tenth; most have reached 
puberty after fourteen years, but everyone has by seventeen (38 A 16, tr. 
H. N. Parker).63
Obviously, Hippon or any other Pythagorean could have had a preference for 
seven or three, but such preferences are not in themselves Pythagorean: Aristotle 
also had a predilection for both these numbers. Usually critical of the Pythagore-
ans, he concurred with them on the triad (Phys. 268a10–20) and insisted that the 
rainbow necessarily has only three colours (Mete. 374b28–375a7). Similarly, the 
number of colours, tastes, and vowels necessarily equals seven (De sensu 442a19–
25, 446a19). Theophrastus adds odours to colours and tastes, calling the number 
seven καιριώτατος καὶ φυσικώτατος (CP VI,4,1–2). The Pythagoreans also con-
nected καιρός with the number seven, making use of the same traditional notions 
as Aristotle and Theophrastus. In the same way they connected justice with the 
number four, because justice “returns like for like.” In such and similar examples 
which, in fact, are not as numerous as is usually believed,64 we do not find specific 
features of arithmology, as described above. Pythagorean number symbolism has 
a pre-philosophical origin and mainly coincides with non-Pythagorean number 
symbolism.65 Where numbers are conceived as the members of the series limited 
by the ten, we can detect the influence of the Academy.
Aristotle, however, regarded the Pythagoreans as the philosophical predeces-
sors of Plato’s unwritten doctrine (Zhmud 2012, 415–452). It seems only natural, 
then, that he was the first to ascribe to them directly the theory of ten as a perfect 
number:
63 What is important here, is the sum of seven and three: 7 + 3 = 10, 7 + 7 + 3 = 17, etc.
64 Met. 985b29–30, 990a23, 1078b22–23; EN 1132b23; MM 1182a11; fr. 13 Ross.
65 Pherecydes (7 B 1), Ion of Chios (36 B 1), and Hippodamus (39 A 1) attached special signifi-
cance to the number three, Empedocles to four and seven (31 A 75, 83, B 153a).
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Since the number ten is considered to be τέλειος and to comprise the 
whole nature of numbers, they also assert that the bodies which revolve in 
the heavens are ten; and there being only nine that are visible, they make 
the counter-earth the tenth.66
This is, of course, only his interpretation of Philolaus’ astronomical system, for 
how plausible is it that Philolaus would have devised an invisible planet solely 
for the sake of a round figure, and that he directly said so? Arithmology does not 
invent things, but fits them into numbers or derives numbers from things avail-
able, of which there are always sufficient to produce the desired combination. 
Elsewhere Aristotle gives another, astronomical explanation of Philolaus’ mo-
tives for introducing the counter-earth (58 B 36), which is much more persuasive 
than an arithmological explanation (Zhmud 2012, 406–407). Further, Philolaus 
introduced two invisible heavenly bodies: Hestia, or Central Fire, and the count-
er-earth, which revolved with the earth around Hestia. Had he wished to bring 
the number of heavenly bodies to ten, he could have stopped with Hestia, which 
was the tenth. The counter-earth could only appear in his system after Hestia, 
hence being the eleventh heavenly body! Certainly Aristotle speaks of ten rotating 
bodies, leaving the stationary Hestia out of the ten. But if Philolaus had wished to 
count Hestia too, the fact that it was motionless would hardly have stopped him.
If the number ten in the eyes of the Pythagoreans had such magical power 
that for its sake Philolaus invented a new planet, this belief should have left nu-
merous traces, similar to those left by the numbers three and seven. In fact, the 
only other example of this account is the famous table of the ten pairs of oppo-
sites that Aristotle ascribes to a separate group of Pythagoreans (Met. 986a22–b8). 
Most experts agree now that it contains both Pythagorean and Academic material 
(Burkert 1972, 51), it is only the proportions which are disputed. True, the table 
begins with the pair limit-unlimited, known from Philolaus, but does this guar-
antee its Pythagorean origin as a whole? Such pairs as warm and cold, dry and 
wet, sweet and bitter, typical of the Pythagoreans and the Presocratics in general, 
are absent from the table. The combination of even and odd with left and right 
first appears in Plato’s Laws (717a–b). According to Aristotle, the pairs at rest and 
moving, and good and bad, are typically Platonic (Met. 1084a35), being derived 
from his ἀρχαί, the One and the Indefinite Dyad. One and plurality are not only 
a Platonic principle; they constitute the cornerstone of Speusippus’ philosophy. 
The male-female pair was significant to Xenocrates, who linked it to another pair, 
even-odd (fr. 213). It is known that Speusippus and Xenocrates had a series of op-
66 Met. 986a8–12. It is worth noting that Aristotle does not speak of the Pythagorean origin of 
this doctrine; rather, he refers to an already existent theory which is supported also by the 
Pythagoreans.
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posites similar to those of the Pythagoreans.67 Aristotle himself evidently thought 
in terms of a universal table of opposites, of which the “Pythagorean table” was 
a particular instance. Sometimes he mentions it as if it were Academic.68 Thus, 
however much the table ultimately derives from the Pythagorean tradition in its 
detail, in its final form of the ten pairs of distinct kindred opposites, it was created by 
somebody very well versed in the teaching of Plato and the Platonists.
The second pillar of arithmology is the tetrad, the “source” of the decad. In 
the Pythagorean tradition it is even less traceable than the decad, if we discard 
the likening of justice to reciprocity and thus to the number four. Revealingly, 
Aristotle mentions the tetrad only when discussing the generation of numbers 
and geometrical figures by Plato and the Platonists,69 and never relates it to the 
Pythagoreans. Obviously, he knew nothing of the famous tetractys which in the 
modern scholarship figures as a “kernel of Pythagorean wisdom” (Burkert 1972, 
72). Τετρακτύς is a special term for a group of the first four numbers which make 
ten (later, other kinds of tetractys were devised). Since the numbers of the tetrac-
tys express the ratios of the basic concords,70 it was regarded as being intimately 
related to music; one of the Pythagorean “symbols,” quoted by Iamblichus, says: 
“What is the oracle at Delphi? The tetractys, which is the harmony in which the 
Sirens sing” (VP 82). The tetractys may appear thoroughly archaic, but is in fact 
a Neopythagorean edifice. The ancient Pythagoreans did indeed assign special 
significance to the numbers that expressed concords, but in harmonics what in-
terested them was not numbers as such, but their ratios, λόγοι. The fact that the 
ratios of the basic concords consist of the first four numbers, which add up to ten, 
is more likely to please lovers of arithmology, such as Speusippus, than a mathe-
matician. The number ten plays no part in harmonics and, as I have tried to show, 
bears no relation to ancient Pythagoreanism. 
The word τετρακτύς appears for the first time in the Pythagorean oath, which 
was quoted almost simultaneously by An. Ar. and the Vetusta placita (above, 331). 
In the same first century BC the τετρακτύς was mentioned by the Anonymus 
Photii (439a8) and alluded to in Philo.71 The Pythagorean oath is a typical speci-
men of pseudo-Pythagorica: 
Οὔ, μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ κεφαλᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν 
παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥίζωμά τ’ ἔχουσαν (Aët. 1.3.8).
67 Speusippus: Arist. Met. 1085b5, 1087b4, b25; 1092a35. For Xenocrates one could reconstruct 
the following table of opposites: μονὰς–δυάς, ἄρρεν–θῆλυ, Ζεὺς–μήτηρ θεῶν, περιττὸν–
ἄρτιον, νοῦς–ψυχή (fr. 213).
68 See for example: Phys. 189a1–5, 201b21–27; Met. 1004b27–35, 1093b11–14.
69 Met. 1081a23, b15–22; 1082a12–34, 1084a23; 1090b23.
70 2:1 the octave, 3:2 the fourth, 4:3 the fifth.
71 He sets forth in detail the same doctrine of the τέλειος τετράς as the decad in potentia, which 
Aetius attributes to Pythagoras: De opif. 47–53, 97–98; De plant. 123–125; De vita Mosi 2.115.
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No, I swear by him who gave the tetractys to our head,
which has the source and root of everlasting nature.
Its spuriousness is clear from the pseudo-Doric dialect (φύσεως is an Attic form), 
and the verse form, which is not attested in authentic oaths, and the fact that 
Pythagoras is not named in it (according to Nicomachus, the Pythagoreans did 
not call Pythagoras by his name.72 It is significant that before the mid-first cen-
tury BC the expression φύσις ἀέναος is used only by Posidonius.73 Xenocrates 
designated the second of his two principles ἀέναος (fr. 101), “ever-flowing,” “ev-
erlasting,” but one should not identify a reference to the Pythagorean oath here.74 
Α᾿έναος is abundantly attested before Xenocrates, both in poetry and prose, in 
Plato amongst others,75 and to connect it with the oath first attested in the mid-
first century BC is quite pointless.
The only evidence that could save the historical authenticity of the τετρακτύς 
is the Pythagorean “symbol” which mentions the tetractys as the harmony of 
the Sirens. The tradition of the Pythagorean “symbols”, to which Iamblichus at-
tached the word (popular among modern scholars) akousmata, goes back to the 
archaic period and even earlier.76 Some proportion of the “symbols” known in 
Antiquity did actually exist in the sixth–fifth centuries BC, but the problem with 
our symbol is that it is found only in Iamblichus and in no other ancient writer. 
Although the collection of symbols in Iamblichus’ De vita Pythagorica 82–86 as a 
whole goes back to Aristotle’s book On the Pythagoreans, it is clear that Iamblichus 
did not use Aristotle himself but an intermediate source, in which the early sym-
bols may have been diluted by later ones. Now, it is not difficult to find out that 
the harmony of the Sirens (without the tetractys) figures twice in Plato’s Republic 
(and nowhere earlier), in the passage in which the famous heavenly harmony is 
described.77 Thus the symbol adduced by Iamblichus is not the “higher wisdom” 
of the ancient Pythagoreans, but a combination of Plato’s harmony of the Sirens 
with the late Hellenistic pseudo-Pythagorean tetractys. The tetractys, for its part, 
arose from the tetrad extolled by Speusippus in his work On Pythagorean Numbers.
Presenting the Pythagoreans in the Metaphysics A, Aristotle mentions three 
concepts in which they saw “resemblances” with the numbers: ψυχἠ καὶ νοῦς, 
καιρός and δικαιοσύνη, but he immediately indicates that the list is open-ended 
(985b26–31). In Book M, however, he specifies that the Pythagoreans explained 
72 Iamb. VP 88. The legendary phrase αὐτὸς ἔφα (ἔφα is Doric) that occurs first in Cicero (ND 
1.10), belongs to the same pseudo-Pythagorean milieu.
73 Fr. 239 E–K. The publishers of his fragments see in this a reference to the Pythagorean oath, 
but the reverse influence seems more easily arguable on chronological grounds.
74 As Burkert 1972, 72 and Dillon 1996, 100.
75 See LSJ, s. v. ἀέναος;  Crit. 88 B 18.1–2 DK; Plat. Leg. 996e2 (ἀέναος οὐσία).
76 For a full discussion of the symbols see Zhmud 2012, 192–206.
77 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ ἄνωθεν ἐφ᾽  ἑκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρῆνα συμπεριφερομένην, 
φωνὴν μίαν ἱεῖσαν, ἕνα τόνον· ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν συμφωνεῖν 
(617b4–7); πρὸς τὴν Σειρήνων ἁρμονίαν (617c4).
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only a few things by means of numbers, such as καιρός, or justice, or marriage 
(1078b21–23). Justice and καιρός occur several times elsewhere,78 marriage and 
ψυχἠ καὶ νοῦς only once; what numbers are attached to them, is not said. If we 
add to them the number three as the symbol of an “all” (Phys. 268a10–20), it will 
exhaust the list of the Pythagorean likenings of concepts to numbers which ap-
pear in the treatises of Aristotle and which he erroneously understood as philo-
sophical definitions explaining the essence of the things. Mathematics is present 
here only insofar as two added to itself makes four, and the (Academic) decad 
does not figure in this context, for it was not attached to any concept. Three, four, 
and seven belong to the classical repertoire of number symbolism, so, if among 
the ancient Pythagoreans there were some people attached to these numbers, 
they would not appear much more superstitious than Aristotle himself. There 
is, however, one source which not only significantly enriches our knowledge of 
Pythagorean number symbolism, but in fact transforms it into an arithmolog-
ical system. This is Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Met. 
985b26, where W. Ross, following P. Wilpert, identified an extensive quotation 
from Aristotle’s work Against the Pythagoreans (38.8–41.15 Hayduck = fr. 13 Ross). 
Alexander presents the whole series of numbers from one to ten accompanied by 
explanations very similar to or identical with those of the arithmological texts.79 
Commenting on the passage where justice and καιρός appear, he started from 
the four and seven, but the original order is easy to restore.
One is νοῦς and οὐσία, “because one was unchanging (μόνιμον), alike every-
where, and a ruling principle, <…> but they also applied these names to substance, 
because it is primary.” Two is δόξα, “because it can move in two directions; they 
also called it movement and epithesis;” two is also the first even number and fe-
male. Three is the first odd number and male. Four is justice and the first square 
number; but others declared justice to be nine, the first square of an odd number. 
Five is marriage, because it is the first number generated from two, which is male, 
and three, which is female. Seven is καιρός, since birth, the emergence of teeth, 
puberty, and so on are related to the number seven. Further, since the sun αἴτιος 
εἶναι τῶν καιρῶν, it is situated in the same place as the number seven, for, of the 
ten bodies which revolved around Hestia, the sun occupied seventh place. Seven 
is also Athena, the motherless maiden, because it alone among the numbers of 
the decad neither generates any number nor is generated from any. The moon 
occupies the eighth place, the earth the ninth, and the counter-earth the tenth. 
Thus, the numbers three and seven are attested in the doxography on the his-
torical Pythagoreans; the numbers three, four, and seven, and two more uniden-
tified numbers appear in Aristotle’s treatises; and the whole series from one to 
ten (except for six), with detailed explanations, is presented in an excerpt from 
78 See above, 339 n. 63.
79 Asclepius’ commentary on Met. 985b26 contains more or less the same material at slightly 
less extent (36.1–34.4 Hayduck).
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his lost work. Which line of the tradition is more reliable, and are they mutually 
compatible? There are, I believe, many serious reasons to doubt that Alexander’s 
excerpt represents a) Aristotle’s account b) of Pythagorean views. If it derives 
from Aristotle, it contains, besides the Pythagorean material, many Academic no-
tions, unattested in the independent Pythagorean tradition. Identification of nous 
with the number one is attested for Plato and Xenocrates.80 Οὐσία is a typically 
Platonic, and later Peripatetic term: Plato contrasted οὐσία, immutable essence, 
to becoming and motion (Tim. 29c); in the Cratylus (411c5), μόνιμον is used in 
this same sense; Eudemus (fr. 60) reports that Plato identified κίνησις with “great-
and-small,” that is, with the Indefinite Dyad; thus, the entire contrast between 
the “unchanging” monad and “moving” dyad is Platonic.81 Even if the “Pythag-
orean” definitions do not fully coincide with those of Plato (for him, opinion was 
three, not two), it is clear that we are dealing with an Academic type of arithmol-
ogy. Sexual differentiation between even and odd numbers is attested in Xeno-
crates (above, 338); it seems unlikely that it goes back to an ancient tradition. At 
least, we have no evidence of this. The odd-even and male-female pairs, however, 
appear in the table of opposites, whose Academic provenance is not in doubt (see 
above, 340). Seven as Athena goes back to Speusippus, who claimed that seven 
was neither a quotient nor a divisor (fr. 28, l. 30). The very idea that numbers can 
be generated, so insistently repeated by Alexander, is typically Platonic.
Now, let us imagine for the sake of argument that some fourth-century Py-
thagoreans unknown to us did set forth such an oral doctrine before Plato and 
the Academy. Then it would have been available only to Aristotle (for nobody 
else testifies to it) and would have disappeared after him, leaving no traces in the 
classical and Hellenistic tradition except for the Early Academy. Again, this doc-
trine would have influenced the Academy in such a way that its distinctively Py-
thagorean features remained concealed – for Plato, Speusippus, and Xenocrates 
never say that justice is four and καιρός is seven – whereas all its “proto-Platonic” 
features became maturely Platonic. If such a case is hard to imagine, it is still pos-
sible to argue that Aristotle may have mistakenly ascribed the Platonic notions to 
the Pythagoreans (see above, 334). It is more problematic to maintain that the text, 
the kinship of which with the arithmological genre is more manifest than that of 
Speusippus’ treatise, was written in the fourth century BC. Indeed, unlike Spe-
usippus’ work, Alexander’s commentary displays all the typical features of an 
arithmological work. It is organized as a systematic commentary on the numbers 
from one to ten, not as scattered remarks on some significant numbers. It com-
bines traditional number symbolism with ontology (substance, rest, movement, 
and so on) and mathematical arithmology: odd and even numbers, squares of 
them, ungenerated numbers, etc. It includes material on the number seven taken 
80 See above, 338. Among the Pythagoreans νοῦς καὶ ψυχή appears only in Ecphantus of Syra-
cuse, who makes it the force which constantly moves the whole cosmos (51 A 1).
81 Cf. a late ps.-Archytean passage: ἐπιστατὰ μὲν τὰ ἀκίνητα, δοξαστὰ δὲ τὰ κινεόμενα (36.19).
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ultimately from Solon (see above, 324). Seven here occupies the most prominent 
place, as in all arithmological texts, and three different interpretations are given 
to it: naturalistic, as for example in Hippon, arithmological, as in Speusippus, and 
cosmological, based on Philolaus’ system. Such a combination of the different 
sections of reality is distinctive of arithmological texts. Consequently, this Aris-
totelian fragment becomes an effective alternative to the origin of arithmology 
as described above, for it contains basically everything that arithmology is about 
and thus makes unnecessary the entire historical evolution of the genre. Another 
alternative would be to consider to what extent exactly this fragment is indeed 
Aristotelian.82
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Pythagorean Numerology and Diophantus’ Arithmetica: 
A Note on Hippolytus’ Elenchos I 2
Eugene Afonasin – Novosibirsk State University
Keenness backed by teaching is a swift road to knowledge.
Diophantus, Arithmetica I, pref. 
1
According to Hippolytus (Elenchos I 2, 18),1 the Pythagoreans “borrowed their 
number theory and the system of measuring from the Egyptian priests.”2 An 
outline of Neopythagorean numerology, which follows this statement, contains 
nothing “Egyptian,” of course.3 But to his otherwise typical summary Hippoly-
tus unexpectedly adds the following extraordinary statement (repeated verbatim 
in a similar exposition of the Pythagorean doctrine in book IV 51, 8), which, as it 
turns out, may be of interest to the historians of mathematics: 
1 The edition used is that of Miroslav Marcovich (1986). An English translation by J. H. Mac-
Mahon in the fifth volume of the Ante-Nicene Christian Library (Roberts / Donaldson 1867–
1897) and that of F. Legge (1921) are mostly reliable but require corrections in some places. 
The work can be dated to the beginning of the third century (AD 222–235, according to 
Marcovich 1986, 17). As regards the character of the author, I prefer to suspend judgment. 
For details cf. Cerrato 2002 (with my review in Bryn Mawr Classical Reviews), Osborne 1987, 
Mansfeld 1992.
2 Τοὺς δὲ ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὰ μέτρα παρ’ Αἰγυπτίων φασὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν μαθεῖν· Similar 
phrases open other summaries of Pythagorean doctrine: in IV 51, 1 Hippolytus simply re-
states this, while in VI 21, 1–2 he adduces a “testimony” from Plato’s Timaeus (19e). Clearly 
the idea is of fundamental importance for him: the Pythagoreans used to lead a solitary life 
in underground chambers, “being struck by the plausible, fanciful, and not easily revealed 
wisdom” of the Egyptian priests (Elenchos I 2, 16–18). Pythagorean ties with Egypt are a 
commonplace, although the reason for keeping silence during the period of instruction giv-
en by Hippolytus is unusual and perhaps arose as a result of merging two or more separate 
reports into one succinct testimony (silence = a solitary life).
3 He starts with definitions of the first number (an originating principle, singular, indefinable, 
incomprehensible, containing in itself all numbers that, according to plurality, can go on ad 
infinitum) and the primary unit (a principle of numbers, a male entity, a parent of all the 
rest of the numbers). The dyad (a female even number), the triad (a male uneven number), 
and the tetrad (a female even number) follow them and produce a decade (“the source of ev-
erlasting nature”), etc. This variant of Pythagorean numerology roughly corresponds with 
the “typical” Pythagorean metaphysics known to have been developed by the members of 
the Old Academy (Speusippus, Xenocrates, etc.). For detailed analyses of the subject see, for 
instance, Burkert 1972, 53 ff. and Dillon 2003, 40 ff., 110 ff.
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The four divisions of this decade, the perfect number, are called (καλεῖται) 
number, unit, dynamis, and cubus (ἀριθμός, μονάς, δύναμις, κύβος), the 
conjunctions and minglings of which make for the birth of increase and 
complete naturally the productive number (τὸν γόνιμον ἀριθμόν). For 
when the dynamis is multiplied by itself, a dynamodynamis is the result 
(ὅταν γὰρ δύναμις αὐτὴ ἐφ› ἑαυτὴν κυβισθῇ, γέγονε δυναμοδύναμις). 
But when the dynamis is multiplied into the cubus, the result is a dynamocu-
bus (ὅταν δὲ δύναμις ἐπὶ κύβον, γέγονε δυναμόκυβος); and when the cu-
bus is multiplied into the cubus, the product of two cubes (cubocubus) is the 
result (ὅταν δὲ κύβος ἐπὶ κύβον, γέγονε κυβόκυβος). So that all the num-
bers from which the production of existing (numbers) arises, are seven – 
namely, number, unit, dynamis, cubus, dynamodynamis, dynamocubus, cubocu-
bus (ἀριθμόν, μονάδα, δύναμιν, κύβον, δυναμοδύναμιν, δυναμόκυβον, 
κυβόκυβον).
This is an excerpt from Diophantus. In his Arithmetica I (Praef., ed. Tannery I, 2, 
3 ff.; I. Thomas’ translation) this Greek mathematician likewise starts his expo-
sition with definitions of number (ἀριθμός) and unit (μονάς), “all numbers are 
made up of some multitude of units” and “their formation has no limit” and pro-
ceeds by saying that the square of a determinate number (τετράγωνον) is formed 
when “any number is multiplied by itself; the number itself is called the side of 
the square (the square root);” cubes are formed when “squares are multiplied by 
their sides;” square-squares (δυναμοδύναμις) are formed when squares are mul-
tiplied by themselves; square-cubes (δυναμόκυβος) are formed when squares are 
multiplied by the cubes formed from the same side; cubo-cubes (κυβόκυβος) are 
formed when cubes are multiplied by themselves.4
A Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG) search helps to identify the place of Hippoly-
tus’ source within the Greek literary tradition. Take, for instance, the κυβόκυβος. 
The TLG gives twelve instances in Diophantus himself (all from the Arithmetica), 
eight in the Scholia in Diophantum (all within one passage), one in the Scholia in 
librum Iamblichi in Nicomachi arithmeticam introductionem (with a reference to Dio-
phantus), and, finally, our passage in Hippolytus (three times). 
A search for δυναμοδύναμις yields similar results (Diophantus, Hippolytus, 
Scholia in Diophantum, Scholia in Iamblichum) with two interesting exceptions. The 
term is twice used in the Metrica (I 17, lines 17, 25 and 26, ed. H. Schöne) of Heron 
of Alexandria and once in the Neoplatonic Anonymous prolegomena to Platonic phi-
losophy (6, ed. L. G. Westerink), discussed below. So the terminology must have 
4 He introduces the following notation: the square of the unknown quantity is called dyna-
mis (signified by Δ with index Υ, that is ΔΥ = x2 in contemporary notation); the cube – cubus 
(ΚΥ= x3); the square multiplied by itself – dynamodynamis (ΔΥΔ = x4); the square multiplied by 
the cube formed from the same root – dynamocubus (ΔΚΥ= x5); the cube multiplied by itself 
– cubocubus (ΚΥΚ = x6). Fractions are defined similarly: arithmoston – 1/x; dynamoston – 1/x2; 
cuboston – 1/x3, etc. He also introduces special marks for number, unit, and unknown value.
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originated in the works of such mathematicians as Heron and Diophantus and, 
for some reason, aroused interest only in Platonic and Pythagorean circles. In-
deed, if we were to look for an example of an “ideal” Pythagorean, Diophantus 
would certainly qualify: he wrote a book on such a popular Pythagorean sub-
ject as polygonal numbers, transformed traditional arithmetic, and created a new 
theory of number; in a word, he did things a Pythagorean is supposed to do. It 
is no secret that Pythagorean numerology is not very useful from a mathemati-
cal point of view. What if an unknown Pythagorean (Hippolytus’ source) decid-
ed to translate the standard Pythagorean theory into the language of the higher 
mathematics of his times? It is as if asked to define number I were to indulge in 
axiomatic set theory.
The anonymous author of the Prolegomena to Platonic philosophy comments on 
the fact that Plato died at the age of 81: this number is associated with Apollo and 
Muses, he says, and bi-quadratic (δυναμοδύναμις), because the number three5 
multiplied by itself gives nine, while nine multiplied by itself gives our 81, i. e. 
32 · 32 = 34 = 81. We know nothing about Diophantus’ life, but he may not have been 
a complete stranger to Pythagorean circles, as a mathematical riddle, allegedly 
an inscription on his tomb, which tells scientifically the span of his life, seems to 
attest (Palatine Anthology XIV 126).6
It is intriguing that Hippolytus is not alone in ascribing this sort of mathe-
matics to the Egyptians. A Byzantine polymath Michael Psellus (Thomas II.514–
515) also says that Diophantus “more accurately” developed a certain “Egyptian 
method.” Compare a Scholium to Plato’s Charmides 165e (Thomas I.17) where logis-
tic is defined as “a science that treats of numbered objects, not of numbers” (1 as a 
unit, 3 as a triad, 10 as a dyad, etc.). It deals, according to the scholiast, with such 
problems as Archimedes’ Cattle Problem and 
its branches include the so-called Greek and Egyptian methods of multi-
plication and division, as well as the addition and splitting up of fractions, 
5 “The first number which contains in itself the beginning, the end, and the middle;” compare 
with Anatolius ap. the Theologoumena arithmeticae 17.
6 “Here lies Diophantus. The wonder behold – Through art algebraic, the stone tells how old: 
‘God gave him his boyhood one-sixth of his life, / One-twelfth more as youth while whiskers 
grew rife; / And then yet one-seventh ere marriage begun; / In five years there came a bounc-
ing new son. / Alas, the dear child of master and sage / After attaining half the measure of 
his father’s life / Chill fate took him. After consoling his fate by the science of numbers / For 
four years, he ended his life’” (trans. W. R. Paton). Let x be the numbers of years Diophantus 
lived, then, given that the number of years his son lived is x / 2, the problem is solved thus: 
x = x / 6 + x / 12 + x / 7 + 5 + x / 2 +4 (quoted according to Eric Weisstein, “Diophantus’ Riddle:” 
mathworld.wolfram.com / DiophantussRiddle.html). The solution is 84 years, admittedly, 
not as perfect as in the case of Plato, but still interesting: consider, for instance: 3 + 81 = 3 + 
34 = 3 · (1+33). Cf. “Pythagorean” methods of finding “side- and diameter-numbers” (Thom-
as I.90–95, 132–139, examples from Aristotle, Lucian, Nicomachus, Theon of Smyrna, and 
Proclus), Archimedes’ famous Cattle Problem (Thomas II.202–205), Heron’s problems (II.504–
509), etc. Compare also the Theologoumena arithmeticae 52–53, where Anatolius applies 63 as 
part of the calculation of Pythagoras’ lifespan: the answer is 82. We will return to this later. 
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whereby it explores the secrets lurking in the subject-matter of the prob-
lems by means of the theory of triangular and polygonal numbers. Its aim 
is to provide a common ground in the relations of life and to be useful in 
making contracts, but it appears to regard sensible objects as though they 
were absolute. (trans. Thomas).
Speaking about the Egyptian influence, our sources do not allude to anything 
especially mystical, nor ascribe to Pythagoras any sort of secret Egyptian lore: the 
ancient testimony is in agreement with the historical truth, as the Egyptian pa-
pyri amply testify (cf. Fowler / Turner 1983, Knorr 1982, 140 ff., Chrisomalis 2003).
2
History was not kind to Diophantus: valued nowadays as one of the greatest 
mathematicians of all times, he was almost completely forgotten by his contem-
poraries.7 We know nothing about his life, and his origin is also uncertain. The 
fundamental Arithmetica (now supplemented by the Arabic books, edited in 1982–
1984) definitely belong to Diophantus; a partially preserved treatise On Polygonal 
Numbers is traditionally ascribed to him. A collection of propositions in the theory 
of numbers, called the Porisms, is several times mentioned by the author in Book 
III of his Arithmetica. Jean Christianidis (1980) suggested that certain (lost to us) 
“elements of arithmetic” (Ἀριθμητικὴ στοίχειωσις), ascribed to Diophantus by 
an anonymous Byzantine commentator to Iamblichus’ Introduction to Nicomachus’ 
Arithmetic (132, 10–13 Pistelli),8 could have served as an elementary introduction 
(similar or identical with this Porisms). This is interesting because, transmitted 
independently, this introductory work would be able live its own life and, unlike 
the exceptionally difficult major treatise of Diophantus, could have influenced 
popular arithmetic; such popular arithmetic took forms such as elementary text-
books (Robbins 1929; Fowler 1983), mathematical epigrams, like those collected 
7 The status questionis is well summarized by N. Schappacher (2005, 9 ff.): “The Arithmetica are 
almost as elusive as their author. The way in which mathematicians through the centuries 
have read and used the Arithmetica is always a reliable expression of their proper ideas; but 
never can we be sure of what these readings tell us about the text itself. The Arithmetica are 
probably the most striking example of a mathematical text which, on the one hand, has 
inspired, and continues to inspire, generations of mathematicians at various different mo-
ments of the history of algebra and number theory; but which, on the other hand, has never, 
for all that we know, been developed further as such.” He then describes “four major renais-
sances of Diophantus, or, more precisely, two times two” which occurred between the ninth 
and thirteenth centuries in the world of Islam and Byzantium and between the sixteen and 
seventeenth centuries in Europe and the Western world. The four Arabic books of Diophan-
tus were discovered in the 1970s and the Greek mathematician still inspires contemporary 
mathematical thought (28 ff.).
8 The text reads: “We shall learn the properties of the harmonic mean more fully in the final 
theorem of the first book of Diophantus’ presentation of the elements of arithmetic, and the 
diligent should read them there” (132 Pistelli, Waterhouse’s translation). 
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
351Pythagorean Numerology and Diophantus’ Arithmetica
by Metrodorus (who, by the way, calls Diophantus’ work στοιχεῖα9), and the Py-
thagorean numerological works similar to this one excerpted by Hippolytus. This 
attribution was somewhat undermined by W. Waterhouse (1993), who, following 
Heath, argued that the Elements of Arithmetic is just another title for the Arithmeti-
ca, having demonstrated that a “diligent reader” could indeed learn about the 
geometric mean from the last problem of the first book of the Arithmetica (I 39). 
Despite this, in the same year Wilbur Knorr (1993) not only found additional in-
dications in favour of this attribution,10 but also argued that another introductory 
work, the Definitions, commonly attributed to Heron of Alexandria, could in fact 
belong to Diophantus.11
Hippolytus’ text can clearly serve as a good and virtually neglected terminus 
ante quem for the dating of Diophantus. Largely forgotten in antiquity, Diophan-
tus is for the first time mentioned by name in Theon of Alexandria’s Commentary 
on Ptolemy’s Syntaxis I, 10 (Thomas II.514).12 On the other hand, in the work On 
 9 Tannery 1893–1895, II, 62–63, 69. These epigrams correspond to the second problem of Arith-
metica I.
10 Most importantly, he noticed that ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς στοιχειώσεως in the Heroni-
an Definitions (128; Heiberg 84.17–19) may actually refer to some Preliminaries to the Elements 
of Arithmetic, and not to the work as such. This proves that the Elements of Arithmetic could 
indeed be an alternative title for the Arithmetica and, at the same time, leaves open the ques-
tion of a hypothetical introductory work. His (and Tannery’s) guess that, “the Iamblichus 
scholiast appears to have conflated” two works, “Preliminaries being a commentary (presum-
ably in the margins of Diophantus’ Arithmetica)” (Knorr 1993, 182) is hopelessly conjectural, 
however.
11 The crucial passage is: Καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸτῆς γεωμετρικῆς στοιχειώσεως τεχνολογούμεν 
αὑπογράφων σοι καὶ ὑποτυπούμενος, ὡς ἔχει μάλιστα συντόμως, Διονύσιε λαμπρότατε, 
τήν τε ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν ὅλην σύνταξιν ποιήσομαι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Εὐκλείδου τοῦ στοιχειωτοῦ 
τῆς ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ θεωρίας διδασκαλίαν – “Also the systematized Preliminaries of the El-
ements of Geometry, by writing them below for you and sketching them out, in the most 
succinct manner, most illustrious Dionysius, I shall make both the foundation and the 
whole arrangement in accordance with the teaching in the theory of geometry of Euclid, 
the Elementator” (the opening phrase of the Definitions; Knorr’s translation, slightly adapt-
ed). Knorr observes that this preface and the preface to the Arithmetica are addressed to 
individuals with the same name, Dionysius, and that, in general, they are very similar in 
their tone, syntax, and style. On the other hand, the Definitions are isolated in the Heroni-
an corpus, their attribution to Heron has long been questioned, and, most importantly, the 
prefaces to other works of Heron are conspicuously different in style and form. This scenario 
entails, according to Knorr (1993, 186–187), that the Preliminaries, called to provide assistance 
for relative beginners in mathematics, were published by Diophantus after the Elements of 
Arithmetic (= our Arithmetica) and “the conspicuous parallelism of the titles – the Elements 
of Arithmetic and the Elements of Geometry, by which he refers, respectively, to his own Ar-
ithmetica and the Elements of Euclid, indicates his arrangement of the two great treatises as 
counterparts within the mathematical curriculum” (Knorr 1993, 188). I find this scenario 
plausible, with the reservation that the Preliminaries could actually have been prepared and 
published any time before, after, or during the composition of the major treatise.
12 In his fairly elementary work Theon quotes the following statement of Diophantus: “The 
unit (monas) being multiplied without dimensions and everywhere the same, a term (eidos) 
that is multiplied by it will remain the same term.” Theon saw the eclipse of AD 364. His 
daughter Hypatia, also a mathematician, was murdered by the Christians in 415. 
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Polygonal Numbers, Diophantus quotes Hypsicles (ed. Tannery I 470.27; Thomas 
II.514), a mathematician and astronomer dated to the mid-second century BC and 
famous for his division of the circle of the zodiac into 360 parts.13 Finally, in the 
Letter mentioned above Psellus states that, “the most learned Anatolius collected 
the most essential parts of the theory as stated by him [Diophantus] in a different 
way and in the most concise form, and dedicated his work to Diophantus” (Tan-
nery II.38.22–39.1; Thomas II.514).14 On the basis of these data Tannery concluded 
that Diophantus must have been a contemporary of Anatolius, whom he iden-
tified with a professor of Aristotelian philosophy in Alexandria who was made 
bishop of Laodicea around AD 270–280.15 Scholars have doubted this inference 
and have felt themselves “at liberty to place Diophantus wherever he best fits 
their theories of historical development” (Swift 1956, 163): some tend to date him 
closer to the time of Theon of Alexandria, while others relate him to Heron of 
Alexandria.16
13 Hypsicles, On risings; Thomas II.394–5. The division of the ecliptic into 360 degrees was, 
probably, developed by the Egyptians on the basis of the Mesopotamian methods already 
in the sixth–fifth centuries BC, when Egypt was under the administration of the Persians 
(Knorr 1982, 157, with a reference to Parker 1972). Hypsicles, however, applied the division to 
any circle in general. He made a general definition of polygonal numbers, which is quoted 
by Diophantus. He is also the author of the so-called Book XIV of Euclid’s Elements, where 
he refers to Apollonius of Perga as a contemporary.
14 Knorr’s (1993, 184–185) suggestion to read heteroi instead of heteros as in Tannery (which 
would imply Psellus’ reference to “a different Diophantus”) further complicates the situa-
tion while offering no useful solution. Admittedly, dynasties of intellectuals were common 
in late antiquity. Take, for instance, Theon and Hypatia (above), or Iamblichus the Younger 
(the second part of the fourth century), a relative of Sopater, who was a student of the Neo-
platonic philosopher Iamblichus (Cameron 1967). Diophantus is not a very common name, 
but nor is it unique. For instance, a series of superb inscriptions from Lydae (in Lycia, on 
the southern coast of Turkey) honour a family using this name, founded by a certain Caius 
Julius Heliodorus, probably a freedman of the Dictator Caesar, which included numerous 
local officials named Diophantus, and a senator Diophantus, a rhetor Heliodorus, etc. An 
inscription found in the same group honours a physician of Lydae, Ameinias Aristobulus, a 
man of learning and of distinguished skills, who may belong to the same family (Hicks 1889, 
58–75); he is not recorded elsewhere in the literary sources, but Galen mentions a certain 
Diophantus, also a physician from Lycia (in De compositione medicamentorum secundum locos 
XII 845.8 Kühn). For more details see Tituli Asiae Minoris vol. 2, fasc. 1 (1920), nos. 129–157.
15 This Anatolius, mentioned by Eusebius (Hist. Eccles. II 726, 6–9), composed ten books of Ar-
ithmetical Introductions. On the other hand, Eunapius (Vita Soph. 363) informs us that a certain 
Anatolius, a contemporary of Plotinus and Porphyry, was a teacher of Iamblichus. If we, 
with D. O’Meara (1990, 23), do not wish to multiply Anatolii beyond necessity, and accept 
an earlier date for Iamblichus’ birth (before AD 245, according to J. Dillon’s suggestion), we 
can entertain the possibility that Iamblichus studied under Anatolius before the latter be-
came bishop. On the same principle, we may presume that the fragments of a numerological 
treatise found, along with the excerpts from Nicomachus, in the anonymous Theologoumena 
arithmeticae also belong to him. 
16 Knorr (1993), discussed above. Thanks to O. Neugebauer we know that the eclipse of the 
moon described by Heron (Dioptra 35) occurred in AD 62.
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I assume that this is the ground for the new dating of Diophantus somewhat 
earlier than it was previously thought. How much earlier? Our passage contains 
no indications. But let us look attentively at what follows it:17
[Pythagoras] likewise said that the soul is immortal, and that it subsists in 
successive bodies (μετενσωμάτωσιν).18 Wherefore he asserted that before 
the Trojan era he was Aethalides, and during the Trojan epoch Euphorbus, 
and subsequent to this Hermotimus of Samos, and after him Pyrrhus of 
Delos; fifth, Pythagoras. 
This was probably invented by a student of Plato and Aristotle, namely Hera-
clides of Pontus (ca. 380–310 BC).19 In a passage from Anatolius in the Theolo-
goumena arithmeticae 52–53 another student of Aristotle, Aristoxenus (ca. 370–300 
BC), and the whole group of Hellenistic historians are credited with a story about 
Pythagoras’ journey from Egypt to Persia as a prisoner of Cambyses (II). The 
chronology is then used to count the years of Pythagoras’ life: the numerologist 
says that Pythagoras’ reincarnations occurred every 63 = 216 years; 514 years had 
passed from the Trojan epoch to the times of Polycrates of Samos; Cambyses was 
a contemporary of Polycrates; therefore 514-216-216 = 82. Another numerological 
riddle, and the cubes again! 
But Diodorus of Eretria and Aristoxenus the musician, – continues Hippoly-
tus – assert that Pythagoras went to Zaratas the Chaldaean (Ζαράταν τὸν 
Χαλδαῖον),20 and that he explained to him that there are two original causes 
of things, father and mother, and that father is light, but mother darkness… 
Zaratas is then credited not only with distinctly Zoroastrian ideas, but also with 
the concept of the cosmos as a musical attunement (μουσικὴν ἁρμονίαν), and 
even with the Pythagorean ban on eating beans, subsequently related to the idea 
of reincarnation.21
17 Elenchos I 2, 12 f. Translations in Kingsley (1990) and Osborne (1987) have been consulted.
18 Cf. VI 26. Metensomatosis is a rare word. It occurs once in Clement of Alexandria (τὸ περὶ τὴν 
μετενσωμάτωσιν τῆς ψυχῆς δόγμα; Stromateis 6.35.1.4, where the Indian philosophers are 
accused of borrowing their doctrines from the Egyptians), once in the Platonic Celsus (ap. 
Origenes, Contra Celsum 7.32.12), six times in Hippolytus and from time to time in later liter-
ature, most notably, in Origenes (some 20 times), Theodoretus (6 times), Epiphanius (8 times) 
and other Christian heresiologists and, quite independently of them in Plotinus (twice), 
Proclus (once), Hermias (once) and Olympiodorus (3 times). One may also note Nemesius 
of Emesa (5 times). A more standard term would be metempsychosis, known at least from 
the first century BC (Diodorus Siculus 10.5.2.8, a pseudo-Pythagorean source, the so-called 
Anonymous Diodori); also note a pseudo-Pythagorean Anonymous Photii and Theologoumena 
Arithm. 52.10 (Aristoxenus, fr. 12.3 Wehrli).
19 Pythagoras had allegedly recognized the shield of Euphorbus, a Trojan hero, killed by Me-
nelaus (cf. Ovid, Metamorphoses 15, 160–164, D. L. 8.4 = fr. 89 Wehrli).
20 Cf. VI 23, 2: Ζαράτας ὁ Πυθαγόρου διδάσκαλος. 
21 This is truly exceptional. A later tradition about Pythagoras adds to the list of countries he 
visited the land of the Brahmans, but no one in antiquity ever connected the Pythagorean 
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This passage, maddening as it stands, has been variously interpreted by schol-
ars. Some, following Eduard Zeller, emphatically denied Aristoxenus’ author-
ship,22 others, and on good grounds, took a more balanced position.23 It is true 
that Aristoxenus is known to have denied that Pythagoras opposed the eating 
of beans.24 But this is not decisive in this context. Given that Aristoxenus wrote 
a great number of works, including other treatises on Pythagoreanism, of which 
we possess only a handful of fragments and secondary reports, we cannot rule 
out that he related this somewhere else. Besides, Aristoxenus is famous for his 
stories about personal contacts between philosophers.25
Another solution suggests itself: the list of previous lives of Pythagoras (as seen 
above) and the peculiar experiment with beans in Hippolytus could be traced 
back to Heraclides of Pontus.26 Further, it is known that Heraclides published a 
(lost) dialogue, entitled “Zoroaster” (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1114f–1115a). Could he 
also have fathered other parts of this report, or, at least have contributed to its 
development? 
We further note that Hippolytus’ strange idea that the Pythagoreans led a sol-
itary life in underground chambers, “being struck by the plausible, fanciful, and 
not easily revealed wisdom” of the Egyptians (Elenchos I 2, 16–18), as mentioned 
psychology with India, although at least from the Hellenistic period Greek and Latin authors 
possessed reasonably reliable information about this country. If we are not surprised to find 
Greek golden pendants in a Hunnic tumulus in Mongolia (Polos’mak et al. 2011, 111 ff.), why 
we are so reluctant to accept the possibility of intellectual contacts between the Greeks and 
other nations? The Greeks and Indians could have interacted in Persia, just as the Persians 
did with the Greeks in Egypt. See also Bernabé / Mendoza (2013, 48–49).
22 Most recently: Zhmud 2012, 83 ff.
23 See Kingsley 1990, 246 ff.
24 Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 1–4.11 = 25 Wehrli; D. L. 8.20 = fr. 29a Wehrli. And, in general, 
Aristoxenus differs a great deal from other authors known to have written on Pythagoras. 
For instance, he is recorded to have established an alternative tradition about Pythagoras’ 
birthplace (Clement, Stromateis I 62, 2–3; D. L. 8.1 = fr. 11a Wehrli: Pythagoras was “a Tyrrhe-
nian from one of the islands which the Athenians held after expelling the Tyrrhenians”). 
It worth noticing that Hippolytus knows about this alternative tradition, as the opening 
sentence of his report clearly indicates: “Some say that Pythagoras was a native of Samos” 
(Hippolytus, Elenchos I 2, 1). Apparently Aristoxenus’ opinion was also recorded immediate-
ly before this phrase in his source. 
25 Kingsley 1990, 252 f. In a recent article Lacrosse (2007) notes that the fictitious discussion 
between Socrates and the Indian (Eusebius, Praep. Evang. I 1, 3 = fr. 53 Wehrli) “echoes the 
genuine and typically Indian axiom that knowledge of the human self is knowledge of God 
and vice versa, which is one of the major commonplaces in traditional Brahmanic thought” 
and “Aristoxenus’ fragment is one of the first and only texts, historically, in which a typical 
Greek philosophical argument is challenged by an authentic Indian proposition translated 
into an argument based on Greek conceptual categories.” Compare the story about Aristotle 
and the Jewish Sage told by Clearchus of Soli (Lewy 1938), and a passage in the Theologoume-
na arithmeticae 52–53 (discussed above). Even if numerology in the latter is due to Anatolius, 
the historical details could go back to Aristoxenus. 
26 Diogenes Laertius 8.4–5 and Lydus, De mens. 99.17, respectively; fr. 41 Wehrli; Marcovich 
1968, 32.
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above, may be inspired by still another student of Aristotle, Dicaearchus (Porphy-
ry, VP 18 = fr. 33 Wehrli).
Finally, a story about the ways new members were accepted into the Pythag-
orean community, recorded almost immediately after our fragment (Elenchos I 2, 
16–18), is clearly based on a report found for the first time in a Hellenistic histo-
rian Timaeus of Tauromenium (c. 350–260 BC). Pythagoras, allegedly, asked pro-
spective disciples to sell their property and deposit the money with him for the 
period of instruction. In the event of success, the accepted candidates would hold 
their property in common,27 while those rejected would receive their money back. 
This tradition is relatively early and is usually considered more-or-less credible, 
as is Hippolytus’ repeated statement that the Pythagorean school28 consisted of 
two groups of disciples: the insiders (“Esoteric Pythagoreans”), and the outsiders 
(the Exoterics, also called Pythagoristae).29 This is the sort of statement one can 
readily believe, unlike the later tradition about the mathematikoi (philosophers 
and scientists) and akousmatikoi (those who receive ethical maxims in a “sym-
bolic” manner), found for the first time in Clement of Alexandria (Strom. V 59, 1) 
and fully developed by Iamblichus.30 It appears therefore that all the information 
given by Hippolytus is in its substance traceable back to the Lyceum. 
The earliest author known to use this material is Alexander Polyhistor (early 
first century BC).31 The source excerpted is also similar to the one appropriated 
27 “What belongs to friends is common property,” κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων; Timaeus, fr. 13a Jacoby; 
Schol. in Plato’s Phaedrus 279c.
28 Called αἵρεσις (l.4). Compare Ref. I 22, 23 and 24.1 where the same term characterizes the 
Epicureans, the Academics and even the Brahmans. It is safe, therefore, to assume with 
Mansfeld (1992, 11) that Hippolytus mechanically copied it from his source, rather than in-
troduced it himself. Clement also thought it was typical of any school: the Academics, the 
Epicureans, the Stoics, and even “the followers of Aristotle say that some of the works of 
their teacher are esoteric, while the rest is popular and exoteric” (Strom. V 58, 1–2; cf. 59, 2).
29 Τοὺς μὲν ἐσωτερικούς, τοὺς δὲ ἐξωτερικοὺς (Ref. I 2, 4); οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐσωτερικοὶ ἐκαλοῦντο 
Πυθαγόρειοι, οἱ δὲ ἕτεροι Πυθαγορισταί (Ref. I 2, 17).
30 This well-known subject cannot be treated here. Lengthy discussions are found in Burkert 
1972, 192–208 and, recently, Zhmud 2012, 169–206; specifically for Clement’s reinterpretation 
of the concept as a good example of a profound change of attitude to Pythagoras and his 
school, which took place in the process of transition from the Late Hellenistic to Early Ro-
man period, cf. Afonasin 2012, 27–32.
31 “Pythagoras was enthusiastic about Zoroaster, the Persian Magus, and the followers of 
Prodicus’ heretical sect claim to have obtained secret books of this writer. Alexander, in his 
work On Pythagorean Symbols, records that Pythagoras was a pupil of the Assyrian Zaratas 
(whom some identify with Ezekiel, wrongly, as I shall show presently), and claims in addi-
tion that Pythagoras learned from Gauls and Brahmans (Clement, Strom. I 69, 6–70, 1; J. Fer-
guson’s translation).” This, by the way, indicates that the ancients typically distinguished 
this Zaratas from the prophet Zoroaster, placed in time immemorial (cf. Aristotle, fr. 6 and 
34), and routinely cited in this capacity, cf. Clement, Strom. I 133, 1 (Zoroaster in a list of real 
and legendary persons), III 48, 3 (on the Magi in general), V 103, 2 (where Er from Plato’s Re-
public is identified with Zoroaster); Hippolytus, Ref. V 14, 8 (quoting from a phantasmagoric 
Gnostic book). Plutarch, On the Generation of the soul in the Timaeus first mentions our Zaratas 
as the teacher of Pythagoras (1012e) and then (1026b) refers to Zoroaster, the author of a 
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by Antonius Diogenes (ca. AD 100–130).32 In his On the Generation of the soul in the 
Timaeus (1012e) Plutarch openly admits that he uses an indirect source and then 
says that Xenocrates (fr. 68 Heinze) 
insert[ed] a limit in infinitude, which they call indefinite dyad (this Zara-
tas, too, the teacher of Pythagoras, called mother of number; and the one 
he called father, which is also why he held those numbers to be better that 
resemble the monad)… (trans. H. Cherniss).
Having combined this testimony with Hippolytus, Harold Cherniss (1976, 165 
note C, with reference to Roeper 1852, 532–535) concludes that behind an other-
wise unknown Diodorus (of Eretria) may “lurk” the name of the Neopythagore-
an philosopher Eudorus (late first century BC), cited several times and frequent-
ly used by Plutarch. This well may be the case and Eudorus could indeed have 
transmitted this information to later writers.
It is safe to assume therefore that our story about Zaratas (if not the entire 
report) had already been a part of Hellenistic doxographic tradition, reflecting a 
general tendency to find suitable foreign teachers for all Greek authorities. In the 
same vein Clement informs us that the teacher of Pythagoras was a certain Son-
chis, the highest prophet of the Egyptians, while Plato was associated with a cer-
tain Sechnuphis of Heliopolis, Eudoxus the Cnidian studied under Chonuphis, 
and Democritus spent eight years with certain “Arpedonaptae” (land-surveyors) 
(Strom. I 69, 1 f.). The source of this cento in Clement is unknown, but can prob-
ably also be traced to Hellenistic doxography.33 And, in general, the material an-
alysed seems to indicate that Hippolytus utilized sources that can be dated to a 
relatively early period. He gives a list of Pythagorean symbols elsewhere (Elen-
chos VI 51, 27, etc), but, as we have seen, knows nothing about the akousmatics 
and mathematics. This may indirectly indicate that his source(s) were not influ-
mythos about Oromasdes and Areimanius, who (according to his On Isis and Osiris 369d–e) 
lived 5000 years before the Trojan War. Cf. also Diogenes Laertius I 2 (from Hermodorus), 
Pliny, Nat. Hist. XXX 4 (from Hermippus), and, finally, Pletho in Anastos (1948, 280 f.). Be 
he Zaratas, Zarathustra, or Zoroaster, our authors clearly distinguish between the ancient 
prophet and the alleged teacher of the historical Pythagoras: a Persian follower of Zoroastri-
anism could easily have been named after the ancient prophet. It is true, however, that the 
later Persian and Arabic authors used Aristoxenus’ dating of Zoroaster to the sixth century, 
as Kingsley (1990, 260) has perfectly demonstrated. Pythagoras, according to the Apollodor-
ian system, reached his acme at the time of Polycrates’ tyranny in Samos (which means that 
he was forty ca. 532–529 BC). He was born in 570 therefore, and this date was assumed by 
the medieval Arabic authors when they calculated that Zoroaster “had appeared” 258 years 
before the Seleucid era. Cf. a similar numerological exercise above (Anatolius ap. the Theolo-
goumena arithmeticae 52–53).
32 For a comparative study of the parallel versions of this report in Porphyry, VP 44, Lydus, De 
mens. IV 42, and Hippolytus, Ref. I 2, 14–15, cf. Marcovich 1964, 29–36. Antonius Diogenes 
authored a novel, entitled the Wonders beyond Thule, now available only as a summary in 
Photius, in which he claims that he has ancient sources for most of his material, but admits 
that the work as such is his own literary creation (Morgan 1985, 482). Cf. also Fauth 1978.
33 Diogenes Laertius (8.90) also calls Chonuphis the teacher of Eudoxus.
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enced by Neopythagorean biography, which is clearly reflected in such authors 
as Clement, Porphyry, or Iamblichus. And all the texts exude references to Egypt: 
Pythagoras studied in Egypt, he borrowed his mathematics and number theory 
from the Egyptians, and the archetype for the organization of his school is pro-
vided by the Egyptian temples. 
3
This has clear implications for the dating of Diophantus. If Anatolius, referred to 
by Psellus, is indeed the future bishop of Laodicea (after AD 270) and Dionysius 
to be identified with the leader of the Alexandrian “Catechetical School“ (ca. AD 
240), then, given that the Elenchos was composed before 235, Diophantus must, at 
least, be an older contemporary of Dionysius, which still places him a generation 
or two earlier than is traditionally supposed. But, given the nature of Hippoly-
tus’ work, it is hard to believe that the idea to interpolate an otherwise tradition-
al Pythagorean text with this piece of “advanced mathematics” occurred to our 
doxographer. The whole text, as we have seen, unmistakably belongs to early 
Neopythagorean tradition, which allows us to entertain the idea that Diophantus 
the philosophus Pythagoricus, was known and used in the Neopythagorean and 
Platonic sources from the second, and, possibly, the first century AD.34 Moreover, 
if he, as it seems, authored an introductory work on arithmetic, he may be set 
in a series with such persons as Eudorus, Cleomedes, Moderatus, Nicomachus, 
and Theon of Smyrna as a fully fledged contributor to the development of the 
Neopythagorean movement, perhaps to be placed somewhere between Eudorus 
and Nicomachus. 
An interesting supplementary testimony, which seems to confirm this hy-
pothesis, is furnished by Papyrus Michigan 620, dated to the third century AD. 
The papyrus contains a series of arithmetical problems “written,” according to F. 
Robbins (1929), “prior to the time of Diophantus, in which a quasi-algebraic meth-
od of solution is employed and in which appear some of the symbols used in 
the manuscripts of Diophantus, notably the sign S, which denotes the unknown 
term.” Robbins concludes that, “neither definitely utilitarian, nor so scientifically 
generalized as the Arithmetica of Diophantus… it is most probably a schoolbook 
of some sort, and perhaps from it or others like it Diophantus may have derived 
ideas which served as a basis for his mathematical methods.” If we now reverse 
the perspective, could we speculate that this and similar textbooks were in fact 
influenced by earlier arithmetical works, of which Diophantus’ Arithmetica was 
the most advanced example?
34 Knorr also speculates that Diophantus “lived earlier than the third century, possibly even 
earlier than Hero in the first century” (1993, 187). I was about to complete this essay when 
I came across the article by Knorr. Is it not significant that two scholars came to a similar 
conclusion when approaching the problem from completely different perspectives?
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The Pythagorean Metaphysics of Numbers in the Works 
of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʼ and al-Shahrastāni*
Anna Izdebska – University of Warsaw
The Pythagorean metaphysics of numbers can be understood as a complex sys-
tem of mutually dependent ideas. Within this system, the doctrine of number (or 
numbers) as the metaphysical principle (arche / archai) is quite often considered 
to be the central element. Consequently, in such cases, the number one is un-
derstood as the arche of number and the very heart of metaphysics.1 Although 
one finds the first traces of this theory in Aristotle’s writings as well as in some 
fragments of Philolaus, most of the sources that present or develop this meta-
physics were composed between the Hellenistic period and Late Antiquity, and it 
can therefore be difficult to ascertain the degree to which this theory represents 
an original Pythagorean concept, and to what extent it is a creation of later phi-
losophers.2 However, as Pythagoreanism became increasingly popular from one 
period to another, this theory continued to be developed, eventually reaching its 
mature form in the works of Nicomachus of Gerasa, a philosopher and mathe-
matician active in the first-second century AD. His work in turn had a strong in-
fluence on those Arabic intellectuals who were interested in Pythagoreanism. In 
this paper, I will analyse two Arabic descriptions of a “metaphysics of numbers,” 
*  Research presented in this paper was conducted as a part of a project funded by the Ministry 
of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland (DI 2011019741). 
1 Arist. Metaph. 985b–986a; SE 7.92; Placita philosophorum, Diels 302a; D. L. 8.1, 25; Anon. in 
Phot. 439a19–24; Hippol. Haer. 1.2; 6.23; 51. For Pythagorean metaphysics and number theory 
(prior to as well as later than Plato) see Burkert 1972, 15–96; 401–482 and also McKirahan 
2013 and Zhmud 2013. For Pythagorean and Platonist number symbolism and metaphysics 
of numbers since the 1st cent. BC, see Kalvesmaki 2013, 7–25 and also O’Meara 1989, passim.
2 L. Zhmud argues that while this purportedly Pythagorean “doctrine of numbers” is not at-
tested in sources prior to Aristotle, there is nothing that would allow us to claim that it was 
shared by Pythagoras and his early disciples. According to Zhmud, this idea was invented 
in the circles around the Academy or the Lyceum, and was only later adopted by Pythagore-
ans and people interested in Pythagoreanism. See Zhmud 1989; 2012, 394–456. This issue of 
the origin of the “doctrine of numbers” is in fact part of a much larger problem of how one 
approaches the fragmentary and difficult evidence on early Pythagoreanism, and what one 
considers to belong to the original Pythagoreanism (and, finally, how one defines the very 
notion of Pythagoreanism). A review of these various approaches is provided by Cornelli 
(2013a; 2013b). In the context of the Pythagorean metaphysics of numbers, see in particular 
Cornelli 2013a, 137–188 (where he also discusses Zhmud’s ideas).
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both of which claim to be Pythagorean. The first one is found in the Epistles of 
the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā ,ʼ while the second was included by al-Shahrastāni in his Kitāb 
al-Milal wa-l-Ni ̣hal (Book of Religions and Sects). Thanks to focusing closely on these 
two different texts, this paper will be able to show some of the ways in which the 
Pythagorean ideas were transferred from the Greek to the Arabic world.
Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʼ
The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʼ (Brethren of Purity) is the name of an esoteric Ismaili frater-
nity of anonymous philosophers who were active in Basra and Baghdad around 
the ninth or tenth centuries AD (the exact date of their activity is disputed).3 The 
collection of their 52 philosophical treatises – known as the Rasā iʼl (Epistles) – 
presents a sort of encyclopaedia of philosophical knowledge, for which there is no 
parallel in medieval Arabic literature. In a sense, the Ikhwān’s attitude towards 
Pythagoras and Pythagorean philosophy also has no parallel. Not only do they 
refer to Pythagoras several times, but they also explicitly emphasize their strong 
attachment to this particular tradition of Greek philosophy.4 Surprisingly, the 
sources on which they base their knowledge of Pythagoreanism seem to have 
been fairly sparse. They certainly knew the Golden Verses, and the Introduction 
to Arithmetic by Nicomachus of Gerasa was also important for them.5 However, 
they probably did not know any of the other texts translated into Arabic that 
had been the main sources of information about Pythagoras in the Arabic world 
(these were the Placita philosophorum, Pseudo-Ammonius’ Opinions of Philosophers, 
and the Life of Pythagoras by Porphyry, as well as gnomologies).
Nonetheless, despite their lack of identifiable sources, the Ikhwān declared a 
strong attachment to the Pythagorean tradition, especially in comparison to other 
Arabic philosophers.6 This tendency is clearly visible in the thirty-second epistle, 
“On the intellectual principles according to the Pythagoreans”7 (which directly 
precedes the epistle “On the intellectual principles according to the Ikhwān al-
Safāʼ”). This epistle begins by recalling what is presented as Pythagoras’ doctrine 
concerning number:
The nature of all that exists is in accordance with the nature of number. 
One who knows number, its laws, its nature, its types and kinds, its prop-
3 Baffioni 2011.
4 Marquet 2006. However, Marquet’s idea of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʼ as “Islamic Pythagoreans” 
has been criticized by D. de Smet, who claimed that Pythagoreanism was not in fact so im-
portant for the Ikhwān, and especially that their actual knowledge of Pythagoreanism was 
poor (De Smet 2007).
5 Baffioni 1994a, 1994b, 1997a, 1997b.
6 Izdebska 2014.
7 For a translation of this epistle, with a commentary, see Diwald 1975, 31–100. See also the lat-
est edition and translation into English of this epistle and the following one in: P. E. Walker, 
I. K. Poonawala, D. Simonowitz, G. de Callataÿ (eds.) 2015, 1–113.
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erties, he is able to know the quality of types and kinds of all beings, and 
to know the reason of their quality according to how they actually exist.8
The very first sentence of this quotation reveals the way in which the Ikhwān 
understood the Pythagorean idea of number in metaphysics. By writing that the 
nature of beings is “in accordance with” (bihasab) the nature of numbers, they 
point out an analogy that exists between the two – yet they do not go so far as to 
claim that numbers constitute the principle of reality. It is the Creator who is the 
cause (‘illa) of all that exists, and he is therefore “the true One” (wahīd bilhaqiqa). 
They then write that, in his wisdom, he did not create all beings as single; they are 
single with regard to their matter, but multifarious in their form. Neither did he 
create all things in the same way, as only double, or only triple, or only quadruple, 
etc.; on the contrary, reality consists of things that are double, as well as those 
that are triple, quadruple, and so forth. The following paragraphs of the epistle 
present examples of this phenomenon, and the authors note that there are various 
religious or intellectual groups who focus only on a particular number: the Saʽ bi-
yya (the Shi’a of seven imams, that is the Ismaili) see seven everywhere, while the 
Christians are concerned only with three, and the natural scientists with four.9 
As the Ikhwān emphasize, Pythagoreans are different: they went beyond this 
level and attributed to each number its true significance while, at the same time, 
observing that none of the numbers is found in every single thing that exists in 
the world. Following this assertion, they write:
They [the Pythagoreans] said that the one is the origin (a  ṣl) and the source 
(mansha’) of the number, and that it is from ‘one’ that the number is com-
posed, both small and large, even or odd, integer or fraction.10
For the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā ,ʼ as for the Greek Pythagoreans, the number one has a 
special place among the numbers, and must not be counted as one of them,11 in 
the same way as the Creator transcends his creatures:
Thus, the one is the cause (‘illa) of number, in the same way as the Creator 
is the cause of all beings.12
In the following sentences, they focus on furthering this analogy: just as the num-
ber one is indivisible and thus completely dissimilar to the other numbers, so too 
is the Creator different from his creatures; and in the same way that the number 
one is contained within all numbers, the Creator is present within all creatures, 
holding them together; and finally, the number one provides the numbers with 
 8 Bustānī 1957 vol. 3, 178. All translations are by the author unless otherwise stated.
 9 Ibid., vol. 3, 179–180.
10 Ibid., vol. 3, 181. The Ikhwān give an explanation of how exactly whole numbers as well as 
fractions are generated from one in El-Bizri 2012, 68–69 (12–14).
11 El-Bizri 2012, 12–13 (translation at 68); see also the commentary of Diwald 1975, 42–43.
12 Bustānī 1957, vol. 3, 181.
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their essence, just as the Creator gives his eternity to everything, imparting exis-
tence in the process of emanating subsequent hypostases of all that exists. They 
say:
In the same way in which the repetition of the one brings into being num-
ber and its increase, thus from the overflow and generosity of the Creator 
comes birth, completeness, and perfection of the creatures. In the same 
way as the Two is the first number brought into being through the repeti-
tion of the One, thus the Intellect is the first being that has emanated from 
the existence of God.13
Thus, according to the Ikhwān, the Soul emanates from the Intellect just as three 
comes from two. Other elements correspond to subsequent numbers: four is Mat-
ter; five is Nature; six, the Body; seven, the Spheres; eight, the Elements; and nine, 
minerals, plants, and animals. In this way the Ikhwān managed to link Islamic 
monotheism with their understanding of the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, 
as well as with an emanationist view of the process of creation. The Ikhwān, how-
ever, differ substantially from Greek Pythagoreans in the way they understood 
the role of numbers: they did not consider them as metaphysical principles, but 
rather as arithmetic beings. This particular approach was not uncommon among 
those Greek authors who showed a genuine interest in Pythagoreanism (see, for 
instance, the Theology of Arithmetic of Nicomachus of Gerasa); nevertheless, the 
Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʼ introduced their own modifications, which moved the central 
focus of the theory from number to God Himself.
The epistle on the Pythagorean doctrine of the intellectual principles quoted 
above is followed directly by an epistle on the intellectual principles “according 
to the Ikhwān”. At the very beginning of this second epistle, the Ikhwān write 
that the Pythagorean idea that “beings exist according to the nature of number” 
– which they have just discussed – is also “the doctrine of our brothers” (madhhab 
ikhwāninā). 
Furthermore, in the very first epistle of the Rasā iʼl, “On Arithmetic,” the au-
thors explain the extraordinary role of arithmetic and evoke the Pythagoreans as 
their predecessors in acknowledging its fundamental place within philosophy.14 
They emphasize that the philosophical education of a novice should necessarily 
begin with the study of the science of numbers,15 because of the analogy of God-
One and creatures-numbers (which they also describe in detail in this treatise). 
To give just one quotation from this epistle:
When you reflect upon what we have said regarding the composition and 
generation of numbers from the one that is prior to the number two, you 
13 Ibid., vol. 3, 181.
14 El-Bizri 2012, 9 [65].
15 Ibid., 9 [66]; see also 62–65 [96–97]; cf. Endress 2003, 132–133.
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will find it the clearest proof of the uniqueness of the Creator, exalted be 
His praise, and of the process of His creation and invention of things.16
It is clear that, for the Ikhwān, the science of numbers is not a goal unto itself, but 
rather a path towards the study of theology. At the same time, the (Pythagorean) 
science of numbers remains central to their philosophy. The epistle “On Arith-
metic” is the opening treatise of their encyclopaedia; furthermore, their symbolic 
approach to numbers is relevant to more fields than just metaphysics or theology. 
The rules that govern numbers, briefly described in “On Arithmetic,” are also the 
organizing principle of the geometry presented in the second epistle (in which 
the point corresponds to the number one); moreover, these rules also govern the 
exposition of astronomy and music, as well as the natural sciences. It is from 
the science of numbers that “one takes examples for everything else that can be 
known.”17 Thus, the Ikhwān’s vision of the doctrine of numbers might be rooted 
in two Pythagorean statements: the claim that the number one is the principle 
of numbers, and the assertion that arithmetic is central to the other sciences. In 
reality, these two statements are so general that they could come from a source 
unrelated to Pythagoreanism (although for the Ikhwān this attribution is evident 
and important). The doctrine of the Ikhwān can therefore be qualified as their 
own version of Neoplatonic monotheism, rather than any Greek – or even late 
antique – version of Pythagoreanism.
Al-Shahrastāni 
Abū l-Fat ḥ Mu ̣hammad al-Shahrastāni was a Persian theologian who lived dur-
ing the eleventh and twelfth centuries AD. Significantly, he was not a philoso-
pher and in his works he actually criticizes Avicenna as the key proponent of 
the Arabic falsafa (that is philosophy based on the Greek tradition).18 Nor was he 
primarily a historian, though his opus magnum is historical or, rather, heresio-
graphic. Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Ni ḥal (Book of Religions and Sects) presents information 
on a huge variety of philosophical currents and famous philosophers, as well as 
religions and religious sects from the time of Adam to al-Shahrastāni’s own day. 
He divided his work into two parts, and this bipartite structure is reflected in the 
title of the text as a whole. The first part is devoted to the religions (milal) of rev-
elation, based on sacred books and divine law; it includes Muslims, Jews, Chris-
tians, Mandeans, and dualists. The second part concerns sects (ni ̣hal), who are the 
followers of ideas that originate solely in the human intellect: Sabians, Greek and 
Arabic philosophers (the falsafa), pre-Islamic Arabs, and various Hindu thinkers.19
16 Ibid., 23 [73]; trans. El-Bizri.
17 Ibid., 62 [96]; trans. El-Bizri.
18 First of all in his Mu ̣sāraʿ at al-falāsifa (Struggling with the Philosophers) (al-Shahrastānī 2001), as 
well as in the section dedicated to Ibn Sīna in his heresiographical Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Ni ḥal 
(Book of Religions and Philosophical Sects).
19 Janssens 1993; see also the introduction to al-Shahrastānī 1986.
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His point of view is that of a heresiographer who presents the groups and fig-
ures as removed, to a greater or lesser degree, from the ideal of Islamic orthodoxy. 
He declares that, while various historians divide humanity into different groups 
according to peoples or regions of the world, he himself has adopted the division 
of people “according to their ideas and beliefs:”20
I decided to gather all this information into a brief compendium contain-
ing all the religious beliefs and creeds of different peoples, so as to provide 
a lesson to the one who can reflect and a means of reflection for the one 
who can draw a lesson.21
Thus, although the form of the text is historical, the aim of its description extends 
beyond the normal purpose of a historical work: rather, it attempts to demon-
strate which of the religious paths is the true one. 
The chapters devoted to Greek philosophers are in the section of the book 
concerning those people who did not have any holy writings or divine law; one 
would thus expect that al-Shahrastāni, a pious Muslim, would wish to present 
them in an entirely negative way. Certainly there is no doubt that he juxtaposes 
Greek philosophers with the Muslim prophets, whose human truth was born 
of divine revelation. The text, however, reveals a hierarchy among the groups 
that were seen as being removed from the divine truth; each of these groups can 
– to varying degrees – possess some elements of the truth. The order in which 
he presents these groups is both chronological and respectful of the degree to 
which the views of a particular group are close to the prophetic revelations. Thus 
the first chapter deals with the Sabians.22 The second chapter is devoted to those 
Greek philosophers whom he calls the “pillars of wisdom” or “the seven sages:” 
Thales, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Pla-
to. The third chapter presents further Greek philosophers – including Plutarch, 
Xenophanes, Zeno, Democritus, Heraclitus, Hippocrates, Euclid, and the Sto-
ics – while the fourth focuses on Aristotle and some later philosophers, for in-
stance Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, or Porphyry. In the fifth chapter, 
al-Shahrastāni describes contemporary Muslim thinkers, in particular Ibn Sīna. 
The final chapter deals with the Arabs of the Jāhiliyya (pre-Islamic) period, and 
the Indians.23
Chapters 2 to 5, from the Seven Sages to Ibn Sīna, can thus be considered to 
form a separate part devoted to philosophers. In this context, it is clear that the 
“pillars of wisdom” – the group in which al-Shahrastāni has included Pythag-
20 Al-Shahrastāni 1846, 2.
21 Ibid., 1; trans. in al-Shahrastānī 1984, 8.
22 People from the city of  Ḥarrān who practised a sort of old Semitic but strongly Hellenized 
polytheism; in the 9th century to avoid persecution by the Muslims, they adopted the name 
of the Sabians, who occur in Qur’ān as one of ahl al-kitāb, who are worthy of respect as peo-
ples who received revelation (de Blois 2012).
23 See the general introduction to the French translation: al-Shahrastānī 1986.
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oras – were in his view much closer to the truth than Aristotle. In fact, the first 
philosophers were in his opinion very close to the divine prophecy, yet due the 
fact that they lacked a divinely revealed book and law, they had to be placed in 
the second part of this huge work. The introduction to the chapter devoted to the 
“Seven Sages” contains the following words:
The philosophers of Islam, who came as the latest, completely neglected 
to cite [the first philosophers], as well as their treatises, except for isolated 
and strange anecdotes which attracted their thoughts and to which they 
referred by falsifying them. As for us, we looked for these anecdotes care-
fully, and followed them with criticism and offered you a choice, so that 
you could read them and compare between the words of the ancients and 
of the moderns.24
Already in this passage al-Shahrastāni demonstrates a surprising respect for the 
first Greek philosophers, presenting his own approach in opposition to his Ara-
bic predecessors. It must be emphasized, however, that he does not display any 
special attitude towards Pythagoras, and the subchapter devoted to his doctrine 
is only a few pages long, just like the other sections devoted to other Greek phi-
losophers.
We can identify at least three sources on which al-Shahrastāni’s Pythagoras 
chapter25 seems to have been based:26 first, The Opinions of the Philosophers, a dox-
ography attributed to Ammonius but most probably composed by an Arabic au-
thor on the basis of material from the Refutatio omnium haeresium by Hippolytus;27 
second, an Arabic translation of the Placita Philosophorum by Pseudo-Plutarch;28 
third, Ṣiwān al- ̣hikma (The Chest of Wisdom), an Arabic history of Greek and Arabic 
philosophy attributed to Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī (tenth century AD). Whereas 
the Arabic translation of the Placita philosophorum, faithful to the Greek original, 
provides relatively reliable information on Pythagoreanism (at least in its Helle-
nistic shape), the doxography of Pseudo-Ammonius reworks its sources in accor-
dance with the creationist Neoplatonic view of its author;29 Ṣiwān al- ̣hikma, on the 
other hand, contains a mixture of various Greek and Arabic elements.30 When 
al-Shahrastāni was using these sources, he had little interest in the coherence of 
the information he quoted, nor for the logic or clarity of the text he created from 
them. However, he did add several sentences or even paragraphs which were 
probably supposed to join these pieces together.
24 Al-Shahrastānī 1846, 253–254.
25 This chapter has been separately translated into Italian with an extensive commentary in 
Baffioni 1983; German translation with a commentary by Dénes Kövendi: Altheim 1962.
26 On al-Shahrastāni’s sources see the introduction to vol. 2 of al-Shahrastānī 1986, 30–36.
27 Rudolph 1989.
28 Daiber 1980.
29 Rudolph 2007.
30 Dunlop 1957; al-Qā ̣dī 1981.
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Immediately after introducing the figure of Pythagoras, al-Shahrastāni pres-
ents a quotation from Pseudo-Ammonius’ doxography,31 which introduces the 
Pythagorean doctrine: 
The highest creator is one, he is not like the ones and does not belong to the 
numbers. He is not within the reach of the intellect or of the soul, because 
the intellectual thought does not attain him, neither does the language of 
the soul describe him, as he is above the spiritual attributes.32
Thus, the Creator can only be known through his works, which are different for 
every level of reality. This negative theology determines the understanding of 
the relationship between God and the number one. Contrary to the theory of the 
Ikhwān, God is presented here as so transcendent that despite being one / single 
he cannot be compared to the number one: his oneness is incomparable with the 
arithmetical one.33 Al-Shahrastāni’s vision of Pythagorean doctrine is certainly 
informed by Islamic theology. God is called the Creator and at the same time pre-
sented as completely transcendent, like the Neoplatonic One but not even compa-
rable to the number one. It is worth emphasizing that the passage quoted above 
appears at the very beginning of the description of Pythagoras’ philosophical 
doctrine. As a consequence, it demonstrates something that will be seen also in 
subsequent sections: for al-Shahrastāni, creationistic monotheism lies at the very 
core of Pythagoras’ teaching.34
The next paragraph begins with a theory, borrowed from a different and un-
identified source, which proposes three distinct divisions of oneness (wa ḥda).35 
The first distinguishes the one that “is not attainable by anything else and… is 
the oneness of the Creator” from the one that is attainable and is the oneness of 
the creatures.36 Al-Shahrastāni follows this with a second division of oneness: 
“the oneness before eternity (dahr),37 the oneness in eternity, the oneness after 
eternity and before time, the oneness in time.”38 The first oneness is the High-
est Creator, the second is the Intellect, then the Soul, and finally everything that 
exists in time, which is to say the elements and composite beings. Whatever his 
source, al-Shahrastāni seems to be returning to the idea of the transcendent one 
as God-Creator, a central point of the chapter. This idea is also apparent in the 
third and final division of oneness, which distinguishes between proper (bidhāt) 
and accidental (bilʽard) oneness:
31 Rudolph 1989, 51.
32 Al-Shahrastāni 1846, 265.
33 Cf. Baffioni 1983, 106–107.
34 This point of view is certainly supported by or even rooted in one of al-Shahrastāni’s sourc-
es, that is Pseudo-Ammonius’ doxography (Rudolph 1989, 50–55).
35 C. Baffioni has pointed out that the concept of such a division of oneness cannot be found in 
the Greek tradition (Baffioni 1983, 107).
36 Al-Shahrastāni 1846, 266.
37 For the translation of dahr as “eternity” see Altheim 1962, 33; 48–51; Baffioni 1983, 107–108.
38 Al-Shahrastāni 1846, 266.
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The proper oneness belongs to the Creator of all being alone, from whom 
derive all onenesses (wa ḥdaniyyāt) in number and in what is countable.39
The accidental oneness, on the other hand, can be divided into that which exists 
according to the principle (mubdan) of number but is not part of number itself – 
that is, the Active Intellect – and that which belongs to the principle of number 
and is also a part of it: that is the units from which the numbers are composed, 
as well as each number in its wholeness, and each counted individually.40 In this 
way, some sort of oneness can be found in everything, on every level of reality, 
from the Highest God – possessing the highest degree of perfect oneness – to 
every material, countable object. Al-Shahrastāni summarizes this idea as follows:
The oneness is thus never disconnected from the beings and this oneness 
is acquired from the oneness of the Highest Creator, it stays with all beings 
despite the fact that in their essence they are plural.41
The oneness (wa ḥda) is therefore connected to existence, and the oneness of the 
Creator is considered to be his creative power. Once again the text focuses on the 
Creator, and the subsequent narrative of oneness is structured accordingly.
It is difficult to identify similar divisions of oneness in Greek Pythagorean-
ism, and al-Shahrastāni’s source is virtually impossible to identify; moreover, the 
monotheistic, creationist, and Islamic perspective of these passages is obvious. 
However, despite these reservations, it is still possible to identify elements within 
the text that can be traced back to the Greek Pythagorean tradition (or at least to 
its Neoplatonic version, as suggested by D. Kövendi).42 In this way, the text testi-
fies to a transfer of the Greek Pythagorean notions into the Arabic tradition. Thus, 
first of all, the establishment of types and levels of oneness (hen or monas) is not 
far removed from the late antique version of Pythagorean doctrine.43 Moreover, 
the identification of the Intellect (‘aql, nous) with the one (monad) – which al-Shah-
rastāni could have found in the Placita philosophorum44 – is also present in other 
Greek texts relating (or purporting to relate) Pythagorean ideas.45 Of course, the 
presentation of Pythagoreanism in emanationist terms is completely anachronis-
tic; yet Arabic philosophers considered this terminology to be elementary to the 
philosophical tradition reaching back to its Greek beginnings. Furthermore, late 
antique philosophers had already used these notions to describe Pythagorean 
39 Ibid., 266.
40 C. Baffioni has observed that al-Shahrastāni here follows one of the principles of Islamic phi-
losophy, according to which the accidental character of the world implies the existence of the 
eternal, unchangeable God, who in his capacity of the Creator grants the world his oneness 
(Baffioni 1983, 320–324).
41 Al-Shahrastāni 1846, 267.
42 Altheim 1962, 45–55.
43 Anon. VP in Phot. 438b33–35; Hippol. Haer. 1.2; 4.23; 51; 6.24; Simp. in Ph. 9.181, 7–30; 230, 34.
44 Daiber 1980, 118–119.
45 Eus. PE 14.16, 6; Nicom. in Phot. 143a22; Theon Sm. 100.1–8.
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doctrine, and this approach was transferred to the Arabic world along with the 
other elements of the late antique understanding of Pythagoreanism.46
Thus, al-Shahrastāni’s text does not contain a coherent exposition of the Py-
thagorean theory of number; it is only possible to distinguish elements which 
he assembled into a single (albeit chaotic) narrative. However we must bear in 
mind that his aim was not to present a clear, logical philosophical doctrine. For 
instance, immediately following the passages summarized above, al-Shahrastāni 
focuses on new ideas:
Pythagoras also had a theory of number and of what is counted, in which 
he differed from all the sages who preceded him as well as from those 
who followed him. Thus, he distinguished number from what is counted, 
in the same way in which form is distinguished from matter. He then de-
scribed number as truly existing with the same existence as the form, and 
he proved that. And he said that number is the principle of all that exists 
and it is the first creature that was created by the Highest Creator. And the 
first number is the one.47
As for this last statement, however, al-Shahrastāni later writes that, according 
to Pythagoras, one was not a number and that numbers began with two. This is, 
without question, an exposition of the classical Greek and specifically Pythago-
rean point of view.48 One is not a number but rather a principle (arche) of num-
bers. The Greek Pythagorean tradition made a connection between this statement 
and the position that “number is the principle of all that exists;” from this they 
concluded that the number one (monas or hen) was the principle (arche) of the 
world. By contrast, al-Shahrastāni (or his source) understands that numbers are 
like forms in opposition to matter, but that they are nonetheless created, and God 
is the only one real creator. Immediately afterwards, al-Shahrastāni presents the 
subsequent numbers and their characteristics. His presentation of the number 
four (arbaʽa) deserves particular attention: he makes a connection between this 
number and the Pythagorean notion of tetraktys (rubāʽiya) as the end (nihāya = 
Greek telos) and perfection (kamāl) of number. Al-Shahrastāni clearly took this 
from the Placita philosophorum; he also quotes the Pythagorean oath from the Gold-
en Verses (v. 47–48, where the term tetraktys appears).49
Later, al-Shahrastāni presents one more theory, this time attributing Neopla-
tonic hypostases to the four subsequent numbers: one, the Creator; two, the Intel-
lect; three, the Soul; and four, Nature. In this way the first four numbers – those 
contained in the tetraktys – correspond to the four principles of the world;50 this 
theory is already very close to the way in which the Ikhwān understood Pythag-
46 Simp. in Ph. 9.230, 34.
47 Al-Shahrastāni 1846, 267.
48 Cf. Baffioni 1983, 109–110.
49 Daiber 1980, 100–103; Al-Shahrastāni 1846, 267.
50 Al-Shahrastāni 1846, 268–269.
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orean metaphysics. Al-Shahrastāni then presents his ideas regarding the first 
matter, the geometric proportions, and numbers as principles; he also quotes a 
passage from Ibn Sīna, as well as from Pseudo-Ammonius’ doxography (which 
presents several of Pythagoras’ views, including his notion of a world built from 
“simple and spiritual” melodies, of the hierarchy of worlds, and of man as micro-
cosm).
Finally, Chrysippus and Zeno appear as followers of Pythagoras in his doc-
trine of the Creator; we also find the doctrine of Heraclitus and Hippasus on fire 
as the principle of beings, as well as the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus.51 
One is thus presented with a considerable number of theories that either differ 
from one another or simply repeat earlier theories in a slightly modified way. 
The text is not organized in a clear, coherent narrative and, as such, it provides 
only a selection from different sources of information collected without much 
in the way of critical historical or philosophical evaluation. Contrary to other 
Arabic authors writing about Pythagoras, however, al-Shahrastāni is particularly 
interested in metaphysics, and the doctrine of numbers in particular. Moreover, 
he writes about different groups among Pythagoreans: while Arabic authors nor-
mally focus only on the founder, al-Shahrastāni cites both anonymous followers52 
and those identified by name, including Heraclitus and Hippasus (considered 
Pythagoreans, following the Placita philosophorum). There can be no doubt that 
al-Shahrastāni’s knowledge of Pythagoreanism was far greater and more detailed 
than that of the Ikhwān: at the very least, his awareness of the internal diversity 
of this philosophical current contrasts with the Ikhwān’s coherent and simple 
narrative.
Conclusions
To conclude, let us first focus on those elements common to the two texts that I 
have discussed here (as well as to Pseudo-Ammonius’ doxography, which has 
been mentioned several times). First and foremost, it is the unconditional tran-
scendence of the God-Creator that makes it necessary to position Him as being 
transcendent with regard to the numbers. For our Arabic authors, this monotheis-
tic and creationist worldview is closely related to Neoplatonic emanationism and 
the hierarchy of hypostases, to which any presentation of Pythagorean metaphys-
ics is always adapted. This is the lens through which our Arabic authors perceive 
Pythagorean metaphysics.
As for the differences between them, they result from the different aims and 
characteristics of their texts. Many of the differences reflect contemporary atti-
tudes toward the Pythagorean tradition, and toward Greek philosophy in gen-
eral. Discrepancies can also be attributed to the respective authors’ methods of 
working with and processing their source material. Al-Shahrastāni’s approach 
51 Ibid., 277.
52 Ibid., 269; 276.
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was typical of the medieval historian: having effortfully gathered his sources, he 
then assembled the quotations into a single, rather incoherent narrative. In his 
great opus, he relates the Pythagorean doctrine as just one of several intellectual 
traditions. Since the purpose of his work is to make evident the immense variety 
of human beliefs and doctrines, al-Shahrastāni wished to increase the diversity 
of theories within each chapter rather than attempting to unify or simplify them. 
One of the consequences of this approach is that there are several elements in 
his presentation of Pythagoreanism that can be securely traced back to ancient 
phases of this philosophical tradition, and which were transferred into the Arabic 
Middle Ages from the Greek world of Late Antiquity. 
On the other hand, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʼ represent a completely different ap-
proach to the historical substance of Pythagorean doctrine, an approach which 
is philosophical in the same way that al-Shahrastāni’s is historical. The Ikhwān’s 
description of Pythagorean metaphysics is actually an exposition of their own 
doctrine, inspired by a version of Pythagoreanism conceived in their own specific 
way. They had access to certain sources which were transferred from the Greek 
tradition, but these texts were not very numerous and the Ikhwān modified the 
ideas in these texts according their own views.53 Whereas al-Shahrastāni’s ap-
proach is closer to the original sources and, at least indirectly, to the original 
Greek philosophy, the approach of the Ikhwān was creative and consistent, and 
accompanied by reflections on the concept, which they decided to absorb into 
their own philosophy. As a result, the genuine historical doctrine was of interest 
to them only in so far as it was helpful for describing reality in their own way.
The Ikhwān were self-conscious in this respect, and one finds an interesting 
description of their approach to earlier philosophical theories in the following 
passage from the epistle “On Arithmetic:”
When those philosophers who used to discuss the science of the soul be-
fore the descent of the Qur’ān, the New Testament [Gospels], and the To-
rah inquired into the science of the soul with the natural talents of their 
pure minds, they deduced the knowledge of its essence by the conclusions 
of their reasoning. This induced them to compose philosophical books (…). 
But because of extensive discourse in them and their transmission from 
language to language, one cannot understand their meaning or know the 
goal of their authors. The understanding of the meaning of these books is 
closed to those who inspect them and their authors’ goals trouble those 
who examine them. We have taken the core of their meaning and the high-
est goals of their authors and we have presented them as briefly as possible 
in fifty-two treatises of which this is the first.54
53 According to A. Straface the central and most important doctrine of the Ikhwān al-Safāʼ 
was prophetic Ismaili emanationism, into which they integrated Pythagorean numerology, 
which they changed and adapted to this religious system (Straface 1987).
54 El-Bizri 2012, 98–99 [68–69].
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Pythagoras and the “Perfect” Churches  
of the Renaissance
Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier – George Washington University Washington DC
The increasingly significant presence of Plato in Renaissance thought lent impor-
tance to the basic concept that the universe is made up of contraries (such as odd 
and even, light and dark, good and bad) and the idea that a single god incorpo-
rates and manages all these in his person and in his creation of the universe. The 
enigmatic language with which Plato describes cosmic structure, the ordering 
of the world, and the achievement of equilibrium doubtless exemplified, for his 
devotees in the Renaissance, the reticence attributed to Pythagoras in ancient and 
Renaissance literature.1 It was Pythagoras who was believed to have taught Plato 
to express ideas indirectly, rather than directly, for fear of their corruption by the 
uninitiated. The cosmos was an admirable and beautiful firmament that exuded 
order and harmony. This was reflected in the significance of number which, ul-
timately based on the four elements, could be added, subtracted, and otherwise 
compounded in different ways in order to explain the mysteries of the universe. 
At the center of all things was the Monad, or number 1, which, being godlike, was 
the origin of all things. The concept of universal order incorporated, for many 
followers of Plato, and therefore of Pythagoras, moral reform that opposed war, 
litigation, excessive luxury, familial abuse, and other forms of depravity. It urged 
frugality, restraint, communal friendship, sharing property, and the practice of 
piety and justice. Earthly behavior thus reflected universal order, enabling hu-
mankind to reach God.
Cardinals Basilios Bessarion and Nicholas of Cusa, the one Greek and the 
other German, were the two most eminent guiding lights in the development of 
these ideas in early and mid-fifteenth century Italy. Their influence on Leon Bat-
tista Alberti, a young intellectual contemporary of theirs in these years and not 
yet an architect, would be profound.
Cardinal Bessarion argued passionately against “excessive” religious piety (of 
Christians as well as neo-pagans). The major theme that animated virtually all 
the writings of this erudite humanist was the reconciliation of opposites. This 
1 See esp. the Timaeus, which was, essentially, the only work of Plato known throughout the 
Middle Ages and was highly regarded during the Renaissance. For a fuller discussion of 
the diffusion of Platonic knowledge and its relation to the reputation of Pythagoras in the 
Renaissance, see Joost-Gaugier 2009, passim. 
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theme was exemplified in the harmonizing of Hellenism with Christianity that 
he proposed, a highly original aim, quite different from the goals of any of his 
predecessors. This goal of reconciliation is especially evident in his aspiration to 
unite the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches, or East and West. The 
active and distinguished role he played to this end can be seen in the magisterial 
discourse he delivered to the Greek delegation at the Great Council of Florence 
in late 1439. Dissention is bad, he proclaimed, union brings peace. There must be 
concord. Contrarieties must meet in a middle ground in order to achieve harmo-
ny. The tumultuous controversy raging in Italy at this time concerning the rela-
tive importance of Plato and Aristotle had led to disputations among the learned, 
many of them acrid, as to which of the two was most important. The wise Bes-
sarion entered the fray by writing a long and learned treatise, In calumniatorem 
Platonis, that not only showed that both were compatible with and important for 
Christianity, but also aimed to reconcile the two philosophers and their philoso-
phies.2 His visionary approach considered the major doctrines of each and advo-
cated a middle ground that joined both. Bessarion defended Plato’s use of enigma 
by saying that this was because Plato valued Pythagorean reliance on oral tradi-
tion. He also explained that, influenced by his teacher Pythagoras, Plato’s high 
esteem for number, especially 3 and 4, led him to study harmony and to realize it 
was obtained by reconciling contraries. The ideas of Plato and Aristotle were, he 
urged, basically in agreement with each other and with Christianity. Despite his 
great fame and influence, this rich prelate of two churches lived a life of extreme 
simplicity and frugality, and was known to have avoided luxury of every sort. 
Except one. The only necessity he regarded as important was to have sufficient 
funds to enable him to have manuscripts copied and to purchase books for the 
great personal library he would, at his death, bequeath to the City of Venice.
Cardinal Cusanus shared a wide range of interests with his Greek colleague 
in Italy, Bessarion. In an early work, De concordantia catholica, he made an impas-
sioned plea for concord and the reconciliation of differences that had arisen with-
in the Catholic church.3 Speaking as a canon lawyer, in this work he makes many 
practical suggestions for replacing dissention with synthesis. He argues that a 
harmonious universe ruled by the moderation of a mutually agreed upon order 
would eliminate dissention and division into parts, or factions. In another work, 
De docta ignorantia, he speaks as a mathematician.4 His greatest praise is for indi-
visible oneness as absolute and infinite for it absorbs all universal capabilities into 
one. The number 3 is oneness just as oneness is threeness – an obvious reference 
to the Trinity. The triad is beautiful beyond all numbers, he proclaimed, because 
it is the first to make actual the potentialities of the Monad.5 He extols the trian-
gle and its progeny as the most perfect rectilinear figures, the circle as the most 
2 Joannes (Basilios) Cardinal Bessarion, Adversus calumniatorem Platonis, 1468.
3 Nicholas Cardinal Cusanus, De concordantia catholica, 1434.
4 Nicholas Cardinal Cusanus, De docta ignorantia, 1440.
5 Ibid., I.7, 10, and 12.
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perfect plane figure, and the sphere as the most perfect solid figure. The cube is 
the earth and its triangular manifestation constitutes the pyramidal shape. Con-
templation of these forms leads to the knowledge of God. Cusanus saw God as 
the master of proportion. God so valued proportion that, in establishing the in-
terrelationship of parts, he allowed for each part to have an immutable relation to 
the whole. Thus is everything unified in perfect harmony – a harmony that, re-
flecting the perfection of God, will live forever. When that harmony is destroyed, 
he explained, all things will be dissolved. Speaking as a theologian (in De Idiota 
de mente), he argues again for peaceful harmony.6 Speaking as a cosmographer (in 
De ludo globi) he describes the sun as the center of the universe, which is God, and 
explains that everything emanates from it (or him).7 In his personal life Cusanus 
was noted for his extraordinary patience, honesty, and altruism, as well as for his 
special interest in helping others to achieve good health. An example of the latter 
is the hospital he founded at Cues (in Germany), his birthplace, where his heart is 
buried (while his body is buried in San Pietro in Vincoli in Rome).
A learned humanist and mathematician, Alberti formed his ideas in the world 
of Bessarion and Cusanus. He became the first Renaissance architect to theorize 
on how “modern” buildings should be designed. This subject dominates his ar-
chitectural treatise, the De re aedificatoria, composed in the early 1450s but not 
published until 1485, thirteen years after his death.8 Though its organization 
and contents were in large part inspired by his reading of Vitruvius, his theories 
reflect the intellectual bouquet of ideas current in contemporary theology and 
mathematics. Alberti also writes with admiration about values of frugality and 
parsimony. He suggests that, based on the dictum of Pythagoras, these values 
ought to be applied to domestic architecture as well as to religious architecture. 
He explicitly says he is following the moral values of “the most prudent and mod-
est of our ancestors” who in his life style practiced frugality. This of course would 
be Pythagoras. “Extravagance I detest!” Alberti continues in one of his few emo-
tional statements, another view corresponding with those attributed to Pythago-
ras.9 His position opposing an excess of adornment leads him to praise simplicity 
and plainness as beautiful and ennobling virtues in his discussion of the aims 
of the new modern architecture he proposes. Beauty, he ascertains, echoing the 
words of Cusanus, results when the parts of a whole are locked together, conso-
nant with each other according to number, form, and proportion. The number 1 
(the Monad), he explains, is perfection because it is the perfect cube (1 × 1 × 1  = 1); 
it is therefore God.
For Alberti the epitome of architectural form is the ideal church based on the 
purest of all forms, the circle which, in its solid extension, is the sphere. The be-
holder’s glance sweeps around instantaneously and unstoppably because this 
6 Nicholas Cardinal Cusanus, De idiota de mente, 1450.
7 Nicholas Cardinal Cusanus, De ludo globi, 1463.
8 Leon Battista Alberti, De re aedificatoria, 1485.
9 Ibid., IX.1 (cf. trans. Rykwert / Leach / Tavernor 1988).
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form, having no beginning and no end, is free of interruption and disruption. 
The large central dome that crowns his ideal church reaffirms this importance 
and, being single (referring to its location in the center), is godlike. Alberti’s dis-
cussion of proportion stresses that in balancing opposites one finds the mean. In 
the rational integration of all parts of the building, each part will be integrated 
into the whole so that nothing can be added or subtracted without destroying 
the integrity of the whole. Together numbers, form, and proportion form a har-
monic relationship which echoes the harmony of the universe – concinnitas, or 
concinnity. This is an ordered arrangement similar to a concord of sounds locked 
together by their relationship – or harmony – the greatest discovery attributed 
by Antiquity to Pythagoras. Thus Alberti, taking his cue from the past, was pro-
posing something very modern: the first Renaissance canon of proportion for 
architecture. He proposed similar canons of order for sculpture and painting, 
most notably a system of artificial perspective that would unite all parts of a giv-
en composition. In all cases, these canons were based on geometry – the square, 
the cube, the sphere, the triangle, and the pyramid.
While Alberti’s new theories may have been far easier to explicate in the late 
1450s when he wrote his revolutionary treatise putting forward the importance 
of symmetry and proportion than in the next decade when he found himself en-
gaged in the practicalities of construction in a world whose workmen had been 
trained in Gothic methods, the extant forms of the structures he designed make 
clear his struggles to practice what he preached. But it was the churches (“tem-
ples”) of his followers that more perfectly demonstrated the idea that a sphere 
(the heavens) was suspended above the cube of the earth. Through geometry and 
number, they constructed a system of objective, concrete, tangible beauty that 
could be measured and interlocked in what Alberti had called concinnitas, the 
harmony of all parts fitted together.10
At this very time Cardinal Bessarion was advocating mathematics as the tool 
of harmony and seeking harmony in all aspects of scholarship while Alberti’s 
friend the mathematician and theologian Cardinal Cusanus was writing that 
God used arithmetic (number), geometry (form), and music (proportion) to create 
a world in which every element takes its place in the harmony created by its im-
mutable relation to the whole. 
In the countryside near the ancient Umbrian city of Cortona a building de-
signed by the architect (and painter) Francesco di Giorgio was the first example 
of a centrally planned church that, following Alberti’s example and built shortly 
after his death, incorporated notions attributed to Pythagoras in late fifteenth 
century Italy (fig. 1). Though the church of Santa Maria delle Grazie in Calcinaio, 
begun in about 1485 (the year in which Alberti’s treatise was published), was 
based on the traditional Latin cross plan (with one arm of greater length than the 
other three), its departure from traditional conceptual language, in terms of its 
10 On this see Joost-Gaugier 2009, 181.
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structure, is immediately apparent in the fact that the hitherto ever-present side 
aisles were eliminated in order to express this unity. Thus the observer is imme-
diately swept to the centre, where the brilliant light of the sky pours in through 
the 8 clear glass (as opposed to stained glass) windows of the dome’s lantern and 
drum, totalling 16 windows. Because they were doubled, the number of the 8 di-
viding pilasters of the dome’s drum also totalled 16. According to ancient Pythag-
orean numerical theory well known in the Renaissance, 8 was the embracer of all 
harmonies because its relation to 2 and 4 made it the first number to be “equal 
times equal.”11 As for the number 16, it signified the perfect temple, according to 
Alberti’s ancient Roman mentor Vitruvius, who, like Alberti, was an admirer of 
Pythagoras. Thus, in terms of its numerical harmony, the conflation of the cube 
(22 × 2 = 8), the square (4 × 4 = 16), and the circle of the dome, all contained within 
this singular structure, suggest the ultimate Monad, or the perfection of God 
himself. This early experiment reveals the architect’s struggle to conceptualize 
the dome in perfect proportion with the unified arms of the body of the church. 
In the Tuscan city of Prato, Giuliano da Sangallo built the Church of Santa 
Maria delle Carceri in the late fifteenth century (fig. 2), at about the same time 
as Francesco di Giorgio’s experimental church near Cortona. Though unfin-
ished, the church of Santa Maria delle Carceri provides the first example of a 
pure Greek cross plan (4 arms of equal length that perfectly balance each other), 
as well as regularity of form, harmony of proportion, and concentration on the 
center. Dominated by a single crowning dome based on the circle and the sphere, 
this church initiates the example that Alberti had dreamed of: perfect centralized 
geometric form which creates perfect harmony. Here the dome (heaven) rests on 
the cube (earth).
Constructed a few decades later, the Church of Santa Maria della Consolazi-
one at Todi, an ancient town in Umbria, exemplifies the consummation of this 
idea (fig. 3). Its form invites us to remember Cusanus’ idea that the Divine Mind 
11 Pseudo-Iamblichus, The Theology of Arithmetric: On the Mystical, Mathematical and Cosmologi-
cal Sybolism of the First Ten Numbers (trans. Waterfield 1988, 102).
Fig. 1: Santa Maria delle Grazie al Calci-
naio, near Cortona.
(Photo: Shannon Pritchard)
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manifests itself, as Alberti had articulated for architecture, as the indivisible 
perfect unity in the circle which, as the dome, represents the cosmos. In a daz-
zling display of geometric purity, the dome of this church rests on a cube, that 
is, the world below, unfolding into 4 apses. Thus opposites are balanced and di-
vergences merged into one. According to Cusanus, “the number 4, which is an 
unfolding of oneness, contains the power of every number. For universal oneness 
is instantiated in the four onenesses that are configured in a fitting order.”12 Here 
this is finally achieved: in the language of Cusanus and according to the vision 
articulated by Alberti, allowing for God to rule as the unity and light from above. 
Though the architect of this perfect church which could, in its entirety, be fitted 
into a circle is not known with certainty, it is known that Todi had been a place 
frequently visited by Cusanus, and it was the place where he had died in 1464.
From the early sixteenth century on, Italian architects experimented ever more 
energetically with these Pythagorean concepts which they understood through 
Alberti’s visionary ideas. This led them to conceive, especially through the eyes 
of Bramante and Michelangelo, of the most important church of Christendom, 
Saint Peter’s, as a centralized plan (with four arms of equal length) articulating 
a perfectly centralized building composed of unifying Pythagorean shapes and 
numbers that expressed perfect harmony. Thus, in reflecting the cosmic structure 
12 Nicholas Cardinal Cusanus, De conjecturis I.3 (trans. Hopkins 2001, 168).
Fig. 2. Santa Maria delle Carceri, Prato.
(Photo: author)
Fig. 3. Santa Maria della Consolazione, Todi.
(Photo: author)
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and God’s ordering of the world, some of the greatest architectural monuments of 
the Renaissance owed their modernity to an inspirational force that, paradoxical-
ly, was conceived in the distant past.
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Kabbalah as a Transfer of Pythagorean Number Theory: 
The Case of Johannes Reuchlin’s De Arte Cabalistica *
Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann – Freie Universität Berlin
1 Introduction
When Reuchlin’s chief work on the Kabbalah, De Arte Cabalistica, was published in 
1517, the papal court had temporarily adjourned the case against Hoogstraten on 
the lawfulness of possessing Jewish books and it looked as if Reuchlin would be 
able to win his trial in Rome against Hoogstraten. Reuchlin’s decision to publish 
his book at this precise juncture was surely also an attempt to take the initiative 
in the conflict over Jewish books in general and the Christian Kabbalah in partic-
ular. De Arte Cabalistica should thus primarily be understood as an intervention in 
the battle of the books, as evidence for Reuchlin’s claim that the Jewish Kabbalah 
at its core proclaims Christianity, and as an argument that it is absurd to destroy 
the ancient revelations secretly containing the speculative heart of the Christian 
faith. Because continuity between the Kabbalah and Christianity was beyond all 
doubt for Reuchlin, his concept of the Christian Kabbalah was not tied only to the 
Jewish tradition. He rather saw the Kabbalah in the tradition of theosophy, which 
had been part of Christian speculative theology since Dionysius the Areopagite. 
The revered Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, after all, produced his theory of numbers 
in the context of Dionysian theosophy. Thus Reuchlin’s Christian Kabbalah was 
a mixture of Christian Neoplatonism, Pythagoreanism, and Jewish-Kabbalistic 
sources, which he believed speculatively proved the truth of the Christian reli-
gion. De Arte Cabalistica demonstrates this view thoroughly and effectively.
Like De Verbo Mirifico, De Arte Cabalistica takes the form of a three-person di-
alogue, which is carried out over three days. The conversants are given unmis-
takable identities: Marranus, a circumcised and baptized Muslim, Philolaus, a 
Pythagorean, and, finally, Simon, a Jew well versed in the Kabbalah. The book 
is dedicated to Pope Leo X (Giovanni Medici 1513–1521), under whom Reuchlin’s 
trial regarding his Augenspiegel and defence of Jewish literature was pending. 
Reuchlin situates himself in the humanist philosophical tradition in this work, 
and casts himself as the renewer of Pythagoreanism. He mentions the occasional 
∗ This chapter has been translated into English by Millay Hyatt. It consists of excerpts from 
the book by W. Schmidt-Biggemann, The History of Christian Cabbala (forthcoming; the book 
will be the translation of Schmidt-Biggemann 2012). 
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engagement with Pythagoreanism at the court of the Pope’s father, Lorenzo de’ 
Medici, but takes credit himself for having renewed Pythagorean thought. He 
avails himself in this context of Nicholas of Cusa’s vocabulary, who, in his key 
Pythagorean work De Coniecturis, referred to his science of numbers as symbol-
ic.1 Reuchlin describes, in passing, the Adamite origins of the Kabbalah, which, 
he writes, was first communicated to the biblical forefathers and then left its mark 
on Greek philosophy. Pythagoras was the first to set it down in writing before it 
was transmitted back to the Jews in the version handed down to us. Reuchlin also 
appeals to humanist national pride when he writes in the dedication: 
Marsilius edited Plato for Italy; Jacob Faber Stapulensis restored Aristotle 
for the French. I, Capnio, want to join their number and hereby dedicate to 
your name the Pythagoras I have revived for the Germans. This, however, 
would not have been possible without the Kabbalah of the Hebrews, as 
Pythagoras’ philosophy had its starting point in the teachings of the Kab-
balists, which, derived from the memory of the Fathers and parting from 
Magna Graecia, in turn formed the basis of the books of the Kabbalists. 
Almost everything had to be reconstructed from there. I wrote about the 
ars Cabalistica, which is a symbolic philosophy, so that the Pythagorean 
teachings might become better known among scholars.2
This promise is made good on in a three-day dialogue in Frankfurt. On the first 
day, a Friday, the Jew Simon initiates the other two into the Jewish tradition com-
bining the Kabbalah with natural philosophy and biblical doctrine. This tradition 
traces the handing down of the wisdom of Adam through world history, translatio 
sapientiae, and works out the messianic meaning of this Kabbalah. On the second 
day, Simon is absent because the law of the Sabbath forbids him from participat-
ing. So it is Philolaus who explicates Pythagorean philosophy to the astounded 
Marranus, showing it to conform in its most essential elements to the Jewish tra-
dition. This sets the stage for Simon to explain the specifics of Kabbalistic wisdom 
and symbolism, on Sunday, the third day.
1 Cf. De coniecturis 1.4: “Symbolicum exemplar rerum numerus est.” De docta ignorantia 1.12: 
the absolute maximum can only be determined “symbolice.”
2 “Italiae Marsilius Platonem edidit, Gallis Aristotelem Ia. Faber Stapulensis restauravit. Im-
plebo numerum et Capnion ego Germanis per me renascentem Pythagoram tuo nomini 
dicatum exhibeo. Id tamen absque Hebraeorum Cabbala fieri non potuit, eò quod Pythago-
rae philosophia de Cabalaeorum praeceptis initia duxit, quae patrum memoria discedens e 
magna Graecia rursus in Cabalistarum volumina incubuit. Eruenda igitur inde fuerant fere 
omnia. Quare de arte Cabalistica, quae symbolica philosophia est scripsi, ut Pythagoraeo-
rum dogmata studiosis fierent notiora.” I quote from the facsimile edition M. / S. Goodman 
1993. The translation in this widely used edition is very imprecise and incorrect in many 
places, but the volume contains the facsimile reprint of the first edition, which has been 
retranslated into English here. I also referred to the annotated edition by Secret 1995, and, 
more importantly, to the excellent Italian edition: Busi / Campanini 1995.
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2 A Kabbalistic Pythagoras?
The second book of De Arte Cabalistica is purely Pythagorean in content. Its func-
tion is to prove that Pythagoras was the first philosopher in the Greek tradition 
and that he adopted Kabbalistic teachings. As Simon is no longer present, the 
discussion takes place between Philolaus and Marranus (the Muslim), with Philo-
laus holding the floor most of the time.
Philolaus begins by giving a historical introduction to Pythagoras, drawing on 
Alexander Polyhistor, Aristobulus,3 Antiphon, who claimed that Pythagoras was 
in Arabia and Chaldaea, and finally – and this is most likely the main source here 
next to Clement of Alexandria – Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica. The assertion 
that this “Pythagorean wisdom” also spread among the Arabs, especially to Al-
Fārābī, is part of Reuchlin’s concept of translatio sapientiae.4
Reuchlin then lays out the epistemological, dogmatic, and historical signifi-
cance of Pythagoreanism. He first turns to the criticism of logic and syllogisms, 
which constitutes a polemical, foundational element of his philosophy. Language, 
in Reuchlin’s view, originated with Adam. The story of the tower of Babel and 
the confusion of languages also constitute important elements of his criticism 
of logic.5 Syllogisms, he writes, developed out of this confusion of language and 
reason.6 True original knowledge, on the other hand, comes from the divine, as 
Aristotle himself confesses. Reuchlin cites Ammonius, according to whom nous, 
dianoia, doxa, phantasia, and aesthesis are the key terms of cognition for Aristotle – 
and neither nous nor aisthesis require syllogisms. For Reuchlin, the divine nous is 
particularly important.7 He identifies it with the sphere of the supraconceptual. 
Thus, for him, on the level of theosophy, syllogisms – and with them lower logic – 
are irrelevant.
Knowing God, then, is to intensify and overcome logic.8 It is in this sense that 
Reuchlin combines his Pythagoreanism with philosophia christiana. He cites Je-
rome, Athanasius, and Gregory of Nazianzus as authorities on the supraconcep-
tuality of God.9 Gregory, along with Dionysius, is one of Reuchlin’s most highly 
esteemed Doctors of the Church.10 Most important for Reuchlin, however, is Di-
onysius the Areopagite, who, he avers, wrote his book on the divine names in a 
Pythagorean spirit and according to Pythagorean sources.11 Dionysius the Are-
opagite’s achievement, for Reuchlin, was to have brought together the Pythagore-
an and biblical sources on the names of God.12
 3 As cited in Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.62.
 4 On Al-Fārābī, cf. Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 133.
 5 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 135.
 6 Ibid., 134.
 7 Ibid., 136.
 8 Ibid., 137.
 9 Ibid., 138.
10 Ibid., 140.
11 Ibid., 140.
12 Ibid., 142.
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The link made here between Greek and Hebrew sources is not accidental. In 
the course of translatio sapientiae, Pythagorean teaching came from Palestine to 
Magna Graecia, for which Reuchlin cites Gregory of Nazianzus’ polemic against 
Julian the Apostate as evidence. This proves for him that, “Cabalistarum et Py-
thagoristarum inter se cuncta eiusdem esse farinae.”13
3 The main teachings of the Pythagoreans according to Reuchlin:  
possest and the world of numbers
The doctrines of the different world spheres and of messianism were already the 
main intellectual elements in the first book of De Arte Cabalistica, and Reuchlin 
finds both of them in Pythagoreanism as well. Here too he relies on Cusa’s teach-
ings. As in the metaphysics and cosmology of the first book, Reuchlin is con-
cerned with establishing a third sphere of the trans-intellectual and supersub-
stantial divine above the sensual world and the world of understanding. Aisthesis, 
sense perception, constitutes the lowest sphere in Reuchlin’s Pythagorean world. 
The middle sphere is made up of ether, the gods, and principles informing the 
world. The highest sphere is the divine sphere, in Pythagorean terms the absolute 
beginning, possest, and a dynamic world of numbers.
The concepts of possest (a Latin word-play meaning “can is”) and of “symbolic 
theology / philosophy” Reuchlin uses come from Nicholas of Cusa. In 1460, Nich-
olas wrote De possest, in which he characterized the nature of God as the coinci-
dence of possibility and reality.14 He defines “possest” as the “possible-real” of 
the divine, in which ability and being are one. The goal of all knowledge is “visio 
Dei,” which for Nicholas is enigmatically visible in mathematics.15 For God, being 
possible is the same thing as being real, and as “possest” he is constantly real-
izing himself. Cusa describes this self-realization as the fundamental process of 
tripartite divine life: the Father, who is beginning and possibility, realizes him-
self in his Son, who emerged from the beginning and is the essential likeness of 
the Father, while the Holy Spirit is the connection of the two. The divine principle 
imbues the world as this self-generated life, which Nicholas also understands as 
the genesis of the original numbers 1, 2, and 3.16 God is thus the “not-other.” He is 
not identical with the world, but nor is he completely separated from it, in that he 
guarantees its existence by defining its being as its principle, thereby protecting 
it from destruction. And yet he remains nothing other than himself, concealed 
within himself and defining all being.
13 Ibid., 146.
14 Reuchlin could have known this text well, as it was included in Faber Stapulensis’ [= Jacques 
Lefèvre d’Étaples] complete edition, to which he himself had contributed manuscripts, and 
which was published in 1514, three years before De Arte Cabalistica; cf. tomus I, fols. clxxviii r.– 
clxxxiii v.
15 Hopkins 1986, 113.
16 Nicholas of Cusa, De Possest 119–123.
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
387Kabbalah as a Transfer of Pythagorean Number Theory
Reuchlin adopts this Cusan idea in its entirety. “Possest” for him is the begin-
ning of the highest of the three worlds, the beginning in the infinite: “Per infini-
tum nihil aliud significans quam ipsum posse.”17 While Reuchlin traces the ar-
gument back to Parmenides (by way of Plato), he reproduces Cusa’s terminology:
For there is nothing that was, or is, or will be, beyond or within the heav-
ens or on earth, in corporeal or incorporeal beings, in angels, in men, in 
beasts, in plants, or in the whole of nature that is not can-is (possest) or, to 
be grammatically correct, potent-is (potis est).18
From this first principle, Pythagorean (and Hesiodic) physics – that is, chaos – 
emerged, explains Philolaus / Reuchlin.19 Chaos is understood here as prima ma-
teria, informed by the order of the spiritual world, which, in turn, is represented 
by numbers. This order can be derived from the indefinite One of “possest” as 
a theory of numbers and as a theology of the Trinity. One itself is not a definite 
number, and can only be grasped in conjunction with the number two, which is 
why “Duo primus numerus est, unum vero principium numeri.”20 The absolute 
separation of two into unmediated units has to be mediated by the number three, 
so as to make clear that one and two refer to the same thing, a third. This is the 
numerical explanation of the Trinity, “So, from the one producing in the divine 
and from the two that are produced, threeness emerges.”21
Reuchlin, then, does not take the number three as a symbol of that which com-
bines one and two, but, following the Christian theology of the Trinity, he thinks 
instead in terms of three independent units (in the Trinity these are persons) 
which are one substance. This allows him to argue that the essence of the Trinity 
is formally different from threeness in number theory.
Reuchlin then generates a fourth element, differing from the original Trinity, 
in this train of thought. The number four allows him to build on the entire Py-
thagorean tradition of the Tetractys, one of whose basic theorems is that the first 
four numbers add up to ten (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10).22 The number four is also represent-
ed as a holy symbol by the letter Y, which normally stands for a fork in the road. 
It can also, however, be interpreted as a particular perspective on a pyramid, and 
as such makes visible the connection between geometry, arithmetic, and symbol-
ism.23 Finally  –  and this is important for the doctrine of the name of God  –  the 
17 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 152.
18 Ibid., 152: “Nihil enim fuit, uel est, uel erit in supercoelestibus, coelestibus, terrenis, corpo-
reis aut incorporeis, in angelis, in hominibus, in brutis, in plantis, in tota universi natura 
quod non possest uel ut grammatice loquamur, potis est” (my emphasis).
19 Ibid., 152.
20 Ibid., 154.
21 Ibid., 154: “Ex uno itaque in divinis producente, duobusque productis, trinitas oritur.”
22 Ibid., 154.
23 Reuchlin learned about this theory from Virgil’s Aeneid (10.101), where the Gods’ house, the 
number 10, is described as a pyramid: “decimo Deum domus alta, cuius quidem culmen est uni-
tas, parietes trinitatis et superficies quaternitas.” Quoted in Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 192.
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Tetractys can be connected to the tetragram. Reuchlin in fact conjectures that 
Pythagoras’ theory of the Tetractys evolved directly from his interpretation of 
the tetragram.24
4 Mythological Messianism
Messianism plays a significant role in the entire first book of De Arte Cabalistica. 
Reuchlin discovers Messianism in his version of Greek mythology, which he in-
terprets typologically in relation to Christ. Marranus expounds on this connec-
tion, interpreting the Greek pantheon with an emphasis on gods of healing. The 
most important of these, he argues, are Asclepius, whom Jupiter sent into the 
world to bring healing, and Hercules, who heroically saved the world from its 
afflictions.25 Reuchlin explicates this allegory of the gods by referencing Plato’s 
Timaeus, where he quotes God as saying: “What I create is indissoluble according 
to my will. Every other connection can be dissolved.” This order and eternity of 
the world is “vera salus.”26 The Christian, of course, is reminded here of the New 
Testament (Matthew 16:18 and Matthew 18:18): “Whatever you bind on earth will 
be bound in heaven.”
For Reuchlin, salvation applies only to the earthly, variable, and fallen world. 
The eternally unchanging world of the intelligences does not need to be saved, 
nor, of course, does the divine world.27 Reuchlin believes that this theory, which 
he discovered in the “true Pythagoreans,” was a Greek appropriation of the orig-
inally pure Jewish Kabbalah.
5 Problems of metempsychosis
It is well established that the Pythagoreans believed in metempsychosis, a deli-
cate matter for Reuchlin, since it calls into question the dogma of the resurrection 
of the body. This issue had been part of an ongoing discussion ever since the Fifth 
Lateran Council had established as dogma the immortality of the individual soul. 
Reuchlin reinterprets this theory, arguing that the soul is not an individual soul, 
but a spiritual type, and combines this idea with the notion of the soul as the form 
of the body. The soul shapes, the body is shaped. Thus every body is uniquely 
shaped, while the shaping element can be used more than once. This corresponds 
precisely to Thomas Aquinas’ theory of individuation, according to which materia 
signata is individuating. It follows that the shaper, the soul, can be understood 
as a collective species-soul. This interpretation is a tolerable attempt to validate 
dogmatically the theory of the transmigration of souls. Reuchlin writes that men 
24 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 156.
25 On Asclepius, cf. Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 156 (the story is found in Julian the Apostate, 
Contra Galilaeos 200a); on Hercules, Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 162.
26 The reference is to Plato, Timaeus 41a. Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 164: “Quae a me facta, 
indissolubilia sunt, me uolente, alioqui ligatum quaedam omne, dissolubile est.”
27 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 166.
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in this sense can be called “animal divinum,” because the divine has manifested 
itself in their lives.28
Reuchlin is particularly intent on making the teaching of life after death and 
the punishment of sins compatible with metempsychosis. There is, however, a 
typically Neoplatonic difficulty here: if the soul, in connection with its body, has 
done good or has sinned, it is no longer a species-soul, but the history of its ac-
tions are part of its identity. Reuchlin’s solution to the problem of the immortal 
species-soul versus the individual soul appears forced. According to Pythagoras, 
he writes, the bad souls have to suffer in phantom bodies like Ixion, Tantalus, 
Sisyphus, and Prometheus.29 Reuchlin then connects this notion of illusory bod-
ies with his ideas about witchcraft and ghosts.30 He does not seem to be entirely 
satisfied with this interpretation himself, as he goes on to suggest typology as the 
actual explanation of the transmigration of souls. This is why, he writes, Socrates 
is called the Attic Moses and Cicero the Latin Demosthenes.31 Regardless of how 
the theory is to be understood, for Reuchlin it at least remains a reflection of the 
original Kabbalistic teaching of the immortality of the soul.
Because the transmission history of the holy, original Kabbalah becomes nar-
rowly focused when it comes to Pythagoras, passing through him as if through 
the eye of a needle, all teachings associated with him must be measured against 
the standard of philosophia perennis. For Reuchlin, this perennial philosophy is 
evident even in the name of Zeus, the highest of the Greek gods, and the Roman 
god Jovis. He develops a complicated allegory here that brings together geome-
try, cosmology, and theology. His interpretation of the geometric pyramid as the 
house of God is based on Virgil (Aeneid, Book 10). Viewed from above, a pyramid 
looks like a Y, and is, as Timaeus of Locri sets out in his De mundo, the form of 
fire.32 Arithmologically, the pyramid is the figure that combines the power of one 
and two, and is the most simple figure after the point. One multiplied by itself 
reveals the power of cohering unity in the point; two multiplied by itself renders 
four, which unfolds as the simplest spatial form in the four corners and sides of 
the pyramid. Thus the powers of one and two are manifest in the pyramid, whose 
surface with its four triangles also points to the Trinity. Reuchlin claims that be-
cause the pyramid, as simplest form, represents fire, the Chaldaeans and the He-
brews believed that God was fire.33 This divine fire that consumes all matter is 
like Jovis, who is pure form – bringing Jupiter and the one God of all mankind 
close together in the tradition of philosophia perennis. This is the God in whose 
28 Ibid., 170.
29 Ibid., 172.
30 Ibid., 172.
31 Ibid., 172.
32 Timaeus Locrus, Peri kosmou 96b.
33 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 196. Pyr is the Greek word for fire and pyramid signifies flame. 
Cf. Timaeus 28b.
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mind all simple, immaterial formae separatae exist discretely.34 Reuchlin quotes 
Virgil: “O Father, O eternal power over men and gods, because of its salutary warmth 
the ancients called this spiritual sun Iupiter.” While this does not explicitly iden-
tify Jovis and YHWH with each other, it does insinuate a connection between 
their names.35 Reuchlin is convinced that all important truths in pagan Greek 
and Roman wisdom ultimately derive from the Jewish tradition and that their 
meaning only becomes fully revealed in the context of Christian interpretation.36 
The participants in the Sabbath dialogue conclude that Pythagorean philosophy 
is the Greek tradition closest to its Kabbalistic origins. It is for this reason that 
Reuchlin, as he wrote in his letter of dedication to Pope Leo X, wants to renew 
Pythagorean philosophy.37
6 Kabbalistic versus Pythagorean number theory
The third book is the actual book of Kabbalah. It summarizes the main theses of 
the Kabbalah of God’s name and Kabbalistic patterns of interpretation. Overall, 
this book’s function is to supply the framework constructed in the first and sec-
ond books with examples and supporting evidence. There is the tacit assumption 
that the examples from Jewish Kabbalistic sources only ever confirm the notion of 
philosophia perennis, while the actual binding interpretation is always lectio chris-
tiana. Unlike in the first and second books, however, Reuchlin does not always 
insinuate the Christian interpretations here. He discusses many of the examples, 
especially from gematria, the interpretation of numbers, strictly in the Jewish con-
text. More than anywhere else it becomes clear here in the third book that Reuch-
lin did not write De Arte Cabalistica for Jewish readers and thus not to proselytize, 
but rather as a defence of his position for a learned Christian public. It is to this 
audience that he addresses his claim that the Jewish Kabbalah conceals the se-
crets of the Trinity and of messianism.38
As with the previous books, Reuchlin begins Book III with an epistemologi-
cal justification. His intention, he writes, is to introduce the inner secrets of the 
Kabbalah. He always regarded this wisdom as being reserved for the highest 
34 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 196–197. 
35 Ibid., 196 (Aeneid 10.18): “Mundi eius conditio est, quod totus quidquid et purissima forma 
est, cuius asserunt Iovialem esse naturam, quae immortalia et mortalia informet, et fotu 
specifico cuncta utriusque Mundi in suo esse conservet, de quo extat illud Maronis: O pater, 
ô hominum, divumque aeterna potestas, propterea ob fomentarium calorem spiritualis Sol vete-
ribus Jupiter dictus est.”
36 Cf. Secret 1977, here 231. Steucho, De Perenni Philosophia (1530), ed. 1591, fols. 54–55, explicitly 
equates Zeus with Jehovah: “Vult igitur Plato Iovem esse Zena, a Graeco Zen, vivere. Que-
madmodum scimus ab essendo vocatum hebraice Iehovah, qui forte est Ioves. Agnoscunt 
igitur eundem esse Iovem atque Deum. Qui dictus est ab Ethruscis, quorum sermo et litterae 
per omnes terras diffunderentur probaturque ex tribus linguis eandem esse Iovem atque 
Deum. Dicitur hebraice Iehovah, graece Dios, Deus latinum, Iehovah hebraicum Iovis lati-
num illud latinum Deus.”
37 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 38.
38 This is also why he begins Book 3 with a defence against the Cologne Dominicans.
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level of being and knowledge, the divine, transrational sphere. This is why he 
has Simon, the Jew (now that it is Sunday he has rejoined the conversation), be-
gin the third book with an interpretation of Jacob’s ladder, the most important 
mystical metaphor for the ascent to the divine and the counterpart to Homer’s 
“catena aurea.”39 Simon interprets Jacob’s ladder epistemologically. The spirits as-
cending the ladder are the forms of things, which, the higher they rise, lose their 
materiality and thus their mutability and transience. In this way, they reach the 
second world, the world of pure forms. These pure forms descend to us, and we 
recognize them internally as the forms communicated to us by heaven. Philolaus 
immediately identifies this theory, which is reminiscent of Christian-Augustini-
an illuminatism, as Pythagorean.40 Simon, who claims not to know what Pythag-
oreanism is, realizes that this is the very teaching that was “handed down from 
the ancient Kabbalists and is contained in the entire divine law of the Hebrews.”41 
For Simon, the fifty gates of insight, which Nachmanides explained in part at the 
beginning of his Torah interpretation, are the model for the “Pythagorean” inter-
pretation that true inspiration comes from the divine sphere.42 For Nachmanides 
as well as for  Reuchlin, the fifty gates of insight are the true way to the Kabbalah, 
opening up all conceivable Kabbalistic interpretations of the Hebrew alphabet, 
which they hold to be literally revealed by God. This alphabet contains the fifty 
gates of insight.
Everything Moses received through the gates of insight is contained in the 
divine law of the Jews, whether in a literal or allegorical sense, in spoken 
or in arithmetical meaning, in the geometric shapes of the letters (whether 
they are described or transposed), or in the harmonious sound of the let-
ters: everything results from their shape, their connections, separations, 
contortions, direction, flaws, excess, smallness or greatness, culmination, 
closure, opening, and order.43
This idea of alphabetical order based on number, shape, and combination holds 
both for the world in its entirety as well as for the written word. Thus the third 
book of De Arte Cabalistica also contains individual interpretations of the secret of 
numbers and letters.
Reuchlin first addresses Kabbalistic number theory, specifically of the num-
ber fifty, which he associates with the “fifty gates of insight.” The number 72 is 
39 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 240; Genesis 28.12, Iliad 12.19.
40 Ibid., 244.
41 Ibid., 244: “a priscis Cabalaeis tradita, et omnia lege diuina Hebraeorum complexa.”
42 Cf. Busi / Campanini 1995, 150 n. 24.
43 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 246: “omne Moysi traditum per portas intelligentiae, contentum 
est in lege diuina Iudeorum, uel sensu literali uel allegorico, per dictiones, uel arithmeticas 
suppositiones, vel geometricas literarum figuras siue descriptas seu transmutatas, uel har-
moniae consonantias ex formis characterum, coniunctionibus, separationibus, tortuositate, 
directione, defectu, superabundantia, minoritate, maioritate, coronatione, clausura, apertu-
ra, et ordine resultantes.”
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also important, as it is both the number of angels as well as of the divine names. 
Next he gives the ten Sefirot a Trinitarian interpretation, and develops further 
the theory of א, the number one. The second part of the book is taken up by the 
three Kabbalistic methods of interpretation, namely temurah, notarikon, and ge-
matria. Finally Reuchlin puts forward a theory of Christian signs and their magi-
cal powers, with the symbolism of the cross and the tree introducing an element 
of Christology.
The number 50 connects the numbers 10 and 5. Both numbers are essential for 
Reuchlin – 5 because of the tetragram with the letter Shin, 10 as a Pythagorean 
number and because of its inclusion in the tetragram. In terms of natural philos-
ophy, 50 can be interpreted as follows. There are five levels of corporeality: 1) ele-
ments, 2) corporeal things made out of the elements, 3) souls, 4) heavenly bodies, 
and 5) “supercoelestia incorporea.”44 Each of these groups can then be classified 
according to the following ten categories: genera generalissima, genera specialia, spe-
cies generales, species specialissimae, res individuae, as well as matter and form, differ-
ence, proprietates, and accidents.45 The natural philosophical interpretation of the 
fifty ways of wisdom is based on this (logically somewhat uneven) list.
Interpreting the number fifty symbolically reveals it to be the perfect example 
of the coincidence of the Kabbalah and Pythagoreanism that interests Reuchlin 
so much. His interpretation derives from Pico’s nine hundred Conclusiones.46 The 
number 5 is in the middle between 1 and 9; there are four numbers above it and 
four below it. This position can be represented geometrically by a circle divided 
vertically down the middle. The number 5 is in the middle; the upper section is 
divided among the numbers 6–9; the lower among the numbers 1–4. Half circles 
can then be drawn with the number 5 always at the center, making the connec-
tions 9–5–1, 8–5–2, 7–5–3, and 6–5–4. If one then subtracts from the larger number 
the amount separating it from 5, and adds the result to the smaller number, the 
sum is always 5.47 This theory aims to highlight the speculative, arithmological 
median position of the number 5, thereby also evoking the role of the pentagram 
in salvation history.
This establishes the special role of the number 5. For Reuchlin, the position 
of numbers in relation to divine infinity is key. His concept of infinity is more 
edifying than it is precise, but nonetheless theologically and philosophically suc-
cinct. He performs the following thought experiment: multiplying 5 by the Py-
thagorean number 10 gives 50, which corresponds to the fiftieth year, set aside 
in the Bible as the year of jubilee. Multiplying 5 by 2 and raising the result to the 
third power renders 1000. Continuing this process leads to infinity, “the realm 
of all eternities, which the Kabbalists call En Sof and which is divinity without 
44 Ibid., 246.
45 Ibid., 246.
46 Pico, Conclusiones (Farmer 1998, 68).
47 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 246.
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garment.”48 Reuchlin’s theological conclusion is a variation on Psalms 104:2: “He 
wraps himself in light as with a garment.” The order of numbers is not divine 
infinity, but merely God’s garment, a symbol of divine infinity, appearing to us 
as the light of reason and of the rational spirits. “With the light of his garment he 
created the intelligible world of distinct and invisible spirits, which the Kabbal-
ists call heaven.”49
Light, which is both intellectual illumination and grace,50 is also the form 
with which God created the intelligible world.51 This idea is commensurate with 
the Florentine Neoplatonist notion that light contains all forms of creation and 
knowledge of these forms as well as the grace of salvation.52 Moses saw the Torah 
shining so brightly in this light that its radiance stayed with him and blinded his 
people, forcing him to conceal his face. “The Kabbalists” deduced from this that 
God does not fully show his glory, but only his predicates.53 For Reuchlin this 
means that הוהי is concealed behind the garments.54
The insight that we cannot ultimately have insight into the divine opens the 
first, most important gate of insight.55 The following 49 gates are the steps in 
which God created the world according to Genesis 1: first the primordial world as 
the second gate, then the visible earth; the third gate is matter; the fourth the void. 
The remaining steps correspond to the six days of creation.56 Following the logic 
of negative theology, the fiftieth gate of insight, the gate of the year of jubilee, is 
reserved for messianic insight: “The highest gate, the one creator of all, is known 
to no man, save the Messiah, for he is the light of God and the light of the nations; 
so he knows God and God is known by him.”57
7 Conclusion
Reuchlin’s two main works, De Verbo Mirifico and De Arte Cabalistica, defined the 
framework and themes of the Christian Kabbalah for the next two hundred years. 
De Arte Cabalistica was written during the conflict over the Christian acceptance of 
48 Ibid., 248: “quae est regnum omnium seculorum a Cabalistis Ensoph nominatum, et est deitas 
sine indumento.”
49 Ibid., 248; cf. Psalms 104.2: “Cum vestimenti sui lumine creavit mundum intelligibilem spiri- 
tuum separatorum et inuisibilium, quod Cabalistae uocant coelum.”
50 Cf. Scheuermann-Peilicke 2000.
51 Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (Pines 1963, ch. 26).
52 Cf. Leinkauf 1999 and Scheuermann-Peilicke 2000.
53 Cf. Nachmanides on Exodus 33:18. Ramban (Nachmanides), Commentary on the Torah (Ber 
Chavel 1971–1976).
54 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 248: “Quo plane apparet deum iuxta ipsum esse suum tetra-
grammaton.”
55 Here again we have the incomprehensibility of the first, following § 5 of the Liber de causis. 
Reuchlin finds all of this in Pico’s Conclusiones (Farmer 1998, 462).
56 Cf. the Maimonides passage cited above.
57 Reuchlin, De Arte Cabalistica 252: “suprema porta unus creator omnium a nullo homine nisi 
a Messiah cognitus, cum ipse est lux dei et lux gentium, ideoque et cognoscit deum et deus 
cognoscitur per eum.”
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Jewish books with the aim of explaining the mysterious Christological meaning 
of Kabbalistic literature to Christians and of describing the most important meth-
ods and topoi of what Reuchlin understood to be the “Kabbalah.” His Christo-
logical interpretation of the divine name replaced the Jewish Kabbalah of names 
with a Christian one. His claim that the Pythagorean tradition was the purest 
form of the original Kabbalah in the Greek tradition contributed to the specula-
tive and theological esteem enjoyed by Pythagoreanism. Reuchlin’s Trinitarian 
interpretation of the Sefirot Christianized the heart of the Jewish Kabbalah; most 
significantly, the question of the En Sof and of the absolute origin of the divine 
continued to play a role in theologico-philosophical speculation until Spinoza. It 
is thanks to Reuchlin’s adaptation of Jewish traditions into Christian theosoph-
ical and philosophical speculation that Kabbalistic techniques and Kabbalistic 
symbolism become acceptable in the Christian context. The framework Reuchlin 
created defined the Christian Kabbalah into the nineteenth century.
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Unfolding Pythagoras: Leibniz, Myth, and Mathesis*
Samuel Galson – Princeton University
Perhaps the most striking feature of Pythagoreanism is the sheer variety of in-
dividuals associated with the tradition.1 One need only glance at Iamblichus’ 
vast catalogue (VP 267) to be impressed: assembled here are doctors, musicians, 
astronomers, athletes, women, politicians, poets, philosophers of all stripes, and 
many non-philosophers. At the same time, the origin myth of Pythagoreanism 
tells of a single godlike leader, whose word is law, acting at the head of a com-
munity so unified as to take all things in common. Such a tradition is a Hydra: 
an impossibility, yet seemingly reinvigorated by every new swipe of the philol-
ogist’s knife. There is a certain logic, then, to the early modern identification of 
Pythagoreanism with a prisca sapientia – a form of knowledge that is either lost or 
concealed, but that, supposedly, appears in corrupted forms in all the traditions 
of the world. To uncover the uncorrupted form of this prisca sapientia would be 
to uncover a key to all the sciences and the secret of humanity’s relation to God. 
Insofar as Pythagoreanism is associated with the knowledge of such an all-pow-
erful secret, the tradition is characterized as “esoteric.”
While Leibniz identifies with the search for an esoteric philosophy, I shall ar-
gue that the concept of Pythagoreanism and of prisca sapientia in general under-
goes a fundamental transformation in his work. For Leibniz, the tradition’s vari-
ety is no longer the corrupt form of an original unity, but a positive multiplicity 
which is itself the sought-for key. The secret of Pythagoreanism is no longer to 
be arrived at by reducing its variations to one, but rather by multiplying them 
into infinity. Leibniz thus identifies with Pythagoreanism precisely because of 
the several “corruptions” the tradition has experienced. This deliberate assimila-
tion of the tradition’s content to its form (the subordination of the esoteric to the 
“exoteric”) explains how it was possible for a self-consciously modern and ratio-
nalist philosopher to identify himself with a mythical figure from Graeco-Roman 
antiquity. Insofar as Leibniz’ reinterpretation of Pythagoreanism is motivated by 
∗  My thanks to Brooke Holmes for her invaluable advice on an early draft of this paper.
1 Abbreviations: GW = Gerhardt, C. I. 1860, Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff, 
Halle; DS = Guhrauer, G. E. 1838–1840, Leibnitz’s Deutsche Schriften, 2 vols., Berlin; GP = Ger-
hardt, C. I. 1875–1890, Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 7 vols., Berlin; 
C = Couturat, L. 1903, Opuscules et Fragments Inédits de Leibniz, Paris; A = Deutsche Akademie 
der Wissenschaften 1923–, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Reihe 1–8, 
Darmstadt / Leipzig / Berlin.
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a return to original sources, it also provides a valuable perspective for thinking 
about the question, hotly debated by classicists in recent years, of the unity or 
otherwise of the tradition in antiquity. Leibniz offers particularly helpful insights 
into the vexed question of the nature of the transition from Philolaus to Plato.
Unfolding esotericism
Leibniz’ understanding of Pythagoreanism was heavily influenced by the inter-
pretation of his sometime teacher at the University of Jena, Erhard Weigel. In turn, 
Weigel drew upon the work of Johannes Scheffer ([1664] 1701), which is referred 
to by both Weigel and Leibniz as the authoritative philological reconstruction of 
ancient Pythagoreanism (A 2.ii 86). Scheffer’s key contribution was the claim that 
the members of Pythagoras’ innermost circle, whom he associated with the label 
of mathematici (literally “learners”), had distinguished themselves by supporting 
all their reasonings with infallible demonstrations. By contrast, a second circle, 
the acusmatici (“hearers”), were only entitled to hear the results of these reason-
ings. In the “Prodromus” to his Universum Corpus Pansophicum of 1672, Weigel 
expounds at length on his “great joy” on discovering Scheffer’s description of 
this divide. He says that it anticipates the primary division in knowledge that he 
wishes to make in his encyclopedia: the division between cognitio denominativa 
and cognitio aestimativa, qualitative knowledge acquired by the senses and quanti-
tative knowledge reposing on firm demonstration (1672, sig. B2r). Weigel’s project 
is to reform Aristotelianism along the lines of Euclid, to submit all denominative 
to aestimative knowledge and thus to construct a mathesis universalis. Whereas 
Cartesian mathematics could be used to establish exact determinations of exten-
sion only (“a shadow taken for a body”), this would be a mathematics with which 
one could establish the precise nature of moral ideas or metaphysical substances. 
The discovery that the Pythagorean mathematici had achieved this, he says, gives 
him hope that his life’s work might not be as hopeless as his critics believed.
Leibniz systematically excerpted the Corpus Pansophicum, giving special atten-
tion to the section on the Pythagoreans (A vi.4 1179). In the Weigelian mould there 
is a certain aspect of Leibniz’ Pythagoreanism that consists in a prioritization of 
the esoteric over the exoteric. Leibniz, too, often dreamed of a mathesis universalis 
in which, from a small number of absolutely simple concepts, any and all truths 
would be demonstrated by logical combination: “if we had it, such as I conceive, 
we should be able to reason in metaphysics and morals in much the same way as 
in geometry and analysis” (GP vii 21). All of his work on particular logical and 
mathematical problems he tended to regard as only a contribution towards the 
eventual development of such a system. Insofar as Leibniz pursues this goal, he 
appears to identify directly with the Pythagorean mathematici as Weigel under-
stood them (e. g. A vi.4 378). It was consequently held by Russell (1900) that what 
failed to adhere to the strictest standards of mathematical logic in Leibniz’ system 
– Russell’s prime example was the doctrine of human freedom – was obfuscatory, 
motivated by money or politics. More recently, Rutherford (1995, 233) delivered 
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
397Unfolding Pythagoras: Leibniz, Myth, and Mathesis
essentially the same judgement with a different moral evaluation, viewing such 
failures as a sacrifice of philosophy proper to ethics. It is indeed noteworthy that 
on several occasions Leibniz suggests that he resorts to “popular arguments” 
only as a practical compromise, and would have preferred (time-permitting, GP 
vii 468) to remain in the esoteric mode. 
Leibniz explicitly rejected Weigel, however. He regarded him as intelligent but 
hardly intelligible (A i.3 466). In turn, Weigel regarded Leibniz as too “exoteric” 
(A ii.3 7914). Weigel’s mistake was to associate his mathematical formalism di-
rectly with esoteric content, hastily assuming to be genuine metaphysical simples 
ideas which he had in fact failed to properly decompose. For example, he purport-
ed to rigorously prove the existence of God from the fact that the multiplication 
table – or “Pythagorean table” as it was known – derives first from one multiplied 
by one. Leibniz responded drily: “one would need a more exact proof to call it a 
demonstration” (GP vi 343). It in fact seems unlikely that Leibniz thought that 
a mathesis universalis dealing directly with simple substances would have been 
possible at all. Certainly by 1683 he remarks explicitly that the determination of 
absolutely simple concepts is impossible (A vi.4 530). But much earlier than that 
Leibniz held that, at the metaphysical level, the notions whose subjects actually 
exist have predicates of infinite complexity. Only God (a syncategorematic infin-
ity) is capable of analysing such predicates in a way that is infallible. If mathesis 
was to be a mathesis of substances that actually existed, it would have to be, in 
some way, an obscure or “exoteric” expression of its object. 
Thus Leibniz directs the concept of mathesis universalis away from the search 
for the definitions of simple substances themselves and towards the development 
of systems of symbolic logic that can operate independently of their hermeneu-
tic content. The quest for mathesis universalis becomes the quest for what Leibniz 
calls a characteristica universalis (“universal characteristic”): the latter does not rely 
upon accurate metaphysical knowledge but is rather “a certain method sensible 
and crude [grossier]” by which one can hope to approach such knowledge in its 
absence (GP vii 22). Leibniz states that no reasoning is possible without charac-
ters: “all of our reasoning is nothing other than the connection and substitution 
of characters” (GP vii 31). All reasoning is thus, insofar as it is rational, an entire-
ly artificial chain of substitutions. Although Weigel was right to criticize Carte-
sian mathematics for treating extension only and ignoring more general forms 
of reasoning, erecting a mathesis universalis did not simply mean substituting one 
esoteric content (substance) for another (extension). Rather, mathematics had to 
be detached from all esoteric content, whether mere extension or true substance. 
Tinner (1977) argued that Leibniz’ rejection of Weigel extended to a rejection 
of Pythagoreanism in general. But, as we shall see, this is not the case. Leibniz be-
lieved that mathematical formalism was constitutively detached from the infinite 
complexity of true substances, but he also believed that this detachment was the 
very basis on which a mathesis universalis could proceed. One way of coming to 
grips with this paradox is through Leibniz’ doctrine of expression. Expression, 
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for Leibniz, is a purely formal relationship: “Something is said to express another 
thing when there are relations in it which correspond to relations in the thing 
expressed” (GP vii 263). A set of purely formal relations between symbols can-
not express the content of another thing directly. But it can express the relation 
between the relations of a thing and its content: “even if characters are arbitrary, 
their use and connection has something which is not arbitrary, that is a certain 
proportion between characters and things and between the relations that dif-
ferent characters expressing the same things have to each other” (GP vii 192). In 
other words, a relation of expression between two symbols can itself constitute 
a formal element in a relation of expression to a third, and so on, in such a way 
that, although an infinite set of relationships could never be written down, there 
is contained in the definition of expression, by recursion, the expression of such 
an infinite set. The very absence of any final content is what propels the system of 
formal relations to infinity. One could say that symbols express things precisely 
because they express, through the restriction that they express only other sym-
bols, their separation from things. Hence “no-one should fear that the contempla-
tion of characters leads us away from things; rather, it will lead us to the interior 
[intima] of things” (A ii.1 623).
Unfolding exotericism
Leibniz’ remarks about the dependence of mathesis on characters or expression 
are paralleled by his occasional remarks to the effect that mathesis itself must at 
times be laid aside in favour of “popular arguments.” Leibniz sometimes refers 
to himself as an esoteric philosopher, sometimes as an exoteric philosopher – and 
sometimes as both (cf. GP v 42 and 242). Russell, as we remarked, saw obfuscation 
in such moments. But if the most rigorous and exact mathesis only functions as 
such to the extent that its ultimate content is obscure, then mathesis and “popular 
arguments” have a common ground. The distinction between two forms of eso-
tericism – the obscure Weigelian approach to mathesis and a mathesis construed 
as constitutively exoteric – thus develops into a distinction between two forms 
of exotericism. On the one hand, there is mathesis, esoteric when compared to 
popular arguments, but exoteric in the manner that we have discussed. On the 
other hand, there are “popular arguments” which enjoy something of the qual-
ity of formal reasoning, but to a lesser extent than is possible within a system of 
symbolic logic. Leibniz described such an exotericism explicitly in his preface to 
Nizolius (1670). This form of exotericism makes use of demonstrations, with the 
limitation that the elements of the demonstrations are popularly acceptable hy-
potheses (topoi) rather than perfectly demonstrated truths: 
Exoteric philosophy is that in which certain things are said without 
demonstration, but are confirmed with similarities and certain topical rea-
sonings, or even demonstrative ones [my emphasis], but not unless the as-
sumptions are topically proposed; they are illustrated with examples and 
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similitudes; such a way of speaking is indeed dogmatic or philosophical, 
but it is not acroamatic, that is, not most rigorous, not most exact (GP iv 146; 
cf. GP v 242).
Topical reasonings can themselves be of varying quality, so that there is pre-
supposed a series of gradations from the most exact to the most obscure. Thus 
Leibniz himself not only makes use of “popular arguments” but even myths and 
enigmas – and even, at times, Weigelian numerology. Wöhrmann (1980) has spo-
ken of this passage as establishing an “Exoterikprinzip” in Leibniz’ philosophy. 
He emphasizes that the mathesis universalis is supposed to have two sides: an ars 
demonstrandi (“art of demonstration”), on the one hand, and an ars inveniendi (“art 
of discovery”) on the other. If the ars demonstrandi encloses symbols within a her-
metic circle of mathematical reasoning, manipulating them provisionally as if 
they were things, the ars inveniendi applies symbols creatively to what they do not 
perfectly represent. The transformation of the esoteric system through a variety 
of exoteric explanations and practical applications is thus not the corruption of 
knowledge, but the production of it. This multiplication and differentiation corre-
sponds to the way in which God produces the individual, limited sensations and 
capacities of finite beings, so that the exoteric principle also expresses the need 
for combining, as Leibniz puts it at one point, veritatis Ratio with Experientia and 
Utilitas (A vi.4 579).
The necessity for a progressive expansion of mathesis away from mathematical 
rigour and towards analogy and example can be seen by contemplating some 
concrete examples of how Leibniz’ thought a mathesis universalis might be con-
structed. In some papers from the late 1670s, Leibniz proposed a universal lan-
guage in which simple concepts would be denoted by prime numbers and com-
bined by multiplication. “To speak in this language will be nothing other than to 
enunciate the numerical propositions of a continued Pythagorean table” (C 277). 
Leibniz introduces a discussion of this language with a reference to Pythagoras:
There is nothing which does not suffer number. So number is like a certain 
metaphysical figure and Arithmetic a certain Statics of the Universe, by 
which the grades of things are explored. Men were persuaded by Pythag-
oras that the greatest mysteries were hidden in numbers. And it is credible 
that Pythagoras, as he brought much else, also brought this opinion from 
the Orient to Greece. But when the true key of the arcanum was lost, the 
curious lapsed into futile superstitions: whence was born a certain vulgar 
Cabbala, far removed from the true one, and the multiplicitous stupidities 
of a certain falsely-named Magic (A vi.4 263).
Leibniz’ system is obviously impossible: the multiplication of numbers would 
quickly render the representations of more complex concepts impractically long. 
At a certain level of complexity a new form of encoding would have to be applied. 
This would render the terms manageable again, but conceal the manner in which 
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the original prime numbers had been combined, whose expression was the moti-
vation of the original system. If Leibniz means to propose this system as the lost 
Pythagorean “key” then he has fallen into the same trap as Weigel. In fact, how-
ever, other systems proposed by Leibniz make it clear that this remarkably eso-
teric system is merely one relatively exoteric example. For example, Leibniz had a 
mystical interpretation of binary arithmetic as a Pythagorean enigma (symbolon, 
that is) encoding the creation of all from being and nothingness (C 430–431; DS ii 
410–413). The binary is the simplest of all possible forms of inscription. Compared 
to it, the present system involving prime numbers is already operating at a level 
in which its simplest components have been obscured. One could imagine such 
a system written in binary, but it would be even more unwieldy than Leibniz’ 
actual proposal.
Ross (1983) saw Leibniz’ celebration of the binary as a straightforward iden-
tification with Pythagorean esotericism. Leibniz had in fact probably been influ-
enced by Weigel on this point, who had interpreted the Tetractys as concealing 
a form of quaternary arithmetic (A iii.8 320). I would emphasize, however, that 
Leibniz is willing to view systems at varying levels of abstraction as all being, 
in some way, Pythagorean. The progression from binary, to the prime number 
system, to the ordinary mathematics of extension, in which the relation to simple 
(non-extended) substance is definitively obscured, means that no one system can 
be interpreted as a definitive presentation of the “key.” From the perspective of 
the prime number model, it is the mystical interpretation of the binary, all too 
close to Cabbalistic numerology, which is obscure. Similarly, from the perspec-
tive of applied mathematics, it is the prime number model which is obscure. The 
same continuity and striation of obscurity extends into those forms of rationality 
that are not mathematical, but based on analogy and example. Hence Leibniz’ 
claim that “philosophers and mathematicians who scorn the exoteric or civil dis-
ciplines as uncertain seem very stupid” (A vi.4 465) The mathesis universalis is not 
constituted by any particular key, but by a series of examples of how the mathesis 
universalis might be constructed. If there is an arcanum, its content can only be 
expressed by the relations between the examples themselves. 
The importance of the Pythagorean tradition thus lay in the very fact that 
through its literally “multiplicitous” (multiplices) corruptions it presented a se-
ries of expressions of greatly varying obscurity – mystical symbola, numerological 
descriptions of physical entities (as in the famous table of opposites) and conven-
tional mathematical expressions (e. g. Pythagoras’ theorem). Most importantly, it 
placed these on a continuum. The tradition itself could thus be adopted as a sym-
bol of how the esoteric truth would depend on a series of exoteric expressions. 
Leibniz’ willingness to blur the lines between mathesis and exoteric philosophy 
may also owe something to an ambiguity in Scheffer about just who the Pythag-
orean esoterics were. This ambiguity was in turn a result of Scheffer’s attempt to 
grapple with the notorious inconsistency between Iamblichus’ accounts of the 
acusmatici and mathematici, thanks to which debate still rages over the identity of 
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the mathematical Pythagoreans. Scheffer had identified several grades through 
which Pythagoreanism was disseminated. He first made a distinction between 
the exoteric (non-Pythagoreans) and the esoteric (disciples); then the esoteric was 
divided into the mathematical (mathematici) and the “acroamatic” (acusmatici). 
The acusmatici were not party to full demonstrations but were nonetheless in-
structed “esoterically,” with the expectation that they might someday progress to 
the inner circle (1701, 80–82). Leibniz would therefore have seen from Scheffer (as 
well as Weigel, who noted the ambiguity) that to a Pythagorean “esoteric” could 
mean both mathematical and acusmatical. To complicate matters further, Schef-
fer’s own language fluctuates. Sometimes he uses “esoteric” to mean only the 
mathematici; sometimes “acroamatic” to mean mathematici and acusmatici taken 
together (that is, “esoteric”). Whatever exactly Leibniz made of this, it is clear that 
when Leibniz identifies with Pythagoreanism he does not identify purely with a 
secret esoteric philosophy, but also with a system of communication, gradated, to 
be sure, yet rational through and through precisely by virtue of this gradation.
Leibniz associated many philosophical ideas with Pythagoras besides that of 
mathesis. Foremost among these were the existence of incorporeal substance and 
the concept of the soul as a harmony (to be considered in the next section), the 
existence of a “central fire” (i. e. the Copernican cosmology), and the concept of 
“number atomism,” which Leibniz developed into the Monadology. According to 
the interpretation of Leibniz’ Pythagoreanism that I am advancing here, however, 
Leibniz does not look to the tradition for determinate philosophical content. Rather, 
he looks for ways in which that content has been or can be transformed. Although 
one might think of the system of Leibniz’ Monadology, for example, as a recreation 
of the Pythagorean number atomism (Neumann 2009), it is above all a flowering 
of the esoteric-exoteric relation taken as a structuring principle of the emanation of 
divine being into nature. Leibniz’ monads are absolutely singular and exclusively 
esoteric beings (with “no windows”), distinguished by nothing except the degree 
of distinctness with which their internal writing “expresses” that of other monads 
(GP vi 598, 616). The content of this idea of expression – always the expression of an 
expression – is susceptible to as many transformations as there are monads. There 
is no Monas Monadum (“Monad of Monads”) in Leibniz.
Idealism and materialism
Much ink has been spilled over the relationship between the Pythagoreanism 
described by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, which closely resembles what we find 
in the fragments of Philolaus, and the Pythagoreanism of Plato and the Academy. 
Burkert drew a sharp (if curiously circular) distinction between these two tradi-
tions: “what differentiates Plato from the Pythagoreans is ‘separation’ (χωρισμός)” 
(Burkert 1972, 31). In other words, so the argument goes, Philolaus represents a 
typically Presocratic materialism, but the concept of the Idea (“separated” from 
material) comes only with Plato. The trouble is, Aristotle interprets Philolaus’ 
doctrine in different places in contradictory ways, either as implying that mate-
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rial objects somehow directly are numbers (Metaph. 1083b, Metaph. 1090a), or that 
they participate in numbers in a Platonic fashion (Metaph. 987b). Plato himself 
sometimes associated Pythagoreans with Parmenidean idealism and sometimes 
with Heraclitean materialism (Horky 164–166, 198–199). Laying aside the problem 
of the diversity of Pythagoreans at this time, one can see how this ambivalence 
could have arisen simply from tensions in Philolaus’ own doctrine. Philolaus 
states that “nature itself” (αὐτὰ μὲν ἁ φύσις) cannot be known by humans, yet it 
is known that it consists in harmony (F6): “all things that are known have num-
ber” (F4) and each “thing itself” (ἕκαστον αὐτὸ) gives signs of which numbers it 
is to be known by (F5). The difficulty here is understanding precisely what kind 
of gap separates “the thing itself,” which remains inaccessible to human knowl-
edge, from the numbers by which it is known. 
This difficulty is similar to that which lurks in Leibniz’ insistence that mathe-
sis, while remaining entirely restricted to symbolic expression, would lead to the 
“interior” of things. There is a suggestion that “nature itself” can somehow be 
absolutely known through numbers – it consists in harmony, after all. Yet it is 
only divinely knowable. Sometime in the fifth century, this tension imprinted a 
permanent mark on the shape of the tradition: on the one hand, there emerged 
Platonic Pythagoreanism, in which numbers were separated from matter as Ideas 
– the true objects of knowledge. On the other hand, there emerged the Pythag-
oreanism of practical empiricists like Archytas, for whom numbers became the 
material expression of an otherwise inaccessible “nature itself.” Hunched over 
his strings, searching for harmonies in material objects, Archytas appeared ridic-
ulous to the Platonic philosopher (Resp. VII 530d; cf. Plut. Marc. 14.5–6). Converse-
ly, to a man such as Aristotle, it was the Platonists’ turn away from the physical 
world that was absurd. Leibniz saw that both tendencies could be regarded as 
springing from the same root (like Netz 2004). But this did not mean the distinc-
tion was to be abandoned. In much the same way as Weigelian symbola could be 
incorporated as one grade of exoteric expression, to be contrasted with the more 
useful yet less comprehensive expressions of Cartesian algebra, for example, 
idealist and materialist Pythagoreanism could be reframed as complementary. 
Just as Leibniz would develop a mathesis universalis by reframing the esoteric as a 
grade of the exoteric, he would develop through this duality what could be char-
acterized as an idealism without Ideas. 
Leibniz states many times that Pythagoras discovered incorporeal being, but 
presents this discovery in two different ways. On the one hand, the discovery led 
to philosophical obscurity and the wrongful neglect of the study of nature. The 
notion of “ideas subsisting outside of matter” (GP vii 148) was a mistake. Leibniz 
criticises Plato’s attack on Archytas for “applying geometry to machines,” in this 
regard, and blames Plato’s attitude on his Pythagoreanism: “for Pythagoras and 
Socrates were convinced of the immortality of the soul and innate incorruptible 
ideas” (A vii.6 495). Leibniz insisted, against Plato and with Archytas, that it was 
precisely through its expression in matter and machines – exoterically, in other 
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words – that incorporeal being could be known. Mathesis, correspondingly, could 
be thought of as a material process: “the Arithmetical Machine counts, whatever 
Pythagoras believed… Mundus vult (nay must) decipi.” (A iv.1 569).2 On the oth-
er hand, Leibniz often identifies himself as a Platonist and praises the Phaedo, 
particularly the passage in which Socrates ridicules Anaxagoras for explaining 
nature in terms of efficient rather than final causes (97c–99c) and which he be-
lieves “comes, in part, from Pythagoras” (GP vii 334; cf. A 2.i 767; A vi.4 1562). 
Correspondingly, he sometimes regards mathesis as founded upon the Pythagore-
an discovery of incorporeal being. Pythagoras “just about [propemodum] founded 
Mathesis and the Science of incorporeals when he discovered that famous dogma 
worthy of a hecatomb, that all souls are indestructible” (GP vii 497).
Leibniz’ particular interest in the Phaedo is significant, for it is here that we 
find one of Plato’s clearest statements of what separates him from the Pythagore-
ans along with perhaps the first mention of absolutely immaterial Ideas. Yet the 
passage upon which Leibniz dwells – on final causes – is the very passage which 
renders problematic the whole enterprise of “separation” (be it separation from 
matter or Philolaus). Here, Socrates himself explains that he only resorted to Ideas 
after he found himself unable to comprehend the Best (99d–100a). Through this 
passage, Plato frames the ensuing demonstration of the immortality of the soul in 
terms of Ideas as one more exoteric expression of what only the final cause – un-
knowable in itself – would infallibly determine. As if to heed Socrates’ warning 
about “misology” (89b–91c), Leibniz does not give up on the concept of incorpore-
al substance – he remains a Platonist. But it does not follow for him that one must 
reject the Pythagoreans. Unlike Socrates, Leibniz has a clear idea of the Best. It is 
that which has in it the maximum of “affirmative intelligibility” or “things worth 
marking” (GW 161). For Leibniz it is thus consistent with a method of reasoning 
that departs from final causes that the foundation of demonstration be not a cer-
tain set of esoteric truths or Ideas, but rather the perception of an order between 
exoteric relations or purely material entities. 
The most obvious trace of Leibniz’ continuing adherence to the Pythagorean-
ism against which Plato defines himself is his resuscitation of the Philolaic doc-
trine of the soul as a harmony, which Plato had dismissed for its lack of, literally, 
ἁρμονία with the existence of innate ideas (Phaedo 97c). It is noteworthy that this 
doctrine seems to have presented Aristotle with a problem very similar to that 
which he encountered in assessing the nature of Pythagorean numbers, namely 
of whether or not the harmony can be reduced to the matter in which it subsists. 
Is the soul the dust motes themselves or the principle of their movement (De An. 
404a)? Recent scholarship tends to replicate his inconsistency here. In the case 
of the number doctrine, scholars are eager to criticize Aristotle’s claim that Py-
thagorean number was material; yet the view that the harmony of the soul was 
purely material goes more or less unquestioned (compare, for example, Huffman 
2 “The world wants to be deceived” – i. e. divinity must be obscured by symbols.
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1988 with Huffman 2009). In regard to the latter, we have simply accepted Plato’s 
analysis of the doctrine. It may be questioned, however, whether it is right to 
consider a harmony in “nature itself” which is, recall, only divinely knowable, 
as purely material. For Leibniz, it is the very duality of the notion of harmony – 
capable of appearing immaterial from an Aristotelian perspective and material 
from a Platonic perspective – that makes it useful. Again, by unfolding Pythago-
reanism itself into its two contradictory forms, Leibniz introduced a dissonance 
in Pythagorean harmony through which it came to express (harmonize with) the 
concordia discors between materialism and idealism, the Presocratics and Plato.
Navigating between the Scylla of Cartesian dualism and the Charybdis of Spi-
nozan monism, Leibniz holds that the soul is both purely immaterial and abso-
lutely inextricable from a particular body, which remains its own through the 
most violent flux, including birth and death. There is no transfer or influence 
between soul and body, but a communication through a “pre-established har-
mony.” The soul may indeed be thought of as a harmony in matter, insofar as the 
ordered activity of the body is what expresses it. But it is not reducible to this har-
mony, because the order that the body expresses over any particular place, time, 
or at any particular level of magnification, is only a partial or obscure expression 
of the infinite and perfect order implicated in the soul and progressively explicat-
ed in the body. Once again, therefore, this doctrine requires Leibniz to justify an 
analogy between the finite and the infinite – the finite harmony of the body and 
the infinite harmony of the soul. This justification arrives in the unfolding of the 
notion of harmony into harmonies of varying clarity and obscurity. From the ma-
terial harmonies that we perceive in our body we analogically infer the existence 
of a more perfect harmony. In turn, we infer the existence of harmony that must 
relate these harmonies, and so on, until we arrive at a harmony that is infinitely 
complex, and therefore immaterial. Specifically, Leibniz identifies at least three 
“levels” of harmony – between body and soul, efficient causes and final causes in 
nature, and between nature itself and Grace.3
Occasionally we find the distinction between the view of the soul as an expres-
sion of matter and as separate from it expressed as a difference between rational 
metaphysics and revealed theology or mysticism: only in the divine perspective 
can the soul be considered as truly distinct from the body.4 The double scientif-
ic-religious aspect of Pythagorean metempsychosis serves a similar purpose. For 
modern scholarship, metempsychosis, which Burkert regards as “groping” to-
wards Parmenides (1972, 136), presents further problems for the view of the soul 
as material, which are only solved by dividing metempsychosis into religious 
and scientific variants. Leibniz enacts a similar division, but once more what is 
3 Haase (1962) suggested Boethius’ musica humana as the immediate source for Leibniz’ notion 
of pre-established harmony; cf. the reference to the Consolatio as Pythagorean at GP vii 545.
4 Leibniz distinguishes between human souls, separated from the body at death by God’s 
grace, and animal souls, confined to the revolutions of matter, but equivocates as to whether 
human souls continue to possess a subtle body after death (Coudert 1995, 198 and GP ii 100).
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important is not the actual content of the doctrine, so much as the way in which 
its religious (or in Leibniz’ case, corrupt, exoteric) and scientific (esoteric) forms 
relate. The esoteric doctrine is called by Leibniz metamorphosis, metaschema-
tism, metasomatosis, or transformation: “Animate beings do not come into being 
or die: but are only transformed” (A vi.4 1649). Leibniz refers to this doctrine as 
a “grand secret” or an “arcanum” because it can only be inferred from the regu-
larity of corporeal transformations that we do see, not demonstrated conclusively 
(A i.21 722; GP vii 199). That is why, almost whenever he introduces the doctrine, 
he introduces it by the negation of metempsychosis. When introducing metamor-
phosis he simultaneously states that it is not metempsychosis.5
Now, metempsychosis is definitely a mistake according to Leibniz, since it 
implies a moment of disharmony, of soul without body. But it has the virtue of 
expressing directly the separability of the soul from body that is at best confused-
ly implied by the corporeal traces of its enfolded order. The esoteric discovery 
of immateriality is thus expressed by its exoteric transformation: metamorphosis 
pro metempsychosi becomes a single idea (GP vii 199). Leibniz explains that “The 
Pythagoreans enveloped the truth in their metempsychoses… the vulgar would 
understand nothing without having their minds prepared” (GP i 392; cf. GP iv 
299). But envelopment is precisely how Leibniz describes the containment of the 
soul in the body: “rigorously speaking there is neither birth nor death, but only 
developments and envelopments.” (GP iv 474). The esoteric-exoteric distinction 
thus not only expresses the soul-body relation through a bare structural differ-
ence, but even in the development of that difference into the metaphor of the 
development of the plis et replis infinis of arcane being (A i.21 722). 
The Pythagorean Pharmakon
Leibniz sometimes speaks as if he associates his doctrines with Pythagoreanism 
merely in order to add authority to his claims. “It is of the greatest utility to show 
that the doctrine of the immortality of the souls is most ancient” (A i, Transkrip-
tionen 1712, 242). “Even the Philosophia Mystica, as that of Plato and Pythagoras, 
has its uses” (GP vii 497; cf. A vi.3 573). Such remarks might seem irreconcilable 
with the assertion (following in GP vii 497) that Pythagoras is “better than the 
other ancient philosophers.” We can understand them once we realize that the 
rationality of the ipse dixit lies precisely in the way that it interrupts the hermet-
icism of mathematical reasoning, in which symbols are treated as things, and 
reinstates them in their distance from things as symbols, that is, as expressions. 
Pythagoreanism “has its uses” not despite, but because of, its envelopment of 
obscurity. It becomes the allegory of allegories, the myth of myths, deployable 
whenever the function of the symbol (that is, of obscurity) requires clarification. 
5 For example, GP ii 100, 124; GP iii 635; GP v 64, 216; GP vi, 601, 619.
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In 1675, Leibniz sketched out an essay designed to persuade the King of France 
to sponsor the creation of an Encyclopedia Universalis. The bid was to have begun 
thus:
The Republic of Letters is a colony in the other world that a certain Greek 
adventurer, named Pythagoras, led there from ours. It is he who first be-
gan to cultivate a part of the country and plant there a certain drug shown 
to him by Mercury, which we call glory… [but now] the poverty of the 
inhabitants makes them sell this product at too low a price, which means 
that the storehouses in Europe are full and it has deteriorated from its first 
reputation. And yet there is nothing so noble as the juice that one draws 
from this drug, provided one knows the preparation. It is the true nectar 
of the gods and the liquor of immortality (A iv.1 571).
Leibniz’ tale is modeled upon the famous moment in the Odyssey in which Her-
mes shows Odysseus Moly (10.303–306). We are dealing here with the first ap-
pearance of the word phusis in Greek literature. Hermes shows Moly to Odysseus 
not as mortals know it, from the flower, but as the gods do, from the root. Yet the 
phusis of the herb does not lie in the root or the flower: it lies in the manner in 
which the one has unfolded from the other. In Leibniz’ tale, the value of the herb 
derives from its circulation. Immortality is produced by the multiplication and 
trade of the fruits of the Republic of Letters. And yet, at the same time, surplus re-
sults in decay. Building on the economic metaphor we might compare the way in 
which Leibniz once drew an analogy between logical demonstrations of varying 
rigour to coins of varying denomination (GP vii 520). True discrimination is not 
counting everything out in one-penny pieces, but knowing when to count and 
when to guess. A fluent system of currency, like the mathesis that would have or-
dered the Encyclopedia, requires a stratification and organization of obscurity and 
distinctness, generality and precision. Pythagoras’ drug is traded most effective-
ly at varying levels of purity. Thus, there is not only a Pythagoreanism of Leibniz’ 
myths, but also a myth of his Pythagoreanism. As it turned out, however, this 
particular myth was never actually communicated.
Couturat wrote of Leibniz that he “dreamed all his life of a grand work which 
was to be his singular work, and of which he left only some plans, some rough 
drafts and some fragments; so that one can say that the true Leibniz not only did 
not publish, but never even wrote (As a poet said, the most beautiful thoughts 
are those we are not able to express).” (O’Briant 1979, 204–205). Just as modern 
scholarship has dismissed the old notion that the mathematical ἄρρητον (“ir-
rational / unsayable”) caused a crisis among the early Pythagoreans, we have 
seen that the unsayability of an esoteric doctrine in itself – esoterically – does not 
mean that it cannot be expressed exoterically; nor is it impervious to rationality, 
since the way in which the esoteric relates to the exoteric can be analogically reca-
pitulated among purely exoteric relations. In general, finite reasonings resemble 
the infinite analysis of God only by an iterative act of self-reference in which the 
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difference between the infinite and the finite is repeatedly reinvested within the 
finite. That, incidentally, is why Leibniz claims that the infinitesimal calculus is 
what finally allowed him to evolvere (“unfold”) the arcanum of the harmony of 
necessity and contingency, regarded by Russell as irrational (C 18). It expressed 
the divine-human ratio particularly clearly. The Pythagorean tradition not only 
offered philosophical concepts to express this unfolding, it evolved them through 
its own transformations as a tradition. Similarly, Leibniz’ Pythagoreanism is ex-
pressed in the staggering multiplication of models and approaches, drafts and 
fragments, that constitute his Nachlass – in the way in which this multiplicity 
unfolds – as well as in each and every finite contribution, though with varying 
degrees of clarity and obscurity.
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The Pythagorean Doctrine in the Caucasus
Tengiz Iremadze – Grigol Robakidze University Tbilisi / New Georgian University Poti
“Pythagoras was a great philosopher”
Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani, Georgian Dictionary
1 Introduction
In the context of intercultural philosophy the research and analysis of transna-
tional philosophical discourses is extremely important. In this regard, it is of 
great value to outline the contours of “Caucasian Philosophy,” the methodologi-
cal foundations and prerequisites of which I have already presented in my recent 
work, Philosophy at the Crossroad of Epochs and Cultures. Intercultural and Interdisci-
plinary Researches.1 This work is an attempt to revitalize old and new philosophical 
concepts in the light of intercultural and interdisciplinary studies. This, in turn, 
leads to an understanding of intercultural philosophy that connects systematic 
and historical aspects in a specific form. Here I speak of “Caucasian philosophy” 
and, above all, refer to those thinkers of this region who initiated the productive 
philosophical relationship between Georgia and Armenia. The foundation for 
the study of a hitherto unexplored field of history of philosophy has been laid 
in this approach, and in addition in my work I indicate the major directions of 
future philosophical discourses between the leading representatives of these two 
nations of ancient cultural traditions.2
In the context of Caucasian philosophy, the Pythagorean doctrine of philoso-
phy and philosophizing is of great significance. In the Caucasus the role, mission, 
and purpose of philosophizing was largely determined by the Pythagorean con-
cept of philosophy.3
1 See Iremadze 2013. For the importance of Caucasian philosophy, see also Tavadze 2013; Za-
karadze 2012, 417–430.
2 Udo Reinhold Jeck in his most important works Platonica Orientalia (2004) and Erläuterungen 
zur georgischen Philosophie (2010) speaks of the need for a new definition of the place and role 
of Western philosophy in the context of global philosophical thought. He specifically under-
lines the importance of reconsidering the Western European understanding of philosophy. 
Eurocentrism is deeply rooted and widespread in the history of philosophy, which brings to 
the fore the dominant European cultures, and essentially hampers research on less known 
philosophical traditions (including many traditions of European philosophy but especially 
non-European philosophy). See Jeck 2012, 9–10.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche in his Early Notebooks (written in 1872/1873) had connected the terms 
“mystics,” “philosophy,” and “religion” to Pythagoras. In his view, the great Greek thinker 
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First and foremost, I will discuss the two most important representatives of 
Caucasian philosophy and their interpretation of Pythagorean doctrine. Thereaf-
ter, I will try to show how the Pythagorean reception developed in the Caucasus. 
Therefore, I will take the following steps: I will begin in chronological order and 
discuss the reception of Pythagorean doctrine by the great Armenian thinker Da-
vid Anaht. My next step refers to the great medieval Georgian philosopher Ioane 
Petritsi and his interpretation of Pythagorean doctrine. The last step is related to 
the analysis of a variety of interpretations of Pythagorean doctrine in early mod-
ern Georgian (Caucasian) philosophy. Finally, it can be concluded that Pythagore-
an doctrine has played an important role in Caucasian philosophy.
2 David Anaht and Pythagoras
The first, remarkable notices about Pythagorean doctrine in the context of Cau-
casian philosophy are given in the works of the Armenian thinker David Anaht 
(David the Invincible, sixth century AD).4 He belonged to the Alexandrian school 
of Neoplatonism.5 This original thinker of the school of Ammonius was a disciple 
of Olympiodorus the Younger and was among the important commentators on 
Aristotle in late antiquity. Biographical information about David is scarce. Nev-
ertheless, some commentators on his works such as Arakel Sjunetsi (1350–1422) 
provide important information about his life and work. Relying on old sourc-
es, Sjunetsi commented upon David’s work Definitions of Philosophy (Prolegomena 
philosophiae), in the fourteenth century.6 Here Sjunetsi tells us that David had a 
lot of trouble because Armenians were persecuting him, so he had to move to 
Georgia, where he died.7 Arevshatian, who has translated and published David’s 
works in Russian, explains this report by Sjunetsi as probably meaning that Da-
vid had a conflict with the Armenian clerics. Nevertheless, in Arevshatian’s view, 
before emigrating David greatly influenced Armenian thought and his works 
were widely spread and extremely influential in the Caucasus.8 Be that as it may, 
one thing is clear: David was a Caucasian philosopher in the best sense of the 
word. In my view, his writings, together with the important philosophical works 
of Ioane Petritsi, form the foundation of Caucasian philosophy.
of Samos played an important role in the development of these fields. The interdisciplinary 
character of his thought itself gave his model of philosophizing a wide resonance well be-
yond Greece. Pythagoras gained significant recognition in the context of different cultures 
and nations and gave important impulses for the establishment of intercultural thought. 
From this perspective his life and creative work is valuable. Nietzsche called Pythagoreans 
“sectarians.” See Nietzsche 1996, 30–31.
4 See Anaht 1975, 29–100.
5 For a more comprehensive picture of the philosophy of David, see Anaht 1983; Benakis 1983, 
558–570; Busse 1892; Khostikian 1907; Mahé 1990, 189–207; Sanjian 1986; Westerink 1967; 
Wildberg 1990, 33–51.
6 The analysis of David’s work “Introduction to Philosophy,” written by Arakel Sjunetsi was 
printed in Old Armenian in Madras in 1797. See Arevshatian 1975, 8.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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In his writings David frequently refers to Ammonius Hermiae (440–517) and 
is greatly indebted to him. In his Definitions of Philosophy, David speaks of six 
famous definitions of philosophy, the source of which can be found in antiquity 
and, in particular, in the doctrines of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. Analysis 
of David’s text shows that for him the major sources of Pythagorean doctrine are 
the works of Alexandrian philosophers – Ammonius Hermiae and one of the 
most famous Pythagoreans, Nicomachus of Gerasa (second century AD).
Ammonius in the preface to his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge discuss-
es six famous definitions of philosophy and indicates their sources (Pythagoras, 
Plato, Aristotle). Ammonius considered the purpose of these definitions to be 
the clarification of the specific nature of philosophy and the object of its study: 
philosophy, in contrast to other sciences, lays claim to universal and necessary 
knowledge about beings as such. This view was of great importance for the devel-
opment of philosophy. These six definitions of philosophy, found in Ammonius, 
had a great influence on the later thinkers of Alexandrian Neoplatonism, and 
especially on John Philoponus, Elias, and David Anaht. These definitions are as 
follows:
Philosophy is the knowledge of existence as such.
Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things.
Philosophy is contemplation of death.
Philosophy is becoming similar to God as far as it is humanly possible.
Philosophy is the art of arts and the sciences.
Philosophy is a love of wisdom.
David included these definitions of philosophy in his work Definitions of Philos-
ophy, but at the same time he attempted to explain them in a more detailed and 
precise way. Depending on the account of Nicomachus of Gerasa, David discuss-
es the three most important of the definitions of philosophy, which he ascribes to 
Pythagoras:
Philosophy is the knowledge of existence as such.
Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things.
Philosophy is a love of wisdom.
In Definitions of Philosophy, above all, David is trying to overcome the agnosticism 
and skepticism of Pyrrho. His declared goal is to reject Pyrrho and his skeptical 
philosophy, which he calls “false wisdom.”9 Against the assertion of Pyrrho and 
his followers that, “there is no existence, and even if there were, its cognition 
would have been impossible,” David asserts the existence of beings. His overall 
purpose is to prove that being as such is the object of philosophy, by means of 
which adequate cognition of it (i. e. of being) is possible.
9 See Anaht 1975, 31.
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Of these three definitions of philosophy, the roots of which, according to Da-
vid, can be found in Pythagoras’ doctrine, the first definition deserves special 
attention. The assertion that philosophy is the knowledge of existence as such, 
in David’s opinion does not refer to the Pythagorean doctrine of number. At this 
point David offers a modified version of the nature of philosophy: it is a science 
which cognizes beings according to their nature. However, the nature of beings, 
that is their essence, is not a number. Beings are understood in a qualitative and 
not in a quantitative dimension.10 However, it should also be noted that Pythago-
ras ascribed to numbers not only quantitative but also qualitative characteristics.
In his work David speaks of the superiority of the number four. The number 
four possesses unlimited possibilities and mystical character. From it the num-
bers seven and ten are derived. In Pythagoras’ doctrine the equivalent of seven 
is wisdom and the equivalent of ten is perfection. Four also manifests itself in 
the form of the four classical elements of the creation such as earth, water, fire, 
and air. Thus, the number four possesses universal character, because all beings 
are related to the principles of the synthesis and unification of these four major 
elements. All beings are thus related to the number four too.
In this context, we should not pass over another important aspect of Pythago-
rean doctrine that was considered by David, namely that Pythagoras did not write 
down his doctrine. David argued that this was so because this great Greek philos-
opher desired to transmit his knowledge to animated beings and not to inanimate 
objects. This means that his thought was dedicated to his disciples and not to inan-
imate books. For Pythagoras, the following considerations were obvious: why do 
we need books if they are not able to disperse doubt from this world and answer 
the most important questions? Only the faithful disciples who hear the teachings 
of their teacher are able to understand, extend, and preserve this teaching. That 
is why Pythagoras did not leave us written works;11 he perfectly understood that 
philosophizing can be incarnated in conversation and not in writing.
Hence, based on Nicomachus of Gerasa, David raises the problem of writing 
down philosophy. According to the Armenian philosopher, Pythagoras was sup-
porting the point that writing is not able to solve important questions and prob-
lems of the world and human existence. Only the spoken word can incarnate 
real philosophical communication. Thus, Pythagoras differentiates speaking and 
writing from each other and does not hide his distrust of writing. Perhaps he had 
a special reason for that: indeed, what gross negligence has taken place when 
writing has been given the advantage? In writing, opinions are shared in such 
a way that the partner in the dialogue is not able to control knowledge directly. 
Plato was of the same opinion about written philosophy. Thus Pythagoras can be 
considered as Plato’s predecessor in this regard.12
10 Ibid., 59.
11 Ibid., 57.
12 See A. Patzer 2006, 28–38.
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3 Ioane Petritsi on Pythagoras and Pythagoreans
Ioane Petritsi – the most important medieval Georgian philosopher – intensively 
studied Neoplatonic philosophy.13 He translated into Georgian the work of Nem-
esius, On Human Nature, which was very famous in that period.14 But especially 
important is his Georgian translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, which he 
interpreted step by step.15 Petritsi’s commentary on the Elements of Theology16 is 
an important part of the reception of this work, in that the Georgian philosopher 
discusses the work immanently, that is based on Proclus’ own philosophy.17 Pe-
tritsi should therefore be a subject of special interest in study and discussion of 
Proclus’ philosophy and especially in study of the medieval commentaries on 
Proclus, but this has not been the case in most publications concerning the El-
ements of Theology. In these publications Petritsi’s translation and commentary 
on Proclus’ work is considered superficially, or unfairly criticized.18 This gap in 
researching Proclus’ philosophical work can be filled only if the Georgian trans-
lation and commentary on the Elements of Theology is discussed and evaluated in 
close connection with Proclus’ Byzantine and Latin interpreters.19
Petritsi’s commentary on the Elements of Theology represents him as a great ex-
pert and supporter of Greek philosophy. Petritsi used his exemplary knowledge 
in order to reconstruct the world of the great thinkers of antiquity and introduced 
it to his countrymen. He managed this task so successfully that even the great 
Georgian thinkers of the early modern period relied on his achievements and 
considered their philosophical paradigms in close connection with the espiste-
mology of Petritsi. Here, first of all, I would like to recall Anton Bagrationi (1720–
1788), who in his major philosophical work Spekali (1752) presented the theory of 
cognition based on Petritsi’s works.
Pythagoras’ doctrine had a great influence on Petritsi’s creative work. In the 
commentary on the Elements of Theology Petritsi speaks of Pythagoras and Py-
thagoreans. For him, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans belong to the line of 
13 About Ioane Petritsi’s philosophy see Iremadze 2004, 13–27; 53–58; 161–241; Tewsadse 2002, 
131–154.
14 See Nemesius of Emesa, 1914.
15 Like Berthold of Moosburg, who wrote an extensive commentary on this work of Proclus, 
Petritsi commented extensively on all chapters of the Elements of Theology. See Mojsisch 2002, 
177.
16 See Ioane Petritsi 1937; Ioane Petritsi 1940; Ioane Petritsi 1999.
17 See Iremadze 2007, 75–78.
18 See Proclus 1963, xli–xlii; 343.
19 Here, above all, we should recall the commentaries of Nicholas of Methone and Berthold of 
Moosburg on this work of Proclus. Each of these two commentators on Proclus had com-
mented and researched Proclus’ Elements of Theology from different perspectives and for 
different purposes. See Mojsisch 2002, 175–184; Podskalsky 1976, 509–523; Zakaradze 2011, 
125–132. In addition, in this context we should consider and mention the Byzantine philos-
ophers of the eleventh to twelfth centuries (Michael Psellus and John Italus), and the me-
dieval Latin thinker Henry Bate of Mechelen (Heinrich Bate von Mechelen). See Steel 1997, 
120–133.
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ancient theologians who tell the supreme truth. It should be noted that Petritsi 
names Parmenides and Zeno as followers of Pythagoras. Thus it is evident that 
the Georgian philosopher sympathizes with these thinkers; this is also revealed 
in Petritsi’s search for “sacred theology,” which, as a Christian philosophy, should 
have been a teaching about divine and heavenly beings. Among ancient Greek 
thinkers Petritsi singled out Pythagoras and his disciples, for these philosophers 
by means of their abstract thought substantially fostered the creation of “sacred 
theology.”
At this point the question of Parmenides and Zeno’s Pythagoreanism should 
be considered. Petritsi’s sources, in this regard, may be Iamblichus, Diogenes 
Laertius, Photius, and Proclus himself. These thinkers considered Parmenides 
and Zeno (because of their thinking style) to be followers of Pythagoras. It is very 
likely that here Petritsi is relying on Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras, but we can also 
assume that he is guided by Proclus, who in his Commentary on Parmenides con-
siders Parmenides and Zeno to be Pythagoreans.20
In Petritsi’s commentary on the Elements of Theology there is one section that 
requires special attention. At one point Petritsi uses Pythagorean motifs more 
intensively than is done in his original source, that is Proclus’ text. In his com-
mentary Petritsi incorporates Pythagorean doctrine and regularly uses it in his 
attempts to establish philosophy as a primary science. Moreover, Petritsi is trying 
to connect Pythagorean doctrine about numbers with Proclus’ mathematical-ar-
ithmetical theorems. Certain epistemological positions should be taken into con-
sideration as the basis for these attempts.
Philosophizing requires general notions and definitions. According to Petritsi, 
the formation of general notions has its basis in the first principle of universe and 
in particular in one. The one, in which everything participates, determines the ori-
gin of genera. These genera have their foundation in the one and they derive their 
essence from it. This supposition becomes clearly visible through the example of 
the numbers. Petritsi attempts to explain the development of each singularity by a 
speculative theory of numbers. The origin of the series of numbers – the one – de-
termines all members of this series. The origins of natural and musical harmony 
lie in numbers, which, in turn, are dependent on the one as a number.21
In this context Petritsi recalls Parmenides’ conversation with Socrates about 
numbers. It is certain that here he relies on Plato’s dialogue Parmenides.” In this 
way Petritsi justifies his methodological approach and, in particular, he intends 
to define the emanation of beings from the one by a speculation about numbers 
that depends on Parmenides. The latter considers it important to explain major 
philosophical problems by speculation of numbers. Here the obvious influence 
of Pythagorean doctrine is revealed. In particular, Petritsi discusses examples 
from music and associates them with rich materials from Greek mythology. He 
20 See Proclus 2010, 66.
21 See Ioane Petritsi 1937, 19.
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needs this in order to explain and define the beings originating from the one. The 
existence of these beings is determined only by the one.22
One, from which all numbers derive, is the origin of the numbers. Two, which 
differs from one, but at the same time is presented as one unit, derives from the 
one. Two as a number is not one, but as genus, that is two as such, by itself it should 
be one. Petritsi uses the speculative dialectics of numbers in the first chapter of 
his commentary, where he speaks of a hundred as of a number and its genus. 
Here he considers “hundredness,” as the genus of a hundred and multitude. 
“Hundredness” means to be one, a hundred as a concrete number should be one 
unit, and hence should be one.23
The speculative dialectics of numbers clearly shows the necessity of intelligi-
ble knowledge and thereby clarifies that the nature of number, as such, guaran-
tees generality and necessity of the knowledge. In this way Petritsi’s primary aim 
is substantiated: he tried to characterize important concepts of thought by means 
of arithmetic. It becomes evident that cognition of sensual beings can be done 
only by means of universal principles.24
According to Petritsi, genera and types, and general definitions should be the 
basic elements of knowledge. Knowledge about beings should be based on these 
notions in order to establish a noetic order in the world of created things. The 
multitude derived from one exists on the basis of difference between concrete 
beings. Resemblance and difference makes possible the existence of multitude. 
Therefore, according to the theoretical perspective of cognition, one and multi-
tude are correlative notions.
Here the importance and function of the Pythagorean theory of numbers can 
be seen: reality and the whole universe can be explained by means of arithmeti-
cal methods. Thus, the doctrine of Pythagoras in Petritsi’s philosophical work 
is, above all, considered from the theoretical-epistemological perspective. In Pe-
tritsi’s work the doctrine of numbers, the philosophy of nature, and logic obtain 
equal importance. These three disciplines serve for the argumentation and con-
struction of the highest science, metaphysics. In Proclus and Petritsi they can be 
used to establish the true doctrine of principles, that is of philosophical theology.
4 Pythagorean Doctrine in Early Modern Georgian Philosophy: Reception 
and Transformation
Pythagorean doctrine was also known in the Caucasus through Old Georgian 
translations of Ammonius’ works. In medieval and early modern Caucasian 
thought Alexandrian Neoplatonism was an important philosophical movement. 
In the twelfth century an unknown Georgian thinker translated important works 
of Ammonius from Greek into Old Georgian, such as the Commentary on Aristo-
22 See Iremadze 2009, 285.
23 Cf. Ioane Petritsi 1937, 11.
24 See Iremadze 2011, 133–139.
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
418 Tengiz Iremadze
tle’s Categories and the Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge.25 The oldest Georgian 
manuscripts of these translations belong to the thirteenth century. 
Ammonius’ version of the definitions of philosophy played an important role 
in the development of Georgian thought. In the medieval Georgian Christian 
philosophical tradition these definitions of philosophy were also known from the 
Old Georgian translation of the Dialectics of John Damascene.26
Even in early modern Georgian philosophy these six definitions of philosophy 
were widely recognized. Therefore, in order to understand better these periods 
from the history of Georgian philosophy, it is necessary to pay due attention to 
them.
As was shown above, the work of David Anaht was decisive in the Caucasian 
reception of Pythagoras. David’s most important philosophical work, the Defini-
tions of Philosophy (“Prolegomena”) is written in Greek. However, there is also an 
Old Armenian translation of this work. In the eighteenth century Anton Bagra-
tioni, with his disciples and followers, translated this text from Old Armenian 
into Georgian. Consequently, the definitions of philosophy by the whole school 
of Ammonius as well by David Anaht became an object of special interest in early 
modern Georgian philosophy.
In early modern Georgia the importance of Pythagoras was so great that his 
name was included in widely used dictionaries and textbooks. For instance, in 
Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani’s (1658–1725) Georgian Dictionary27 which was used in 
schools, there is an interesting passage where Pythagoras is named as a great 
philosopher.28 Such a vision of Pythagoras was typical of early modern Georgian 
thought. Pythagoras, above all, was seen as a wise man and a philosopher. This 
attitude is evident in the philosophical and poetical works of the Georgian King 
Vakhtang VI (1675–1737). In his work Vakhtang considered Pythagoras and Plato 
to be the wisest men in the world.29
Anton Bagrationi, one of the most important representatives of early modern 
Georgian and Caucasian thought, made masterly use of the Pythagorean defini-
tions of philosophy from the Old Georgian translations of the works of Ammo-
nius Hermiae. At the same time he also considered other aspects of Pythagorean 
doctrine. In his major work Spekali30 (in Georgian: “precious stones”), when defin-
ing the essence of the soul, he put Pythagoras among other important figures in 
the history of thought (Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Nemesius, Augus-
tine, Ioane Petritsi, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, etc.). In his epistemology 
Bagrationi paid particular attention to Pythagoras’ doctrine of the soul. Like Pe-
tritsi, Bagrationi believed that study of the problem of the connection and relation 
25 See Ammonius Hermiae 1983.
26 See John Damascene 1976.
27 See Orbeliani 1991.
28 Ibid., 622.
29 See Vakhtang VI 1947, 44.
30 See Bagrationi 1991.
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of body and soul is extremely important, because only by means of such study 
is it possible to develop a theory of cognition, and, in particular, epistemology. 
According to Bagrationi, Pythagoras underlined the unity of soul and body and 
thus accurately defined one of its most important features.31 Bagrationi united 
concepts of ancient philosophy with the theoretical views of Eastern and Western 
thinkers, and attempted to define the nature of the soul. This attempt was suc-
cessful and brought productive results. Accordingly, an influential philosophical 
and theological direction was created in Georgian philosophy, which was based 
on Anton’s works and became the foundation for philosophical cooperation in 
the Caucasian region.
Nevertheless, in Caucasian thought Pythagoras was recognized to a lesser ex-
tent as a religious figure and mystic. In this respect, particularly noteworthy is 
the image of Pythagoras given in the works of the Georgian philosopher and 
theologian Iona Khelashvili (1778–1837).32 This great Georgian thinker consid-
ers Pythagoras (together with Voltaire, Rousseau, and Spinoza) to be an enemy 
of philosophy and especially of theology.33 Khelashvili goes further, and in one 
of his letters to the great Georgian philosopher Solomon Dodashvili (1805–1836) 
he places Pythagoras among such thinkers as Epicurus, the Sophists, Stoics, and 
Manicheans, and accuses them of being atheists. According to Khelashvili, Py-
thagoras, like these thinkers, had “naturalistic” inclinations, and therefore he 
was not a believer.34 This thesis of Khelashvili is not unusual: he was establishing 
his own model of Christian philosophy, where those thinkers and books were 
preferred which reflected divine revelation. Khelashvili was an active philoso-
pher and theologian; he thought that the highest purpose of a man should be 
the discussion of divine objects, and that the best ground for such discussion is 
provided by Christian philosophy, more precisely by philosophical theology. He 
considered Pythagoras’ doctrine to be an obstacle and hence useless on the path 
towards implementation of this task. In contrast to Petritsi’s ideas about Pythago-
ras, Khelashvili’s ideas are obviously regressive.
Nevertheless, Khelashvili’s assessment of Pythagorean doctrine did not be-
come paradigmatic. In this regard, special attention should be paid to one of the 
most important representatives of early modern Georgian thought, the philos-
opher, writer, and encyclopaedist Ioane Bagrationi (1768–1830). In his famous 
work Kalmasoba, which he wrote over fifteen years (1813–1828), he included the 
definitions of philosophy given in the work of David Anaht and updated them 
in the context of early modern Georgian and Caucasian philosophy. In this con-
text, he paid special attention to the Pythagorean definitions of philosophy that 
are found in David’s Definitions of Philosophy.35 It is especially notable that Ioane 
31 Ibid., 309.
32 See Khelashvili 2000.
33 Ibid., 79.
34 Ibid., 82.
35 See Bagrationi 1974.
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
420 Tengiz Iremadze
Bagrationi’s work is written in the style of a dialogue, in which the Georgian 
thinker Iona Khelashvili, mentioned above, is a major dramatic character. His 
function is similar to Socrates’ function in Platonic dialogues. When in the Kal-
masoba he is asked, “What and how many are the definitions of philosophy, which 
is a love of wisdom?,”36 Iona Khelashvili cites the definitions of philosophy from 
David’s work, but at the same time criticizes Pythagoras. For Ioane Bagrationi it is 
more important to present an explicitly Pythagorean understanding of philoso-
phy, rather than to show Khelashvili’s attitude towards Pythagoras. Accordingly, 
he makes Khelashvili present the vision of Pythagorean doctrine that prevailed 
in Alexandrian Neoplatonism (Ammonius Hermiae, David Anaht, etc.). In Ioane 
Bagrationi, Pythagoras, as one of the most important thinkers of antiquity, is the 
obvious embodiment of love of wisdom, that is of the ancient understanding of 
philosophy. Therefore, by means of Ioane Bagrationi’s vision, the Pythagorean 
understanding of philosophy became the object of intensive discussion in the 
context of Caucasian philosophy.
5 Summary
In late antique, medieval, and early modern Caucasian thought Pythagorean doc-
trine was interpreted by very interesting thinkers. As the history of reception and 
transformation discussed above shows, the Pythagorean concept of philosophy 
had great importance in the Caucasus. Even his mystical figure and the teaching 
of secret numbers was an object of interest in the Caucasian region. Together 
with Plato and Aristotle, he was regarded as one of the most important thinkers. 
Caucasian philosophers used Pythagorean doctrine extensively when discussing 
the essence and the role of philosophy.
The indisputably interesting task of future research in this area will be to show 
how Pythagoras’ religious teaching and mysticism was reflected in the Caucasus. 
An interested researcher will find an extremely important research field in this 
regard. The upcoming research in this field can extend and develop our present 
knowledge of the history of Pythagorean influence.
36 Ibid., 187.
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Ibn Sīnā’s and Al-Ghazālī’s Approach to Pythagoreanism
Beate Ulrike La Sala – Freie Universität Berlin
Introduction
Abū  Ḥāmid Mu ̣hammad b. Mu ḥammad Al-Ghazālī (1058–1111) famously criti-
cized Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā as well as the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ (or “Brethren of Puri-
ty”) as followers of Pythagoreanism, because of their philosophical approach and 
adaptation of Classical Greek philosophy, in his al-Munqidh min al- ḍalāl (usually 
translated as Deliverance from Error). His detailed criticism of the so-called falāsifa 
that is, the tradition of Arabic philosophy in the Greek tradition is best seen in 
his Tahāfut al-falāsifa (usually translated as Incoherence of the Philosophers). He ex-
plicitly takes issue with certain philosophical convictions of the falāsifa like the 
eternity of the world, God’s ignorance of particulars, and the non-existence of 
reward and punishment in the hereafter. This is not to say that the approach of 
Al-Ghazālī is bare of philosophical content, however. Further, it should be noted 
that Abū ‛Alī b. al- Ḥusayn b. ‛Abdullāh b. Sīnā (980–1030, Latinized as Avicen-
na), who is criticized by Al-Ghazālī, also offers a rather critical depiction of Py-
thagorean number philosophy or number doctrine.1 Especially in Book VII of his 
Al-Ilāhiyyāt (al-Ilāhiyyāt min al-Shifā’ usually translated as The Metaphysics of the 
Healing), Ibn Sīnā is critical of the Pythagorean concept of number in relation to 
the idea of unity. This critical attitude could represent a common ground between 
Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā. Their critical attitudes to Pythagoreanism will therefore 
be examined more closely and compared to each other in this essay. Finally, I will 
focus on the question of why the tradition of Pythagorean rules for life appears to 
be absent from the accounts of both authors. 
1 For a definition of the term “number philosophy” with reference to Pythagoreanism see 
Zhmud 2012, 13. According to this definition, number philosophy contains the notion that 
numbers represent an ontological principle of the world. For an application of Pythagorean 
number philosophy in the Platonic tradition see Zhmud 2013, 323–344. For a depiction of 
Aristotle’s approach towards Pythagorean number philosophy see Casertano 2013, 345–368. 
For this see also Riedweg 2002, 105–116. For Aristotle’s critic of the number philosophy see 
also Zhmud 2012, 399–414.
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Pythagoras in Ibn Sīnā’s Ilāhiyyāt
Ibn Sīnā’s Ilāhiyyāt2 is the metaphysical part of his major philosophical work, the 
Al-Shifā’. It was probably composed in the years 1014–20 and published in 1027.3 In 
this, his main metaphysical work, Ibn Sīnā concentrates in Book VII on Pythago-
rean philosophy within the framework of a discussion of classical Greek mathe-
matical principles. Book VII is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, Ibn 
Sīnā focuses on defining the concepts of unity and multiplicity. His starting point 
is clearly Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which he closely paraphrases.4 Thus, already at 
this point, one expects Ibn Sīnā to take an Aristotelian approach towards Pythag-
oreanism too. In the following two chapters he develops his criticism of the math-
ematical and philosophical approaches of certain classical thinkers. The fact that 
the second chapter of Book VII is in principle composed as a criticism of different 
classical mathematical schools is already evident in the title of this chapter: “On 
the doctrine of the ancient philosophers regarding the exemplars and principles 
of mathematics and the reason calling for this; revealing the origin of the igno-
rance that befell them, by reason of which they deviated [from the truth].”5 Ibn 
Sīnā’s criticism in this chapter is aimed at Plato and Platonists6 as well as Pythag-
oreans. As a general critique he argues that the ancient philosophers made a ma-
jor mistake when they shifted their focus from sensible to intellectual knowledge. 
The great error, committed most of all by Plato and his followers, consists in con-
ceiving of all intelligible things as being separate from sensible things, which led 
in turn to their corresponding assumption that there are two different forms of 
existence. For these thinkers, only the ideal forms contain the principles. Ibn Sīnā 
also criticizes an unnamed group of ancient philosophers for making the mistake 
of assuming two different forms of existence. The error of this group consists in 
imputing a separate existence to mathematical entities instead of the intelligibles. 
The next group at which Ibn Sīnā directs his criticism are the Pythagoreans.
Ibn Sīnā claims that the Pythagoreans consider mathematical entities or num-
bers to be principles. They do not distinguish between the principles, however. 
According to Ibn Sīnā, the Pythagoreans only differentiate between unity and 
duality and connect this distinction to the distinction between good and evil. For 
them, the concept of unity is connected with the good and all that is restricted, 
while duality is connected with evil and all that is unrestricted. Furthermore, 
Ibn Sīnā claims that Pythagoreans consider number to be comprised of unity and 
substance. Multiplicity comes into existence when a syncrisis of the two takes 
2 Avicenna 2005.
3 Goodman 1992, 31.
4 For a direct comparison of chosen paragraphs of Ibn Sīnā’s text with Aristotele’s Metaphysics 
see Bertolacci 2003, 25–45. In Book VII of the Ilāhiyyāt one finds only implicit quotations of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, whereas other books of the Ilāhiyyāt contain direct quotations. For a 
detailed list of the implicit quotations see Bertolacci 2006, 366. See also Porro 2011, 291–292. 
5 Avicenna 2005, VII, 2 = 243.
6 Marmura 2006, 355–369. 
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place. Ibn Sīnā expresses this as follows: “One is astonished at a Pythagorean 
party that maintains that number is composed of unity and substance, since uni-
ty, they maintain, does not subsist by itself. For it is unity of something and the 
receptacle is a substance. It is then [they argue] that composition takes place, and 
thus multiplicity comes to be.”7 Ibn Sīnā believes that one can differentiate here 
between two subgroups of Pythagoreans. One group claims there is a difference 
between abstract numerical figures on the one hand, and numbers that are mixed 
with matter on the other. In contrast, the second group does not recognize this 
difference. Furthermore, according to Ibn Sīnā, Pythagoreans defend the doctrine 
that mathematical numbers constitute a principle but that this principle has no 
separate existence. This necessarily conflicts with his conviction that God is the 
First Principle and has an existence that is separate from all other existing things.
Ibn Sīnā is convinced that the intellectual failures of the Platonists and Py-
thagoreans alike can be traced back to five fundamental errors. He notes, “If you 
give thought [to this matter], you will find the bases of the causes of error, in all 
the things wherein these people have gone astray, to be five [in number].”8 Ibn 
Sīnā here lists the following five assumptions as the five fundamental mistakes. 
These are, namely, the assumptions that:
 I. things that can be separated in the mind are also separate in existence
 II. one is understood as quiddity (being) that is connected with existence
 III. oneness and multiplicity are identical with quiddity
 IV. a permanently existing thing is identical with the one or many of this 
thing
 V. the causes of material things are necessarily separate and that the caus-
es are mathematical because they are separate 
With regard to the final point, Ibn Sīnā also insists that at least some mathemati-
cal objects, specifically geometrical figures, are not independent of matter.
As the reasons Ibn Sīnā specifies here clearly show, his criticism does not nec-
essarily focus on mathematics as mathematics, but rather on the Pythagorean 
number philosophy. Ibn Sīnā’s approval of Pythagorean mathematics as mere 
mathematical principles can also be seen in his refutation of atomist theories in 
his As-Samā‛ a ṭ- ṭabī‛ī, where he uses the Pythagorean theorem to argue against 
atomism.9 In the relevant chapters of the Ilāhiyyāt the Arabic term Ibn Sīnā uses 
for mathematics is taʽ līmī, which might be translated as “instructive science.”10 By 
contrast, the third book of his Al-Shifā’, which is entirely devoted to mathematics, 
is called ar-Riyā ḍīyāt.11 This expression is the plural form of the more common 
term in Arabic for mathematics: Riyā ̣da. It is noteworthy that Ibn Sīnā focuses in 
 7 Avicenna 2005, VII, 2.12 = 246.
 8 Ibid., VII, 2.15 = 247.
 9 Avicenna 2009, III, 4.5 = 285.
10 See Morewedge 1975, 164.  
11 Ibn Sīnā, A. I. ‛A. 1984.
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the third book of ar-Riyā ̣dīyāt on music.12 In the second chapter of Book VI of this 
work, Ibn Sīnā adopts the Pythagorean system for the fretting of the lute.13 Never-
theless, in his works on music he mainly follows the path laid out by Al-Fārābī.14 
One might thus conclude that the terminology that Ibn Sīnā uses in the Ilāhiyyāt 
for mathematics indicates that he is more interested here in number philosophy. 
Ibn Sīnā’s criticism is directed at the metaphysical implications that arise from 
Pythagorean and Platonist conceptions about unity and multiplicity. It turns out 
that they have a flawed understanding of being, for according to Ibn Sīnā’s con-
ception being is closely related to the question of the one. This was already point-
ed out in a discussion of this subject in Book III, Chapter 4, of the Ilāhiyyāt, where 
he explicitly writes: 
And what is foremost [in importance] for us [to do] is to make known the 
nature of the one in these places in terms of two things. For it is incumbent 
on us to make known the true nature of the one in these places in terms of 
two things. One of them is that the one is very closely related to the exis-
tent, which is the subject of this [metaphysical] science.15
Thus, having a wrong conception of the one is tantamount to having a false meta-
physics. One could even take this a step further, however. Having a wrong con-
ception of the one and numbers and mathematical objects also implies having an 
erroneous understanding of God. This conclusion is apparent if one takes into 
consideration Ibn Sīnā’s description of the purpose of metaphysics and his own 
approach in Book I of the Ilāhiyyāt. There he had already made clear that mathe-
matical figures cannot be the principle of existing things. Only God is this prin-
ciple and Ibn Sīnā formulates this within his book after showing the erroneous 
mathematical theories of ancient philosophers:
After this, we will move on to the principles of existing things. We will 
prove the existence of the First Principle and [show] that He is one, Truth, 
and the utmost in majesty. We will make known in how many respects He 
is one and in how many respects He is truth; how He knows all things and 
has power over all things; the meaning of “He knows” and of “He is pow-
erful;” that He is bountiful, that He is peace – that is, pure good, that He is 
loved for Himself, that He is true enjoyment, and that true beauty [resides] 
12 Ibn Sīnā, A. I. ‛A. 1984.
13 Ibid., 143–145. Ibn Sīnā calls the lute here barba ṭ as well as ‛ūd. Farmer has shown that Al-
Kindī was the first to take over the Pythagorean system for lute playing. Al-Fārābī and Ibn 
Sīnā followed him. See Farmer 1937, 245–257.
14 For both of them, the effect that music has on human beings is of great importance. In con-
trast, authors like Al-Kindī and the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ rather focus on the things that music is 
thought to represent, namely the music of the spheres. The latter’s conception of this is an 
application of Neoplatonic and Pythagorean ideas on music. See Leaman 2004, 105–109. For 
a detailed discussion of why Ibn Sīnā’s approach contains a rejection of the Pythagorean 
understanding of music see Shehadi 1989, 217–227.
15 Avicenna 2005, III, 1.10 = 73.
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with Him. We will then strip away the opinions stated and thought of Him 
that are contrary to the truth.16
The inference presents itself here that the major mistake of the Pythagoreans, in 
the end, consists in having the wrong conception of the divine and of being.
Ibn Sīnā’s line of reasoning becomes clearer when, in addition to his criticism 
in Chapter 2 of Book VII, one also considers his criticism in Chapter 3 of the same 
book. Here he discusses in detail the problem of whether mathematical objects 
devoid of matter can exist. He points out that mathematical objects can clearly be 
abstracted from a specific kind of matter. Nonetheless they can never be conceived 
of as completely devoid of matter. Especially concepts like unity or plurality can 
be separated from matter, but they are still to be thought of conceptually as being 
connected with matter, even though they are not conjoined with any matter in 
particular. Thus, in the case of mathematical objects, the abstraction from matter 
can never be total. For things to be considered as subjects of metaphysics, howev-
er, they must be completely abstracted. Mathematical objects, therefore, cannot 
be the subject of metaphysics, such as are, for example, the mind, pure existence 
or, most of all, God. Furthermore, numbers cannot constitute the forms of materi-
ally existing things. The most problematic conception, again, is the one or unity. 
The mistake of the Pythagoreans in this context is an erroneous concept of unity 
that considers unities to be the principles of measures or dimensions. As Ibn Sīnā 
writes: “Another [group of] people made postulated unity as hyle for number; 
another group made it as form because [unity] is predicated of everything. One 
is astonished by the Pythagoreans when they made the indivisible unities the 
principles of measures, knowing [full well] that measures regress in indivisibility 
ad infinitum.”17 As in the previous chapter, the criticism here revolves around a 
misunderstanding of the idea of one and unity. The ultimate aim of Ibn Sīnā’s ar-
gumentation becomes evident in the closing paragraphs of the chapter, where he 
points out that his criticism mainly targets the conception that the existing world 
originated from numbers: “Some people among them made the things [that exist] 
to be generated from a number that corresponds with a quality and exists with 
it.”18
Ibn Sīnā’s account in these chapters appears to want to refute a grounding of 
metaphysics in mathematics and thus draw a clear distinction between math-
ematical and metaphysical knowledge. The Pythagoreans as much as the Pla-
tonists are to be blamed for a false conception of mathematics which wants to be 
metaphysics. His criticism is thus clearly directed at the so-called number phi-
losophy. As a result, Ibn Sīnā appears to stand in the Aristotelian critical tradi-
tion with regard to Pythagorean number philosophy as it is laid out in numerous 
16 Ibid., I, 4.7 = 21.
17 Ibid., VII, 3.15 = 254.
18 Ibid., VII, 3.24 = 256.
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works like the Physics, De caelo, or Metaphysics.19 Ibn Sīnā combines this criticism 
with a monotheistic perspective. His primary reason for rejecting the accounts 
mentioned is their conception of one and unity, which appears to be incompat-
ible with a monotheistic God, who is understood as the First Principle. Given 
the metaphysically and religiously grounded criticism of Pythagorean number 
philosophy in the work of Ibn Sīnā, it is therefore not surprising that Al-Ghazālī 
expresses appreciation for Ibn Sīnā in the very same book in which he criticizes 
Pythagoras, namely in the al-Munqidh min al- ̣dalāl.
Pythagoras in Al-Ghazālī’s Al-Munqidh min al- ̣dalāl
As mentioned above, Al-Ghazālī undertakes a major critique of Pythagoreanism 
in his book al-Munqidh min al- ̣dalāl20 (usually translated as Deliverance from Error). 
This book was probably written in 1105 and 1106, a period of his life when he 
had already left his academic post in Baghdad, completed his turn to Sufism, 
and returned to his hometown Tus after a long journey. It is an autobiographical 
work in which Al-Ghazālī reports on his life and his inner development. The 
main aim is to describe the path that needs to be taken to be cognizant of the 
truth. To describe what he is looking for, Al-Ghazālī uses the words “sure and 
certain knowledge.”21 To this end, he describes different ways of cognition and 
their epistemological status. The first way of gaining the insights that he discuss-
es is sensory perception. Here, he mainly focuses on the visual faculty, showing 
its capacities and limits in a way that recalls Aristotle’s approach in De Anima. 
The second way of gaining this knowledge is through the reasoning faculty – 
although for Al-Ghazālī the insights of reason do not lead to completely reliable 
knowledge. The last and most effective way of gaining this knowledge is through 
the non-mediated, intuitive knowledge of God. Al-Ghazālī also calls this kind 
of knowledge, which is given to man by God out of his mercy, “light.” It is pre-
cisely this light which allows the special insights that Al-Ghazālī has in mind. 
He writes, “From that light must be sought an intuitive understanding of things 
Divine.”22 The metaphysics of light that he describes here is more clearly laid out 
in his book Mishkāt al-anwār (usually translated as Niche of the Lights).23 It is in this 
book that his ideas about the inner senses, imagination, intuition, and prophetic 
insight are most vividly presented. Despite his criticism, the deliberations in this 
book also reflect Al-Ghazālī’s indebtedness to the Neoplatonic Aristotelian epis-
temological tradition, in which Ibn Sīnā also stands.
19 For Aristotle’s critique of the number philosophy in the mentioned works, see Zhmud 2012, 
399–414. 
20 For quotations from the Arabic original, I refer to the edition of Saliba and ’Ayyad. Al-
Ghazālī 1967, al-Munqidh min al- ̣dalāl (Deliverance from Error). For the English translation, I 
rely on the following edition: Watt 1967.
21 Watt 1967, 21.
22 Ibid., 26.
23 Al-Ghazālī 1964, Mishkāt al-anwār.
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In the course of his discussion in al-Munqidh min al- ̣dalāl, Al-Ghazālī also tries 
to assess major schools of thinking that were prevalent during his lifetime. He 
discusses in the second part of the book the doctrines and ideas of different 
thinkers of his day under the heading of “classes of seekers.” He accordingly dif-
ferentiates between four different classes: the theologians (or Mutakallimūn), the 
philosophers, the Bā ̣tinīya, and the Sufis (or mystics). The teachings of the Bā ̣tinīya 
or Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ / Brethren of Purity24 receive the greatest criticism in this context. 
As regards Pythagoreanism, this criticism is of particular interest, because Al-
Ghazālī rightly considers the Bā ̣tinīya to be followers of Pythagoreanism.25 The 
Pythagorean philosophy itself is considered in this context to be the weakest pos-
sible form of ancient Greek philosophy. Al-Ghazālī offers the following appraisal: 
But this knowledge, as they describe it, amounts to some trifling details of 
the philosophy of Pythagoras. The latter was one of the earliest of the an-
cients and his philosophical system is the weakest of all; Aristotle not only 
criticized him but showed the weakness and corruption of his thought. Yet 
he is the person followed in the Book of the Brethren of Purity, which is 
really but the dregs of philosophy.26
This hierarchization of thought leaves rather few doubts about how Al-Ghazālī 
ranks the value of Pythagorean philosophy. The thinking of the Bā ̣tinīya is to a 
great extent the wrong approach towards truth, because it is based on Pythago-
ras’ erroneous philosophical ideas. Interestingly, Aristotle is here taken to pro-
vide reliable testimony against Pythagoras. Al-Ghazālī’s criticism in this instance 
is based upon the sharp distinction he had laid out earlier in the book between 
different ancient Greek philosophical schools. He clarifies that not all of these 
schools are erroneous in the same way or to the same extent. Nonetheless, he 
clearly assigns Pythagoreanism the lowest possible rank. This becomes even 
more prominent if we also take into account the description and classification 
of philosophers and philosophies that Al-Ghazālī has provided in the preceding 
chapter. A closer look at this classification makes it impossible to claim “that Py-
thagoreanism and Ibn Sinā’s Peripatetic philosophy came under severe criticism 
by Al-Gazzālī.”27 This would suggest that his criticism would in both instances be 
as harsh and directed towards the same problems, but it is clear, to the contrary, 
that his criticism of Pythagoras is both stronger and more fundamental. 
24 There is debate on whether the term ṣafā’ should be translated as purity or sincerity. De 
Callataÿ explains that the name primarily aims to express and underline “true friendship, 
unflinching loyalty.” De Callataÿ 2005, 3. For a general introduction to the thinking of the 
Brethren of Purity see also, Netton 2002.
25 The Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ actually were followers of Pythagoreanism in many aspects. One of their 
Epistles (Epistle 32 “On the intellectual principles of the existing beings according to the 
Pythagoreans”) entirely focuses on Pythagorean thinking. See De Callataÿ 2005, 13, 18 and 
24. See also Netton 2002, 9–10.
26 Watt 1967, 53.
27 Bakar 1998, 182.  
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In Al-Ghazālī’s chapter on philosophers, he distinguishes between three dif-
ferent classes of philosophers: materialists, naturalists, and theists. He considers 
only the thinking of the philosophers of the last class as also containing positive 
and meaningful insights. As representatives of this class, he explicitly cites Soc-
rates, Plato, and Aristotle. The latter receives praise for his systematic approach: 
“It was Aristotle who systematized logic for them and organized the sciences, 
securing a higher degree of accuracy and bringing them to maturity.”28 Besides 
this obvious approval, Al-Ghazālī points out that Aristotelian philosophy still 
contains some unbelief and heresy and that this is also true of its Islamic pro-
ponents. Nevertheless, he considers Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā to be the most com-
mendable exponents of Aristotelianism because of their way of dealing with it. 
He underlines this by saying: 
[…] Ibn Sīna, al-Fārābī and others; in transmitting the philosophy of Aristo-
tle, however, none of the Islamic philosophers has accomplished anything 
comparable to the achievements of the two men named. The translations 
of others are marked by disorder and confusion, which so perplex the un-
derstanding of the student that he fails to comprehend; and if a thing is not 
comprehended how can it be either refuted or accepted?29
Thus, Al-Ghazālī clearly recognizes a hierarchy of philosophical ideas and their 
proponents. Aristotle and his Islamic advocates receive the highest rank in his 
order. To examine the philosophical schools, he introduces three different catego-
ries for the evaluation of their ideas. He considers their conceptions to be either 
undeniably truthful, heretical, or evidence of unbelief. His listing and evaluation 
of six philosophical sciences clearly indicates which parts of the philosophical 
tradition he considers to be the most reliable. Mathematics and logic receive his 
praise. The term he uses for mathematics is Riyā ̣da,30 which, as explained above, is 
the usual Arabic term for mathematics. His description of mathematics, further, 
makes clear that his approach to it would leave no room for number philosophy:
[Mathematics] embraces arithmetic, plane geometry and solid geometry. 
None of its results are connected with religious matters, either to deny or 
to affirm them. They are matters of demonstration which it is impossible 
to deny once they have been understood and apprehended. […] A grievous 
crime indeed against religion has been committed by the man, who imag-
ines that Islam is defended by the denial of the mathematical sciences, 
seeing that there is nothing in revealed truth opposed to these sciences 
by way of either negation or affirmation, and nothing in these sciences 
opposed to the truth of religion.31
28 Watt 1967, 32.
29 Ibid.
30 Al-Ghazālī 1967, 79.
31 Watt 1967, 33.
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However, Al-Ghazālī considers mathematics to be problematic if it leads to an 
inconsiderate appraisal of all kinds of philosophy that does not reflect upon its 
possible failures and dangers.
Al-Ghazālī appears rather indifferent to political philosophy. He finds most 
problematic Aristotelian metaphysics and, to some degree, natural philosophy 
and ethics. In his criticism of this kind of metaphysics, he refers to his own ear-
lier work Tahāfut al-falāsifa and repeats the major points of criticism made there. 
His main bone of contention with Peripatetic metaphysics is its denial of bodily 
resurrection and bodily rewards and punishments in the hereafter, along with 
the claim of the eternity of the world and God’s ignorance of particulars. Be-
yond this, its theory of divine attributes appears erroneous to him. Nevertheless, 
Al-Ghazālī explicitly points out that, “(t)he views of Aristotle, as expounded by 
Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīna, are close to the Islamic writers.”32 Thus, despite his objec-
tions to particular claims of the Neoplatonic Aristotelian Falāsifa, Al-Ghazālī is 
willing to admit that their metaphysics in nuce could at least be considered Islam-
ic and thus truthful. This is not the case, however, when Al-Ghazālī describes the 
metaphysics of the Bā ̣tinīya as followers of Pythagoras.
He criticizes followers of the Bā ̣tinīya, also called Taʽ līmīya by Al-Ghazālī,33 for 
their conception of “Authoritative Instruction.” At the heart of his criticism is the 
teaching of this group that one hidden infallible imam or instructor (Taʽ līm) has 
access to the absolute truth.34 Al-Ghazālī agrees with this point insofar as he em-
phasizes that there is indeed one infallible instructor. This is not a hidden imam, 
however, but the prophet Mu ̣hammad himself. After his death and his perfection 
of religion, there was no need or space for another infallible instructor. A further 
point of criticism concerns the restrictive attitude of the Bā ̣tinīya towards the con-
cept of independent judgment or interpretation (ijtihād). In addition, Al-Ghazālī 
complains that this group of thinkers spend their lifetimes searching for this 
infallible instructor and his knowledge, while they themselves remain without 
any concrete knowledge. The only kind of knowledge to which they explicitly 
refer, according to Al-Ghazālī, is the teachings of Pythagoras. He denounces this, 
however, in the way already described above. The recourse to Pythagoreanism 
thus cannot lead to Al-Ghazālī’s desired certain knowledge. Unfortunately, he 
fails in his account to explain unambiguously in what way Pythagorean philos-
ophy is erroneous. We may presume that this was because it suffers from a false 
epistemology and a false metaphysics that do not lead to truth and insight to the 
32 Ibid., 37.
33 Al-Ghazālī 1967, 91.
34 Al-Ghazālī had already composed a critical book about the Bā ṭinīya during his time in 
Baghdad. The Caliph Mustazhir had around 1092 commanded him to write a confutation 
of this group. The title of this earlier book was al-Musta ̣zhiri or Fadaʼih al-Batiniyya wa fadaʼil 
al-mutazhiriyya (Infamies of the Esoterics and the Renown of the Exoterics). In response to 
the book he was accused of restating, systematizing, and by that defending the ideas of the 
Bā ṭinīya by orthodox Sunni theologians, as he himself reports in Al-Munqidh min al- ḍalāl. 
See Watt 1967, 44.
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divine, but Al-Ghazālī himself does not point this out. He also does not explicitly 
mention Pythagorean number philosophy, as Ibn Sīnā had done.
Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ghazālī, and the Pythagorean way of life
Neither Ibn Sīnā nor Al-Ghazālī addresses in his account the question of evalu-
ating the practical religious teachings of the Pythagoreans or the Pythagorean 
way of life. One can only speculate on possible reasons for this, though it is most 
probably attributable to the fact that both authors express the conviction in their 
works that the concrete rules of life should be based on the prophetic revelation 
and associated divine sources. There is therefore no real need for either author 
to provide a philosophically grounded ethics or prescriptions for life that are not 
based on religious teachings. This argument is supported by a closer look at the 
relevant passages of the books discussed here, namely the Ilāhiyyāt and al-Mun-
qidh min al- ̣dalāl.
Ibn Sīnā devotes the last book of his Ilāhiyyāt to the question of prophecy and 
revelation. He focuses on practical philosophy only in this Book X, where his 
ideas include deliberations about politics, household management, and ethics. 
Given the fact that the whole project of the Al-Shifā’ consists of twenty-two vol-
umes and only contains this small section on practical philosophy at the very end 
of the Ilāhiyyāt, it is evident that ethics was not one of Ibn Sīnā’s major philosoph-
ical concerns.35 In the relevant passage at the end of the Ilāhiyyāt, Ibn Sīnā clearly 
ascribes the role of lawgiving to the prophet Mu ḥammad:
It follows necessarily, then, that the Prophet (may God’s prayers and peace 
be upon him) must plan with great care to ensure the preservation of what 
he prescribes and legislates in matters pertaining to human welfare. With-
out doubt, the fundamental principle in this is that men must continue in 
their knowledge of God and the resurrection and that the cause for forget-
ting these things with the passage of the century succeeding [the mission 
of] the Prophet [may God’s prayers and peace be upon him) must be abso-
lutely eliminated. Hence, there must be certain acts and works incumbent 
on people that the legislator must prescribe to be repeated at proximate 
intervals, so that the time in which [the act] is enacted would be close to 
the one that succeeds it.36
This statement is followed by descriptions of the instructions for prayer and the 
administration of the state and private life, such as the marriage laws given by 
the Prophet. These passages appear to offer a philosophical legitimation of Sharī‛a 
and suggest unequivocally that there was no room for prescriptions for living 
35 Nevertheless, he appears to have written a short treatise on ethics independently. See Karli-
ga 2002, 21–35.
36 Avicenna 2005, X, 3.1 = 367. 
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that are not based on Sharī‛a. He thus clearly considers the revealed text to be a 
sufficient source of rules for life in the form of prescriptions and prohibitions.37
In contrast, Al-Ghazālī concerned himself with religiously grounded ethics in 
many of his writings, focusing on right conduct, development of a good character, 
and improvement of the soul.38 In his al-Munqidh min al- ̣dalāl he also concentrates 
on philosophical ethics. As discussed above, Al-Ghazālī criticizes philosophy in 
one chapter, discussing in particular the related philosophical sciences. Ethics, 
one of the six philosophical sciences he addresses, is not dismissed entirely. How-
ever, he considers the ancient philosophers to have adopted divine insights that 
had been received by religious mystics. In this way, philosophical ethics origi-
nated in the teachings of the mystics. Furthermore, Al-Ghazālī distinguishes be-
tween two different ways of dealing with philosophical ethics. The first receives 
his praise, as long as it is compatible with Sharī‛a. He remarks as follows:
Suppose, however, that the statements are found only in the philosophers’ 
books. If they are reasonable in themselves and supported by proof, and if 
they do not contradict the Book and the Sunnah (the example of Muham-
mad), then it is not necessary to abstain from using them. If we open this 
door, if we adopt the attitude of abstaining from every truth that the mind 
of a heretic has apprehended before us, we should be obliged to abstain 
from much that is true.39
Al-Ghazālī goes even further here, recommending the closer examination of 
philosophical ethics to identify any divine truth comprised in them, even in the 
case of thinkers whose other theories prove to be false. He qualifies this recom-
mendation, however, by explaining that the acceptance of a truthful ethical idea 
from the work of a heretical thinker must not lead to the erroneous acceptance 
of his whole work. In the case of this particular danger, he recommends in pref-
erence a complete abstention from reading. The only work that he specifically 
mentions as a danger in this context is the book of the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’.40 With this 
remark, he rejects even the possibility of examining their prescriptions for life, 
be they influenced by Pythagoreanism or not. Nonetheless, given the fact that Al-
Ghazālī in the same work considers this group to be followers of Pythagoreanism 
and sees Pythagoreanism as the worst form of false philosophy, it would appear 
that a Pythagorean way of life does not come into consideration at all for him.
37 Strohmaier expresses in his book a similar idea about the absence of an ethics in the work of 
Ibn Sīnā by saying: “[Die Ethik] bleibt damit eine Domäne der Scharia und kommt bei [Ibn 
Sīnā] nur am Rande und im Kontext der Seelenlehre und der Metaphysik vor.” Strohmaier 
2006, 108. 
38 For a depiction of Al-Ghazālī’s ethical approach see Hourani 2007, 135–166. Sherif 1975.
39 Watt 1967, 41.
40 Ibid., 42.
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Against the backdrop of these convictions of Ibn Sīnā and Al-Ghazālī, the ab-
sence of a discussion or concrete examination of Pythagorean rules of life is quite 
comprehensible.
Conclusion
Ibn Sīnā and Al-Ghazālī in the books we have examined follow an Aristotelian 
approach to Pythagoreanism. This is less surprising in the case of Ibn Sīnā, who 
can generally be deemed a representative of a Neoplatonic Aristotelianism. What 
clearly unites their criticisms is their skepticism towards Pythagorean metaphys-
ics. Both authors are convinced that no insights can be gained into the divine 
knowledge via the Pythagorean approach. Ibn Sīnā explains much more explicitly 
in his account the reasons for his rejection of Pythagoreanism, which he contends 
is based on erroneous mathematics that communicates a false understanding of 
unity and consequently arrives at a wrong conception of God. Al-Ghazālī was 
clearly familiar with Ibn Sīnā’s account, a familiarity also attested by Al-Ghazālī’s 
earlier work Tahāfut al-falāsifa. Especially telling is the explicit statement that Ibn 
Sīnā and Al-Fārābī, as interpreters of Aristotle, rank among of the highest of all 
philosophers and come closest to genuine Islamic thinkers in their approaches. 
Despite Al-Ghazālī’s criticism, this indicates his particularly strong appreciation 
for Ibn Sīnā. It is also significant that he points out that especially their accounts 
of logic and mathematics are correct. Given that Al-Ghazālī was well acquainted 
with Ibn Sīnā’s works, this suggests that he agrees with Ibn Sīnā’s criticism of Pla-
tonic and Pythagorean mathematics and metaphysics in Book VII of the Ilāhiyyāt. 
This, in turn, could offer an explanation for the fact that he felt no further need 
to point out the ways in which Pythagoreanism is erroneous, for he adopted the 
Aristotelian criticism. This is supported by the quotation mentioned above, in 
which Aristotle functions as witness against Pythagoras. The Aristotelian crit-
icism he refers to, however, is the Avicennian perspective on Pythagoras with 
which Al-Ghazālī was familiar from the Ilāhiyyāt. This is astonishing given that 
Al-Ghazālī usually represents himself as an author who is rather critical of Aris-
totelianism, as is also borne out in the work examined here.
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Marsilio Ficino and Plato’s Divided Line:  
Iamblichus and Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha  
in the Renaissance
Denis Robichaud – University of Notre Dame
More than any of his contemporaries Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) is responsible 
for shaping the reception of Plato and Platonism in the Renaissance and early 
modern Europe. In addition to distinguishing himself as a philosopher in his 
own right with such works as his eighteen-volume Platonic Theology, Ficino is 
known primarily as the translator and interpreter of the first complete and ac-
curate Latin translations of Plato and Plotinus. Ficino also earned his reputation 
by translating the Corpus Hermeticum and numerous other, largely Neoplatonic 
works (at times as paraphrastic exegeses or partial translations), which would 
find their way into his 1497 (Venice) edition of Iamblichus’ De mysteriis.1 Christo-
pher Celenza has demonstrated that Ficino’s circulation of the Pythagorean Aurea 
verba and Symbola enhanced both his and Pythagoras’s influence and spawned a 
series of imitative approaches towards Pythagorean thaumaturgy and soteriolo-
gy in the Renaissance.2 Michael Allen has also shed light on Ficino’s employment 
of Pythagorean mathematics and harmonic theories.3 Allen’s and Celenza’s read-
ings begin to correct the previous neglect by modern scholars of the Pythagore-
an dimension of Ficino’s work. In fact, Pythagoreanism is much more central to 
Ficino’s early philosophical development than has hitherto been noted. Besides 
the above translations, Ficino also translated Theon of Smyrna’s Mathematica and 
Iamblichus’ De secta pythagorica.4 His translations of De secta pythagorica and the 
1 Iamblichus 1497, includes the following translations: Iamblichus, De mysteriis; Porphyry, De 
Abstinentia and the Sententiae; Proclus, De sacrificio et magia, his commentary on the First Al-
cibiades, and brief portions of his commentary on the Republic; Synesius, De insomniis; Psellus, 
De daemonibus; Priscian of Lydia’s commentary on Theophrastus’ De sensu, phantasia, et intel-
lectu; Alcinous, Liber de doctrina platonis; Xenocrates’, De morte; Speusippus’, Liber de platonis 
definitionibus; as well as the Pythagorean Aurea verba and Symbola.
2 Celenza 1999, 667–711; Celenza 2001, 15–52.
3 Allen 1982, 171–192; Allen 1994; Allen 2014, 435–453.
4 Kristeller also identified Ficino’s translation of Hermias’ commentary on the Phaedrus. See 
Kristeller 1937–45, 1: cxlv–cxlvii. I have documented fragments of Ficino’s translations of 
Proclus’ Elements of Theology, and have documented the evidence for Ficino’s lost transla-
tions of Proclus’ Elements of Theology and Physics: Robichaud 2016. I am adopting Ficino’s 
title of the work, which is the translation of the Greek title that he found in the pinax to 
MS. Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 86.03. Three Greek titles are given by 
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Mathematica, which I am presently editing, have never been printed, nor been the 
subject of extensive scholarly study. In fact, they were long thought lost before 
Paul O. Kristeller located their manuscripts. Despite their rediscovery the most 
recent editions, translations, and studies of Iamblichus’ and Theon’s works ignore 
their existence altogether.5 More generally, with the exception of Sicherl’s early 
and important work, the significant influence of Iamblichus on Ficino’s thought 
and the Renaissance overall is only now beginning to be studied.6
Ficino inherited a late ancient habit of organizing the history of philosophy, 
religion, and thought in terms of a spiritual diadoche or succession. This type of 
understanding of the historical transmission of knowledge is not a purely abstract 
history of a doctrine or idea. It is a habit of mind that requires actual persons to 
serve as spokespersons for the logoi connecting one generation to the next. For ex-
ample, a common feature shared by the traditions of ancient Orphism and Pythag-
oreanism is the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. In his De secta pythagorica 
Iamblichus expresses this commonality in terms of Pythagoras’ life and personal 
connection to the shadowy figure of Aglaophamus, who supposedly initiated Py-
thagoras into the Orphic mysteries.7 Pythagoras then transmitted the knowledge 
of the immortality of the soul to his own disciples who, in turn, taught this doc-
trine to Plato. Thus Ficino’s prisca theologia is organized according to prosopopoeic 
reasoning, whereby, in his classic formulation of this lineage of ancient theolo-
gians, Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, and Plato become 
spokespersons for a single emanative religious spirit. Ficino utilized numerous 
sources to construct his prisca theologia, including Proclus’ Platonic Theology 1.5 for 
example, but it is the Iamblichean connections that are of present interest. Con-
tinuing down the genealogy, it is not only Pythagoras’ personal initiation into 
the Orphic adytum by Aglaophamus that presents problems of pseudonymity: the 
transition from Pythagoras to Plato raises equally interesting questions, for which 
Ficino again seeks answers in Iamblichus’ De secta Pythagorica. 
I have recently argued that the prosopopoeic nature of Ficino’s exegesis of the 
Platonic corpus helps us understand Ficino’s grasp of the dialogic nature of the 
corpus as well as Plato’s place in philosophical genealogies. The way in which 
Ficino approaches the Pythagorizing Plato is no exception. Plato, we are told, im-
itates and follows them in the Timaeus, in which he wears a Pythagorean persona. 
While the division of philosophy into the Pythagorean, Socratic, and Platonic was 
already present in Antiquity, e. g. in Numenius, Cicero, Augustine, and Proclus, 
Ficino uses the triadic division to form his prosopopoeic interpretation of the 
the manuscript tradition: Περὶ τῆς πυθαγορικῆς αἱρέσεως, ἡ τῶν πυθαγορείων δογμάτων 
συναγωγή, Πυθαγόρει ὑπομνήματα.
5 See for instance, Napolitano Valditara 2000, 45–46; Iamblichus 2006; Theon of Smyrna 2010.
6 Sicherl 1957; Copenhaver 1987, 441–455; Celenza 2002, 71–97; Saffrey / Segonds 2006, 117–124; 
Toussaint’s introduction to the facsimile: Iamblichus 1497, i–xvii; Giglioni 2012, 3–36; Robi-
chaud 2017.
7 Lobeck 1829, 723.
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Platonic corpus itself.8 He identifies moments in the corpus where Plato speaks in 
the persona of Socrates, other occasions in the personae of Pythagoreans, and fi-
nally in the Laws and the Epinomis, where Plato addresses his audience in his own 
voice under the pseudonymous name of the Athenian Stranger, as well as in the 
Letters, where Plato abandons the dialogic form.9 Plato, for Ficino, played the role 
of Janus for later Greeks since his writings were fundamentally expressing the 
philosophy of two great predecessors who chose to communicate their thought 
orally: Pythagoras and Socrates. Yet the Renaissance philosopher believed that 
Plato also had Pythagorean books to help him in his work.
Ficino, for instance, drew on Proclus’ In Timaeum to claim that Plato wrote the 
Timaeus in a Pythagorean persona: “Just as in the Parmenides Plato expresses with 
great talent all genera of the divine, so in the Timaeus all of nature is encompassed, 
and in both of these works he is mostly a Pythagorean, arguing under a Pythago-
rean persona (or mask). Indeed in the Parmenides he imitates (imitatur) Parmenides 
and Zeno, Eleatic Pythagoreans who wrote about the divine, but in the Timaeus 
he follows (sequitur) Timaeus of Locri – a Pythagorean who wrote a book about 
the nature of the universe. However, he not only adds eloquence to them, but 
also mysteries.”10 Two marginal notes in Ficino’s hand in a Florentine manuscript 
of Proclus’ In Timaeum confirm where he found his inspiration. Next to Proclus’ 
opening paragraph (In Tim. 1.1.1–15) describing the Timaeus’ skopos (the study 
of nature as a whole) and how a certain sillographer, Timon of Phlius (c. 320–
230 BC), claimed that Plato took the material for his dialogue from the Pythag-
orean Timaeus’ Περὶ Φύσεως, Ficino writes simply: “the subject is on universal 
nature just as Timaeus the Pythagorean.”11 A few folios later, where Proclus takes 
up the question of the dialogue’s form and character (In Tim. 1.1.7.17–8.29), saying 
that once Plato had the Pythagorean Timaeus’ book he undertook to write his 
Timaeus in the guise of the Pythagoreans (τὸν τῶν Πυθαγορείων τρόπον), Ficino 
is prompted to jot down: “The style of Plato is partially of the Socratic kind and 
partially Pythagorean. He treats natural things divinely – Aristotle, however, is 
contrary [to this approach] – Nature is something divine, therefore, this book on 
nature mixes the divine with the natural.”12 Thus Ficino also read of stories and 
rumours of Plato’s supposed plagiarism in Diogenes Laertius and various other 
sources.13 Of notable importance to Ficino was the account that he supposedly 
received the “Pythagorean books” of Philolaus.14 In fact Proclus only speaks of a 
 8 Robichaud 2014, 87–114.
 9 Ibid., 87–114.
10 Ficino 1576 = Fic. Op. 1438.
11 “Subiectum de universa natura sicut Timaeus Pythagoricus” MS. Florence, Biblioteca Ric-
cardiana, 24 f.1r.
12 “Stilus Platonis qualis, partim sed Pythagoricus partim Socraticus. Tractat naturalia divine. 
Aristoteles autem contra. Natura est non nihil divinum. Ergo hic liber de natura miscet divi-
num cum naturali.” MS. Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 24, f.3v.
13 See recently Brisson 2000, 25–41.
14 Riginos 1976, 165–174; Burkert 1972, 218–298; Brisson 2000, 33–34.
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certain Pythagorean Timaeus’ On Nature. Ficino probably could have concluded 
on his own that Timaeus of Locri is intended, but he also read the explicit identi-
fication in Iamblichus’ De secta pythagorica, where he compares Timaeus 31c–32a to 
a passage from Timaeus of Locri: “And even before Plato the Pythagoreans made 
the same distinctions on this topic. In fact Timaeus of Locri in his On the nature 
of the cosmos and the soul (from which, they say, Plato had been supplied with ma-
terial and wrote the work that received the name Timaeus on account of this; one 
of those who report this is Timon the composer of the satirical poems who says 
that ‘Plato bartered a large sum of money for the little book, thence undertook 
to work on the Timaeus’) somehow says this…”15 If Ficino reasons that Plato had 
these books to help him compose the Parmenides and the Timaeus, he also believes 
that he had other specific works to help him express the Republic through a Py-
thagorean persona.
We know from the anonymous prolegomenon to Plato that Iamblichus (and 
Proclus after him) did not include the Republic in the cycle of Plato’s dialogues 
that he taught in his school at Apamea.16 On these grounds some scholars assume 
that Iamblichus paid no attention to Plato’s great dialogue since they believe that 
he and other Neoplatonists took no interest in the Athenian’s political works. Yet 
Dominic O’Meara has argued that in the De secta pythagorica there are a number 
of references that imply that Iamblichus did in fact study the Republic attentively 
and concluded that it is a “Pythagorean document.”17 In Ficino’s case, it has been 
correctly observed that one reason why Ficino thinks of the Republic as Pythag-
orean is that the dialogue’s arguments on communal property agree with the 
Pythagorean precept that “among friends all things are held in common,” which 
are also the closing words of the Phaedrus and is an opinion that Ficino believes 
is retracted in the Laws – a work, to repeat, which he claims expresses Plato’s 
own voice.18 However, Ficino also specifically turned to Iamblichus’ De communi 
mathematica scientia, the third book of the De secta pythagorica, to find Plato’s Py-
thagorean sources for the Republic.
The De secta pythagorica apparently once contained ten volumes. Of these only 
the first four, which Ficino translates, are extant. Volumes five, six, and seven 
were known and quoted by the Byzantine savant Michael Psellus (c. 1017–1078) 
but have not come down to us otherwise. Although we do have a text entitled On 
Arithmetic in Theological Matters, as O’Meara has demonstrated, it is almost cer-
tainly not the workof Iamblichus but a compilation of various tracts. The remain-
ing three volumes of the De secta pythagorica are missing.19 The work has a specific 
programmatic structure. It begins with the On the Pythagorean Life, which serves 
as a model for the exemplary and even miraculous life of the philosopher and his 
15 Iamb. in Nic. 1894, 105.10–17.
16 Westerink et al. 1990, lviii–lxvii. 
17 O’Meara 1999, 197; See also O’Meara 2003.
18 Celenza 1999, 687–689; See also Allen 1982, 174–175.
19 Allen 1989, 30–105; 217–229.
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sect and followers. The Protrepticus comes next. Through it the reader’s soul is 
supposedly turned towards the study of philosophy, the moment of ἐπιστροφή 
when the prisoners in the cave turn their heads, so to speak. Thereafter the read-
er studies the principles of mathematics in the De communi mathematica scientia, 
before turning towards the specific mathematical disciplines of arithmetic, ge-
ometry, music, and astronomy. There is therefore, I believe, an analogical corre-
spondence with the formal structure of Books 4–10 of the De secta pythagorica and 
the disciplinary cursus of Book 7 of the Republic. If one follows the logic of this 
analogy, the De communi mathematica scientia (book 3 of De secta pythagorica) cor-
responds to Book 6 of the Republic, since both introduce the cursus of disciplines 
in book 7. It is therefore for significant reasons that Iamblichus there introduces a 
discussion of the divided line from Book 6 of the Republic. 
The subject matter of the De communi mathematica scientia is not the individual 
branches of science (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy) but mathemat-
ics as such, that is the mathematical principles (ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὅλων μαθημάτων) of 
all discursive reasoning employed by individual mathematical disciplines.20 Ac-
cordingly it is dedicated to the metaphysical principles that ground epistemologi-
cal judgments. In the eighth chapter of the work Iamblichus analyses the criterion 
(κριτήριον) for mathematical judgments, and argues that discursive reasoning 
functions according to the differences (διαφοράς) produced by the divisions 
of reason’s methods of aphaeresis and division (ἀπο διαιρέσεως).21 Iamblichus 
thereafter quotes two Pythagorean pseudepigraphic texts. The first is attributed 
to Brotinus’ book On the Intellect and Discursive Reasoning (Περὶ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας), 
which provides an account of the mathematical analogy of the divided line made 
famous at Republic 509d7 (although the fragment does not mention it explicitly): 
“And on account of which Brotinus in his book On the Intellect and Discursive Rea-
son dividing them [the levels of knowledge] from one another says the following: 
‘discursive reason is more (μεῖζόν) than the intellect, and the object of discursive 
reasoning is more than the intelligible. For the intellect is simple and not compos-
ite, and is the first thinking and the first thought (but this is the idea; for it is in-
divisible and not composite and first before the others), but discursive reasoning 
is manifold and divisible, and is the second thinking (for it has received science 
and reason); and proportionately the objects of discursive reasoning, which are 
the things known, demonstrated, and universal, are received from the intellect 
and through reason.’”22 Brotinus’ pseudepigraphon argues that the line is divid-
ed into unequal segments and that the larger portion of the line corresponds to 
discursive reasoning (διάνοια), whereas the smaller identifies the intellect (νόος). 
Analogously, according to the same ratio the larger segment also corresponds to 
20 On Iamblichus’ De communi mathematica scientia see O’Meara 1989, 44–51; 157–166; Roma-
no 1995; Romano 2000, 1–13; Bechtle 2000, 15–44; Napolitano Valditara 2000, 45–69; Brisson 
2012, 37–49; and Merlan 1960.
21 Iamb. Comm. Math. 32.8–12.
22 Iamb. Comm. Math. 34.20–35.6. Thesleff 1965, 55.
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the objects of discursive reasoning (διανοατά) and the smaller to the intelligible 
objects of thought (νοητά). 
The second pseudepigraphon of importance to the present inquiry that is 
quoted by Iamblichus is one of Archytas’: 
But Archytas in his On the Intellect and Sense Perception (Περὶ νοῦ καὶ 
αἰσθήσεως) distinguishes still more clearly the criteria of beings, and es-
tablishes the criterion (κριτήριον) corresponding to mathematics with the 
following: “In our very selves, he says, with respect to our soul there are 
four kinds of knowledge, intellect, science, opinion, and sense perception, 
two of which are the origins of reasoning, namely intellect and sense per-
ception, but two are at the end, namely science and opinion… For just like 
a line divided in two equal (ἴσα) segments, with each segment again divid-
ed according to the same ratio, thus also one divides the intelligible from 
the visible, and again one divides in this way each of these segments to 
differentiate one another with respect to clearness and obscurity.”23
This corroborates Brotinus’ analogy of faculties of discursive reasoning and intel-
lect with their matching objects, but it also unfolds the two lower analogous levels 
of belief (δόξα) and sense perception (αἴσθησις) and their corresponding meta-
physical realities, namely objects of perception and belief (αἰσθητά; δοξαστά), 
and likenesses or images (εἰκασία). However, Archytas’ pseudepigraphon not 
only differs from Brotinus by explicitly mentioning the divided line (γραμμὰν 
δίχα τετμαμένην) and postulating that the segments are divided in equal ratios, 
it also utilizes the same terminology of clarity and obscurity (σαφηνείᾳ τε καὶ 
ἀσαφείᾳ) from Republic 509d7. The two pseudepigrapha, in effect, establish a Mid-
dle and / or Neoplatonic schema for interpreting Plato’s divided line but project 
it into the past. 
Based on a comparative analysis of Ficino’s translation of Plato’s divided line 
and other humanist translations of the same passage James Hankins has argued 
convincingly that Ficino “comes down firmly on the side of the Neoplatonic in-
terpretation of this passage.” Hankins also offered a comparison with Proclus’ 
commentary to the Republic to make the point.24 Agreeing on the whole with this 
assessment, I think that one can be even more precise. First, Ficino could not have 
known Proclus’ commentary on the Republic when he first translated Plato’s Re-
public, since Janus Lascaris (c. 1445–1535) only brought the manuscript to Florence 
in 1492.25 Second, rather than being Proclean sensu stricto Ficino’s interpretation 
and translation follows Iamblichus (although I will demonstrate below that Fi-
cino was also interpreting the divided line in light of other works by Proclus, 
notably the Platonic Theology). The similarities between Ficino’s rendering of the 
23 Iamb. Comm. Math. 35.27–37.2. Thesleff 1965, 36–39.
24 Hankins 1986, 287–304.
25 Fic. Op. 937. Piccolomini 1874, 401–423.
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divided line and Proclus’ schematic interpretation can be explained by the fact 
that they are both utilizing a common source, namely Iamblichus’ De communi 
mathematica scientia. Here is Proclus’ commentary on Euclid:
Next we should see what faculty it is that pronounces judgment in math-
ematics [τὸ κριτήριον τῶν μαθημάτων]. On this doctrine let us again fol-
low the guidance of Plato. In the Republic he sets on one side the objects 
of knowledge and over against them the forms of knowing, and pairs the 
forms of knowing with the types of knowable things. Some things he pos-
its as intelligibles (νοητά), others as perceptibles (αἰσθητά); and then he 
makes a further distinction among intelligibles between intelligibles and 
understandables (διανοητά), and among perceptibles between percepti-
bles and likenesses (εἰκαστά). To the intelligibles, the highest of the four 
classes, he assigns intellection (νόησιν) as its mode of knowing, to under-
standables understanding (διάνοια), to perceptibles belief (πίστις), and to 
likeness conjecture (εἰκασία).26
Proclus interprets Platos’ divided line in his commentary to the Republic as follows:
Since Plato wishes to demonstrate that the procession of beings from the 
One is continuous and united, he represents this continuity as a single 
line (γραμμῇ μιᾷ), the second segments always proceeding from the first 
through mutual conjunction and by way of resemblance (ὁμοιότητος), 
and devoid of nothing separating the beings. For this was not allowed; all 
things proceed from the Good and turn back to it. In any case the offspring 
must resemble the parents. Since the One is a being of this kind it is nec-
essary for the offspring to be indistinct; for a family relation is continuous 
in unity. The cause of this continuity is the resemblance of the following 
segments to the leading segments. But we agree altogether that this pro-
ceeds from the One; for resemblance is a kind of unity (ἑνότης). So because 
of this Plato takes a single line and cuts it into two, not cutting into equal 
parts, but into unequal parts, that are nevertheless two.27
If one compares the two pseudepigraphic texts from Brotinus and Archytas that 
were quoted above with these two passages on the divided line from Proclus’ 
commentaries on the Republic and on Euclid’s Elements, it can be seen that al-
though Proclus prefers to follow Plato directly and not Pythagorean sources, 
his indebtedness to chapter eight of De communi mathematica scientia is perfectly 
clear.28 In his analysis of the criterion (κριτήριον) for mathematical judgments, he 
26 Procl. In Euc. 1970,10.15–27; Procl. In Euc. 1873, 10.15–27.
27 Procl. In Remp. 1.288.6–20.
28 See Mueller 1987, 334–348; O’Meara 1988, 49–59; O’Meara 1989, 164–166. Festa and van der 
Waerden speculated on a possible common source for Iamblichus and Proclus, but Proclus 
despite his different approach to the topic would have almost certainly studies Iamblichus’ 
work, perhaps under the influence of his teacher Syrianus who (as seen below) was well 
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presents the Iamblichean divisions of faculties and their corresponding realities 
in a similar manner and terminology to Iamblichus.
There are two passages from Ficino’s works that are relevant to the discussion 
of his debt to Iamblichus’ De communi mathematica scientia. The first, as one would 
expect, is a very brief statement in his Epitome of the Republic on the divided line: 
“Plato follows (sequitur) the division of things into two genera, the visible and the 
invisible, both of which are again divided in two, namely the antecedent and 
the subsequent, and he makes a similar division for human perception. In this 
regards he follows (sequitur) Bro[n]tinus and Archytas, but he explains it more el-
egantly and extensively.”29 In the second, Ficino (like Proclus in his commentary 
on Euclid’s Elements) responds to the aporetic conclusion of the Theaetetus, namely 
that the interlocutors are incapable of providing a definition of knowledge by 
explicating the schema of the divided line: 
Finally once all of these have been refuted one ought to see what Plato 
teaches. In fact, in the sixth book of the Republic he imitates the Pythagore-
ans Bro[n]tinus and Archytas; he establishes two genera of things, namely 
the intelligible and the sensible. The former is stable and incorporeal, the 
latter is changeable and corporeal. He calls the way to know the former 
“reason,” and the way to the other “sense perception,” and the common 
notion of the former “intelligence,” and of the latter “opinion.” But he also 
divides each genus into two segments. For he wishes the intelligible to be 
first and secondary; in the first the ideas (that is the species and notions 
[notiones; Op. = motiones] of the divine mind), other minds, and souls are 
contained, in the second numbers and figures. In fact, although numbers 
and figures are incorporeals, however because they admit a certain divi-
sion, they should not be judged of equal rank to the indivisible substances. 
The knowledge of the first he calls by the precise name “intellect,” and 
of the second “intellection.” He also divides the sensible in the same ra-
tio, namely into a first and a second. In the first he places all bodies and 
corporeals. In the second shadows and images of bodies, whether they 
are visible in water or in mirrors. Plato thinks that they relate to bodies 
as mathematics relate to the divine. He specifically names the perception 
of bodies “belief” and the shadow of bodies “imagination.” Thereafter 
he denies that there is knowledge concerning bodies, their shadows, and 
mathematics; instead he locates it only in the intellect of divinities, which 
is what he meant in this dialogue in the beginning when he proposed that 
knowledge and wisdom are identical. For he always testifies that wisdom 
is the contemplation of the divine.30
versed in Pythagorean material. This point furthers corrects the previous tendencies to ex-
aggerate Proclus’ differences from Iamblichus. 
29 Fic. Op. 1408.
30 Fic. Op. 1280–1281.
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Ficino ignores what many ancient and modern commentators find puzzling 
about the divided line, namely whether the line is divided into equal or unequal 
segments, that is whether the text ought to be read according to one of two vari-
ants: ἄνισα or ἄν ἴσα.31 Following the Greek of MS. Florence, Biblioteca Medicea 
Laurenziana, Plut. 85.09 (ἄν ἴσα), he translates the passage to render it as two 
equal segments (duas equales sectam).32 This is at first glance somewhat odd, since 
Iamblichus’ De communi mathematica scientia is perhaps the most important source 
that identifies the alternative readings of the text; the unequal division of the line 
is attributed to Brotinus, and the equal division of the line to Archytas. However, 
Iamblichus in effect synthesizes both options to present conclusions that are re-
markably similar to Ficino’s (and Proclus’), namely that the line remains one and 
the same because the analogy between the segments should be understood as an 
emanation: 
After this he cuts the line into pieces, which in truth is one line (γραμμὴν… 
μίαν), so that he may understand comprehension (τὸ γνωριστικόν) as one, 
and divides it into two according to the first differences of beings and the 
divisions distinguishing the two segments. But he establishes these equal 
differences and divisions according to their participation with ratios and 
ideas, and through the resemblance (ὁμοιότητα) of the participants to the 
participated, and for this reason there is in a certain way the same analogy 
in both. And again he divides each of the segments according to the same 
ratio, since throughout the whole the power of comprehension is of the 
same form with itself, and he produces its differences in terms of clarity 
and obscurity, and to demarcate completion and lack he points out their 
separation with respect to each other, according to which the secondaries 
alter and are inferior to the superior.33
Ficino’s circumlocutious reading of the divided line agrees with Iamblichus’ con-
clusion that the line, although divided, remains one. Ficino formulates the divid-
ed line as an emanation flowing out from the divine, connecting us with it: 
Therefore knowledge is by means of a certain reason the comprehension of 
divine things (comprehensio / Iamblichus’ τὸ γνωριστικόν), residing in the 
intellect and emanating into reason, having been inserted into the intellect 
by God, and having been turned towards reason by a dialectical instructor 
inspired by God, reorienting reason to the intellect, and uniting the Intel-
lect with divinity.34
31 See, for instance, Brumbaugh 1952, 529–534; Lafrance 1987; Aubenque 1992, 37–44.
32 “Perinde ac si acceperis lineam in duas equales sectam portiones, et utramque rursus par-
tem simili ratione diviseris…” Plato 1491, f.291r.
33 Iamb. Comm. Math. 38.15–28; On this passage see Napolitano Valditara 2000, 67–69.
34 Fic. Op. 1281.
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In his exposition of the divided line Ficino presents Plato as a follower of a Py-
thagorean understanding, which modern scholarship would characterize as a 
Neoplatonic understanding, of the cyclical process in the triad of μονή (remain-
ing), πρόοδος (proceeding), and ἐπιστροφή (return).
Ficino is also attentive to the fact that the divided line is attributed to Pythago-
rean personae. He consistently uses the same terminology in the passages quoted 
above to interpret the Timaeus, the Republic, and the Theaetetus, that is Plato fol-
lows (sequitur) or imitates (imitatur) the Pythagoreans but is more eloquent in the 
process (elegantius). This is in perfect harmony with his prosopopoeic exegesis 
of the Platonic corpus into Pythagorean, Socratic, and Platonic personae. Wal-
ter Burkert and Holger Thesleff have concluded that these fragments, written in 
an archaizing Pythagorean Doric prose, probably date to the end of the second 
century BC – a productive period for Pythagorean pseudepigrapha.35 In utilizing 
these fragments Iamblichus’ intention, like Ficino’s, is to present a unitary source 
for Platonism, before Plato, in Pythagorean philosophy. At times blurring the dis-
tinctions between precise Socratic and Pythagorean personae Ficino has Plato 
make Socrates speak on occasion in a Pythagorean register.
Archytas of Tarentum is one of the most famous ancient thinkers and mathema-
ticians designated as Pythagorean. Known to the Renaissance through a number 
of ancient sources (both Greek and Latin), including biographies in the Suda and 
Diogenes Laertius, Archytas would have come to prominence for Ficino through 
Plato’s Letters, not least for saving Plato from Dionysus II the tyrant of Syracuse.36 
Commenting on the Seventh Letter, in which Archytas is mentioned by name and 
which Ficino accepts as authentic, Ficino makes it clear that Plato learned from 
the Pythagoreans during his voyages to Sicily that the divine may be grasped by 
the intellect but that such an understanding could not be expressed in writing or 
speech since this truth is not conceived by way of discursive reasoning.37 Here 
the esoteric dimension of Plato’s philosophy is presented as a Pythagorean un-
derstanding that the highest objects of intellect (νοητά) are themselves ineffable 
and cannot be understood singularly by our discursive reasoning. Carl Huffman 
has recently cast light on the “shadow of Plato,” or rather the Platonic tradition, 
in which Archytas stood, in order to study the mathematician directly and in-
dependently of later transformations.38 Yet if Ficino Platonized the Pythagoreans 
– a tradition that goes as far back as the Old Academy – in reality the Florentine 
35 The proposed chronologies for the composition of Doric pseudepigrapha has variied in 
recent times between the third century BC and the second century AD, while it is often 
thought that most of them come from a period between the first century BC (or late second 
century BC) and the first century AD. 
36 I limit myself to citing Thesleff 1961, 8–11, 75–77, 92–96; Thesleff 1965, 2–48; Burkert 1972, 27, 
78, 84, 92, 221–222, 384–389, 442–447, et passim; Huffman 2005; and Brisson 2008.
37 Fic. Op. 1535. On Archytas and Ficino see also Allen 1994, 48, 64–65.
38 Huffman 2005, 3–43.
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thought that the Platonic field was often covered by Pythagorean shadows, but in 
his mind this did not prevent it from being fertile ground for thinking.
The identity of the second Pythagorean in question, Brotinus, is more obscure 
to us moderns. The few fragments that we now posses attributed to him were 
known to Ficino and his contemporaries, who utilized his pseudepigrapha fruit-
fully.39 For instance, the interlocutors of Jacques Lefevre d’Etaples’ (c. 1455–1536) 
Rithmomachia are the Pythagoreans Alcmeon, Bathillus, and Brotinus.40 Giorgio 
Valla (1447–1500) cites the pseudepigrapha of Archytas and Brotinus, as does Fi-
cino’s own disciple Francesco Cattani da Diacceto (1466–1522) to argue for the 
possibility of a mathesis universalis and interpret the divided line.41 Moreover, 
two separate pieces of evidence seem to indicate that Renaissance humanists 
had access to other Greek manuscripts of Iamblichus’ work than those that have 
survived: the lending records of the Biblioteca Marciana from 1553 record that 
Sebastiano Erizzo (1525–1585) borrowed a volume that contained the De secta py-
thagorica, apparently along with a now lost commentary on the work by Simpli-
cius; Raffaello Maffei (1451–1522) mentions the existence of a similar manuscript 
in 1506 in the Vatican Library.42 A number of other humanists, such as Bessari-
on (1403–1472), were familiar either specifically with Brotinus or more generally 
with Iamblichus’ De secta pythagorica. For instance, it seems that others also knew 
Ficino’s translation of the work: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), his 
erudite nephew Gianfrancesco Pico (1470–1533), Pierleone Leoni (c. 1445–1492), 
Angelo Poliziano (1454–1494), Nicholas Scutellius (1490–1542), and Lucas Holste-
nius (1596–1661). 
Brotinus’ fortuna, therefore, reached far from his origins in Metapontum, 
where he was supposedly a contemporary and disciple of Pythagoras himself. 
Diogenes Laertius, the Suda, and Iamblichus disagree as to whether he was the 
husband or the father of the famous Pythagorean philosopher, Theano, who had 
an equally murky relationship with Pythagoras and whose pseudonymous frag-
ments also survive. Moreover, readers of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (2nd c. AD) 
commentary to Aristotle’s Metaphysics would have learned that Plato followed 
Brotinus in stating that the Good and One are beyond being.43 Similarly, readers 
of Proclus’ teacher Syrianus’ (fourth and fifth c. CE) Commentary to the Metaphysics 
would know that Brotinus declares that the supra-substantial principles of real-
ity are “surpassing all intellect and substance in power and dignity,” which is a 
quotation from Republic 509b that is voiced in the persona of Brotinus, and that 
“taking his start from these, the divine Plato also, in the Letters, in the Republic, 
and the Parmenides, utters the same sentiments on the topic;” and again that “the 
One and the Good is supra-essential (ὑπερούσιον) for Plato, for Brotinus the Py-
39 Thesleff 1961, 12, 78, 101, 104–116; Thesleff 1965, 54–56; Burkert 1972, 114.
40 Lefèvre d’Etaples 1496.
41 Valla 1501, lib. 1, cap. 6; Diacceto 1563, 165.
42 Omont 1888, 40; Hadot 1990, 295–296.
43 (Lemma: 1091b4). Alex. of Aphrod. In Metaph. 821.32–822.2; Thesleff 1965, 56.
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thagorean, and, in a word, for all of those who have come from the school of the 
Pythagoreans.”44 That is, even before Iamblichus, in the writings of Alexander 
of Aphrodisias and later in Syrianus, we find an account of Brotinus that agrees 
with the De communi mathematica scientia and states that the henological doctrine 
of Plato, central to Neoplatonic thought, of an ineffable One above Being, has a 
unitary source in Pythagoras’ immediate disciple. Furthermore, given that Syr-
ianus and Alexander of Aphrodisias quote Brotinus in order to interpret Aris-
totle’s Metaphyiscs 1091, there are perhaps good reasons to believe that they are 
working from a common source.
What may seem like an odd Ficinian interpretation of Plato’s divided line turns 
out to be more common than one might think in Renaissance and premodern un-
derstandings of Platonism. Other important Iamblichean sources available in the 
Renaissance for the origins of the divided line in the pseudepigraphic works of 
Brotinus and Archytas are the manuscripts of Plato themselves. Although it is not 
present in the two principal Plato manuscripts used by Ficino (Laur. Plut. 85.09 
and Laur. Plut. 59.01), there is a long marginal scholion explaining the divided 
line, which abridges Iamblichus’ De communi mathematica scientia and debates the 
two Greek variants indicating that the line is divided either into two equal (ἴσα) 
or unequal (ἄνισα) segments. So far I have not been able to identify any manu-
script that includes the scholion which we know Ficino used.45 In any case, Ficino 
could have made the argument for expressing the divided line in the personae 
of Brotinus and Archytas solely on the basis of his studies of Iamblichus’ De secta 
pythagorica without having recourse to the abridged scholion. Nonetheless, the 
hypothesis of another, still unknown, manuscript of Plato’s Republic that would 
have placed the Iamblichean scholion immediately under Ficino’s eyes while he 
read the Republic is worth pursuing. I have recently established that Ficino finds 
important reasons for identifying where Plato speaks in his own voice from the 
introductory scholion to Plato’s Laws, so I think it plausible that he could likewise 
have drawn on the scholion to the Republic for a passage where he believes Plato 
is speaking in a Pythagorean persona.46
In 1959 Henri-Dominique Saffrey published Ficino’s notes to MS. Florence, Bib-
lioteca Riccardiana 70, which contains Proclus’ Platonic Theology, his Elements of 
Theology and Physics, as well as Ocellus Lucanus’ De natura universi. In this man-
uscript Ficino also wrote a short four-folio treatise entitled Proprietas vocabulorum 
platonicorum, an essential part of which is an exposition of the philosophical termi-
nology drawn from Plato’s divided line. Here Ficino resolves: “There are therefore 
four cognitive faculties in the soul, according to Plato and Proclus, as Iamblichus 
shows; on the one hand there are the two first, pertaining to the intelligible, and on 
44 (Lemma: 1086b14). Syr. In Metaph. 165.33–166.8; Thesleff 1965, 56. Cf. Plat. Resp. 509b6–10. 
(Lemma: 1091b6). Syr. In Metaph. 182.30–183.21; Thesleff 1965, 56.
45 Greene et al. 1938, 246 (Plat. Resp. 510d); Hermann (ed.) 1853, xxxi–xxxii, 350–351; Ruhnken 
1800, 176–179.
46 Robichaud 2014, 87–114.
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the other the two secondary ones, pertaining to the sensible.”47 About the long sec-
tion on the divided line Saffrey says, “Il est vrai que cette doctrine est le bien com-
mun de tout le platonisme, et Ficin l’aura trouvée ou retrouvée dans Proclus aussi 
bien que dans Platon lui-même… Ficin donne lui-même sa source sous la forme 
d’une référence à Jamblique, que malheureusement nous n’avons pu identifier.”48 
At the very least, the present article has identified Saffrey’s missing source. If one 
accepts Saffrey’s dating of the annotations, moreover, it demonstrates Ficino’s use 
of Iamblichus’ understanding of the divided line to gloss Plato and Proclus before 
1463, that is before he undertook the task of translating the Republic, and perhaps 
before he finished or while he was in the process of translating the first ten Platon-
ic dialogues that he presented to Cosimo de’ Medici in 1464.49
By determining which books Ficino had on his desk, so to speak, while in-
terpreting Plato one can also identify which Pythagorean books the Florentine 
believed Plato had at hand while composing his own dialogues. Thus for Fici-
no Brotinus and Archytas were to Plato what Aglaophamus was to Pythagoras, 
namely intermediary spokespersons. For Ficino the false dating of the pseude-
pigrapha established early written continuities with oral philosophical and reli-
gious traditions. Brotinus may have played a double role in transmitting Pythag-
orean formulations not only of a mathesis universalis but also of a religio universalis. 
This was insofar as he also served as a direct intermediary for Orphism, since 
we know from a passage in the Suda and from Clement of Alexandria that the 
ancients identified him as the author of the Orphic hymn to Nature that was 
frequently and fondly quoted by Ficino to characterize nature’s silent (ἄψοφος) 
emanation. Ficino never mentions the attribution of authorship to Brotinus for 
the Orphic hymn to Nature, but it is very likely that he would have known of 
it, since the passage is excerpted and transcribed in a manuscript in the hand of 
Angelo Poliziano, his personal friend and sometimes intellectual rival.50 Burkert 
has argued that one can find in Aristotle evidence for authentic Pythagoreanism, 
specifically before it was co-opted by the Platonic Academy, which shows that 
the Pythagoreans did not espouse the Platonic χωρισμός, that is the separation 
between the intelligible and the sensible, between being and becoming, that is 
famously illustrated by the divided line.51 However, the Neoplatonic interpreta-
tion of the divided line emphatically underscores the emanative unity through 
all divided segments, from the ineffable supra-essential One through nature’s 
images and shadows. There is no absolute dualism. The line, although precisely 
47 “Sunt igitur potentie cognitive anime quattuor secundum Platonem et Pythagoram, ut Iam-
blicus ostendit; ille due prime ad intelligibile, iste due secunde ad sensibile pertinent.” MS. 
Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 70, f.3v. Saffrey 2002, 84.
48 Saffrey 2002, 90, also 84 n. 232: “Iamblicus ostendit: locum non inveni.”
49 It is also S. Gentile’s opinion that Ficino translated the De secta pythagorica very early in his 
philosophical career. Gentile 1990, 57–104.
50 MS. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, cod. gr., 182, f.41r.
51 Burkert 1972, 28–52 (esp. 30–31), 230–231, et passim.
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divided, remains unified. Ficino, following Iamblichus, therefore retrojects one 
the most central aspects of Neoplatonism, emanation, onto a Pythagorean source 
before Plato. Iamblichus and Ficino’s understanding of Pythagoreanism is there-
fore – oddly enough – in agreement with Aristotle’s, insofar as, to abridge the 
argument from 1091b of the Metaphysics, the Pythagoreans postulate the One as 
both the highest and most self-sufficient principle of unity, as well as a principle 
of number and an element of nature, as the ancient poets have it.52 Just as his di-
vided line remains a single unit so the divisions in Ficino’s progressive unfolding 
of the prisca theologia remains continuous and unitary.
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Pythagoras Refracted: The Formation of Pythagoreanism 
in the Early Modern Period
Hanns-Peter Neumann – Freie Universität Berlin
1 Michel Mourgues and the emergence of the term “Pythagoreanism”
In 1712, the French scholar Michel Mourgues, (1642–1713), Jesuit at the Diocèse de 
S. Flour in the Auvergne and professor of rhetoric and mathematics at the Univer-
sity of Toulouse, published his Plan Théologique du Pythagorisme, et des autres Sectes 
Sçavantes de la Grèce, a work which he had already finished three years earlier, 
as is clear from the Jesuit imprimatur signed by Pierre Nicolas on October 14, 
1709.1 The dedicatory letter to Simon de La Loubère2 reveals that Mourgues had 
conceived of the Plan as early as 1705. He wrote two parts, the Plan Théologique 
du Pythagorisme and the Plan Philosophique du Pythagorisme, of which only the for-
mer was published. The latter was never printed, but it was certainly completed, 
since at least La Loubère must have read most of it, as stated by Mourgues in the 
dedicatory letter to his mathematician colleague.3 The most likely reason why 
the second part of the Plan was never published is that Mourgues died soon after 
publication of the first part. 
This learned Jesuit was highly esteemed in his own time, for instance by Pierre 
Bayle, who appreciated Mourgues’ Traité de la poësie françoise (1684), but he is now 
little known. What makes his major work so important for the history and trans-
formation of Pythagorean knowledge is that it is probably the first time that we 
find the term “Pythagoreanism” in the title of an early modern book. Hence the 
publication date of Mourgues’ Plan Théologique marks a significant break in the 
long tradition of Pythagoras and his school. In 1712 it was evidently possible to 
unite Pythagoras’ biography and his philosophical and theological teachings 
under a distinctive label, “Pythagoreanism”, which suggests that whatever was 
passed down as Pythagorean knowledge from antiquity to modern times could 
now be interpreted as forming a coherent system of genuine Pythagorean think-
ing.
1 Mourgues 1712.
2 Simon de La Loubère (1642–1729), a well-known mathematician at the Académie française, 
who was also famous for his precise description of his travels in Siam (present-day Thai-
land) in his Du Royaume de Siam (1693).
3 Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, III: “…du Plan Philosophique que vous avez déja, Mon-
sieur, presque tout lû, & que j’achéve de mettre en état de paroître…”
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At least this is what Mourgues’ Plan Théologique du Pythagorisme and the un-
published Plan Philosophique du Pythagorisme seem to signal, namely that at the 
dawn of the eighteenth century the term “Pythagoreanism,” like the labels “Pla-
tonism” or “Aristotelianism,” referred to a system of Pythagorean traditions 
which, as we read in Mourgues’ book, had the greatest impact on Plato, Aristotle, 
and the Middle- and Neoplatonists.4 Or, as the Swiss theologian, Biblical scholar 
and suspected Socinian Jean Le Clerc noted in his review on the Plan Théologique 
du Pythagorisme in the 1713 edition of his Amsterdam journal Bibliothèque choisie:
Our author believes that Pythagoreanism is the primitive and original 
theology and philosophy, being the source of the doctrine of all the other 
sects which in fact appear to be nothing more than different heresies of one 
religion or diverse dialects of one original language.5
Thus, the first thing we learn from Mourgues’ Plan and Le Clerc’s review of it is that 
early modern authors who referred to the Pythagorean tradition usually did not 
distinguish between early or ancient Pythagoreanism and Neopythagoreanism.6
However, once in a while we detect some critical remarks on the lack of dif-
ferentiation within the transfer and reception history of Pythagorean knowledge 
in early modernity like those made by the Lutheran theologians Christoph Au-
gust Heumann and Johann Lorenz Mosheim for example. The former criticized 
Thomas Stanley, author of the first history of philosophy in English language, 
for relying too much on Iamblichus in his intent to provide a survey on Pythago-
ras and his school,7 for Heumann considered Iamblichus more a hagiographer of 
Pythagoras than a reliable source of authentic Pythagorean teachings, and thus 
he could not accept Stanley’s use of Iamblichus.8 Mourgues himself shared Heu-
mann’s critical view of Iamblichus to some extent, insofar as he made Iamblichus’ 
theurgical idolatry responsible for the reception-history of a “false Platonism” 
and a “bad Pythagoreanism.”9 Johann Lorenz Mosheim, on the other hand, in his 
4 See O’Meara 1989; Kahn 2001.
5 Le Clerc 1713, 432: “Nôtre Auteur croit que la Pythagorisme est la Théologie & la Philoso-
phie primitive, qui fait le fonds de la doctrine des autres sectes; qui ne sont, à l’égard de 
celle-là, que comme diverses Héresies à l’égard d’une Religion; ou comme diverses dialects, 
par rapport à une Langue originelle.” See also Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, XVIII, a 
passage that Le Clerc quoted in his review; and Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, XIX: “Il 
[Pythagore] ouvrit son Ecole en Italie: & la rapidité avec laquelle sa Doctrine passa la mer, & 
s’étendit de tous côtez, est une preuve éclatante de la supériorité de son génie. Toute la Gréce 
sçavante l’a reconnu pour son Maître…” 
6 See Zhmud 1997, 13: Zhmud refers to two different modern research positions concerning 
early Pythagoreanism, one denying, the other accepting that the antique and late antique 
Pythagorean tradition has some authentic roots in early Pythagoreanism and hence could 
provide important insights into early Pythagoreanism. 
7 Stanley 1655–1660.
8 Heumann 1715, 540.
9 Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, XVI: “Et voilà, pour le dire en passant, le faux Plato-
nisme ou le mauvais Pythagorisme des plus modernes de la Secte…”
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comments on the Latin edition of Ralph Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System 
of the Universe, criticized some apparent contradictions in Cudworth’s interpreta-
tion of the Pythagorean monads.10 He pointed out that, only because Ecphantus, 
a Pythagorean philosopher of the fourth century BC, had defined monads for 
the first time as corporeal units or atoms, the conclusion made by Cudworth that 
Pythagoras himself had originally founded a monadic physical atomism must 
be wrong.11 What Mosheim and Heumann were actually hinting at was that the 
Pythagorean tradition was not in itself without contradictions. Nevertheless, de-
spite the few critical voices in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and de-
spite the emergence of the historical-philological ars critica in early modern times, 
Pythagoreanism was mostly, as is obviously the case with Michel Mourgues, 
represented as a stringent theological and philosophical system of Pythagorean 
knowledge. Moreover, Pythagoreanism was thought to be the essential core of 
Platonism and Neoplatonism. Hence, Mourgues could argue: “It is once and for 
all necessary to state that Pythagoreanism and Platonism are the same thing.”12
Secondly, we learn from the French Jesuit that he construed what he called Py-
thagoreanism as a blueprint of pagan philosophy and theology in order to shed 
light on the Church Fathers’ polemics against the pagans. So Mourgues’ main 
concern was to provide a commentary on his French translation of the Church Fa-
ther Theodoret’s Graecarum affectionum curatio (Remedy for the diseases of the Greeks), 
“the last and probably also the most complete of the numerous apologies which 
Greek antiquity produced,”13 of which the original Greek text was first edited 
in Heidelberg in 1592 as Theodoretu Episkopu Kyru Ellenikon Pathematon Therapeu-
tike.14 Mourgues wanted to deliver background information in order to make the 
arguments of the Church Fathers against pagan philosophy, particularly those 
presented in Theodoret’s Therapeutike, more comprehensible to his contemporar-
ies, who he considered to be particularly ignorant and undifferentiated concern-
ing the so-called and, as Mourgues claims, mostly misunderstood Platonism of 
the Church Fathers.15 He believed that this ignorance had unfortunately led to 
the opinion that whoever shows esteem for the Church Fathers would nowadays 
generally be seen with suspicion: “The right of the Church Fathers to claim our 
esteem is so notorious, that an actual declaration of esteem and admiration for 
them has almost no value among the public.”16
10 Cudworth 1678.
11 Cudworth / Mosheim 1733, vol. 1, 16.
12 Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, XV: “Il faut être averti une fois pour toutes, que le Py-
thagorisme & le Platonisme, est la même chose.”
13 Bardenhewer 19103, 327.
14 Theodoret of Cyrrhus 1592.
15 Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, XII: “J’aurai souvent occasion de faire remarquer dans 
mes Lettres combien la réputation des Péres est nette sur l’article d’un mauvais Platonisme, 
qu’on leur impute…”
16 Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, XIV: “Le droit des Péres sur notre estime est si notoire, 
qu’une déclaration d’estime & de vénération pour les Péres n’est presque d’aucun mérite 
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Thirdly, we learn that Mourgues was engaged in the scholarly discussions 
of his time. One of his objectives was to argue and defend the Church Fathers 
against the Dutch scholar Anton van Dale’s (1638–1708) critique of patristic au-
thority on the oracles of the pagans in De oraculis veterum ethnicorum dissertationes 
(1683).17 Thus, in presenting Pythagoreanism as a blueprint of pagan theology 
and philosophy, Mourgues obviously wanted to deliver first-hand material that 
would back up the Church Fathers’ interpretation of the oracles of the heathens.
From this follows that the label “Pythagoreanism” functioned (1) as histori-
cal category, (2) as a coherent system of thought ascribed to Pythagoras and his 
school, and (3) as knowledge and argument in commentaries, for instance in 
commentaries on editions like Mourgues’ edition of Theodoret, or within con-
temporary discussions, here particularly relating to the discourse on the Church 
Fathers’ relation to the philosophy and theology of the pagans.
2 Between Judaism and Hellenism: Michel Mourgues’ understanding of Py-
thag o re anism as being rooted in early modern “Pythagorean” knowledge
Although the appearance of the term “Pythagoreanism” on the title page of 
Mourgues’ Plan Théologique du Pythagorisme without doubt signals an important 
shift in the history of the Pythagorean tradition, Mourgues’ own understanding 
of Pythagoreanism was anything but new. In fact, Mourgues merely summarizes 
the conventional descriptions we usually find of the Pythagorean tradition in 
early modern times.
Based on the legendary voyages of Pythagoras, which, as most early modern 
accounts of the biography of Pythagoras point out, took him to the Phoenicians, 
Egyptians, Chaldeans, Persians, and Hebrews, voyages that, as is usually as-
sumed, lasted more than three decades, the Pythagorean doctrines were inter-
preted as a systematic Greek narrative of the lux ex oriente.18 The famous baroque 
polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz even indicates that the Republic of Letters 
was originally a colony that Pythagoras had discovered for the very first time 
during his travels to the East, thus preparing and founding the “modern” inven-
tion of a research network of knowledge of any kind:
The Republic of Letters is a colony of another world which a certain ad-
venturer of Greek origin called Pythagoras brought to us. Imitating the 
example of the Argonauts he was searching for new lands thus having 
learned in Egypt and with the Brahmins, where he stayed for a while, that 
there was an infinity of worlds to discover.19
auprès du public.”
17 Van Dale 1683. As for Van Dale’s critique see Ossa-Richardson 2013, 171 f.
18 See Neumann 2013, 98.
19 Leibniz 570–571: “La Republiqve des Lettres est une colonie de l’autre monde qu’un certain 
avanturier, Grec de nation, nommé Pythagore, y a mené du nostre. Il alloit chercher des pays 
nouueuax à l’exemple des Argonautes, ayant appris en Egypte et chez les Brachmanes, ou il 
avoit esté qvelqve temps, qv’il a avoit une infinité de mondes à decouvrir.”
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Thus Pythagoras was considered a travelling genius and the first and most im-
portant mediator of the so-called oriental wisdom to the West, with a deep im-
pact on later Greek philosophers who either followed in the steps of the voyager 
Pythagoras or adapted themselves to the tradition of Pythagorean philosophy 
and theology.20
This is also the main reason why Mourgues argues, due to the generally ac-
cepted fact of the oriental origin of the systema Pythagoricum, that one could eas-
ily find elements of Hebrew, especially Mosaic, doctrines in the teachings of the 
Greek philosophers, since most of them, and particularly Pythagoras, had pri-
marily Hebrew teachers.21 Numenius’ characterization of Plato as the Attic Moses 
was, as Mourgues claims, only a concluding result of this process of transferring 
knowledge from the East to the West.
Through their Hebrew, but also through their Chaldean teachers, as Mour-
gues continues to argue, the Greek philosophers gained first-hand insight into 
the knowledge of the divine, human, and natural.22 Hence the French Jesuit em-
phasizes that Pythagoras imported the most sublime ideas from his voyage into 
the West, in particular those concerning the eternal and intelligible being, which 
he made the first principle and subject of his theology and philosophy. Like his 
contemporaries, for instance Pierre Bayle, Mourgues interpreted the Pythagorean 
theology as being ultimately a result of the influence of the lux ex oriente, as an 
enlightened counterpart to the superstitious religion and idolatry of the common 
Greek people.23 Some specific parts of Pythagorean knowledge, such as the doc-
trine of the transmigration of the soul, were understood by Mourgues as a polit-
ical stratagem designed to confirm the authority of Pythagoras, who was said to 
be capable of remembering the early stages of his transmigration. This and other 
parts of his doctrine were interpreted symbolically, metaphorically, or anagogi-
cally, rather than literally.24 The political interpretation of Pythagorean metem-
psychosis was intended to defend it against the objections of learned scholars like 
those of Gerhard Johannes Vossius and Noël Regnault.25
20 See for instance Naudé 1653, 203; Hornius 1655, 172 f.; Vossius 1657, 28; Stanley 1660, 4 f.; Gale 
1676, Part II, 134; Budde 1706.
21 Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, IX: “…que leurs Théologiens prétendus avoient eû les 
Hébreux pour leurs premiers maîtres.” As regards the Jewish origin of the Pythagorean 
philosophy, see especially Gale 1676, 129–214. See also Wendelen 1637, for the Jewish origin 
of the Pythagorean tetractys.
22 Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, X: the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans “doivent aux 
Hébreux & aux Caldéens les premiéres connoissances des choses Divines, humaines, & na-
turelles.”
23 Mourgues 1712, Lettre Preliminaire, XI. For Bayle, who considered the doctrine of metem-
psychosis a political strategy for attaining authority in order to educate the people and to 
fight their superstitious religious beliefs, see Bayle 1740, Part III, 747 f.
24 Neumann 2013, 75–77.
25 Vossius 1657, 29, Regnault 1734, 93–95. For the debates on metempsychosis in the 17th and 
18th centuries see Zander 1999, 257 f.
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Since Pythagoras was seen as the first Western philosopher to systematize and 
politicize the ancient oriental wisdom, “Pythagoras” became an important label 
in early modern times, especially in the course of the seventeenth century. His 
name was considered a sort of pars pro toto for the oriental origin of occiden-
tal wisdom, which manifested itself later in Platonism and Neoplatonism, and 
thus became one of the main arguments for connecting Hebrew wisdom, Greek 
philosophy and theology, the Christian philosophy of the Church Fathers, and 
“modern” science. 
In connecting modern science with the Pythagorean tradition, early modern 
scholars contributed to the fact that the Pythagoreans were highly esteemed as a 
kind of Copernicans avant la lettre, being the first to advocate a heliocentric sys-
tem.26 But they were also highly valued for their mathematical knowledge, which 
made them extraordinarily attractive – more than other Greek philosophers – to 
the movement of the so-called Scientific Revolution in early modern Europe.27
Because in Pythagoreanism, as understood in early modernity, mathematics 
had a metaphysical foundation, the label “Pythagoras” was also used as an argu-
ment for bringing theological principles into line with mathematical, scientific, 
and philosophical ones. Thus, arguing against Hobbes’s Democritean and Epi-
curean materialism, which he saw as being mainly based on mere mathematical 
principles, Leibniz, in his second letter to the Newtonian Samuel Clarke, referred 
to Pythagoras and Plato in order to point out that mathematics had to be rooted in 
metaphysical principles to avoid the theological and moral risks of materialistic 
thinking, which denied the existence of immaterial entities.28
Hence, Pythagoreanism offered what Mourgues needed in order to reinstate 
the authority of the Church Fathers. In order to avoid the term “Platonism,” which 
in a mistaken form was, in Mourgues’ opinion, imputed to the Church Fathers, 
he chose the label “Pythagoreanism,” which was actually a new term capable of 
refreshing what Mourgues called the true basis of the Platonism of the Church 
Fathers. As a mathematician, Mourgues certainly knew that in the course of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the mathematical and astronomical reputa-
tion of the Pythagoreans had reached a high level due to the fact, as mentioned 
above, that they were considered to be Copernicans avant la lettre. The scientific 
26 See for instance Digges 1576, Froidmont 1631, Boulliau 1645, and Zimmermann 1669.
27 For a critical survey of the label “Scientific Revolution“ and its historiography see Cohen 
1994; for two different surveys on the factum itself, see Principe 2011; Shapin 1996.
28 See for instance the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, Leibniz’s second letter to Samuel 
Clarke, Leibniz 1890, VII, 355: “Mais je ne crois pas qu’on aye sujet d’adjouter que les Prin-
cipes Mathematiques de la Philosophie sont opposés à ceux des Materialistes. Au contraire, 
ils sont les mêmes, excepté que les materialistes à l’exemple de Democrite, d’Epicure et de 
Hobbes, se bornent aux seuls Principes Mathematiques, et n’admettent que des corps; et que 
les Mathematiciens Chrestiens admettent encor des substances immaterielles. Ainsi ce ne 
sont pas les Principes Mathematiques (selon le sens ordinaire de ce terme) mais les Principes 
Metaphysiques, qu’il faut opposer à ceux des Materialistes. Pythagore, Platon et en partie 
Aristote, en ont eu quelque connoissance…”
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reputation of the Pythagoreans, Pythagoras as paradigm of an ancient scholar 
and enlightened politician worthy of being imitated by the moderns (as pointed 
out for instance by Leibniz), and the theological and metaphysical core – the lux ex 
oriente – of the Pythagorean mathematics and physics made the label “Pythagore-
anism” all the more attractive: it replaced Platonism, Hebrew Wisdom, and Egyp-
tian or Hermetic Wisdom by simply integrating them into one single term, while 
at the same time associating Pythagorean knowledge with the newest trends in 
science and philosophy. It was now possible to use “Pythagoras” as an argument 
which could grab the attention of most contemporary scholars. At least this ap-
pears to be what Mourgues hoped for by using the term “Pythagoreanism” in the 
title of his book.
Nevertheless the coinage of the term or label “Pythagoreanism” was the result 
of a long process of transfer and transformation of the so-called Pythagorean 
tradition in early modern times, be it in editions or dissertations, or in historio-
graphical writings, or other media of early modern knowledge transfer (for in-
stance Bayle’s Dictionnaire).29 Hence it was by no means merely a spontaneous act 
by Mourgues himself.
Prior to and at the same time as Mourgues, scholars such as Thomas Stanley, 
Ismael Boulliau, Leibniz, Ralph Cudworth, and others contributed to the transfer 
and use in argument of Pythagorean knowledge. Stanley tried to (re)construct 
what he called the systema Pythagoricum, the Pythagorean system of – universal – 
knowledge, which he thought to be highly adaptable to modernity. Boulliau not 
only published an Astronomia philolaica, named after the Pythagorean Philolaus, 
but also edited and commented on Theon of Smyrna’s Eorum, quae in Mathematicis 
ad Platonis lectionem utilia sunt, expositio. In the latter work he outlined the Pythag-
orean origin of the Platonic conception of mathematics by referring to, amongst 
others, Nicomachus of Gerasa, who was seen as one of the most important Py-
thagorean mathematicians, and whose Arithmetica was first printed in Paris in 
1538.30 Leibniz referred to Pythagorean knowledge in different ways, utilizing 
its descriptive, theoretical, and “modern” potentials; his most famous reference 
to Pythagorean knowledge can be seen in his monadology.31 Ralph Cudworth in-
terpreted Pythagorean knowledge as a welcome opportunity to proclaim a com-
bination of Cartesian natural philosophy and Hermetic metaphysical theology, 
thus replacing both of them with a ancient and at the same time modern philoso-
phy in conformity with Christian theology.32
From this follows that there were different ways of relating to and using the la-
bels “Pythagoras,” “Pythagorean,” and “Pythagoreanism.” Depending on which 
aspect of Pythagorean knowledge was to be used in argument, even modern 
29 For the early modern systematization of Pythagorean knowledge in different media and text 
genres, see Neumann 2013, 110–149.
30 Theon of Smyrna 1644; Nicomachus of Gerasa 1538.
31 See Neumann 2013, 159–259.
32 See Neumann 2011, 627–640.
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scholars who represented opposed world-views could be referred to by using the 
same label, namely “Pythagorean” or “Pythagoras.”
3 Pythagoras Refracted: Newton, Leibniz, and Pythagoreanism
In 1748 the Scottish Newtonian, professor of mathematics, and member of the 
Royal Society Colin Maclaurin published An Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philo-
sophical Discoveries. In his account of Newton’s discoveries, Maclaurin refers to 
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans as forerunners of Newton, or, the other way 
round, interprets Newton as a modern Pythagoras or Pythagorean. He ascribes to 
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans an extraordinary knowledge of astronomy and 
natural philosophy, a knowledge they had described in mathematical propor-
tions. As Maclaurin maintains, the Pythagorean approach to astronomy and nat-
ural philosophy appeared to be remarkably independent of sensual impressions 
as well as of the prejudices of the common people: “One must have got over many 
difficulties from sense as well as from the religious prejudices that prevailed in 
those days.”33
In the course of his argumentation, Maclaurin declared reason – being inde-
pendent of more or less deceptive sensual impressions – and criticism of religious 
prejudices as conditions of scientific progress. Hence these conditions of scientific 
progress must have already been fulfilled in ancient times, from which follows that 
the historian’s gaze into the past could reveal plenty of “modern” truths that had 
already been discovered by ancient philosophers. Consequently, these truths must 
by necessity be “agreeable to modern discoveries,” as Maclaurin puts it.34 Now Ma-
claurin tries to exemplify the close relation between ancient and modern science 
by emphasizing the affinity between the Pythagorean doctrine of the harmony of 
the spheres and Newton’s determination of the “gravitation of celestial bodies:”
A musical chord gives the same notes as one double in length, when the 
tension or force with which the latter is stretched is quadruple: and the 
gravity of a planet is quadruple of the gravity of a planet at a double dis-
tance. In general, that any musical chord may become unison to a lesser 
chord of the same kind, its tension must be increased in the same propor-
tion as the square of its length is greater; and that the gravity of a planet 
may become equal to the gravity of another planet nearer to the sun, it 
must be increased in proportion as the square of its distance from the sun 
is greater. If therefore we should suppose musical chords extended from 
the sun to each planet, that all these chords might become unison, it would 
be requisite to increase or diminish their tension in the same proportions 
as would be sufficient to render the gravities of the planets equal. And 
33 Maclaurin 1748, 33.
34 Ibid., 32.
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from the similitude of those proportions, the celebrated doctrine of the 
harmony of the spheres is supposed to have been derived.35
Since Maclaurin assumed the Pythagorean doctrine of the harmony of the spheres 
to have been consistent with the mathematical explication of the forces governing 
the relations between the planets, he was convinced that Pythagoras already had 
knowledge of the laws of gravitation. From this perspective Pythagoras became 
a Presocratic Newton, and Newton a modern Pythagoras, the modern heir of Py-
thagorean mathematics, astronomy, and natural philosophy.
In the same year, when Maclaurin published his Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s 
Philosophical Discoveries, a lesser known adherent of Leibniz and Christian Wolff, 
Andreas Clavius from Celle, released his Bericht von dem gefährlichen Vorurtheile, 
worin die Lehre von den Elementen der Körper zu diesen Zeiten geraten ist (Account of 
the Dangerous Prejudice with which the Doctrine of the Elements of the Bodies is Seen 
Nowadays).36 In his Bericht, Clavius claims that Leibniz was responsible for the 
reformation and renewal of a long forgotten ancient idea, a treasure of ancient 
wisdom (“Kleinod der uhralten Weltweißheit”): the monadology, which had long 
fallen into oblivion or had simply been ignored.37 Clavius’s text referred to the 
prize question announced by the Berlin Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences in 
1746, which asked whether the theory of the monads was capable of explaining 
the physical phenomena in the world or not. Shortly after the announcement, 
a member of the Academy, the famous mathematician Leonhard Euler, anony-
mously published a provocative attack on the Leibnitian and Wolffian doctrine of 
monads.38 Clavius, in his Bericht, tried to argue against Euler and Euler’s Newto-
nian background. By interpreting the Leibnitian monadology as the restoration 
of a theologically and philosophically crucial theory of genuinely ancient origin, 
Clavius referred to a notion of truth which in ancient times had still been origi-
nally pure and essential, while, in the course of time, at the latest from Aristot-
le onwards, as Clavius says, it became more and more corrupted and forgotten. 
Clavius emphasized that it was the task of the modern enlightenment to release 
the ancient wisdom and truth from its historical corruptions and oblivion. But 
only Leibniz and, in part, Wolff had fulfilled this task by renewing the Pythago-
rean doctrine of the monads. For this reason, Clavius had already called Leibniz 
the German Pythagoras in a book published in 1740.39 When in 1746 Clavius par-
ticipated in the prize question announced by the Berlin Academy, he even sent 
three articles all of them arguing in favour of the scientific value of the Leibnitian 
monadology and against Newtonian natural philosophy. In his first attempt, only 
35 Maclaurin 1748, 32–33.
36 Clavius 1748. For Clavius see Neumann 2013, 452 f.
37 Clavius 1748, 1.
38 Euler 1746.
39 Clavius 1740, Dedicatory Letter to George II, where he calls Leibniz “Germaniae Pythago-
ram & Socratem, philosophiae instauratorem.”
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preserved in manuscript, he once again affirms the Pythagorean origin of the new 
“modern” monadology of Leibniz and makes Leibniz a modern Pythagoras.40
Thus, contrary to Maclaurin’s Newtonian approach to Pythagoreanism, Clavi-
us used the label “Pythagoras” to dignify the metaphysical concept of the Leibni-
tian monadology. Since Leibniz’s theory of monads offers an explanation of phys-
ical phenomena which is not consistent with Newtonianism, we find the label 
“Pythagorean” attached to theories that are opposed to each other, and indeed 
were even directly confronted with each other within the scientific, theological, 
and philosophical discussions of the eighteenth century.
Consequently, Pythagoreanism could be and was refracted in different direc-
tions, which shows all the more the importance it gained in the course of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a political, scientific, philosophical, and 
theological label and argument.
4 Conclusion
In his Plan Théologique du Pythagorisme, et des autres Sectes Sçavantes de la Grèce, 
published in 1712, the French Jesuit Michel Mourgues used, probably for the first 
time, the term “Pythagoreanism.” Pythagoreanism served as a historical cate-
gory, as a specific coherent system of ideas to which scholars could refer and 
relate, and as an argument used within the communicative structure of the early 
modern Republic of Letters, that is within the publications, letters, debates, and 
discussions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Mourgues may have been the first to apply the term “Pythagoreanism” in the 
title of an early modern book, but in doing so he was only summarizing a long 
process in which, in the early modern period, Pythagorean knowledge estab-
lished itself as an important system of reference. Within this reference system, 
Pythagoras played the role of a travelling genius who was the first to transfer the 
lux ex oriente systematically to the West. Thus the term “Pythagoreanism” simply 
unified oriental wisdom, especially Hebrew wisdom, as well as the later devel-
opment of the Pythagorean tradition in Platonism and Neoplatonism. For Mour-
gues, Pythagoreanism was identical with Platonism, but a Platonism purged of 
the common misunderstandings imputed to the Platonic aspects of the Church 
Fathers’ teachings.
As we have seen, the labels “Pythagoras,” “Pythagorean” and “Pythagore-
anism” could nonetheless be attached to the proponents of quite different, even 
opposed and contrary scientific theories such as those of Newton and Leibniz. 
In this specific context these labels were thought to elevate the scholars and the 
ideas to which they were attached through a particular historical exaltation.
40 Clavius 1747, but see the edition of the text in Neumann 2013, 510: “Monadologia, omnium 
scientiarum fundamentum, vel summa continet scientiarum mysteria, de quibus Pythago-
ras, Socrates, Plato, parum aut nihil publice proponendum statuerunt. Leibnitius Monadolo-
giam oblivioni traditam in lucem iterum protraxit.”
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Pythagoras, the Wandering Ascetic:  
A Reconstruction of the Life of Pythagoras According to  
al-Mubashshir Ibn Fātik and Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a *
Emily Cottrell – Freie Universität Berlin
1 The Medical History of Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa and Its Sources
In 1882, the German Orientalist August Friedrich Müller published in Cairo, un-
der the pseudonym of Imru’ al-Qays b. al- Ṭa ̣h ̣hān1, the ʻUyūn al-anbāʼ fī  ̣tabaqāt al- 
a ̣tibbāʼ (“Sources2 of the Information on the Generations of Physicians” [hereafter: 
“Generations of Physicians”]) written by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a (Damascus, 1203–1270). A 
reprint immediately followed, this time in Königsberg and under his real name, 
after Müller realized that the volume printed in Cairo lacked the notes and criti-
cal apparatus which he had prepared.3 This second edition consisted of a reprint 
of the first two volumes with the addition of a third volume containing several 
introductions and copious annotation.
Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a studied medicine as a youth, and he pursued his quest for 
knowledge throughout his life, resulting in the composition of two versions (at 
twenty-five years of interval) of what should be considered one of the earliest dic-
tionary of medical authorities.4 Heir to a family of physicians, he claimed descent 
from the Arab tribe of the Bānū Khazraj and developed an interest for the history 
∗ Gerda Henkel M4Human / Marie Curie Fellow. I wish to thank heartily Michael Chase 
(CNRS Paris) for his corrections and suggestions; all remaining errors are mine. This article 
is dedicated to the memory of my father, who gave me his love of philosophy, literature and 
translations.
1 Müller 1880–1882 [published under the pseudonym Imru’ al-Qays b. al- Ṭa ḥ ḥān]. The name 
was created in reference to one of the greatest Arabic poet (Imru’ al-Qays, who lived during 
the first half of the 6th c. AD) and juxtaposed to the translation of Müller (the “miller”) into 
Arabic ( ̣ta ḥ ḥān).
2 ʻUyūn, plural of ʻayn (an “eye” but also “a spring, a source”) may refer to “the best, the 
essential,” but because Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa tends to give the sources he used to compile his 
encyclopaedia, I have opted for “sources.”
3 Müller 1884 [published under the name Friedrich August Müller] (hereafter: Müller / Le-
sarten). The critical apparatus for the chapter on Pythagoras established by Müller is to be 
found in this additional volume (Müller / Lesarten, 6–8).
4 On these two recensions, see the introduction to the Königsberg edition by Müller 1884, xvi–
xxi, and the detailed entry on Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa in EI2, vol. 3, 693–694 [J. Vernet]. Müller and 
Vernet differ on the date of composition of the first recension: 1242 according to Vernet, 1245 
according to Müller). The two recensions differ in length and in the addition of new material 
gathered in the course of the author’s continuous readings.
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of medicine among the Arabs and the other “nations,” studying the roots of its 
knowledge and diffusion. His father, uncle and grandfather all held high-ranking 
positions in Cairo and Damascus hospitals during the Ayyubid period, starting 
with his grandfather who had been one of Saladin’s (r. 1169–1193) personal phy-
sicians.5
The Generations of Physicians is composed as a dictionary of surnames, orga-
nized geographically and chronologically. In fifteen chapters and almost four 
hundred biographies, Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a presents his reader with a full history of 
medicine as it was known up to his age. The work was dedicated to Abū al-  ̣Hasan 
Ibn Ghazāl Ibn Abī Saʻīd (d. 1250), a vizier of the Ayyubid court in Damascus 
who was himself a physician.6 In his introduction, Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a addresses 
the different theories of the invention of medicine. Conscious of the difficulty of 
the task, he refers primarily to Galen’s Commentary on the Hippocratic Oath to un-
derline the fact that the early Greek physicians themselves had not reached any 
agreement on the origin of medicine.7 Familiar with the works of Hippocrates 
and Galen, of which numerous Arabic translations were available8, Ibn Abī U ̣say-
biʿa mentions the legends about Asclepius and the existence of a family or a caste 
known as the Asclepiads who claimed descent from his lineage, showing a good 
knowledge of both Galen’s De Sectis and of Hippocrates’ pseudepigraphic Letters.9 
Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a shows a degree of familiarity with historical and geographical 
elements concerning the ancient past of Alexandria, Pergamon, or Rome, and his 
capacity to render Greek names in correct Arabic transliterations is rare enough 
in his epoch – especially for a man who was not himself a translator – to be high-
lighted. In the chapter on Pythagoras, copying from al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik, Ibn 
Abī U ṣaybia reports the (correct) identification of the ancient Heliopolis with the 
district of Aʿyn al-Shams in Cairo where he and his father and uncle reportedly 
5 A vivid description of the role of his uncle is given by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa throughout his own 
autobiographical notes in The Generations of Physicians. See Leclerc 1870, vol. 2, 187–188, and 
the extensive research on Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa’s biography by Anawati 1985.
6 According to Steinschneider, quoted by M. Plessner in his annotation to the draft trans-
lation of the minor recension of The Generations of Physicians prepared by L. Kopf in 1971 
(unpublished except for a digital version by Roger Pearse available at: http://www.tertullian.
org / fathers / ibn_abi_usaibia_01.htm#FN16), he was a Samaritan Jew who had converted to 
Islam. Some of the themes developed by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻa in his introduction find an echo in 
Samaritan literature, such as the role given to Enoch, considered as the Hebrew equivalent 
of Hermes, or the reference to a Book of Cures sent by God to Moses.
7 The fragments of this text have been studied by Rosenthal 1956. The attribution to Galen 
now seems accepted by Jouanna 2012, 263, n.7.
8 See the list of works by Hippocrates and Galen translated by  Ḥunayn ibn Is ḥāq in his Risā-
la  Ḥunayn ibn Is ḥāq ilā ʻAlī b. Ya ḥyā fī 
¯
dikr mā turjima min kutub Jālīnūs bi-ʻ ilmihi wa-baʻ  ̣d mā lam 
yutarjam, edited by Bergsträsser 1925. New edition by Mohaghegh 2001. Galen and Hippo-
crates are each reserved a full chapter in Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa’s medical history.
9 Both texts were available in Arabic translations. The first was translated in his youth 
by   ̣Hunayn ibn Isḥāq under the title Fī Firaq al-ṭibb li-l-mutaʻ allimīn (ed. Sālim 1977). An 
edition of a ninth-century translation of the Pseudo-Hippocratic Letters is in preparation by 
E. Cottrell, forthcoming.
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
469Pythagoras, the Wandering Ascetic
exercised medicine (see infra, translation of the Arabic Life of Pythagoras [here-
after: Ar.], Ar. IX.5). 
The Sources used for the Chapter on Pythagoras
A conscientious scholar, Ibn Abī U ̣saybi῾a mentions his sources, most often at the 
beginning of the quotation, or even by framing the quote with a reference both 
at beginning and end. In the chapter on Pythagoras, four sources are enumerat-
ed:  ̣Sāʻid al-Andalusī [b. Almeria, 1029, d. Toledo, 1070]10; Porphyry [b. Tyre, 234, d. 
Rome, about 305?]11; al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik [d. Cairo, 1087?]12; a “Plutarch” about 
whom no further specification is provided.13
1  Ṣāʻid al-Andalusī
The insertion of chapters on Empedocles and Pythagoras in a book on the history 
of medicine is somewhat surprising. As a matter of fact, the information provided 
by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a on Empedocles in a very short entry (I,36–37 Müller / I,230–
231 al-Najjār), placed directly before his longer entry on Pythagoras, does not 
refer to his medical theories. The Empedocles entry immediately follows a list of 
“philosophers” apparently taken from notes by Is ḥāq b.  Ḥunayn (d. 910) where 
Empedocles appears between Theon [of Smyrna] and Euclides (sic).14 The para-
graph on Empedocles is entirely taken – with the exception of a short bibliography 
consisting of two titles – from  ̣Sāʻid al-Andalusī’s  Ṭabaqāt al-umam (“The Ranks of 
the Nations”), where it formed part of a chapter on the sciences developed within 
the Greek “nation.”15 However, the doctrine attributed by the Andalusian author 
to Empedocles is reduced to some unorthodox beliefs about God’s attributes and 
10 On him, see EI2, vol. 8, 867–868, s. v. “ Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī” [G. Martinez-Gros].
11 See the entry “Porphyre de Tyr” in DPhA, vol. 5/a, 1289–1325 [R. Goulet et al.], which contains 
the biographical and bibliographical introduction to specialized subsections by a number of 
specialists (loc.cit., 1326–1468).
12 On him, see E. Cottrell, “al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik,” in: Lagerlund 2011, vol. 1, 815–818.
13 An Arabic translation of the doxographical text known as the Pseudo-Plutarch’s Opinions 
of the Philosophers was produced by the late ninth-century Christian Qus ṭā b. Lūqā (d. in 
Armenia about 912, see EI2, vol. 5, 529–530, s. v. “ Ḳù ṣtā b. Lū ḳā” [sic, sc. Ḳùs ̣tā] [D. Hill]). The 
translation of Qus ̣tā is faithful to the original – which should be considered as the epitome of 
the Pseudo-Plutarch and not as the larger collection by Aëtius from which it was drawn – ac-
cording to Mansfeld / Runia 1997, 154. The Greek and Arabic versions of the Pseudo-Plutarch 
do not contain biographical information on the authors quoted, while the paragraph quoted 
by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻa (see infra, Ar. XXI) and Ibn al-Nadīm on the authority of this “Plutarch” 
is of a bibliographical nature.
14 Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa,  Ṭabaqāt al-a ̣tibbāʼ, I, 36 Müller /  I,228–229 al-Najjār (the new critical edition 
by Āʿmir al-Najjār, Cairo 2001, does not entirely replace Müller and Müller / Lesarten). 
15 The old edition of Cheikho 1912, should now be replaced with that by Bū Aʻlwān 1985 or 
with the critical edition by Jamšīdnezhad Avval 1998. For my translation below, I relied on 
Müller’s text (after verification of the parallel text, to which Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa makes occa-
sionally minor corrections). A French translation was given by Blachère 1935. The English 
translation by Salem / Kumar 1991 should be used with caution. For the relevant extract, a 
better English translation is provided by Rosenthal 1975, 39–41.
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the destiny of the sinful souls and their return (al-maʻ ād), which seem inspired by 
an Islamic version of Hermeticism and Neopythagoreanism more than related to 
anything genuinely Empedoclean.16 As was already noted by Daniel De Smet, the 
widespread confusion between Empedocles and Proclus in Arabic sources (the 
ducti of both names being close enough) and the vagueness of the doctrine make 
it hard to draw a conclusion on the texts that were available to the author of this 
doxographical extract.17
Right after the paragraph on Empedocles comes the rather long entry on Py-
thagoras (I, 37–43 Müller / I, 231–245 al-Najjār). It is from  Ṣāʻid al-Andalusī again 
that Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a copied the first paragraph of his entry on Pythagoras (see 
infra, Ar. II). The confused entry by  Ṣāʻid al-Andalusī on Pythagoras places him 
“long after” Empedocles (sic).18 His education in wisdom and the sciences is de-
scribed as the result of his encounter with the Solomon’s disciples (for wisdom) 
and with the Egyptians (for the sciences). Later, on his return from Egypt, he 
had introduced them in Greece. Furthermore, he is credited with the discovery 
through his own mental capacities of the science of harmonics, defined as the 
relations of numbers and musical tones, and with the claim he had reached this 
level through prophetic light.19 A comparison of Pythagoras’ theory of “return” 
(i. e. metempsychosis?) with Empedocles’ own doctrine is given, concluding with 
their doctrinal proximity.20 Allusions to Pythagorean ethics and teachings on the 
soul’s purification are finally added, in terms reminiscent of both Porphyry’s Life 
of Pythagoras (hereafter: VP with indication of the paragraph and when necessary-
16 The little-known Mu ḥammad ibn Aʻbdallāh ibn Masarra, an Andalusian ascetic (and per-
haps a Shiite) is mentioned by Sāʻid al-Andalusī as a proponent of the “Empedoclean” doc-
trine which is sketched in two sentences. On him and his beliefs, see Stroumsa / Sviri 2009. 
According to the report, Empedocles held a doctrine of the divine attributes where these are 
united in the One, which remains unattainable. The Godhead would thus be above any attri-
bute, and free from increase and decrease. Barhebraeus, who knew the works of Sāʻid al-An-
dalusī, adds to his own cursory entry on Empedocles (Mu
˘
hta ̣sar al-duwal, 30–31  ̣Sal ̣hānī2) that 
the same doctrine was advocated already by the prophet Salomon, son of David, in the book 
he composed under the name of Qohelet (i. e. the Ecclesiastes). Barhebraeus (or his source) 
compares this doctrine of attributes to that of Sabellius (Mu
˘
hta ṣar al-duwal, 75  Ṣal ̣hānī2).
17 De Smet 1999, 11–12. Moreover, the possibility that the source used by  ̣Saʻid al-Andalusī was 
either Abū al- Ḥasan al- Āʻmirī, the latter’s source (a version of the Pseudo-Ammonius’ Ārāʼ 
al-falasifa larger than the one we possess today but which was known to al- Āʻmirī) or the 
lost Ṣiwān al- ̣hikma points to the fact Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻa is providing here a second-hand extract 
of which he probably had no precise understanding. For De Smet’s analysis of Abū al-  ̣Hasan 
al- Āʻmirī’s report on Empedocles and its parallels in medieval Arabic literature, see loc. cit., 
31–33, 38–58.
18 Two sources probably known to  Ṣāʻid al-Andalusī have doxographical reports on Empedo-
cles and Pythagoras in this very chronological order: the Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology and 
al- Aʻmirī. See further De Smet, loc. cit., 28–32.
19 De Smet (loc. cit., 43–44) gives exhaustive references to the sources where the theme of a 
(Biblical) wisdom attained (or stolen) by the Greek philosophers was developed. 
20 Shortly afterwards,  Ṣāʻid al-Andalusī ascribes Socrates a quasi similar doctrine (following 
again al-ʿ Amirī). The full texts preserved in the Pseudo-Ammonius fragments nevertheless 
show important differences between the two doctrines. See Rudolph 1989, 47 [XII.20].
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with page numbers and lines according to Des Places’ edition) and the Pythag-
orean Golden Verses.21 In conclusion, Pythagoras’ ability to have his soul receive 
(divine) graces is juxtaposed with a capacity for contemplating the spiritual sub-
stances, in a context not unfamiliar to that of Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras (VP 30), 
where Empedocles is quoted as a witness to Pythagoras’ capacities. Ibn Abī 
 U  ṣaybiʿa gives a precise indication for the end of quote from  Ṣāʻid al-Andalusī.
2 Porphyry
The second author mentioned by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a is Porphyry. Oddly, already 
before the beginning of the extract cited as copied from “Book one” of Porphyry’s 
Philosophical History, we find three additional paragraphs (see Ar. III–IV–V) with-
out any indication of a source, and for which the sole Greek parallels known can 
be found in the Life of Pythagoras by the same Porphyry. These same paragraphs 
appear – with some important differences that will now be discussed – at the 
very beginning of al-Mubashshir Ibn Fātik’s entry on Pythagoras, without any 
mention of a source. Moreover, these paragraphs are followed in both authors by 
the Pythagorean symbolae (see Ar. VI), but in the case of Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a, after 
the indication of the Philosophical History as a source (see infra, part 2, “Concor-
dance”). 
Before we return to Ibn Fātik and his own knowledge of the life of Pythagoras, 
we will detail the main differences between Ar. III–IV–V in Ibn Fātik’s and Ibn 
Abī U ṣaybiʻ a’s entries.22 Ar. III is almost identical in both, with the exception of 
the introductory words: “and another one said (wa 
¯
dakara ġayruhu),” in Ibn Abī 
U ṣaybiʻ a, which should be understood as a normal transition after the end of the 
quotation from  Ṣāʻid al-Andalusī and a shift from source, while Ibn Fātik reads 
“and they said (wa 
¯
dakarū),” which is reminiscent of Porphyry’s style in the Life of 
Pythagoras as we know it from the Greek manuscripts and elsewhere in the chap-
ter on Pythagoras in Ibn Fātik (which is believed to be taken from the Philosoph-
ical History, as will be explained shortly).23 The case of Ar. IV, corresponding to 
21  Ṣāʻid al-Andalusī’s extract shows a parallel with Abū al-  Ḥasan al- Āʻmirī (see IV.4–7 in Row-
son 1988, 82 (Ar.) / 83 (tr.)). These paragraphs in turn recall a more extensive fragment of 
the Pseudo-Ammonius known to al-Bīrūnī, where a possible reference to a Neoplatonic in-
terpretation of the Golden Verses (vv. 47–53; 69–71) is to be found. The parallel extracts as 
they can be read in the unicum manuscript of the Pseudo-Ammonius’ Ārāʼ al-falāsifa (fol. 
121r9–13) and in al-Bīrūnī’s India are given by Ziai 1976, 185–202, who was the first to notice 
the possibility of a larger “Pseudo-Ammonius” source known to al-Bīrūnī and to al-Shah-
rastānī.
22 In the following translation (infra, “section 3.” of the present article), I have added between 
brackets the parts of the text which are preserved in Ibn Fātik but not in Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa, 
who was at times willing to abbreviate his source (especially in the “sayings” section of the 
chapter). I have not mentioned in the footnotes or in the additional notes the minor stylistic 
or lexical differences in the two versions and the manuscripts, as these will be mentioned in 
the apparatus of the planned on-line publication of the Arabic text.
23 We should keep in mind that very little is known of the transmission of this text which ends 
abruptly with “historousi…”, see Des Places 1982, 18–27 and Id. 1981, 175–181. Des Places 1982, 
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VP 34–35, is slightly more complicated: Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a provides a full version, 
while Ibn Fātik has seemingly summarized the text in two sentences, in what 
could be a sign of his desire to avoid the contents, either because of complicated 
botanical words in the text or for another reason, related to the interdiction made 
by the Fatimid caliph al-  ̣Hakīm against the consumption of a plant mentioned in 
the recipe, the mallow.24
Another difficulty lies in the fact that Ibn Fātik does not mention his source, 
while Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a does, but only after three paragraphs for which we know 
that the source must also have been Porphyry. A possible explanation would be 
that of the textual transmission, if a careless copyist wrongly inserted a marginal 
note where the source was identified three paragraphs after the place it belonged 
to. The fact that Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a introduces the source shortly before the sym-
bolae (which also occur in Ibn Fātik at the same place, but without indication 
of a source) seems to point to the fact that it is in the margins of this paragraph 
that the source was indicated, at least in some copies of Ibn Fātik. This seems 
confirmed by the fact al-Shahrazūrī gives the reference to Porphyry immediate-
ly after the symbolae, introducing a short sentence corresponding to VP 33 + 39.25 
What follows, Ar. V, is identical in Ibn Fātik and Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a. It seems likely 
that both Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a and al-Shahrazūrī had access to better manuscripts of 
Ibn Fātik or that they used copies which contained additional material, possibly 
in the form of annotations. 
A closer examination of Ar. III shows that it consists of parallels to the Por-
phyrian text, which here seems epitomized and hardly understood, possibly as 
the result of the use of an intermediary source or a sketchy summary of a num-
ber of elements echoing both the Life of Pythagoras (VP 7) and the Golden Verses 
(vv. 10–11; 13–14; 18–19), while Ar. IV is more strictly parallel to Life of Pythagoras 
(VP 34–35), with a few minor differences showing that the text was probably not 
18, refers to Schenkl’s description of the Bodleian manuscript Bodleianus Auct T. 4. 14 (misc. 
gr. 251), fol. 171r–185v. Schenkl considered it to date from the end of the 11th or early 12th cen-
tury; it preserves the best tradition of the VP known today. Schenkl suggested to ascribe the 
scholia on the VP to Arethas of Cesarea (ed. and tr. in Des Places 1982, 34/35).
24 Another author who made extensive use of Ibn Fātik’s Choicest Maxims was Shams al-Dīn 
al-Shahrazūrī (d. after 1287). The fact that he preserves the recipes in his entry on Pythag-
oras would show that either Ibn Fātik’s manuscripts bore them at an initial stage or that 
he found them in Ibn Abī Usaybiʻa (from whom he does indeed borrow elsewhere without 
aknowledgement). In the first alternative, the paragraph could have been left aside by the 
translator and for this reason ended up in the margins and was eventually copied where we 
find it, directly at the beginning of the manuscript. Supporting this hypothesis is the fact 
that VP 34 reappears later in Ibn Fātik, in an extremely abbreviated version as well, but in a 
more coherent place, forming a paragraph with a sentence which may be found in VP 36. See 
infra, part 2, “Concordance” and for al-Shahrazūrī’s use of the text, part 3, introd. and Ar. IV.
25 Al-Shahrazūrī, Nuzhat, 89.11 Abū Shuwayrib, identifies the source as “Furfuriyūs fī taʼrī
˘
hihi” 
(“Porphyry in his History / Chronicle”). On this title, wrongly interpreted by earlier scholars 
as the trace of an independent Chronicle, see Croke 1983. Jacoby’s mistake was probably made 
under the influence of his Karl Müller’s Fragmenta historicorum graecorum, where it also ap-
pears.
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copied from the VP as we know it.26 Ar. IV consists of the recipes of the alima and 
adipsa foods, which Demeter was said to have taught Heracles before his cross-
ing of the Libyan desert.27 These recipes, in which most of the ingredients of the 
kykeon are to be found, were supposedly prepared by Pythagoras before his long 
fasting retreats in the adyta. If Ar. III is somehow related to  Ṣāʻid al-Andalusī’s 
cursory summary of Pythagorean doctrines, Ar. IV is almost unrelated to what 
comes before and after, although health may be seen as a link between Ar. IV and 
V, since both paragraphs deal with a diet and some cures. Ar. V consists of a com-
bination of VP 33 + 39 (and perhaps 30), possibly pointing to a different redaction 
of the chapter on Pythagoras in the Philosophical History. These paragraphs are 
therefore given as an introduction to the Pythagoras chapter in Ibn Fātik, directly 
before a biography which shows, unlike the beginning of the chapter, a very good 
coherence in its organisation. In turn, the knowledge of the recipes of VP 34 by 
al-Shahrazūrī could be an indication that he either had access to a copy of Ibn 
Fātik preserving the full text, as did Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa, or that he used the latter.28
The importance given to the recipes by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a, who decided to keep 
the odd organisation of the beginning of the Pythagoras entry in Ibn Fātik rather 
than inserting the recipes later in the text, at the place where they seem to have 
been originally, is surprising but may be explained by his interest in medicine. 
The insertion of an entry on Pythagoras in a history of medicine may have been 
justified by the allusions to the cures and the special recipes, and their enumer-
ation of the plants used to prepare the food to be taken before spiritual retreats. 
Pythagoras’ knowledge of botany is reminiscent of Pliny’s reference in his Natural 
History (19.94), to a Book on Squills by the philosopher. 
Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa’s interest in botany is well-attested, and the insertion of ma-
terial directly related to medicine may also be the result of his own interest for 
such information. He left for us in the Generations of Physicians a description of 
his excursions with the famous author of a commentary on Dioscorides, Ibn al- 
Bay ̣tār, whom he met while the latter was residing in Damascus (after 1227) at the 
time the Andalusian scholar was engaged in the writing of his great treatise of 
pharmacopoeia, the Jamīʻ li-mufradāt al-adwiyya wa-l-aġdiyya (“Compendium on 
26 The comparison of the Greek and Arabic texts shows that the Arabic text preserves the men-
tion of “hyssop-seeds” in the recipe for the adipson, a plant which is missing from the Greek 
text as known from the manuscripts of Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras. The plants names in this 
paragraph are usually given through a simple transliteration of the Syriac equivalent (which 
in most cases is a loan-word from Greek: almost all the plant names of Ar. IV = VP 34, are to 
be found in Bar Bahlul’s Syriac-Arabic Dictionary [cf. Duval 1888–1901]) and not according to 
the Arabic terminology. This practice reflects that of the early translations and would point 
to a translator who was neither an Arab nor a botanist. On Bar Bahlūl (fl. 10th c.), see Endress 
2001, 165–166. 
27 Porphyry seems to be willing to establish some relation between Pythagoras and the Ele-
usinian Mysteries.
28 The recipes appear in al-Shahrazūrī (94.12–18 Abū Shuwayrib) who copied extensively from 
Ibn Fātik in his Nuzhat al-arwā ̣h. 
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Simple Drugs and Foods”).29 This is an important testimony of scholarly methods 
at the time. One cannot escape the feeling Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a had access to a wide 
range of sources which may not have all been preserved. 
[Ibn al-Bay ̣tār] had travelled to Greece (bilād al-aġāriqa) and through Asia 
Minor (wa-aqsā bilād al-rūm), and he met numerous people who knew this 
art [i. e. botany], from whom he took over his knowledge… The first time 
I met him, it was in Damascus in 633 [= 1235–1236 AD]… Later, I investi-
gated with him Damascus’ surroundings and observed many new plants. 
I was reading with him his commentary on the medical pharmacopoeiea 
of Dioscorides and I could witness his amazing erudition and the depth of 
his knowledge and understanding. I would take with us a number of writ-
ings on the simple drugs, such as those by Dioscorides, Galen, al-Ghafiqī, 
as well as many of the same kind. He would read aloud in Greek what was 
written in Dioscorides, according to the corrections he had made while in 
Asia Minor, and then explain the rest of what Dioscorides had stated of 
their external characteristics, their descriptions and their properties. He 
did the same with Galen and what the latter stated of their characteristics, 
humors and properties and what the moderns had written on the same 
plants, pointing out their mistakes and the confusions they made…30
As mentioned above, the second source quoted by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a is Porphy-
ry’s Philosophical History, which is referred to twice in the chapter on Pythagoras. 
Ar. VI is introduced as an extract of “the first book31 (al-maqālat al-ūlā)” of Porphy-
ry’s Reports on the Philosophers, with their Stories and Sayings32 (fī akhbār al-falāsifa wa- 
qi ̣sa ̣sihim wa-ārāʾihim), while Ar. XX is mentioned with a simple reference to Por-
phyry and the title of the work without specification of the excerpted book. Ar. VI 
gives the first of two occurrences of the Pythagorean symbolae, corresponding 
to VP 42 slightly abbreviated. This corresponds to the fourth paragraph of Ibn 
Fātik’s chapter, although the latter’s preserved manuscripts never provide the 
names of the sources. The second occurrence of the symbolae at Ar. XVIII, be-
longs to the gnomological part of Ibn Fātik’s entry. Interestingly, it is parallel to 
a paragraph wrongly ascribed to Socrates by the Pseudo-Majrịtī with which it 
corresponds in detail, although in an abbreviated version (on the long quotation 
29 See EI2, vol. 3, 737, s. v. “Ibn al-Bay ̣tār” [J. Vernet] and Dictionary of Scientific Biography, vol. 1, 
538–539 [J. Vernet]. His Commentary to Dioscorides’ Materia Medica was published by Mūrad 
1990. For a recent synthesis and bibliography, see Cabo González 1997, 23–39.
30 Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa, II, 133 Müller / III, 500–501 al-Najjār.
31 Maqāla can be translated as “book” or more often, “chapter.” Like Greek logos, it stems from a 
root (q-w-l) conveying the notion of “speech.” Eusebius in his Chronicle (I, 190 Schoene = An. 
Gr. Par. II, 140, 5–16 Cramer) makes use of logos to designate the first “book” of the Philosoph-
ical History.
32 This lengthy title corresponds to the description of Porphyry’s Philosophical History by The-
odoret of Cyrus (Curatio, II, 95 Canivet). It would have included for each philosopher a biog-
raphy as well as doxographical extracts and sayings.
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from al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik’s Choicest Maxims made by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a, see the 
next section (iii) and infra part 2 “Concordance”).33
Ar. XX in turn, discusses the extant books ascribed to Pythagoras and com-
ments on the pseudepigrapha ascribed to him and on their authors. The corrup-
tion of the Greek names in Ar. XX shows that it may have passed into Arabic 
through a number of intermediaries, and possibly through a Syriac translation 
from which the Arabic version may have originated. This seems confirmed by the 
use of (Syriac) Illā
¯
dā for Hellas. This paragraph might have been found in Book I 
of the Philosophical History with the entry on Pythagoras or in Book IV, available in 
a Syriac version in tenth-century Baghdad according to Ibn al-Nadīm’s testimo-
ny, and possibly later throughout the Middle Ages. The extract on the authentic 
Pythagorean books and the forgeries could well have appeared in an entry on 
Archytas (mentioned as the main editor of the genuine Pythagorean texts) or in 
the chapter on Plato (which was included in “book four” according to the frag-
ments preserved in Cyril of Alexandria’s Contra Iulianum). Ar. XX is unique to 
the Generations of Physicians.34 The discovery of these fragments was announced 
with enthusiasm by A. Müller at the international congress of the Orientalists in 
Leiden in 1883, but the use of the excerpt by specialists has remained somewhat 
inconclusive.35
3 Al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik
The third authority mentioned by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa is al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik 
(d. 1087?), a little-known author of Syrian descent who was one of the great schol-
ars of the Fatimid court in Cairo during the first half of the eleventh century and 
a serious bibliophile.36 His only preserved work, the Mu
˘
htar al- ̣hikam wa-ma ̣hasin 
33 The Pseudo-Majrī ̣tī’s Ghāyat al- ̣hakim was written in the same decade as the Choicest Maxims 
(see Vajda 1964, 90). In the final section of the Ghāyat al- ḥakim (414–415 Ritter ed. / 421–422 
Ritter-Plessner translation), we find the symbolae ascribed to Socrates (a mistake al-Shah-
rastānī, who however has a much longer list of symbolae, would also make, cf. Kitāb al-Milal /  
Livre des Religions et des Sectes **872–876 Badrān / Jolivet). The Ritter edition, published in 
Germany in 1933, is hard to find and should be supplemented with the translation, in which 
Pless ner offered a number of important corrections and identifications of the authorities 
mentioned (Ritter / Plessner 1962).
34 A first edition of the paragraph was given in Cottrell 2008, 523–555 and accompanied by a 
translation, which is now replaced by the one offered at the end of this article. A transla-
tion (without the Arabic text or comments) was provided by M. Rashed for Huffman 2005, 
616–617.
35 Müller 1885, 2nd part, section 1, 257–280, see 270. Müller had already mentioned the paragraph 
on the pseudepigraphs in an article written in 1873 for the Festschrift Bernhardy [cf. Müller 
1873]. Van den Waerden 1965, in RE Supp. 10, 843–864, at 862; Id. 1979, 272–273 and Rashed in 
Huffman 2005 (see the previous footnote) focused on the list of forgeries without contextual 
analysis of the fragment. Ehrman’s interpretation of the text is based on a faulty translation 
which we cannot discuss here for lack of space (see Ehrman 2012, 109–110). See infra, part 3, 
“Additional notes” to Ar. XX.
36 In the short biography he gives on him (Generations of Physicians, II, 98–99 Müller /  III, 400–
401 al-Najjār), Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa mentions his own access to Ibn Fātik’s books in autographs 
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al-kilam37 (“The Choicest Maxims and Best Sayings”), was used by Müller for his crit-
ical apparatus to the chapters where Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a was explicitly quoting from 
Ibn Fātik, but it is only in the 1930s that this crucial source began to be studied 
by Franz Rosenthal, who had noticed (after Steinschneider) that it was one of 
the main references used by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a in the chapters on classical Greek 
history and literature.38 It contained a long fragment parallel to Porphyry’s Life 
of Pythagoras, but with a different organisation and some extra material, without 
any mention of a source. Elsewhere in The Choicest Maxims, Rosenthal discovered 
other extracts which he suggested may have originated, directly or not, from Por-
phyry’s Philosophical History.39
In an article – which was to become authoritative for later research – on Por-
phyry’s Philosophical History,40 Rosenthal published in two synoptic columns a 
translation of about one third of the Arabic text given by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a in his 
chapter on Pythagoras in regard to the Greek text of Porphyry.41 He provided 
the reference to the paragraphs of the Greek text of Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras 
according to the Nauck edition (VP 1, 2, 10, 2, 10, 12, 15, 16, 7, 8, 9, 18, 19, 21, 22, 21, 
4, 34, 37, 54, 55, 56, 57). Following Nauck, he considered the Life as a part of the 
Philosophical History and he limited himself to the extracts for which parallels 
could be found in Porphyry’s VP. Rosenthal showed that in spite of a few transla-
tion mistakes and a different organization, the text must have indeed been that of 
Porphyry. Where it differed, such as in the paragraph on Pherecydes, Rosenthal 
suggested that the additional information might have been inserted from a chap-
ter on Pherecydes which might have been in the Philosophical History. The extract 
on the Pythagorean books referred to above (see Ar. XX) was left aside by Rosen-
and the loss of parts of the scholar’s library. See further Rosenthal 1960–1961, 132–158, and 
Cottrell, “al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik,” in: Lagerlund 2011, vol. 1, 815–818.
37 The plural kalim for sg. kalimat is commonly attested, unlike the form kilam. It is the latter, 
however, which should be preferred in order to respect the assonance in the title “Mu
˘
htar 
al- ḥīkam fī ma ḥāsin al-kilam.” “Kilam” is listed among the accepted plurals by the thir-
teenth-century lexicographer Ibn Man ̣zūr in his dictionary, the Lisān al-ʻ arab, under the root 
k-l-m (a fully searchable version is available at http://www.baheth.info) as being used by the 
tribes of Tamīm according to the testimony of Ibn Jinnī.
38 Rosenthal 1937, 21-67. A concordance of the parallels between Ibn Fātik and Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻa 
was given by Id., 1960–1961, 145–147.
39 Rosenthal 1937, 36–40, cf. 36 (on Zeno); 37 (on Diagoras, who might have immediately fol-
lowed the entry on Zeno); 40–43 (on the Solon chapter and the anecdote about the Seven 
Sages and Apollo’s tripod); 47 n.3 (on Pherecydes); 43–56 (on Pythagoras). A semi-critical 
edition of The Choicest Maxims was published by Aʻbd al-Ra ̣hmān Badawī in 1958.
40 Jacoby 1959, and Untersteiner 1963 were among the first classicists to make use of Rosen-
thal’s German version of Ibn Fātik’s text for their own studies.
41 Rosenthal 1937, 41–56. Rosenthal compared Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa with parallels in Ibn Fātik and 
al-Shahrazūrī, two authors about whom very little was known at the time. I have shown 
elsewhere that al-Shahrazūrī took over almost the totality of Ibn Fātik’s Choicest Maxims, 
provided with lengthy quotations from the Munta
˘
hab Ṣiwān al- ̣hikma and al-Shahrastānī, to 
compile his own history of philosophy (the Nuzhat al-arwā ̣h wa Raw ḍat al-afrā ̣h fī taʼrī
˘
h al- ̣hu-
kamāʼ), see Cottrell 2004–2005, 225–260.
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thal because he could not find any Greek parallel.42 More surprisingly however, 
among the paragraphs that were omitted by Rosenthal, some had their equivalent 
in the Life of Pythagoras (such as VP 34). The possible reason for Rosenthal’s omis-
sions is the tradition he used for the reconstruction of the text: Müller’s edition of 
Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a and a couple of manuscripts of the same, two incomplete manu-
scripts of Ibn Fātik and three manuscripts of al-Shahrazūrī representing two dif-
ferent recensions of the latter’s text. This complicated transmission has preserved 
to this day a number of unsolved issues, which are primarily due to the contem-
poraneity of Barhebraeus (d. 1286), Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a (d. 1270) and al-Shahrazūrī 
(d. after 1287) and their use of common sources, sadly not all preserved. Another 
reason for his omissions might have been the desire to preserve a biographical 
coherence, in order to highlight the affinities between the Zeno, Diagoras and 
Pythagoras narratives. This resulted in a simple reference to the paragraph on the 
symbolae of VP 42 that had already been translated from Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a by San-
guinetti.43 The absence of any mention of the recipes of VP 34 remains puzzling, 
and Rosenthal never mentioned it in his later publications. Yet a last reason for 
these shortcomings might have been the date of publication of the article (1936), 
which could easily explain the difficulties he faced travelling within Germany 
and the Netherlands, where the libraries in which the manuscripts of the works 
he was studying were located.
Comparing the Arabic fragment on Pythagoras to the preserved Greek text 
of VP, we find several discrepancies. The first and most visible one lies in the or-
ganisation of the text (cf. infra, part 2, “Concordance”). The second, however, can 
be explained by the numerous misunderstandings committed by the translator.44 
In a certain number of cases though, some of the added details have parallels in 
other late antique sources and for this reason, the apparent disorganisation of the 
Arabic text should not be considered as a reordering of the text by the translator 
but as parallel to the original he had in his hands. What remains to be determined 
is whether the Syriac and Arabic translations were made from the original Por-
phyrian text or from quotations of it by later authors. The Christian theologians 
who preserved most of the fragments of the Philosophical History known today 
and engaged in refuting Porphyry could easily be suspected for the different trac-
es of christianization in the text. But in the details, the numerous parallels with 
Porphyry’s text can only be explained by the fact that the Life of Pythagoras as we 
know it from the Greek manuscripts differed in its organisation (and slightly in 
its contents) from the chapter on Pythagoras in the Philosophical History, unless 
42 Rosenthal 1937, 56, n.1.
43 Ibid., 44, n.1.
44 Ibid., 39, considered the mistakes in the text as traces of a Syrian or a Syriac translator. The 
reason why a Middle Persian original can safely be excluded is the relatively good preserva-
tion of the Greek names.
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Porphyry wrote two recensions of this work throughout his life.45 One does not 
get the same impression when reading the Greek version of the Life of Pythagoras, 
with its enumeration of historians recounting often contradictory facts, and the 
Arabic version, which exhibits a certain coherence, notwithstanding the fact it 
lacks the names of the authorities that were provided in the VP as we know it.46 
Further parallels between our text and the gnomology used to compose the Letter 
to Marcella, i. e. the source of the Sentences of Sextus and of the Puthagoreiai Gnomai, 
should also be studied by specialists before any conclusion can be reached (see 
infra, “Additional notes” to Ar. XVII).47
4  “Plutarch”
The Plutarch paragraph consists in a short introductory sentence giving the name 
of Pythagoras’s father and the place where he was born, followed by a bibliog-
raphy. A parallel to the paragraph given by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a can be found in 
Ibn al-Nadīm’s48 Catalogue (al-Fihrist) (I, 245.16–20 Flügel / p. 306.3–6 Tajaddod), 
achieved in 988. From his own testimony, we know that Ibn al-Nadīm followed 
what seems to have been a current practice, inserting blanks for the possibility of 
adding further information at a later stage, and explicitly asking future copyists 
to continue his task (I, 193.17 Flügel / p. 244 Tajaddod). We should therefore not be 
surprised to find two extra titles (see Ar. XXI) in the Plutarch paragraph of Ibn 
Abī U ṣaybiʻ a, but should refrain from ascribing the addition to either Ibn al-Na-
dīm or Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a rather than to one of the copyists. We cannot determine 
further if Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a used Ibn al-Nadīm or if he copied this paragraph from 
the latter’s source. 
It might be worth noticing that the “Plutarch” extract (see infra, Ar. XXI) follows 
almost immediately in Ibn al-Nadīm’s Catalogue the famous discussion between 
Ibn Suwār and Ibn al-Nadīm about the “first person who discussed philosophy,” 
where Ibn Suwār refers to “Porphyry’s History (fī kitābihi al-ta’rī
˘
h)” as pointing to 
45 Elements in the doxography on Plato show that Porphyry wrote the text known to the 
fifth-century Christian theologians only after his meeting with Plotinus (cf. Cyril of Alex-
andria, Contra Iulianum, 549AB, 916B, 553CD, 552BC = FGrH, 260 F14a, 260 F15, 260 F16, 260 
F17 Jacoby, quoted by A. Ph. Segonds, “Appendice: Les Fragments de l’Histoire de la Philo-
sophie,” in: Des Places 1982, 181–194, at 189–194).
46 The Arabic text does not contain any reference to the sources used.
47 A study of the Pseudo-Demophilus’ collection by Sodano 1991, 61–76, provides a useful 
comparison between the Puthagoreiai Gnomai, the Letter to Marcella, and the gnomology of 
Pythagoras according to Ibn Fātik. However, he does not refer to the gnomology in his sub-
sequent editions of Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras (Sodano 1998) or in his collection of the 
fragments of the Philosophical History (Sodano 1997).
48 “Ibn al-Nadīm” and “al-Nadīm” are both correct, as both our author and his father were 
Baghdadian book-sellers who may have been nicknamed “the boon-companion (al-nadīm)” 
because of their acquaintance with scholars at the court. However, medieval scholars always 
refer to the author of the Fihrist as “Ibn al-Nadīm.” Furthermore, he was primarily known as a 
book-seller, and not as a boon-companion. See EIr, vol. 9, 475–476, s. v. “Fehrest (i.)” [ M. Zakeri /  
R. Sellheim], also available online: http://www.iranicaonline.org / articles / fehrest.
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the fact that it was Thales who had been the first philosopher.49 A short sentence 
(al-Fihrist, I, 245.15–16 Flügel / p. 306.2–3 Tajaddod), which in Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a is 
to be found as inserted within the Plutarch quotations, connects this statement to 
the “Plutarch” extract: “But others said (wa-qāla ākhirūn) that the first to talk about 
philosophy was Pythagoras (Bū
¯
tāġūras), who is Pythagoras son of Mnesarch 
(Mīsār
˘
hs ← *M[n]īsār
˘
hus), from the people of Samos (Sāmīnā ← * Sāmiyyā) and he 
was the first to call philosophy by this name.”50 What follows is a short bibliog-
raphy of Pythagoras. However, the Placita as we know them do not contain any 
bibliographical indication. 
Directly after the bibliography, Ibn al-Nadīm seems to follow the same source 
in stating that the second philosopher after Pythagoras was Socrates (Suqrā ṭ ibn 
Suqrā ̣tīs)51, whose “genuine books” are briefly discussed. An interesting statement 
on the circumstances of Socrates’ death points to a certain degree of confusion in 
the interpretation of past events. According to the report, Socrates was killed by 
the Athenians because he opposed them. The king who allowed his execution is 
given as Artaxerxes (wa kāna al-malik al-la
¯
dī tawallā qi ̣tlahu Ar ̣ta
˘
hašt), but one may 
wonder if the Arabic is not rendering a misunderstood “under the reign of Artax-
erxes,” via a Syriac or a Middle Persian intermediacy. It is after this short report 
on Socrates that Ibn al-Nadīm again mentions “Plutarch” as his source, providing 
this time the full name of Plato (correctly given as “Aflāṭūn ibn Aris ̣tun,” i. e. “Pla-
to son of Ariston”) and an etymology in which Plato’s name is interpreted meta-
phorically as meaning “the eloquent one.”52 “Plutarch” is not quoted as a source 
anywhere else in Ibn al-Nadīm’s Catalogue, but elsewhere in the chapter on phil-
49 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 305.28–306.2 Tajaddod.
50 The change in the orthography of “Pythagoras” (now Bū
¯
tāġūras) shows that Ibn al-Nadīm 
is here shifting sources and should be explain thus: the Greek letter pi is now transliterated 
with an Arabic bāʼ, while in his own notes about the conversation with Ibn Suwār, Ibn al-Na-
dīm was using the (more common in his time) transliteration with a fāʼ. The connecting sen-
tence may stem from the Arabic version of Ps-Plutarch’s Opinions of the Philosophers, cf. Aetius 
arabus, 100.5 Daiber (spelled Fū
¯
tāġūras).
51 Flügel et al. 1872 [the edition of the Fihrist was completed after Flügel’s death in 1870 by A. 
Müller and J. Rödiger], II, 111, suggested that the reading “Suqrā ̣tis” may reflect a prior “So-
phroniscus,” which seems an unlikely hypothesis. This casual way of dealing with foreign 
names has a parallel a few lines before in the reference made by Ibn Suwār to the Philosoph-
ical History and what it stated about Thales as being the first philosopher. The name of the 
Ionian scientist is given in that case as “Thālis son of Mālis al-Amalīsī” (I, 245.14 Flügel) 
where Mālis could either be a mistake for Thālis (repeated by lack of knowledge of Thales’ 
father’s name) or a first attempt to translate “Milesian,” followed by a hypercorrection (“al-
Amalīsī”). The edition of Qus ṭā ibn Lūqā’s translation of the Pseudo-Plutarch reads Thālīs 
al-Mala ̣tī possibly a corruption of al-Mala ̣sī (Aetius Arabus, 3.13 Daiber).
52 The sentence in the Fihrist is roughly parallel to what we read at the beginning of Ibn Fātik’s 
entry on Plato (see the translation by Rosenthal 1965, 28–29). It is of course possible that 
Ibn Fātik used the Fihrist, which he certainly knew. It is also very likely that he had access 
to some of the sources used by Ibn al-Nadīm. Qus ṭā ibn Lūqā provides the same spelling 
for “Plato son of Ariston” in his translation of the Placita (Aetius arabus, 8.1 Daiber) but does 
not give an etymology. On the classical parallels to this etymology see Notopoulos 1939, 
135–145.
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osophical books (Fihrist, chap. VII, 1), Ibn al-Nadīm has two entries on authors 
named “Plutarch.” One of them, he claims, was the author of a single book On 
Rivers and Mountains, while the other one was known for five titles, among which 
are some works known to have been written by Plutarch of Chaeronea.53 None 
of the titles attributed to these two “Plutarchs” refer specifically to philosophers’ 
biographies or bibliographies, but the Arabic translation of Ps-Plutarch’s Opinions 
of the Philosophers by Qus ̣tā ibn Lūqā is duly mentioned, so that it may be taken for 
granted that Ibn al-Nadīm had a copy of such an important work, as he did also 
for other works by Qus ̣tā ibn Lūqā which have not been preserved.
Provisional Conclusion
Research on the Arabic transmission of Porphyry’s Philosophical History is still in 
its early stages. Porphyry’s massive literary output, his versatility, the influence 
of his work on almost each and every Late Antique author (Pagans and Chris-
tians alike) up to Medieval scholars, are among the reasons making the study of 
his works particularly difficult. The study of Porphyry’s works is disputed today 
between historians of philosophy, specialists of patristics or gnosticism, in addi-
tion to the historians of sciences and those of Greek literature, seemingly without 
much confrontation or exchanges. The role played by Porphyry on the develop-
ment of philosophy in the Arab world, first established by Richard Walzer, also 
made him the object of numerous studies by the specialists of Arabic medieval 
philosophy, but the discussion of their findings in the world of classicists remains 
limited.54 Yet, a better knowledge of Porphyry’s philosophical commentaries, of 
his exegesis of ancient history and religions should be further sought before a 
concrete understanding of his diffusion will be reached. To be properly conduct-
ed, such research will require the collaboration of specialists of Greek, Syriac and 
Arabic literatures in their varied aspects. Besides the role of the Christian fathers 
and within the same sphere, a better study of the Syriac chronographers will be 
needed: their use of Eusebius and of Eusebius’ own sources is well attested as is 
also the influence of Cyril of Alexandria’s Contra Julianum.55 Were parts of this 
work available in Syriac and Arabic, as were other treatises by Cyril? 
The history of research on the Philosophical History illustrates this in an exem-
plary way. Early scholarship on the Philosophical History did not take into account 
53 Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, VII, 1, s. v. “Flūtar
˘
hūs,” see the translation by Dodge 1970, vol. 2, 611.
54 This was first acknowledged by Walzer 1965, 273–299.
55 Next to the Isagoge, Porphyry’s most famous work among the Arabic-speaking scholars 
was his edition of Plotinus’ Enneads, mistakenly attributed to Aristotle in the Arabic tra-
dition where it was known as the latter’s Theology (on which see the comprehensive arti-
cle by M. Aouad, in DPhA, vol. 1, 541–570). On the fragments of the Enneads in Syriac, 
cf. DPhA, vol. 5/a, 925–926 [C. D’Ancona]. Cyril transmits a Letter to Tat related to the Corpus 
Hermeticum, which might be identified with the book under this title known to al-Kindī, 
cf. Nock / Festugière 1983, s. v. “Fragments divers,” 140–141, n° 33 (= Cyril, Contra Iulianum, 
588B). On Cyril of Alexandria’s works in Syriac, see Geerard 1979, and Geerard / Noret, 1998 
and 2003, passim.
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the fragments discovered by Müller. Nauck, whose edition of the fragments was 
published in 1886, knew of Müller’s discoveries, but he does not seem to have 
studied them thoroughly.56 His investigation of the Arabic material resulted in 
the inclusion as “Fragment V” of a concatenation of two very different short notes. 
One was a report on Thales being the first of the Seven Sages, as transmitted in 
the Fihrist on the authority of Ibn Suwār, and the other was a chronological in-
dication of Thales’ date reported by al-Shahrastānī in his Kitāb al-milal wa-l-nihal 
and parallel to Barhebraeus’ Arabic Chronology, the Mu
˘
hta ̣sar al-duwal. Much later, 
after Rosenthal’s discovery of the importance of Ibn Fātik’s Choicest Maxims for 
the reconstruction of the Arabic excerpts of the Philosophical History, some interest 
among classicists emerged (in particular, F. Jacoby’s positive comments on Rosen-
thal’s finding of a unique extract on Diagoras was no small matter).57 But ill-luck 
willed that recent studies and editions of the Porphyrian fragments (Segonds, 
Smith, Sodano) relied on Rosenthal’s partial translations and fragmentary edi-
tions without any attempt to investigate the original material and to expand it.58
The portrait of Pythagoras we read in the Arabic Life of Pythagoras is consistent 
with Porphyry’s agenda elsewhere in his work. Pythagoras is depicted as a true 
successor of the Seven Sages, an initiate of Eleusis (through his imitation of Her-
acles), and a disciple of Zoroaster (cf. Ar. VII.14). But the question whether Por-
phyry really placed Zoroaster in the 6th c. BC deserves further research. Should 
we see here an attempt to play down Zoroaster’s antiquity and use him as a tool 
in the controversy against the Gnostics (cf. Plotinus, Enneads, 2.9 and Porphyry, 
Life of Plotinus, 16)? Simultaneously, by confirming the relation between Zoroaster 
and Pythagoras, Porphyry seems to be giving some credit to the Christian haere-
siologists’ reports accusing Pythagoras and Empedocles of dualism, but was this 
part of a strategy to develop his own idea of an evolution towards genuine mo-
nism that would have been achieved only with Plato? 
Although the transmission of a text in the Middle Ages may always go through 
several intermediaries showing little or no respect for the genuine “authority” of 
the text they copy and reassemble, Theodoret’s description of the structure of 
Porphyry’s Philosophical History seems too faithful to the preserved Arabic Life of 
Pythagoras for us to refuse ascribing the latter to Porphyry (a point of importance 
in the case of Ibn Fātik’s evidence, as the Cairene author, unlike Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʿa, 
does not mention his sources). However, if initial evaluation shows that the text 
transmitted by Ibn Fātik corresponds to the description of the Philosophical History 
which was left to us by Theodoret of Cyrus (Curatio, II, 95 Canivet), i. e. that of a 
56 Nauck 1886.
57 Cf. supra, n. 40.
58 A.-Ph. Segonds, ref. supra, n. 45; Smith / Wasserstein 1993; Sodano 1997. To keep this article 
within reasonable dimensions, a development on the history of research on Porphyry’s Phil-
osophical History has been reserved for the online critical edition of the Arabic Life of Phythag-
oras (forthcoming).
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collection including biographies, maxims and doxographical extracts, not much 
is known of the sources used by Theodoret.59 Were they compendia or full texts? 
The fact, that according to Ibn Suwār, two “books” of the Philosophical History 
were translated into Arabic does not seem to provide any further clue wheth-
er these were translated from Greek or from Syriac. But Ibn al-Nadīm’s state-
ment about the availability in his time of the fourth “book” (if this is how maqāla 
should be understood, rather than “chapter”) in Syriac may imply that the two 
other treatises available had been translated from Greek. The greatest number of 
Syriac into Arabic translations were realized during the 8th–10th centuries, so that 
it seems hard to believe the Syriac text had already vanished. Supporting this 
hypothesis is the relatively good preservation of the Greek names in the Arabic 
Life of Pythagoras and the excellent preservation of the names of the Seven Sages 
in the anecdote reported in the Solon chapter of al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik’s Choicest 
Maxims. In contrast, the additional paragraphs known solely to Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa 
(Ar. IV and Ar. XX), i. e. the list of plants used by Pythagoras for retreats and the 
excerpt on genuine and forged Pythagorean works, show possible evidence of a 
Syriac intermediary. As was seen above (section 1.1.2.) Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʿa certainly 
knew enough botany to be innocent of the blunders we find in the Arabic transla-
tion of VP 34 (cf. Ar. IV.2–3). One cannot believe that he did not manage to trans-
late the Greek words for “opium,” “coriander,” or that for “flour.” Moreover, the 
pure and simple transliteration of the names found in the original is a feature of 
old translations, as was noted by M. Meyerhof in his study of the pharmacopoeia 
of Maimonides.60
Barhebraeus’ statement on Porphyry’s Reports on the Philosophers (a
˘
hbār al-falā-
sifa) i. e. the Philosophical History, more than two centuries after Ibn al-Nadīm, 
is puzzling. The passive wujida (in “its fourth book existed in Syriac (wujida minhu 
al-maqālat al-rābiʿa bi-l-suryānī),” Mu
˘
htạsar al-duwal, 78.21 Sal ̣hānī2) might carry the 
meaning that it had been available in the past but was not available to him at 
the time of writing (something which in the midst of the Mongol invasion was 
not impossible). According to Notopoulos however, Barhebraeus’ Syriac Chronicle 
shows traces of a text he believes may have been Porphyry’s life of Plato, which 
59 The Graecarum affectionum curatio was composed ca 437, around the same time Cyril of Alex-
andria achieved his Contra Iulianum (before 440), although Theodoret was slightly younger 
than the Alexandrian. A better understanding of the place of their respective works (and 
of that of Eusebius, on which they draw repeatedly) in the diffusion of Plotinus’ Enneads 
to the Syriac and Arab world remains a desideratum: both transmit excerpts from the very 
same Plotinian treatises we find in good order in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology and its 
related works, referred to as the Plotiniana Arabica (on which see Aouad, in: Goulet et al. 1989, 
and the introduction and concordance to the translations established by G. Lewis, in Hen-
ry / Schwyzer 1959 a).
60 Meyerhof 1941, vi–vii.
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belonged to book four of the Philosophical History.61 This would imply that either 
Barhebraeus used this information from an intermediary source or that it was 
indeed available to him at some point, thus pointing to the continuous availabil-
ity of the fourth book until the Syriac bishop’s time, i. e. the thirteenth century, 
which was also the epoch when Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a’s lived and may have consulted 
it.62 This would explain the unique fragments found in Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a, such 
as the paragraphs on the forgeries, a paragraph which was possibly taken from 
book IV, where Plato’s attempt to collect the Pythagorean books may have been 
mentioned. 
The impression of a Christianized text emerges from the sayings ascribed to 
Pythagoras in the Arabic tradition, known to Ibn Fātik and copied from the lat-
ter’s Choicest Maxims by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a. They have been shown to be related 
to gnomological collections that were already known to Porphyry, such as the 
Puthagoreiai gnomai, which were also used by Porphyry to compose his Letter to 
Marcella.63 But the formulation of the Arabic sayings shows distinct Christian fea-
tures, similar to those found in the Arabic VP, such as the replacement of “gods” 
with “angels.”64 The question then arises of the possibility that the lost folios of 
the Greek VP did contain the gnomology we can read in the Arabic Life of Pythag-
oras (cf. Ar. XVII–XVIII, sayings M1 to M91).
Finally, let us turn briefly to what the Medievals made of this ancient erudition. 
Al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik’s Choicest Maxims were the object of an extraordinary 
diffusion all along the Middle Ages, first pointed out by Franz Rosenthal, who 
corrected some of the earlier hypotheses made by Knust and Franceschini on the 
basis of the medieval Spanish and Latin translations. According to him, the Ar-
abic text, composed in Cairo, quickly reached Spain where it was translated into 
Old Spanish and from this translation, passed into Latin.65 At this stage already, 
the text was adapted for Spanish readers and preserved mainly the sayings, while 
the biographical information and its garbled Greek names were left aside. From 
then on, the Choicest Maxims were read in Old French and Old English (the famed 
Dicts and Sayings of the Philosophers was among the first books printed by Caxton 
on English soil) and constituted with Diogenes Laertius an important source of 
61 Notopoulos 1940, 284–293. According to Eunapius’ Lives of the Sophists the Philosophical His-
tory ended with Plato. On Eunapius and his proximity to Emperor Julian’s circle, see De 
Labriolle 1934, 362.
62 The testimonies of the Suda and Tzetzes show that the Philosophical History could still be read 
in Greek in 10th–11th c. Byzantium.
63 Gutas 1975, 268–269; 486–487. Sodano 1991, 61–76. Knust 1879 already pointed out to the main 
gnomologies and to the Golden Verses and symbolae in his annotation to the chapter on Py-
thagoras in the Bocados de Oro, i. e. the medieval Spanish translation of the Choicest Maxims.
64 The same device is used by  Ḥunayn ibn Is ̣haq in his translation of the Golden Verses, cf. his 
Ādāb al-Falāsifa, 116–119 Badawī.
65 Rosenthal 1960–1961, 132–158, at 143–144. As was first noticed by Rosenthal, the Old Span-
ish and the Old French that derives from it tend to skip biographies in favor of sayings. 
Cf. Knust 1879; Eder 1915, 928–933. The Latin text was published by Franceschini 1931–1932, 
393–597.
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information on Pythagoras for the medieval scholars. During the first half of the 
seventeenth century, an Arabic manuscript of the Choicest Maxims made its en-
trance to the Leiden University Library. It was used by Johannes Elich mann, a 
close friend of Golius and Descartes, to produce what is probably the first edition 
of the Arabic version of the Golden Verses.66
In the East too, The Choicest Maxims were read, not solely in Syria by scholars 
such as Ibn al-Qif ̣tī and Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a, but throughout Iraq and Iran, where 
al-Shahrastānī and al-Shahrazūrī made profitable use of the text to compose their 
own histories of philosophy. The latter in particular realized in his Nuzhat al-Ar-
wā ḥ a complete reworking of Ibn Fātik’s text, slightly abbreviated. Shahrazūrī’s 
text, composed during the second half of the thirteenth century, was translated 
into Persian during the fifteenth century, and continuously copied in this lan-
guage in Iran and India during the subsequent centuries.67 Moreover, the Ara-
bic original of al-Shahrazūrī’s Nuzhat kept being copied in the Persian-speaking 
world, as attested by a manuscript stemming from the court of Golconda now in 
Berlin.68 Ibn Fātik’s Choicest Maxims and the Ṣiwān al- ̣hikma thus became, thanks to 
the extensive citations made by al-Shahrastānī, Ibn al-Qif ̣tī, or al-Shahrazūrī, the 
reference tools of erudites who sought information on the history of philosophy.
But let us ask now what kind of appeal these ancient narratives on the “philo-
sophical way of life” and their accompanying maxims and anecdotes – cultivated 
as they were by both Pagans and Christians – had for the Medievals? An insight 
into the answers lies in al-Shahrazūrī’s testimony, where his understanding of the 
paedagogical role of ethics is explained in such a way that his own philosophical 
sensibility comes forth.
The enlightened man must read, and the scientist learn and teach, the 
chronologies of the ancient sages and inspired philosophers of the Greeks 
and Egyptians. Likewise, they must know their words of wisdom, their 
edifying anecdotes and their sublime and exemplary lives. It is incumbent 
upon whomever seeks eternal felicity to consider their deeds, their speech-
es, and their ways of life in detail, if he wishes to take them as guides and 
models. For taking up the path leading to God – may He be exalted – in 
their footsteps is an immense blessing, a generous gift and a great lesson. 
Indeed, whoever examines the secrets of the Divine kingdom (lāhūt) and 
fervently wishes to observe the lights of the Lord’s realm (malakūt), should 
not model his comportment on anyone other than these pillars (asā ̣tīn) [of 
wisdom] nor let others guide him. Only the lights of excellent sages and 
sent prophets must lead him. Nor should he lean upon one of the sons of 
demons, [and be among those] whose efforts in this life go astray while 
66 Number 64 of the Golius collection (= cod. ar. 1488). 
67 See Rosenthal 1960–1961; Cottrell, 2004–2005.
68 Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, MS Or. Oct. 217 (= Landberg 430), copied in 782/1380. I owe the 
identification of the provenance of this manuscript to Francis Richard, whom I thank heartily.
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they think they are working good deeds.69 These times lack such virtuous 
men and all creatures – except those God wished to spare – are steeped 
in ignorance. Therefore, if you are among the serious researchers and the 
well-guided men of reason, you must follow their example, examine the 
veracity of what is told about them, and contemplate them inwardly70 so 
that your actions and words will proceed from this method and reach this 
model. And perhaps through this personal effort, you will join their com-
munities, share their intimate beliefs and contemplate the greatest secrets, 
that had been concealed after them. You cannot hope to contemplate all 
this without a pure behaviour and an extreme austerity. [And know that] 
to abstain from this world is akin to the shedding of its skin by a snake.71
Pythagoras, a Greek from Samos who traveled to Southern Italy in the early 
sixth-century BC and died there after the communities claiming his influence un-
derwent political upheavals, was made into a “father of mathematics” in Western 
culture. In the East though, it was rather for his ethics that he was remembered.72 
One may wonder if the Pythagorean revival in first-century BC Rome was the 
unique factor leading in the diverging path taken by Western Pythagorism. Be-
side the absence of Pythagorean books in Hellas, attested by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a’s 
fragment on genuine and forged Pythagorean texts (Ar. XX.22), Platonism might 
have played a role in the extinction of the scientific tradition attached to Pythag-
oras’ name in the East, even more so after the complete assimilation of the latter 
into what we know today as Middle-Platonism and Neoplatonism. It is likely that 
69 An expression borrowed from Qurʼān, 18:104.
70 I read fa-ma
¯
t
¯
tilhum bayna ʻaynayka, with a slight modification of the vocalization suggested 
by Abū Shuwayrib.
71 Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī, Kitāb Nuzhat al-arwā ḥ, 33–34 Abū Shuwayrib / 3–4 Khurshid 
A ḥmad. Cf. Porphyry, Cave of the Nymphs, 34, for a similar call to asceticism as a purification 
of the soul.
72 The role of the Syriac-speaking Christians remains to be studied. There is no doubt that 
the wide diffusion of the symbolae and of the commentaries on the Golden Verses among 
Christians played a crucial role in the use of these texts among Muslim scholars. It was 
Abū al-Faraj Ibn al- Ṭayyib (d. 1043), the secretary to the Jacobite patriarch in Baghdad, who 
translated into Arabic the Commentary of the Golden Verses attributed to Proclus (ed. by Linley 
1984). This commentary, which according to Linley (whose translation is often faulty) does 
not resemble that by Hierocles, pace Walzer, does contain an anecdote on Theano known 
elsewhere solely from another work by Proclus, the De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam. 
The orthographic features and vocabulary of the commentary studied by Linley show the 
deep influence of Christian Arabic, possibly under the double influence of Ibn al- Ṭayyib 
and from the fact it may have been made out of a Syriac version (known to Ibn al-Nadīm). 
This text should be studied in comparison with the first section of the gnomology contained 
in the Arabic Life of Pythagoras (cf. infra Ar. XVII) the Greek original of which lays behind 
the commentary of the sayings forming what we know as the Letter to Marcella. Guillau-
mont 1962, highlighted the role of Neopythagoreanism in Evagrius’ thinking. On the role of 
Origen’s allegorical interpretations among Late Antique fathers, Muslim philosophers and 
mystics, cf. Gobillot 2002, 161–192.
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the assimilation of Platonic and Stoic thought engaged by the Cappadocian fa-
thers led to a further fall into oblivion of Pythagoreanism. Thābit ibn Qurra, one 
of the greatest scientists of the ninth century, states that no book by Pythagoras 
was available to him. Thābit’s culture was deeply rooted in his  Ḥarrānian back-
ground and his statement implies that no genuine scientific text by Pythagoras 
was known in his time, be it in Syria or in Iraq, where he had become one of 
the most important translators of the Abbasid court.73 However, the handful of 
his works which survived and the greater legacy of the Graeco-Arabic transla-
tion movement show that the study of mathematics and astronomy continued 
in the Eastern Mediterranean through the widely available texts of Nicomachus 
of Gerasa and Ptolemy. As for the Eastern Christians such as Ibn Suwār or Ibn 
al- Ṭayyib and those who kept reading Neopythagorean ethics and cultivating the 
myth of a “divine” Plato, they were hardly remembered.
2 Concordance
It was not possible to represent all the differences, parallels or accidents in the 
texts in this concordance (especially for Ar. IV, XI and XIV). A full representa-
tion would require providing a synoptic view using the translated text to help 
non-Arabist readers follow the different versions. The places were Ibn Abī U 
ṣaybiʻ a differs from al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik are but a few, and we must admit 
that the chapter on Pythagoras in Ibn Fātik (and consequently, this section of the 
chapter in Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a) are not entirely taken from Porphyry. The testimony 
of al-Shahrazūrī may help in understanding the eventual additions of the manu-
script of the Choicest Maxims to which both he and Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻa seem to have 
had access, but this point could not be addressed here. 
I used the following letters: c for “complete,” and a for “abbreviated,” to ex-
plain whether the text of Ibn Fātik (= Mub) copied by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a (= IAU) is 
given in full or abridged. In the following translation (cf. infra, part 3), the addi-
tional material of Ibn Fātik is given between square brackets.
73 Munta
˘
hab Ṣiwān al- ḥikma, §254, 124, ll. 2719–2725 Dunlop. Thābit adds that “even two hun-
dred years before [his] time, the Pythagorean scientific theories were already fully lost.” 
Ibn al-Nadīm (Fihrist, II, 252.17–18 Flügel), however, states that Thābit had started a trans-
lation of Proclus’ Commentary on the Golden Verses but died too early to complete it. It is not 
possible to ascertain that the commentary known to Thābit was the one later translated by 
Ibn al- Ṭayyib and published by Linley. In the absence of any trace of Thābit’s translation, it 
could also well have been Hierocles’ Commentary, since the ducti for “Proclus” (*Br[u]ql[u]s) 
and that for “Hierocles” (*Īr[u]ql[i]s) in Arabic are indeed very close, as was noted long ago 
by Walzer (cf. Linley, loc. cit., vi, n. 15). Bibliographers such as Ibn al-Nadīm could very well 
have confused both works.
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IAU Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fātik  
(ed. Badawī)
VP (ed. Des Places) and other  
Pythagorean material
I –
II – Cf. supra part 1.
III I (52.11–17 Badawī) c
III.1 7 (38.26–39.4 Des Places)
III.2 39 (53.24–54.2 Des Places) + Golden 
Verses, vv. 10–11, 13–14, 18–19
III.3–5 Passim + ?
IV II (52.17–53.2 Badawī = 
VP 34–35 strongly abbrevi-
ated)
34–35 (51.25–52.26 Des Places)
V III (53.2–3 Badawī = VP 33 
strongly abbreviated)
33 (51.16–23 Des Places) + 39 
(53.22–24 Des Places) (+ 30, 50.2–4 
Des Places)
VI.1 – IAU gives his source (= Porphyry)
VI.2 – 28–29 (49.12–16 Des Places)
VI.3–10 IV (53.3–12 Badawī) c 36 (53.2–3 Des Places)? + symbolae 
from VP
42 (55.11–56.5 Des Places)
VII.1 – IAU gives his source (= Mub)
VII.2–15 V (53.13–55.5 Badawī) c 1 (36.1–2 ; 36.5 Des Places) + 2 
(37.4–8 ; 36.14–16 Des Places) + 10 
(40.14–16 Des Places) + 1 (36.5–6 Des 
Places) + 2 (37.1–4 Des Places) + 10 
(40.23–24 ; 41.1–2 Des Places) + 11 
(41.3–6 Des Places) + 11–12 (41.7–22 
Des Places)
VIII VI (55.5–56.1 Badawī) c 15 (42.16–18 Des Places)? + 55 (62.24–
28 Des Places)? + ? (cf. DL VIII,3 + 
DL I, 117–118)
IX VII (56.1–57.7 Badawī) c 7–8–9 (39.6–40.10 Des Places) + 16 
(43.1–4 Des Places)
X VIII (57.7–58.8 Badawī) c
X.1–4 VIII (57.7–58.2 Badawī) c 18–19 (44.1–18 Des Places)
X.5–8 VIII (58.3–8 Badawī) a
Mub has a different list of 
cities compared to VP 22
20–21–22 (45.3–46.14 Des Places) 
IAU X.6 reduces the list of cities to 
“the people of Tauromenium”
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IAU Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fātik  
(ed. Badawī)
VP (ed. Des Places) and other  
Pythagorean material
XI IX (58.8–13 Badawī) c 4 (38.1–9 Des Places)
XII X (59.1–5 Badawī) a [IAU 
abbreviates the chronology 
of Pythagoras’ life]
–
XIII XI (59.6–11 Badawī) c 34 (p. 51.25–p. 52.6); 36–37  
(p. 53.2–4)
XIV XII (59.11–61.8 Badawī) c 54–57 (62.6–64.12 Des Places) 
strongly abbreviated and rear-
ranged
XIV.1 XII (59.11–60.1 Badawī) 55 (62.22–24 Des Places)?
XIV.2–4 XII (60.1–5 Badawī) 54–55 (62.6–18 Des Places)
XIV.5 XII (60.5–6 Badawī) 56 (63.7–10 Des Places)
XIV.6 XII (60.7–8 Badawī) –
XIV.7–12 XII (60.8–61.8 Badawī) 56–57 (63.10–64.12 Des Places)
XV XIII (61.9–12 Badawī) c Cf. infra “Additional notes,”  
to Ar. XV.
XVI – IAU gives his source for the sayings 
(= Mub)
XVII XIV (62.1–70.3 Badawī) a Cf. PG + GV + Letter to Marcella?
XVIII XIV.91 (70.4–8 Badawī) c Second version of the symbolae. 
Cf. infra “Additional notes.”
XIX XV (70.9–72.10 Badawī) a
XX – IAU gives his source (= Porphyry)
XXI – Cf. supra section iv of part 1.
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3 Translation of the Arabic Life of Pythagoras according to al-Mubashshir 
ibn Fātik (d. 1087?) and Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻa (d. 1270), based on Porphyry’s 
Philosophical History and other sources
As explained in the introduction above, Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa (Ar. III–XIX) abbrevi-
ated Ibn Fātik’s text, to which he added a paragraph for which no other parallel 
has been found (Ar. XX), while Ar. IV, parallel to the Greek VP 34–35, is known to 
al-Shahrazūrī, who wrote the first draft of his Kitāb Nuzhat al-arwā ̣h shortly after 
the Generations of the Physicians was composed.74 Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʿa did not interfere 
with the succession of the paragraphs in Ibn Fātik, and for this reason it has been 
possible to insert in brackets within the text taken from the Generations of the Phy-
sicians the additional material from the Choicest Maxims that was skipped by Ibn 
Abī U ṣaybiʿa. The omissions especially occur in the gnomology, which did not 
really belong to the scope of an encyclopaedia devoted to the history of medicine. 
Within the text and notes, al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik is abbreviated as Mub, while 
in the gnomology, the additional sayings in the Choicest Maxims are numbered 
according to their rank in the text, preceded with the letter M for Mubashshir.
In the annotation to the translation below, priority has been given to the un-
derstandability of the text for readers of different disciplines. Most of the dis-
crepancies with the Porphyrian text can be explained as translation mistakes, but 
listing these mistakes was not the initial objective, and it would have required the 
cooperation of a specialist of Porphyry. Rather, we attempted to provide the pos-
sible scribal corruptions which explain part of these mistakes, elucidating the vo-
cabulary used, and describing the context of the allusions made in the text. Both 
translation and transliteration mistakes have been marked between asterisks so 
that the reader knows he will find further explanation either in the footnotes 
or in the additional notes at the end of the translation. We refrained from using 
here the erudite footnotes provided by the different editors and translators of the 
Greek Life of Pythagoras by Porphyry or those to the fragments of the sources he 
himself used, but we hope these will find a place in a full online commentary of 
the text in which interdisciplinary scholars willing to discuss the multifarious 
aspects of this text will participate. The Arabic Life of Pythagoras, we believe, is 
a paradigmatic representative of the early Medieval reception of a Late Antique 
narrative involving figures of the mythical past.75
74 Cf. al-Shahrazūrī, Kitāb Nuzhat al-arwā ̣h, 94 Abū Shuwayrib. The paragraph is missing from 
the short recension (edited by Khurshīd A ̣hmad 1976). However, al-Shahrazūrī refers to Por-
phyry as pointing out to the 280 books composed by Pythagoras and preserved in “Antioch” 
(a common mistake for “Italy,” as both An ̣tākiyā and I ̣tāliyā have very close ducti), an infor-
mation he must have found in a parallel to Ar. XX. In the same breath, al-Shahrazūrī adds 
without explicit mention a source that Pythagoras lived during the end of the captivity of 
the Jews in Babylon (i. e. ca 538 B.C., under Cyrus the Great, cf. Augustine, City of God, XVIII, 
37 who places Pythagoras’ acme at the time).
75 A more extensive introduction on the state of research regarding the fragments of the Philo-
sophical History in Arabic will hopefully be published online in a reasonable future with the 
Arabic text and critical apparatus (although we consider that Müller’s text remains perfectly 
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The Life of Pythagoras, translated from the Arabic
I.1 Pythagoras (Fī
¯
tāġūrs). 2 [also:] Fū
¯
tāġūrās, Fū
¯
tāġūrs and Fū
¯
tāġūrīyā’.
II.1 The Qā ḍī  Ṣā‘id wrote in The Book of the Ranks of the Nations: 2 “Pythagoras 
(Fī
¯
tāġūras) comes long after Empedocles. 3 He studied wisdom ( ḥikma) with the 
companions of Solomon, son of David – peace be on both of them – in Egypt, 
where they had arrived from Syria. 4 He had already learnt geometry with the 
Egyptians. 5 Then he returned to Greece where he introduced this science, to-
gether with the natural sciences (ʿ ilm al- ̣tabīʿa) and religious science (ʿ ilm al-dīn). 
6 He deduced, from his own intelligence, the science of melodies, the composi-
tion of sounds (ta’līf al-naġam) and placed them under numeral relations (al-nus-
ab al-ʻ adadiyya), and claimed he had learned this from the window of prophecy 
(miškat al-nubuwwa). 7 He made odd allusions and symbolic explanations about 
the stratification (na ḍad) of the world and its organization along the properties 
of numbers and their classification. 8 On the question of the Return (al-maʿ ād), 
he held positions close to those of Empedocles, among which: beyond the world 
of Nature exists a spiritual luminous world, the beauty and splendour of which 
elude the intellect, and to which purified souls are yearning. 9 [Also] that man 
improves his soul’s rectitude by purifying himself from vanity, pride, hypocrisy, 
jealousy and other bodily passions. 10 Thus he was able to access the spiritual 
world and to perceive what he wished of its essences (min ğawāhirihi) and this, 
thanks to divine wisdom (al- ̣hikma al-ilāhīyya). 11 As well, what is pleasant to the 
soul comes in an uninterrupted way, as melodies are heard, effortlessly. 12 Py-
thagoras composed on the laws governing arithmetics and music among other 
topics.” 13 End of [Qā ̣dī  Ṣāʻid]’s discourse.
III.1 Someone else (wa 
¯
dakara ġayruhu) reported that Pythagoras the Sage pro-
fessed journeys (kāna yarā al-siyā ḥa) and avoided contact with both those who 
killed and the victims. 2 And that he ordered: the purification of senses; learn-
ing to act with justice; [to practice] the totality of virtues; abstaining from faults; 
searching for human graces in order to know the nature of everything. 3 He [also] 
ordered mutual affection; education through the explanation of celestial sciences; 
fighting against bad leanings, as well as the impeccability of souls and the ap-
prenticeship of spiritual effort (ji ̣hād) ; the frequency of fasting; sitting on chairs; 
the assiduity to read books, and also that men teach men and women teach wom-
en. 4 He ordered an excellence of elocution (jawdat al-man ̣tiq) and the exhortation 
of kings. 5 He also mentioned the eternity (baqā’) of the soul and its subsistence 
after death, whether in reward or punishment, according to the opinion of the 
divine sages.
commendable, it was important to verify the manuscrits he used as far as possible and to 
complete his work with the parallels offered in the manuscripts of Ibn Fātik and al-Shah-
razūrī that were unknown to him).
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IV.1 And when Pythagoras the Sage *presided the sanctuaries and became supe-
rior to the priests*, he began to nourish himself with foods which do not stir up 
appetite or thirst. 2 As to these foods, he prepared poppy seeds (mīqūniyūn) and 
sesame seeds, and scilla husks (qišr asqāl) well-washed to the bulb; as well as *an-
thericus, asphodel*, flour, chickpeas and barley. He would mash and mix a mea-
sure of each together, [binding them] with a kind of honey called *amī ̣tīyyū*.76 3 In 
order to avoid thirst, he would prepare cucumber seeds and seeded large grapes, 
coriander flowers and corete (qūryūn) seeds, as well as *hyssop (asūfa) seeds* and 
purslane seeds, a sort of *cheese*77(jubn) known as *fils ṭamūs*78 and cereal flour. 
He would mix [it all] with *wild mint / basil* honey ( ̣hābūq). 4 The Sage reported 
that Heracles had learned these two recipes from Demeter on his way to the Lib-
yan desert. 5 Pythagoras imposed on himself a balanced diet, and was not once 
healthy and another time sick, just as he was not alternatively fat and thin. 6 He 
had a very pleasant soul and was not alternatively joyous or excessively sad. And 
no one ever saw him laugh or cry. 
V.1 He always considered his companions above himself. 2 It is also said (wa 
yu ḥkā) that he was the first to say that his friends’ possessions were collective 
and indivisible. 3 He cared about the health of healthy people and cured the ones 
whose bodies were aching and the afflicted souls, either with oracles (takahhun), 
or thanks to divine melodies (al-al ̣hān al-ilāhiyya) with which he [also] cured bodi-
ly pains. 4 He ordered to return any entrusted deposit and not only money and to 
keep one’s word as well as being faithful to promises.
VI.1 Porphyry wrote in the first book / chapter (al-maqāla al-ūlā) of his book (Re-
ports on the philosophers, with their stories and sayings (Fī a
˘
hbār al-falāsifa wa qi ̣sa ̣sihim 
wa ārā’ihim), 2 strange stories about Pythagoras, including his predictions and 
what is attributed to him of miracles (muġayyabāt) told by himself or by witnesses, 
as he had announced. 3 He would confide his wisdom in symbols, hiding it be-
hind a veil. Among his enigmas, he would say this: 4 Do not overweigh the scale, 
i. e. “avoid excess.” 5 Do not poke the fire with a knife, for it has been heated in fire 
before, or “avoid a provocative word with an irascible man when he is furious.” 6 
Do not sit on the bushel (qafīz), or “do not live in idleness.” 7 Do not walk by wild 
lions, or “do not follow the opinion of young men (murd).” 8 Do not keep company 
with house swallows, or “do not imitate boasters and prattlers, among others who 
cannot keep their tongue.” 9 Do not grab anyone’s burden but help him carry it, 
or “Do not neglect your own affairs [be it in the domain] of virtues or in that of 
duties.” 10 Do not cover with images of *angels (al-malā’ika)* the settings of your 
76 Gr. “Hymettian” was not understood by the translator, who left it in transliteration.
77 Scribal corruption of 
˘
hubz (“bread,” cf. VP 34 and “Additional notes” on the rendering of this 
paragraph in the Arabic version): 
78 Scribal corruption of unidentified Gr. knesteos, left in transliteration (                             ).
Footnotes 
 
Scribal corru tion of ḫubz (“bread,” cf. VP 34 and “Additional notes” on the rendering 
of this paragraph in the Arabic version  : ﺰﺒﺧ → ﻦﺒﺟ  . 
 
Scribal corruption of unidentified Gr. knesteos, left in transliteration: 
سﻮﻤﻄﺴﻠﻓ  سوﺎﺘﺳﺎﻨﻗ→  . 
 
For Gr. Imbros (probable confusion of the Syriac bēṯ  ܒ and kāp    ). This points to a 
possible Syriac interpolation within the paragraph, the full extent of which is still to 
determine. 
 
Scribal confusion  ﺎﻴﻠﻄﻳا → ﺎﻴﻜﻄﻧأ . 
 
MSS : Zārabāṭā. Emended ( ﺎﻃﺎﺑراز → زﺎﻃﺎﺗرا ). The final -ṭā should be identified as a 
suffix mark in Syriac. 
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rings, or “do not publicly declare your belief and make the secrets of divine sci-
ences available to ignorants .”
VII.1 The Prince al-Mubashshir b. Fātik reported (qāla) this: 2 Pythagoras’ father 
was named Mnesarchus (Mnīsār
˘
hūs), from the people of Tyre (Ṣūr). 3 [Pythag-
oras] had two brothers, the elder was Eunostus (Awnūstūs) and the other one 
Tyrrhenus ( Ṭūrīnūs). 4 His mother was Pythais (Bū
¯
tāīs), daughter of a man called 
Ankaius (Ajqāyūs), who lived in Samos (Sāmūs). 5 When the three tribes of Lem-
nos (Līmnūn), *Imqros* (Imqrūn)79, and Skyros (Sqrūn) defeated Tyre and settled 
there, the inhabitants deserted. Pythagoras’ father also left and he lived [near] the 
*lake* (al-bu ̣hāyra).80 6 He then traveled to Samos, seeking fortune. He settled there 
and became a respected man. One day, traveling to *Antioch* (An ̣takīyā) [i. e. Italia 
< *Ay ̣talīyā]81, he took Pythagoras with him so that he could see it, as it was a joy 
[to the eyes] and very fertile. 7 [The writers] report (wa 
¯
dakarū) that Pythagoras 
went back and settled there after having seen its beauty. 8 When Mnesarchus left 
Tyre to live in Samos, [he took] with him his sons Eunostus, Tyrrhenus and Py-
thagoras.82 9 The chief (ra’īs) of Samos, Androcles, adopted Pythagoras and took 
care of him, as he was the younger brother, and that his young age made him 
the most fit to receive the teachings of literature, grammar, and music. 10 Once 
he became a young man, he went with him to the town of Milet (Mīlī ṭūn) and 
entrusted him to Anaximander (Anāksīmāndrūs) the Sage, so that he would learn 
geometry, [i. e.] surveying, and astronomy. 11 When Pythagoras had mastered 
these two arts, his love for science and wisdom became stronger and he traveled 
many a country in that search. 12 He visited Chaldeans (kaldāniyyīn), Egyptians, 
and several more. 13 He sojourned among the priests and from them learned wis-
dom; he became proficient in the Egyptian language and its three calligraphies: 
the popular writing (
˘
ha ̣t ̣t al-‘āmma), the writing of the elite (
˘
ha ̣t ̣t al-
˘
hā ̣s ̣sa), which is 
the abridged writing of the priests, and the Royal writing (
˘
ha ̣t ̣t al-mulūk). 14 When 
he stayed in *Heraclea* (Arāqlīyā < Arābiyya)83, he became close to the king, and 
79 For Gr. Imbros (probable confusion of the Syriac bē
¯
t   and kāp   ). This points to a possible 
Syriac interpolation within the paragraph, the full extent of which is still to determine.
80 For Gr. Lemnos (resulting from a confusion with Gr. limnè as noticed by Schaeder in a com-
munication to Rosenthal 1937, 45, n.1). Ar. bu ḥayra means ‘lake’ but it was also one of the 
pagarchy around Alexandria in the early Islamic period (see EI2, vol. 1, 1288, s. v. Bu ḥayra 
[G. Wiet]), and possibly identified as such by the translator.
81 Scribal confusion
82 Ar. VII.7–8–9 and 15 give the transliteration Fū
¯
tāġūras, against Fīthāġūras in the rest of the 
paragraph. This might be a scribal correction (if the scribe failed to homogenize the orthog-
raphy) or could also point to the role of two translators or that of a translator and an editor (a 
common practice according to Ibn al-Nadīm’s Fihrist, chap. VII). The same goes for Ar. VIII.6 
in the next paragraph, and again in Ar. IX.11 and Ar. XX.2.
83 The scribal corruption cannot have been made on Arabic (where “Arabia” would have been 
spelled with a ʻ ayn: ʻ arabiyya), but proves the Syriac model here (Syr. Ārabiyā, cf. Payne Smith, 
Thesaurus, col. 366, with further confusion of the bē
¯
t into a kāp and probably a hypercorrec-
tion resulting in Arāqlīyā).
Footnotes 
 
Scribal corruption of ḫubz (“bread,” cf. VP 34 and “Additional notes” on the rendering 
of this paragraph in the Arabic version) : ﺰﺒﺧ → ﻦﺒﺟ  . 
 
Scribal orruption of unidentified Gr. knesteos, left in translit ration: 
سﻮﻤﻄﺴﻠﻓ  سوﺎﺘﺳﺎﻨﻗ→  . 
 
For Gr. Imbros (probable co fusion of the Syriac ṯ ܒ nd kāp    ). This points t  a 
possible Syr ac nterpolation within the paragraph, the full extent of which is stil  to 
determine. 
 
Scribal confusion  ﺎﻴﻠﻄﻳا → ﺎﻴﻜﻄﻧأ . 
 
MSS : Zārabāṭā. Emended ( ﺎﻃﺎﺑراز → زﺎﻃﺎﺗرا ). The final -ṭā should be identified as a 
suffix mark in Syriac. 
 
See the corrections on the pdf for footnote 86, i add here the end of the note 
…with the confusion of qāf ق into fāʼ ف and of final waw و into a mīm م : Afruqulim < 
*Aqrufuliyū, from Greek dative Creophylo. 
 
Gr. “to his sister (adelphè).” Scribal mistake in the Arabic transmission (brother → sister: ﻪﺘﺧٲ → ﻪﻴﺧأ  ). 
 
  → سﻮﻧﺎﻴﺛ  سﺪﻧﺎﺑ   
 
 → ﺲﺻﺮﻗ   ﺲﻣﺮﻓ 
 
  
 
 What stands for the goddess Demeter seems the result of the scribal corruption of Demeter-heios 
into “Saint (Ar. al-muʼmīn) Dimitrios” ( سﻮﻳدﻮﻄﻴﻤﻳد←سﻮﻳﺮﻄﻴﻤﻳد ). 
  
   نﻮﻴﻄﻧﻮﻳﺎﻃﺎﻣ →نﻮﻴﻄﻧﻮﺑﺎﻃﺎﻣ  . 
 
XIV.8 
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of this paragraph in the Arabic version) : ﺰﺒﺧ → ﻦﺒﺟ  . 
 
Scriba  corruption of unidentified Gr. kn steos, left in transliteration: 
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For Gr. Imbros (pro able confusion of the Syriac bēṯ  ܒ and k    . This points to a 
possible Syriac interpolation within the paragraph, th  full extent of w ich is s ill to 
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Scribal confusion  ﺎﻴﻠﻄﻳا → ﺎﻴﻜﻄﻧأ . 
 
MSS : Zārabāṭā. Emen ed ( ﺎﻃﺎﺑراز → زﺎﻃﺎﺗرا ). The final -ṭā should be identified s a 
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*Aqrufuliyū, from Greek dative Creophylo. 
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into “Saint (Ar. al- uʼmīn) Dimitrios” ( سﻮﻳدﻮﻄﻴﻤﻳد←سﻮﻳﺮﻄﻴﻤﻳد ). 
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Scribal corruption of unidentified Gr. knesteos, left in transliteration: 
سﻮﻤﻄﺴﻠﻓ  سوﺎﺘﺳﺎﻨﻗ→  . 
 
For Gr. Imbros (probable confusion of the Syriac bēṯ  ܒ and kāp    ). This points to a 
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Scribal confusion  ﺎﻴﻠﻄﻳا → ﺎﻴﻜﻄﻧأ . 
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when he went to Babylon, he assiduously frequented the Chaldeans / astrologers 
(
˘
hal
¯
dāyyūn) and studied with *Zaratas* (Zāratā ̣tā)84, who revealed to him what is 
incumbent to those who are truthful (fa-ba ṣ ṣarahu bi-mā yajib ‘alā al- ṣiddīqīn). He 
transmitted to him [his book] Lesson on Being (asma‘ahu simā‘ al-kiyān)85 and taught 
him the principles of the universe (awā’il al-kull) and what they consist of. 15 It 
is thanks to this that Pythagoras excelled in wisdom and thus found the way to 
guide people and divert them from sin, [by using] the great number of sciences 
which he acquired with all nations and everywhere.
VIII.1 While still a young man (fī bidāyat amrihi), he frequented the wise man 
Pherecydes *the Syrian*, in the town of Delos (Dīlūn), in Syria. 2 Pherecydes left 
and moved to Samos (Sāmūs). 3 He had been affected by a violent illness to the 
degree that lice swarmed on his body, and when his condition worsened so that 
he could not stand the place where he was any longer, his disciples transported 
him to Ephesus (Afasas). 4 When his condition worsened even more, he requested 
(raġaba) that the inhabitants of Ephesus promise that he would be taken outside 
their town, and they carried him to Magnesia (Māġānisīyā). 5 His disciples re-
mained at his service until he died, they buried him and wrote his story upon 
his grave. 6 Pythagoras went back to Samos and after Pherecydes studied under 
*Hermodamas (Armū
¯
dāmānī ̣tis)* the splendid (al-bahī) and divine Sage who was 
from the lineage of Creophylos (Qrāūfulīyū) *in Samos. 7 There, he met with Her-
modamas (Armū
¯
dāmānīs !)* the Sage who was a descendant of Creophylos, and 
attached himself to him for a long period.*86
IX.1 The tyranny ( ̣tarāna) of Samos then passed on to Polycrates (Fūlūqrā ̣tīs) the 
tyrant (al-a ̣trūn). 2 Pythagoras fervently desired to return to the company of Egyp-
tian priests, and he begged Polycrates to help him. 3 Polycrates wrote on his be-
half to Amasis, king of Egypt, a letter informing him that Pythagoras yearned 
to meet him and that he was a friend of his. He sollicited generosity towards 
his request and to welcome it with affection. 4 Amasis acceeded and gave him 
a letter for the chief priest as he had wished. 5 Carrying their king’s letter, he 
went to meet the people of Heliopolis (madīnat al-šams), presently known as ‘Ayn 
al-Shams [in Cairo]. 6 They welcomed him very poorly and tested him for a long 
84 MSS: Zārabā ̣tā. Emended (                  ). The final - ̣tā should be identified as a suffix mark in 
Syriac.
85 The book in question is certainly the spurious Peri Phuseos of Zoroaster, quoted by Clement 
of Alexandria and by Proclus. The same Arabic title was also given to Aristotle’s Physics, be-
cause of the ambiguity of the use of kiyān in Syriac: both “nature” and “being” (cf. Ullmann 
1970, vol. kāf, 467).
86 Ar. VIII.7 seems to be the result of a double translation (resulting from an homoioteleuton 
after “Samos”?) of the same sentence, with Afruqulim respecting Arabic rules of orthography 
where two consonants – as in Qrāūfulīy – must be supported by an initial vowel, but add-
ing further mistakes with the confusion of qāf    into fāʼ    and of final waw   into a mīm   : 
Afruqulim < *Aqrufuliyū, from Greek dative Creophylo. 
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time without finding in him any fault or shortcoming. 7 They visited with him 
the priests of Memphis (Manaf) in order to make the test even more difficult. They 
gave him [the same] execrable reception and reinforced the examination without 
finding any failing [in him] or being able to make him stumble. 8 They then sent 
him to the people of Diospolis (Dīūsbūlis) to submit him [to more] confrontations 
but they could not find any way ( ̣tarīq) against him or any manner to let him in-
cur the king’s disgrace. 9 They imposed on him difficult precepts contradicting 
those of the Greeks [thinking he would refuse to apply them] so that they [would 
manage] to refute him and refuse his request. 10 However, he accepted these 
precepts and held on to them, which increased their amazement towards him. 
His audacity spread in Egypt until it reached the ears of Amasis, who put him in 
charge of sacrifices to God– be He exalted – and the rest of sacrificial offerings, 
[when] this had never before been entrusted to a foreigner. 11 Later, Pythagoras 
left Egypt to return to his homeland. In the *town*87 of Ionia (Ayūnīyah), he built a 
house to teach. The people of Samos would visit him and get initiated to his wis-
dom; they arranged for him an abode outside of the city of which he made a place 
of reunion devoted to [the transmission of] his wisdom. He spent there (yurābi ̣t) 
most of his time with a small group of disciples. 12 When he was forty, Polycrates’ 
(Fūlūqrā ̣tīs) tyranny had been going on for long as he had been named [tyrant of 
Samos] over them since a long time, and [Polycrates] wanted *[Pythagoras?] to 
replace him (istakfāhu).* 13 [Pythagoras] thought about this and considered that 
it was not good for a wise man to remain at the disposal of tyranny, power and 
injustice.
X.1 He traveled to Italy and from there to Croton, which he entered, and the 
inhabitants thought he had the best appearance, a pleasant eloquence, a noble 
soul (nubl), a wide knowledge of science, a just conduct, a vast generosity and a 
great perfection in every feature ( ḥi ṣāl), finally that he was [endowed with] the 
totality of virtues (fa ḍā’il). 2 The whole people of Croton submitted, becoming 
for him as disciples (inqāda lahu inqiyād al- ̣tā‘a al-‘ilmiyya) and he imposed upon 
them [the rules] of infallibility of the Ancients, guided them, exhorted them to 
practice good deeds (al- ̣sāli ḥāt) and ordered the archons (al-arākina) to give books 
of sapiential literature (kutub al-ādāb al- ḥikmiyya) to the young and to teach it to 
them. 3 Men and women gathered near him to hear his exhortations (mawā‘i ̣zihi) 
and benefit from his wisdom. [Pythagoras’] glory grew and his aura widened. 
4 A great number of the inhabitants of this city became excellent in the matter of 
sciences, and the news spread so much that all the barbarian kings came to listen 
to his wisdom and to know his science. 5 Later on, Pythagoras travelled through 
the towns of Italy and Sicily as injustice and revolt were oppressing them. 6 The 
87 Should be “region,” but the word employed in Arabic, madīna, refers to a “city.” Possibly the 
ambigious balad (“town,” “region”) was used initially and later corrected into madīna.
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inhabitants of Tauromenium ( Ṭāwrūmānīyūn) and elsewhere88 became his listen-
ers ( ̣sammā῾īhi) and the veracious [i. e. “perfects”?] ( ̣siddīqihi). 7 He uprooted their 
spirit of revolt as well as that of their children, and this for a long time. 8 His 
discourse (man ṭiq) dispelled all villainy and when Sīmākhos (Sīmā
˘
hus), archon 
of Centorbi (Qān ̣tūribiyyā) heard his wisdom and advices, he decided to give up 
power and entrusted part of his possessions to his *brother*89 and the rest to the 
town inhabitants.
XI.1 It was said (wa 
¯
dukira) that Theano (Bāndis< *
¯
TYĀNS)90, who originated from 
Crete (Farmas < *QRṢS)91 *and king of Fū
¯
tū*, was a descendant of Pythagoras.92 
2 At the time when he resided in Croton (Aqrū ̣tūnīyyā), Pythagoras had a perfect-
ly pure daughter (bint batūl) who taught religious laws (šarāʾ iʿ  al-dīn) to the virgins 
of the city, their obligations and rules (farāʾi ̣d) as to what was permitted and for-
bidden. He also had a wife, who taught the rest of the women. 3 When Pythagoras 
died, *Dimitri (Dīmī ̣tūdīūs)93 the believer (al-mu’mīn)* went into the house of the 
Sage and made it into a temple for the people of Croton (Qrū ̣tūnīyā). 
XII.1 [The authors] report (wa 
¯
dakarū) that at the time of Cyrus’ reign, Pythagoras 
was a young man. That reign lasted for thirty years. 2 After him, his son Cam-
byses reigned, while Pythagoras was still alive. 3 Pythagoras lived in Samos for 
sixty years before he left for Italy. From there he headed to [Mub: Croton and 
stayed there for eight years and that when the agitation there happened, he left 
for] Metapontion (Mā ̣tāyūn ̣tiyūn < *Mā ̣tābūn ̣tiyūn).94 4 He stayed there for five years 
and died.
XIII.1 His lunch was composed of honey and *honeycomb*95, and his dinner of 
bread qāj
˘
hirūn96 and vegetables, raw and cooked. 2 He ate no meat, except those 
88 Al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik adds here: Crotonia, Syracusa, Agrigenta and Roma (all found in 
Porphyry, VP 21 where lesser-known cities are further listed). The mention of Roma in the 
Arabic list has no parallel in the preserved Greek VP, but it might have played a role in the 
Pythagoras chapter of the Philosophical History, written after Porphyry’s meeting with Ploti-
nus in Rome. The whole sentence seems to aim at transforming Pythagoras into a Gnostic 
precursor.
89 Gr. “to his sister (adelphe).” Scribal mistake in the Arabic transmission (sister → brother: 
90                           .
91                           .
92 Instead of “daughter of Pythonax,” the female disciple of Pythagoras has been made into a 
man and her name transformed into “king of Pytho,” possibly through a calque translation 
of *Python-aktôr. I am grateful to C. Macris for his suggestion here.
93 What stands for the goddess Demeter seems to be a scribal corruption resulting from the 
scribal corruption Demeter- heios into“Saint (Ar. al-muʼmīn) Dīmī ̣triyūṣ” (                                                                 ). 
94                                       .
95 
96 Gr. kegkhron (VP 35, 52.1 Des Places) transliterated (correctly) by the translator who could not 
understand the word.
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which had been sacrified by his clergy (kahūnatihi) and presented as offerings to 
God, be He exalted. 3 When *he presided to* the temples97, he started to nourish 
himself with foods which gave no hunger or thirst. 4. When a visitor presented 
himself to hear his words, he talked to him in either of two ways: according to the 
mode of argumentation and lesson, or with exhortation and advice. His teaching 
was of two kinds (šakl 
¯
dū fanayn). 
XIV.1 He had to take a trip somewhere and wished to gather his disciples before 
leaving them. They met in the house of a man named Milon (Mīlūn) and, while 
they were there a man of Croton, named Kylon (Qūlūn), burst in. 2 He was a man of 
great nobility and powerful lineage, and he had a lot of money. For this reason he 
was uttering insolent words to others, and displayed arrogance and injustice. 3 So 
he was in the presence of Pythagoras and started to boast but [the latter] scolded 
him in front of his guests, and advised him to try and purify his soul. 4  Kylon’s 
fury towards him redoubled, he gathered his friends, accused Pythagoras in front 
of them of being guilty of impiety and organised with them to kill him together 
with his friends. 5 When they burst upon him, they killed forty people, and the 
others fled. Among those, a few were caught and killed, and others escaped and 
went into hiding. 6 The chase and the hunt lasted, and [his companions] feared 
for Pythagoras’ life. They appointed a small group among themselves and used 
ruse to protect him until he could get out of the city in the middle of the night. 
7 A small group escorted him to Kaulonie (Qāwlūniyā), and from there to Locris 
(Lūqrūs), where the calumny against him was already known. 8 The important 
people (mašāyi
˘
h) [of Locris] came to him and said: “Indeed you are, O Pythagoras, 
a sage, as we can see, and calumny (šanā‘a) is indeed contemptible. But we have 
not found in our laws (nawāmīsinā) what could condemn you, and we are firmly 
attached to our rules (šarā’i‘inā); so, take among us the hospitality which is owed 
you and your travel provisions (nafaqa li- ̣tarīqika), and leave our country in peace.” 
9 He then went to Tarentum ( Ṭāran ṭā) and was surprised there by some people 
of Croton (Qrū ̣tūnīyā) who got close to kill him and his companions, but he left 
in the direction of Metapontion (Mī ̣tābūn ̣tīūs). Everywhere, arguments about him 
were so vivid that the inhabitants remembered them for long years. 10 Later, he 
took shelter in the temple (haykal) of the months98(al-asnān) also known as the 
temple of Muses (haykal al-mūsun), and he and his friends entrenched there. He 
stayed there for forty days without food, and flaming [objects] were thrown on 
the temple where he was. 11 When his friends realised [the danger] they came 
close to him (‘amadū ilayhi) and set him in their midst, encircling with him to 
97                               See above, Ar. IV.1 and infra, additional notes.
98 There is a possible misunderstanding here of the Greek original which I cannot elucidate. 
Arabic asnān has three principal meanings: “teeth,” “peaks,” and “years.” The word which 
is used for “Muses” is a simple transliteration of Greek mouson. If “the years” is correct, the 
homophony between Ar. mawsim (“season,” “period”) and the uncommon mūsūn (for “Mus-
es”) could be behind asnān, and what follows (correctly) is an hypercorrection.
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protect him from the fire with their own bodies. 12 But as the fire spread in the 
temple, the flames grew and the pains caused by the heat surrounding the sage 
[increased], which in addition to the effects of the fast made him fall dead. Then 
[the fire] surrounded them all and they burnt. This was the cause of his death. 
XV.1 [The authors] report (wa 
¯
dakarū) that he composed 280 books, and left be-
hind a great number of disciples. 2 His ring was engraved: “An ephemeral evil is 
better than an ephemeral good,” which means that an evil prompt to disappear 
is better than a good the disappearance of which can be anticipated. 3 And on his 
belt: “Silence protects against regrets” (al-ṣamt salāma min al-nidāma).
XVI.1 As to Pythagoras’ moral teachings and his exhortations, I copied this from 
the Book of Choicest Maxims and Best Sayings (Kitāb Mu
˘
htar al- ḥikam wa Ma ḥāsin 
al-kilam), by the Prince Ma ̣hmūd al-Dawla Abī al-Wafā’ al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik:99 
XVII.1 [=M1] Pythagoras said: “Just as the origin of our existence and creation is 
within God, likewise it is incumbent upon our souls to be devoted to God.”
[M2 He said: “If you wish to know God, do not waste your time knowing peo-
ple, as it is possible for you to know God while saving your talk.”]
[M3 He said: “It is not the words of the sage that are first with God as to attain 
His reward, but the actions.”]
2 [=M4] And also: “Thinking (al-fikra) belongs specifically to God, the love [of 
thinking] is linked to the love of God, and whoever loves God exercises the pre-
cepts of His love, whoever works in view of His love approaches Him, and who-
ever approaches Him is saved and rewarded.”
3 [=M5] He said: “The sacrifices and the offerings are not signs of honour to 
God, rather the belief that one should have in Him is enough to honour Him.”
4 [=M6] He said: “The great number of words concerning God is proof of man’s 
powerlessness to know Him.”
[M7 He said: “At the time of every corporal or intellectual action, keep in mind 
the proximity of God, who is witness to every action and thought. You will soon 
feel ashamed under the eyes which escape nothing. And this will happen when 
you will commit yourself to God.”]
[M8 He said: “Appreciate what is noble and elevated in actions, and not [only] 
in words so that you become such as God wishes for us, as He is our Creator.”]
[M9 He said: “The wise man (al-insān al- ḥakīm) who censors himself in front 
of God is known to Him. For this reason, he does not regret being little-known 
among people.”]
[M10 He said: “God has no better place on earth than within a pure soul.”]
99 In the following sayings, M stands for al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik in order to provide readers 
with the additional sayings omitted by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻa. A number of these sayings find par-
allels in Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella and in the Puthagoreiai Gnomai (i. e. Pseudo-Demophi-
lus), the Sextus collection, and the Golden Verses. See “Additional notes,” infra.
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5 [=M11] He said: “Nothing is more profitable to man than discussing glorious 
and sublime things, but if that is impossible, let him listen to the one who tells 
them.”
6 [=M12] He said: “Refrain from acting badly whether in solitude or with oth-
ers. Let the shame you feel for yourself be even greater than the shame which you 
would feel towards anyone.”
7 [=M13] He said: “Let your goal be, in money matters, to earn it by licit means 
and to spend it licitly.”
8 [=M14] He said: “When you hear a lie, just force your soul to bear it with 
patience.” 
[M15 He said: “Think before you act so that you will not be blamed for your 
action.”]
9 [=M16] He said: “You must not neglect the matter of your physical health, 
but you must apply moderation (qa ṣad) as to food, drink, sexuality and exercise.”
[M17 He said: “Refrain from doing what could bring jealousy (al- ḥasad) onto 
you.”]
10 [=M18] He said: “Do not be wasteful as the one who does not know the val-
ue of what he owns, but do not be paltry either to the extent of excluding personal 
freedom. Best in all matters is moderation.”
11 [=M19] He said: “Be vigilant in your opinions all throughout your life, for 
somnolence in thinking matches impotency. (fa-inna subbāt al-ra’y mušārik li-l-
mawt fī al-jins)”
12 [=M20] He said: “What you must not do, restrain from [letting it] come to 
your mind.”
[M21 He said: “Do not hope that someone vile will cause you good, for every-
one’s behaviour (tadbīr) is for his own self only while what he dispenses to others 
is related to what indicate his thinking and conscience.”]
[M22 He said: “[When] someone’s tongue lies and he is bad-mannered, his 
prayers as well as his sacrifices are impure to God.”]
[M23 He said: “To recriminate oneself is more useful that blaming your close 
relations.”]
[M24 He said: “The correct travel provision in a just life consists in not doing 
wrong to your friend.”]
[M25 He said: “Negligence does not allow reaching the truth of things.”]
[M26 He said: “Know that with the one who is devoid of science, it is better to 
flatter him, to keep him company, and to scoff at him without excess, rather than 
mocking him. For the life of the ignorant is disgrace (῾ār).”]
[M27 He said: “As a useful maxim, think of your enemies as brothers.”] 
[M28 He said: “The judge who does not render just decisions is familiar with 
every villainy.”]
13 [=M29] He said: “Do not soil your tongue with malicious gossip, and do not 
lend your ears to it.”
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[M30 He said: “Make your intelligence master of all of your comportments at 
every moment, for the sleep of intelligence is akin to death.”]
14 [=M31] He said: “It is difficult for man to be free, when he submits to com-
miting hideous actions which become habitual to him.”
15 [=M32] He said: “It is not appropriate for man to seek absolute wealth or 
lofty buildings for, after he dies, these things will be preserved according to their 
own nature (‘alā   ̣hudūd  ̣tabā’i‘ihā) and someone else will dispose of it. But he must 
seek the wealth which will be useful for him to spend after the separation [from 
this world].” 
[M33 He said: “It is more commendable for someone to be ashamed while 
he has a wooden bed and keeps faith in God, than to have a bed of gold and to 
doubt.”]
[M34 He said: “When the sage breaks from what is decent (
˘
haraja ʿalā ġayr al-
ṣawāb), he is the cause of all evils.”]
[M35 He said: “Choose to move within your soul, and not your body, so that 
your profits are spiritual and not corporal.”]
16 [=M36] He said: “Embellished figures, coated ornaments, soon become fu-
tile.”
[M37 He said: “Failure affects not only who caused it, but also those who are 
linked to them.”]
17 [=M38] He said: “Do believe that the foundation of the fear of God is com-
passion.” 
[M39 He said: “If you have harmed someone, imagine that you cannot put an 
end to the harm he does you.”]
[M40 He said: “ Prepare yourself to what could happen to you in the future, 
whether they be things you enjoy or pain you, and especially those that grieve 
you in your daily life.”]
[M41 He said: “It is incumbent upon you to move away from all the ornaments 
(za
˘
hārif) of the world, which make your reflection stray and confuse it.”]
[M42 He said: “Do not let your eyes sleep before you have reviewed your ac-
tions of the day and stopped at the points on which you have been in error [con-
sidering] what you should have done if you have been in error. And [stop] at 
what you have done and shouldn’t have done, and at what you should have done 
but did not do. As to the ill that happened, be afraid of it, and as to what you 
have reached that was praise-worthy, rejoice in it. This will prepare you to what 
brings you closer to the divine excellence (al-fa ̣dīla al-ilāhiyya) of the one who grat-
ified our souls with the Tetraktys (lit. “the quadruple source,”al-yanbū῾ 
¯
dā al-arba῾) 
which comes from immutable Nature (al-latī lā tataġayyar).”]100
18 [=M43] He said: “When you wish to realise one action among others, start 
with imploring success from God.”
100 Golden Verses, vv. 40–47.
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[M44 He said: “Give some of your possessions to kind people and to the needy, 
for he who does not give to others according to their needs receives nothing from 
God.”]
19 [=M45] He said: “Whomever you have tested by experience, and whom you 
found unfit [for you] as an acquaintance and friend, beware of making your en-
emy.” 
[M46 He said: “Is not counted as free the one who cannot control himself.”]
[M47 He said: “Choose a man on his action, not on his word, for many have 
beautiful speeches but vile manners.”]
20 [=M48] He said: “It would be better that man does not sin (an lā ya
˘
h ̣tāʾ), and 
if he does, the most profitable for him would be to be aware that he did, and that 
he deeply wishes not to do it again.”
[M49 He said: “The one who is used to being unjust, do not entrust him with 
your governance.”
[M50 He said: “Wine is an enemy to the soul, a hindrance to acting of one’s 
own free will. It gives strength to the body and excites it, by acting the way fire 
meets fire.”]
[M51 He said: “It is incumbent upon man to be obedient to his sovereign and 
his army. But this is not absolute. This should only remain so to the extent re-
quired by the conditions of freedom.”]
[M52 He said: “It is better for man to die than to let his soul grow dark with 
ignorance and laziness.”]
[M53 He said: “Do not let the despicable way of life of the one who denies [di-
vine] benedictions turn you away from good deeds.”]
[M54 He said: “Remember this: all beings are created to achieve virtuous 
thinking (li-yafkurū al-fikra al-fa ̣dīla), but few reach this higher rank and are capa-
ble of being patient in view of reaching it.”]
[M55 He said: “To the pure and divine soul, there is no way that it be suited by 
any of terrestrial pleasures.”]
[M56 He said: “For who devotes his whole life to obedience to God, it is neces-
sary that his hope always be in God and with God.”]
[M57 He said: “Rejoice over the one who blames you, and not over who flatters 
you.”]
[M58 He said: “Beware of letting enmity find a way to increase.”]
[M59 He said: “When someone does you a slight harm, do not do him a harsh-
er harm.”]
[M60 He said: “When your friend commits a wrong to you, show patience 
towards him and forgive him.”]
[M61 He said: “Be very careful to have friends who take you for what you are 
and not for what you own.”]
21 [=M62] He said: “The most appropriate thing for man is to do what is nec-
essary, not what he desires.”
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22 [=M63] He said: “You must know the moment when speaking is desirable, 
and the moment when silence rather is.”
[M64 He said: “The one whose soul does not overcome the body, his body is a 
grave for his soul.”]
23 [=M65] He said: “The free man is the one who does not let one atom of his 
soul [lose itself] in any natural desire.”
[M66 He said: “The height of equity and justice is harmony in the decision and 
its implementation.”]
[M67 He said: “Strip your intellect of passions so that the right way to proceed 
(ṣidq al-mu῾āmala) will appear.”]
[M68 He said: “If a just intention ( ḥusn al- ̣zunn) has not preceded everything 
praise worthy to which you aspire, you will not appreciate what you asked for, 
even if you achieve it. In the same way, it is incumbent upon man to precede his 
despicable actions with unjust thinking (sū’ al- ̣zunn).”]
24 [=M69] He said: “As much as you ask for you will learn, and as much as you 
learn, you will ask [for more to learn].”
25 [=M70] He said: “The sage is not obligated to never be angry, but to be so 
with moderation.”
[M71 He said: “He was asked: ‘What man is free?’ And he answered: ‘The one 
who serves the right’.”]
26 [=M72] He said: “The sage is not the one who had to bear and be patient and 
resist; the sage is the one whose burden was more than his nature could endure, 
and who remained patient.”
[M73 He said: “The physician is the one who does not let his body waste away, 
and not the one who cures others. That is to say, the one who preserves (man  ̣sāna) 
himself from committing ugly actions (al-maqābi ḥ) and acts commendably (fa῾ala 
al-fa ḍā’il), and not [simply] someone who prescribes and demonstrates but ne-
glects his own self (man taraka nafsahu).”]
27 [=M74] He said: “The world is changing, sometimes in your favor and some-
times against. If you are in control, be up to it, and if you are driven, be flexible.” 
28 [=M75] He also said: “Most calamities arise in animals because they are 
without speech, and they arise in men because of it.”
29 [=M76] He also said that the one who can forbid four things to his soul will 
not have adversity descend upon him as it descends upon others, [they are] haste, 
disputatiousness, vanity, and negligence. For haste bears regret, disputatiousness 
bears confusion, vanity bears hate, and negligence bears degradation. 
30 [=M77] He saw a man who was wearing a magnificent coat but was using 
faulty grammar and he told him: “Either your speech must [resemble] your coat, 
or you [must] wear a coat that resembles your speech.”
[M78] The king of Sicily asked him to come and stay [at his court], but he an-
swered [him]: “Your spirit goes the opposite of what fits you, and your abode is 
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sliding from its foundations. So do not hope for Pythagoras’ presence at your side, 
as doctors have no obligation to fall ill with their patients..”]101
31 [=M79] He told his disciples: “Do not seek things according to your desires, 
but [rather] love things that are lovable in themselves.”
[M80/1 He told his brother: “If you wish that neither your father nor your ser-
vant do wrong, you are asking for the unnatural.”] 
[M80/2102 Do not wonder when a grave misfortune causes someone such a se-
vere grief, but wonder about the patience which helps him endure it.]
[M81 He said: “The sage worries for his soul as someone else about his body.”]
[M82 He said: “The soul is softened, for the just, by pleasures and delights, and 
for the bad, by sorrows and worries.”]
[M83 He said: “You must show kindness to humans, as you can’t [allow your-
self] to detest them.”]
[M84 He said: “Take as your friends those who are familiar with the truth and 
as enemies those who refuse it.”]
32 [=M85] And he said: “Be patient and do not complain when you face vicissi-
tudes assailing you, and do your best to find them a cure for them.” 
[M86 He said: “If you hear the best and the worst in people’s speeches, do not 
get irritated and do not take on yourself to contradict it, but [take on yourself] to 
listen to it.”]
[M87 He said: “If you hear a lie, try and be patient.”]
33 [=M88] He said: “Think before acting.”
[M89 He said: “The same way a man who cannot be trusted by the doctor 
when describing his case cannot be cured, the man who is not truthful to his self 
regarding his aptitudes and faults (mā lahu wa mā ῾alayhi), will not benefit from 
either luxury or the ordinary goods.”
34 [=M90] He said: “Too many enemies (‘adūw) harm tranquillity.”
XVIII.1 When Pythagoras sat down to deliver his testament, he gave these seven 
provisions: 2 “Verify your scales and know their measures. 3 Rectify the line103 
in order to stay in peace. 4 Do not stir up the fire where you see that the knife is 
sharp. 5 Refrain your desires in order to preserve [your] health. 6 Be fair so that 
friendship (ma ̣habba) may be established between you. 7 Bear [the vicissitudes of] 
time in imitation of those governors (wulāh) who may once have the upper hand 
and once be dismissed. 8 Do not spoil your bodies or your souls, as by doing so, 
they will be lacking in difficult times, should these happen.” [XVIII.1–8 = M91]
101 The Letter to the Tyrant of Sicily was known in an Arabic translation, cf. infra Ar. XXI.27.
102 Badawī in his edition of Ibn Fātik’s Choicest Maxims, counts 80/1 and 80/2 as one saying.
103 IAU: “the line (
˘
ha ̣t ̣t);” Mub: “wrongdoings” (al-
˘
ha ̣tāʾ).
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XIX.1 [=M92] Money was mentioned and praised in front of him. He said: “What 
need would I have of what is brought by luck, preserved by miserliness, and 
squandered by generosity?”
[M93 He was asked: “What is the most difficult thing to man?” He said: “To 
know himself and keep secrets.”] 
2 [=M94] And one said: “He saw a shaykh who loved to dabble in science and 
was ashamed to be seen as such: ‘Hey you! Would you be ashamed of being better 
at the end of your life than at the beginning?’” 
3 [=M95] And he said: “The most annoying thing for your enemy is that you 
do not show him that you consider him as such.”
[M96 He said: “The way of a powerful king (sabīl al-malik al- ḥāzim) is to take 
care of his kingdom and of his people as a landowner does his garden.”]
[M97 He said: “The appropriate thing for the king (sabīl al-malik) at the be-
ginning of his rule is to proclaim the common customs (i ̣zhār al-sunan al-jāriyya), 
to set in order the people’s obligations, to edict the orders prescribed with the 
experts, according to what each one is able to prescribe. Also to fight his soul 
until he has divested it of any passion. And if he finds necessary to add [more] 
collaborators to his aides, let him request the agreement of the efficient advisors 
who assist him [in matters of] religion and stick to laws and [religious] precepts.”]
[M98 He said: “What is appropriate for a king consists in avoiding pride and 
stubbornness in his own opinion ; [let him avoid] to hunt too often; [let him avoid] 
to remaining isolated, away from his guards. Let him avoid [as well] taking a 
path which he does not know well or yet a path with narrowings [of passage]. Let 
him avoid riding his horse in the dark of night. If he appears [in public] with his 
cortège, let him hold himself firmly on his mount, in a beautiful posture, showing 
a radiant face ( ̣talq al-wajh), staring at people, waving back at them with a friend-
ly gesture, since the eyes of the people on him are numerous. He should not let 
servant women under fifty years of age visit his wives. And if he needs a man to 
be at their service, let him be advanced in age, unattractive, [a man] of religion 
and confidence. When the king sleeps or enjoys some festivities, let him trust the 
guards of his castle and call on them at any time.”]
[M99 He said: “Those [who are familiar] with bodily passions are slaves to 
the senses and those [who are familiar] with virtues (fa ̣dā’il) are in harmony with 
intelligence (al-῾aql).”]
[M100 He said: “The prudent man in this world is the one who can enumerate 
his faults, and his opposite is the one who can enumerate his qualities.”]
4 [= M101] Death caught his wife in a foreign land and his companions came 
to lament her death in a foreign land104, and he said: “O friends, there is no differ-
ence between dying abroad or in your homeland, [the proof being] that there is 
only one way to the Hereafter (al-ā
˘
hira), no matter the place [of departure].”
104 Homoioteleuton, cf. infra, “Additional notes.”
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5 [= M102] He was asked: “What is the most beautiful thing?” and he an-
swered: “It is what the human being desires.”
[M103 To a young man who scorned studying: “O young man, if you are not 
patient in the face of the effort to study, you will be patient before the misery 
caused by ignorance.”]
6 [= M104] He said: “The man who is loved by God – exalted be He – is the one 
who does not abide by his odious thoughts.”
[M105 He said: “A moderate discourse is the most refined incense that may be 
offered to God.”]
[M106 He said: “The discourse about God, it is incumbent to precede it with 
actions which please God. But only God knows what truth there is to it.”]105
XX.1 I copied / translated / excerpted106 (naqaltu) [this] from the book of Porphyry 
on the Reports on the Philosophers, [with] their Stories and Opinions (fī a
˘
hbār al-falā-
sifa wa qi ṣa ṣihim wa ārāʾihim): 2 “The books of Pythagoras (Fū
¯
tāġuras) the Sage, 
which Archytas (Ar
˘
hū ṭis) the philosopher from Tarentum (al- Ṭāran ṭīnī) brought 
together all by himself number eighty. 3 As for those which he attempted with 
all efforts to collect, to edit and to assemble from the elder men who belonged to 
the family (jins) of Pythagoras the philosopher, to his party, and the recipients 
of his scientific teachings, one man after the other, they number two hundred. 
4 But whoever reflects on his own over them with the best of his intelligence 
and takes out the fakes which are said to be from the mouth of the Sage and put 
under his name [but] were fabricated by dishonest people and which are: 5 The 
Book of the Secret Dialogue / Fervent Prayer (Kitāb al-Munājāh); 6 The Book of the De-
scription of Vile Professions; 7 The Book of the Science of mechanisms; 8 The Book of the 
Rules for the Organisation (ta ṣwīr) of Banquets (majālis al-
˘
humūr) ; 9 The Book about 
the Preparation of Drums, Cymbals and Lyres; 10 The Book of Priestly Exhortations (al-
mayāmir al-kahanūtiyya); 11 The Book of Crop Seeds (bi
¯
dr al-zurū‘) ; 12 The Book of 
Instruments; 13 The Book of Poems, 14 The Book of the Generation of the World (takwīn 
al-ʻalām); 15 The Book of the Hands [i. e. Astronomical Tables ?]; 16 The Book of Virtue 
(al-murū aʼ), and many more books which resemble those but were only recently 
forged, 17 – he will enjoy eternal felicity.” 18 He said: And these dishonest men, 
these criminals who fabricated the forgeries which we just mentioned, they are, 
according to the tradition: Aristipp the Rhetor / Sophist (Arisṭībūs al-mu ḥaddi
¯
t), 
and *Niqūs known as “the One-Eyed” / “who had a weak eye”107(‘ayn al-nāqi ṣ), 
105 End of the chapter on Pythagoras in al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik. The last sentence is certainly 
an addition by Ibn Fātik or a copyist.
106 The Arabic verb naqala has these three meanings equally so that it is almost impossible 
to choose one here, depending on whether we decide to consider that this introductory 
sentence was written by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʿa, by the translator of the Porphyrian extract or by 
anyone else in the chain of transmission.
107 This conundrum could possibly result from a mention of “Philip of Opus” (a disciple of 
Socrates and Plato whose interests were mainly in astronomy and who is believed to be 
the real author of the Epinomis) which in the transmission was garbled into [Phi-]lippos 
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and a Cretan (min iqrī ̣tīyya) called Cleinias (Qūnīūs)108; also Megillos (Māġīālūs), 
and Fū
˘
hjwāqā109 and others even worse [than them]. 19 And what had made them 
fabricate these fakes under the name of Pythagoras the philosopher and ascribe 
them to him, was the desire to be received by young people thanks to him and 
to be honoured, revered and assisted. 20 The books of the Sage on which there 
is no doubt are two hundred and eighty.110 21 They were forgotten, until they 
reappeared with a group of sages endowed with a pure intention and piety, who 
found the books, collected and edited them. 22 Before that [these works] were not 
known in Hellas (Illā
¯
dā), because they were preserved [solely] in Italy. 
XXI.1 Plutarch says that Pythagoras (Fū
¯
tāġuras) was the first one to name philos-
ophy as such. 2 And the books by Pythagoras (Fī
¯
tāġuras) which are available are: 
3 The Book of Arithmetics (Kitāb al-ari
¯
tmā ̣tīqī), 4 The Book of Tables (Kitāb al-alwā ̣h), 
5 The Book on Sleep and Awakeness (Kitāb al-nawm wa-l-yaq ̣za); 6 The Book on the 
Condition of Soul and Body (Kitāb fī kayfiyyat al-nafs wa-l-jasad); 7 Letter to the Ty-
rant of Sicily (Risāla ilā mutamarrid111 Siqiliyya); 8 The Golden Letter, so called be-
cause Galen wrote it in gold letters out of respect for its value and splendour, and 
he applied to study it, reading it every day; 9 Letter to Saqāyīs112 on the Deduction of 
Meanings; 10 Letter on Rational Politics (al-siyāsat al-‘aqliyya), and this epistle was 
commented upon (wa qad tu ̣sābu ha
¯
dihi al-risāla) by Iamblichus (Amalī
˘
has); 11 Letter 
to Sīmdūsīūs.
Additional Notes to the translation of the Arabic Life of Pythagoras
Ar. I.
Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa lists three possible transliterations of the name Pythagoras in 
Arabic, differing mainly in the length of the vowels. The last form, Fū
¯
tāġūrayāʾ 
seems to reflect an Arabic plural (with -āʼ ending) unattested elsewhere and prob-
ably shaped on Syriac (cf. Payne Smith 1879–1901, col. 3123).
(confusion of l / n and of p / q are common in both Syriac and Arabic) and a further misun-
derstanding of Gr. Opountios as deriving from Gr. opsis (“sight”)? This, of course a very ten-
tative hypothesis; the tone of XX.18–19 is that of a scholion which may have been inserted 
at any time in the transmission.
108 If not for Megillos who immediately follows and is associated to Cleinias in the Laws and 
the Epinomis, one may search for other candidates.
109 The two initials are possibly the result of a scribal corruption of a Syriac semkat. 
110 This number appears already in Ar. XV.1, thus showing that the source used for Ar. XV was 
probably the Philosophical History rather than considering Ar. XX.20 as an interpolation. 
What precedes (Ar. XX.4–19) may have been an interpolation, or belonging to the original 
text. The translator’s style shows that his Arabic was rather weak.
111 Ar. mutamarrid is usually translated “rebel” but the meaning of the verb tamarrada is “to be 
immoderate” (cf. Lane, Dictionary, vol. 7, 2706a), so that its use in this context where the title 
is well-known is not incorrect but probably archaic. See further, “Additional Notes” below.
112               from [Anak-]simānis (              ) ? Cf. D. L. 8.49.
XVII.15 
(‘alā ḥudūd ṭabā’i‘ihā) 
 
XX.18 
Fūḫjwāqā 
 
ﺲﻳﺎﻘﺳ f  [Anak-]simānis (ﺲﻧﺎﻤﺳ) ? Cf  D.L. 8.49. 
 
Note 115 of the pdf: 
ﺪﻧااس  → سأﺮﻧا 
Insert the following word before ‘with’ in the footnote: ﺪﻧاوس  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XVII.15 
(‘alā ḥudūd ṭabā’i‘ hā) 
 
X .18 
Fūḫjwāqā 
 
ﺲﻳﺎﻘﺳ from [Anak-]si ā is ﺲﻧﺎﻤﺳ  Cf. D.L. 8.49. 
 
Note 1 5 of the pdf: 
ﺪﻧااس  → سأﺮﻧا 
Insert the following word before ‘with’ in the fo tnote: ﺪﻧاوس  
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Ar. II
On this paragraph, see above, part 1. II.1 This chronological mismatch is accept-
ed by Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʿa’s contemporary Barhebraeus in his chronicle in Syriac 
(cf. Wallis Budge 1932, 19) immediately following a quotation from Eusebius 
where Empedocles is said to have been a contemporary of the prophet David. 
II.6  r. miškāt is used in the Qurʼān in a simile where God is compared to a “lamp” 
where a light which is “neither from East or West is burning.” The term is derived 
from Ethiopic miškōt (see Worrell 1948, 46–47). Moreover, miškāt (used mainly in 
commentaries to the Qurʼān but rare in other contexts) appears in Ibn Hishām’s 
Biography (sīra) of the Prophet Mu ḥammad, where it is used by the Ethiopian Ne-
gus when he replies to Mu ḥammad’s envoys that, according to him, Jesus and 
Mu ḥammad were carrying the same prophetic message, originating from the 
same miškāt (spelled miškūt, according to the old orthography). For possible traces 
of a Christian Alexandrian influence (as already noticed by Munk 1857, 245–247) 
behind the formulation, cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, VI, 57.3–59.2. 
Ar. III.
III.1 The beginning of the paragraph shows a possible misunderstanding where 
“[Pythagoras] advised travel (kāna yarā al-siyā ̣ha)” could reflect a poor translation 
of “Eudoxos in his Travel around the Earth.”113 Ar. yarāʾ (present form of ra’ā, “to 
see, to consider”) is common in philosophical literature for Gr. edoxen, cf. Siwān 
al- ̣hikma, 79 Badawī, and Aetius Arabus, 2.26; 3.1, 3.24; 4.8, 4.19 Daiber, etc. For their 
part, the Brethren of Purity refer four times to Pythagoras in a similar context, 
two of which being explicit references to the Golden Verses. The Brethren state that 
the ascetic way taught in the poem leads to the ascent of the soul in the Hereaf-
ter, where it will float in the air, purified, wandering (sāʾi ̣h) and immortal.114 The 
report of Ibn Suwār on the availability in his time of the Philosophical History in 
Syriac and / or in Arabic implies that Ar. III.1 may have been behind the Breth-
ren’s interpretation. 
Ar. IV
IV.1 The second part of the sentence might be considered as an explanatory gloss, 
after the mistaken use of a verb which does not seem attested in the dictionaries. 
For this reason, we suggest to understand Ar. inraʼasa as a mere corruption of 
Ar. indāsa,115 which properly corresponds to Gr. egkatadusesthai. The addition “and 
113 I am grateful to C. Macris for his help in “cracking the code” here. 
114 Cf. Marquet 2006, 38–39.
115               . A manuscript of a unique recension of al-Shahrazūrī’s Kitāb Nuzhat al- 
arwā ḥ, the Istanbul Esad Efendi 3804, has kept the trace of the original verb according to 
the old orthography (          with a waw instead of the alif for the concave verbs). On this 
manuscript and its relation to the short and long recensions of the Nuzhat, see Cottrell 
2004–2005, 231–232.
XVII.15 
(‘alā ḥudūd ṭabā’i‘ihā) 
 
XX.18 
Fūḫjwāqā 
 
ﺲﻳﺎﻘﺳ from [Anak-]simānis (ﺲﻧﺎﻤﺳ) ? Cf. D.L. 8.49. 
 
Note 115 of the pdf: 
ﺪﻧااس  → سأﺮﻧا 
Insert the following word before ‘with’ in the footnote: ﺪﻧاوس  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XVII.15 
ḥudūd ṭabā’i‘ihā) 
 
XX.18 
jwāqā 
 
ﺲﻳﺎﻘﺳ from [Anak-]simānis (ﺲﻧﺎﻤﺳ) ? Cf. D.L. 8.49. 
 
Note 115 of the pdf: 
ﺪﻧااس  → سأﺮﻧا 
Insert the following word before ‘with’ in the footnote: ﺪﻧاوس
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became the superior of the priests” was added in the process of the transmission 
in Arabic to develop on the corrupt inraʼasa. This seems confirmed by the fact 
that a second occurrence of this same phrase in al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik’s extract 
(cf. Ar. XIII.3) corresponds more exactly to its position in Greek VP 34. In this oth-
er occurrence, the gloss is lacking and the recipes have been omitted (from a lack 
of interest or with an intention of censorship).116 IV.2 Gr. kai asphodelon antherikon, 
Ar. wa-antārīqūn wa-asfūdālin. The genitive construction was not understood, pos-
sibly after the confusion of a dāla
¯
t and a wāw in Syriac (*de-asfūdālin ?). As to the 
‘flour’ which seems to be rendered by Ar. awālīs in our text it might be the result 
of a transliteration of Gr. palès which I cannot explain (possibly, Ar. aw [b-]ālīs, 
with fall of the initial bāʼ would mean “or flour”). IV.3 The hyssop is missing from 
the preserved text of the Greek VP. The honey “from the islands” (Gr. nesiotiko) 
should refer to a honey made from a plant growing on sandy soils, where basil 
and wild mint are common. Ar.  ḥabūq might be understood with this meaning, 
if  ̣habūq, unattested elsewhere, is to be taken as a local pronunciation (or possibly 
a Syriac local form) of  ḥabaq, i. e. wild mint (but also used for other odoriferous 
plants such as basil, artemisia, or origanum). IV.2–3 Most of the forms used in 
the translation of this pharmacopoiea are simple transliterations of the Syriac 
equivalent or directly of the Greek word.117 The fact that most of the plants names 
in our recipes are to be found in Bar Bahlul’s Syriac-Arabic dictionary (composed 
first half of the tenth-century?) is a possible indication of the availabity of a Syriac 
or an Arabic version of VP 34 to him.118 This would also imply that the paragraph 
appeared in Porphyry’s Philosophical History as we can read it in Ibn Abī U ṣay-
biʻ a. The differences between the Greek and the Arabic text point to two different 
versions of the Life of Pythagoras, the one preserved in the Greek VP, and another 
version, redacted especially for the Philosophical History.
Ar. VI
VI.4–10 Symbolae. The text follows VP 42 with omissions and diverging inter-
pretations. Hans Daiber, quoting Baumstark, pointed the role of Theodore bar 
Konai (Liber Scholiorum II, 291.11-18) as a possible intermediary in the transmis-
sion of the symbolae. Daiber believes that Theodoret, who composed his Book of 
Scholia around 791, knew the Philosophical History, perhaps through a Syriac com-
pilation.119 Nevertheless, the role of Cyril of Alexandria, who quotes the symbolae 
116 The mention of the mallow in both recipes might have led to its expurgation from the text 
used by al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik. Mallow had been famously forbidden by the Fatimid ca-
liph al-  Ḥakīm (r. 996–1021), often known as the “mad caliph,” whose reign led to a schism 
in Ismailism which led to the formation of the Druze sect.
117 Cf. Payne Smith 1879–1901, s. v. “mayqūn,” col. 2096–2097; “andraqīnī,” col. 257; “andrakhnā,” 
col. 258; “asfudelūn,” col. 312. 
118 Duval 1888, s. v. Greek index, with additional bibliography on mekonion (1076.21), skellos 
(1378.02), skilla (1384.20 and cf. 241.21), antherikos (210.3), asphodelos (131.18), korion (1753.10), 
malakhè (1021.13), andrakhnè (199.4).
119 Daiber 1994, 4984. Baumstark 1905, 5 f.
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in his Contra Julianum (PG 76, col. 961 AB) as expressly copied from Book I of the 
Philosophical History should be further investigated. 
Ar. VII
VII.14 There can be no doubt that Zaratos (a pronunciation which probably re-
flects Aramaic) in Porphyry’s VP 12 should be identified with Zoroaster: he is 
identified as the author of the Peri Phuseos, a text known, e. g. to Clement of Alex-
andria (cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, V, 14; Proclus, Comm. In Remp., vol. 2, 
109.9 Kroll and Bidez / Cumont, Mages Hellénisés, II,16). According to Proclus, the 
Peri Phuseos was dedicated to “King Cyrus.” This could explain the chronology 
referred to in Ar. XII.1. Moreover, Cambyses, given as the son of Cyrus in the 
same paragraph (Ar. XII.1), is known to Herodotus as a contemporary of the Pha-
raoh Amasis, whom Pythagoras visited according Porphyry. On Zoroaster as a 
priest of Mithra, see Porphyry’s Cave of the Nymphs, 6. 
Ar. VIII 
On the Pherecydes episode, cf. Diogenes Laertius, I, 117–118. VIII.1 “The Syrian“ 
(sic), i.e. from the island of Syros in the Cyclads. Delos is the place where Pythag-
oras buried Pherecydes according to Diogenes Laertius, I, 118.
Ar. IX
IX.12 On Polycrates’s exact date and more generally on the chronology of Pythag-
oras, see the remarks of Labarbe 1962, 153–188. 
Ar. X
X.6 Spencer Trimingham 1979, 143, noticed that the Arabic words used to des-
ignate the degrees of auditors and initiates (or ‘elects’) in Manichaeism are sam-
māʻūn and  ṣiddīqūn. It is not unlikely that the translator was influenced by this 
vocabulary, which complies with other archaic features. Debates between Zoro-
astrians, Christians, and Manichaeans were widespread in Iraq and Iran before 
the advent of Islam, and were extended to include Muslim theologians well until 
the 10th–11th c. and later.
Ar. XI
XI.3 A Syriac translator could be accountable for some of the mistakes showing 
a Christianizing trend in the text unless the Greek original had already been 
altered in this direction.120
120  Cf. Lane 1863, 103, s. v. “muʼmīn:” “…is [found] as an epithet applied to God: He Who ren-
dereth mankind secure from his wronging them….” Demetrius of Alexandria (d. 232) was cer-
tainly known to the Syriac transmitters of chronicles. This and a possible reference to the 
“Bu ḥayra,” i. e. the “lake,” but also the administrative name of the Egyptian Eastern delta 
(cf. Ar. VII.5), are possible hints of the Christian milieu where the translation was carried out.
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Ar. XII
XII.1 is introduced with “the authors reported” which seems to imply a shift in 
the source, apparently a chronology where the reigns of the Achaemenids were 
synchronized with Biblical history, of the type that was also used by Eusebius. It 
cannot be excluded that Porphyry decided to confront Greek and Biblical history 
in his Philosophical History, as this was the common practice of his time and had 
been for at least two centuries before him. Porphyry famously debated in book 
XII of his Against the Christians the date of the Book of Daniel by resorting to his 
extensive knowledge of ancient history.
Ar. XIII
XIII.1 The “butter” (samnan) we find in the Arabic text is the result of a scribal 
corruption of “honeycomb” (šahdan). XIII.3 Cf. supra commentary to IV.1.
Ar. XIV
XIV.1–12 shows important differences with the Porphyrian text of the Greek 
VP. The parallel between Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’ De Vita Pythagorica is well-
known, with Iamblichus adding where Porphyry’s text ends abruptly (because 
the manuscripts we have all represent an incomplete witness, lacking an unde-
termined number of folios at the end). The Arabic version of Pythagoras’ death in 
the Arabic VP is closer to Diogenes Laertius, 8.39–40.
Ar. XV
XV.1 is introduced with “the authors reported” and seems to imply a shift in 
the source, while XV.2–3 on the sayings found on Pythagoras’ ring (Ar. XV.2) 
and belt (Ar. XV.3), are inspired by a topos of Pehlevi literature that duly appear 
in   Ḥunayn ibn Is ̣hāq’s Ādab al-Falāsifa.121
Ar. XVII
XVII.1–34 (= M1 to M91): The parallels to the Puthagoreiai Gnomai (= Pseudo-De-
mophilus) in this section were analyzed by Gutas 1975, 248–250; 268–275. On the 
transmission of the Sayings of Sextus in Syriac, cf. Arzhanov 2015. The longer text 
of Ibn Fātik includes even longer extracts from the Golden Verses and one of the 
Letter to the Tyrant of Sicily (see infra Ar. XXI.7) alongside other sayings and anec-
dotes. Ullmann identifies the Golden Verses (=GV) behind most of the sayings of 
the first part of the Pythagoras gnomology in the Choicest Maxims (GV 40–44, 46–
49, 11, 12, 16, 23, 27?, 32, 33, 36?–38, 31–39, 21–24, 39) and those taken over from Ibn 
Fātik by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a.122  ̣Hunayn ibn Is ̣hāq carried out a faithful translation of 
121 The belt saying is ascribed to Pythagoras (spelled Fū
¯
tāġūraš) by  Ḥunayn, Ādāb al-falāsifa, 
45 Badawī. On the Pehlevi origin of rings and belts sayings, see the article by Zakeri forth-
coming.
122 Ullmann 1959, 24–26.
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the Golden Verses (cf. Ādāb al-falāsifa, 116–119 Badawī). Ullmann considers that the 
version preserved by Miskawayh (al- Ḥikma al-
˘
halīda, 227–228 Badawī) is a simple 
revision of  Ḥunayn’s text. Nauck in his time already provided in his edition of 
the Letter to Marcella a list of parallels between this text and important gnomolo-
gies such as the Pythagorean Maxims of the Pseudo-Demophilus, the related Syriac 
Pythagorean Maxims, the excerpts of Stobaeus, and the Florilegium Monacense.123 
It was only much later, however, that the Arabic parallels were investigated by 
Rosenthal and Gutas in their respective contributions to the studies of the gno-
mologia (cf. Gutas 1975 and Rosenthal, infra Ar. XIX). Porphyry seems to have 
been using a gnomology he probably knew by heart,124 reappropriating it in the 
prosaic form of his Letter.125 The same device was used earlier by the same author 
in his De Abstinentia, book II, 34–35 (known to Cyril of Alexandria, Contra Iulia-
num, II, 37, who rephrased the excerpt in order to give it a Christian inclination). 
Ar. XVIII
This is the second occurrence of the Pythagorean symbolae. These were wide-
ly copied in Arabic literature, where they are ascribed by some either Socrates 
(cf. Shahrastānī, Book of Religions, *871 Badrān / Jolivet) or the physician Archi-
genes in a dialogue where Socrates provides the keys for each symbola.126 The 
dialogue in question is mentioned by Ibn al-Nadīm (Fihrist, 260.5 Flügel) among 
al-Kindī’s works as a Dialogue between Socrates and Archigenes (Kitāb risālatihi fī 
mu ̣hāwara jarat bayna Suqrāt wa Aršīğānis) which should be identified with the text 
transmitted by Ibn Hindū (who studied philosophy with Abū al- ̣Hasan al- Āʻmirī, 
himself the pupil of Abū Zayd al-Balkhī, a close disciple of al-Kindī) and was 
known to Ibn Fātik, Mu
˘
htār, 116 Badawī). The version here preserved by Ibn Fātik 
and copied by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a cannot have been taken from a gnomology of Py-
thagoras in the Philosophical History, since the symbolae have already been quoted 
at Ar. VI (parallel to VP 42) with explicit reference to Book I of the Porphyrian lost 
text. Rather, it is close to the text preserved by the Pseudo-Majrī ̣tī, the source of 
which seems to have been shared by Ibn Fātik.127 Clement of Alexandria (Stro-
mates, V, 30–31) and Hippolytus, Refutatio, VI,27 share some of the symbolae in 
our text but in most cases either the sequence or the explanation differs.128
123 Nauck 1886, introd. xviii–xx.
124 On the role of gnomologies in rhetorical studies, see the interesting hypothesis put for-
ward by Mahé 1978, I, 408–418.
125 For the parallels between the Letter to Marcella and the Sextus collection, see the contribu-
tion of I. Fotini Viltanioti in this volume. See further Chadwick 1959, 144–158; Rocca-Serra 
1971; Sodano 1991a; Sodano 1991b.
126 Ibn Hindū, al-Kalim al-rū ̣hānīyah fī al- ̣hikam al-Yūnānīya, 375–377 Khalīfāt (in: Khalīfāt 1995). 
The chapter is titled Mu ̣hāwarāt jarat bayna Arsīğānis [sic] wa Suqrā ̣t.
127 Cf. supra n. 33 and ad loc.
128 On the Christian transmission of the symbolae, cf. Thom 1994.
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Ar. XIX 
This section shows parallels with several Greek and Arabic gnomologies iden-
tified by Rosenthal.129 Ibn Durayd (m. 933) was among the sources used by Ibn 
Fātik, according to Rosenthal, alongside  Ḥunayn ibn Is ḥāq’s Ādāb al-falāsifa and 
to the Ṣiwān al- ̣hikma.  Ḥunayn and Ibn Durayd in turn are dependent on two dif-
ferent Greek sources which seem to have shared some sayings, while Ibn Durayd 
and the Ṣiwān probably depend on a common source. XIX.1 Cf. Rosenthal 1958, 
48 n°LIV: “ When the value of money and the possession of large amounts of it 
were extolled in his presence, he said: “What do I need money for ? Obtaining it 
depends on luck, saving it is (a sign of) meanness, and spending it liberally is the 
end of it, ” with references to  ̣Hunayn’s Ādāb al-falāsifa (missing from the Hebrew 
translation), where it is ascribed to *Bndārs or *Bīdārs (if we remove the dot of the 
nūn), while the Siwān ascribes it to Pythagoras. Abū   ̣Hayyān al-Taw ̣hīdī, Imtā‘, 2.45, 
ascribes it to a 
¯
Tiyūdūrūs but the ductus according to Rosenthal is close enough to 
Bndārs, with  Ḥunayn and Ibn Hindū, which Rosenthal suggests should be iden-
tified with Bion, with Stobaeus and Maximus the Confessor.130 XIX.3 Cf. Rosen-
thal 1958, 49–50, n°LIX: “Observing an old man who wanted to study philosophy 
but was ashamed to do so (on account of his age), he said: ‘You there! Are you 
ashamed of being better at the end of your life than you were at its beginning?’” 
parallel to Ibn Hindū (Socrates). Repeated in Ibn Fātik’s Choicest Maxims in the 
chapter on Plato and again in the chapter on Socrates. A Greek parallel can be 
found in Stobaeus. XIX.5 Cf. Rosenthal 1958, 40–41, n°XXX: “When death came to 
Anaxagoras in a foreign country…” with the same homoioteleuton as in Ibn Fātik. 
Rosenthal 1958, 40, n. 2, notices that the ducti for Anaxagoras and Pythagoras are 
close enough to assume a confusion and provides parallels with the Ṣiwān, where 
the saying is ascribed to Pythagoras in a formulation practically identical with 
Ibn Durayd; twice in the Choicest Maxims (in the Pythagoras’ chapter and in the 
anonymous sayings) and in Ibn Hindū, where the orthography *Abāfūthāġūrs may 
help explain the transition from Anaxagoras to Pythagoras: Ar. *Abā- in scriptio 
defectiva would have rendered Syriac ʼn
¯
t
¯
t (pronounced ā
¯
t
¯
ta), “wife.” The Greek 
tradition ascribes the saying to Anaxagoras (Diogenes Laertius and Florilegium 
Vindobonense, while the Gnomologium Vaticanum ascribes it to Anaximenes once 
and to Anaxagoras another time, parallel to Diogenes Laertius; Antonius Melissa 
ascribes it to Diogenes). XIX.6 Rosenthal 1958, 41, n°XXXII identified two occur-
rences of the same sayings131 in the Choicest Maxims (once in the chapter on Py-
thagoras n°103, and once in the chapter made of anonymous sayings), and refers 
to Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, 1099a28; Eudemian Ethics, 1214a6; Diogenes Laertius I, 36 
(Thales); Stobaeus and Gnomologium Vaticanum for thematic parallels.
129 Rosenthal 1958, 29–55 and 150–183.
130 See further Gutas 1975, 218–220.
131 On the phenomena of repeated translations of the same sayings and anecdotes in Ibn Fā-
tik’s Choicest Maxims, see the review by Kuentz 1957, 255–269.
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Ar. XX
XX.2 On Archytas (Ar
˘
hū ṭis), cf. Munta
˘
hab Ṣiwān al- ḥikma, § 238, 112–113 Dunlop. 
XX.10 Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a ascribes a Kitāb al-Mayāmir and a Book on Metaphysics (fī 
mā baʻ d al- ṭabīʻa) to Empedocles (37.7 Müller).132 It should be added here that ac-
cording to the Commentary on the Golden Verses ascribed in Arabic to “Proclus,” the 
author of the poem is none other than Empedocles, who was the one who wrote 
down the Golden Verses (transmitted by his master Pythagoras).133 XX.16 A Book of 
Virtue is ascribed by Diogenes Laertius (II, 85) to Aristippus (Aristipp the Rhetor 
= Aristipp of Cyrene). XX.17 The identification of Megillos was already suggested 
by M. Steinschneider.134 A Pythagorean “Clinias” is mentioned by Athenaeus, 
Deipnosophists XIV, 624a. XX.18 The only safe identification in this list is that of the 
Socratic Aristippus of Cyrene, which is probably a late gloss by a Christian reader 
of Porphyry. Aristippus’ thoughts on hedone could well explain the disparaging 
comment at XX.19. On XX.20, cf. Ar. XV.1. 
Ar. XXI
XXI.7 A fragment of this Pseudo-Pythagorean letter is preserved in Arabic.135 
XXI.8 Galen’s daily reading of the Golden Verses is a common topos of Arabic liter-
ature.136 XXI.9 Diogenes Laertius (VIII, 49–50) gives a letter supposedly written by 
Anaximenes to Pythagoras. XXI.10 Ibn Abī U ṣaybiʻ a states that Iamblichus com-
mented on this single epistle while Ibn al-Nadīm’s Fihrist reads “on these epistles 
(hā
¯
dihi al-rasāʼil),” without further specification as to which of the titles in the list 
are actually referred to. XXI.11 This title is missing from Ibn al-Nadīm. It was ei-
ther added by Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻ a himself or by one of the scribes of the Fihrist. The 
name could be read Simonides.
132  Al-Shahrazūrī might be referring to this title when he describes a book of Empedocles 
“on the divine science (fī al-ʻ ilm al-ilāhī)” [sc. on theology] he has perused (Nuzhat, 83.9–10 
Abū Shuwayrib). He further quotes explicitly the Kitāb al-Mayāmir by Empedocles in his 
Shar ̣h  ̣hikmat al-išrāq, so that we may wonder if the two titles of Ibn Abī U ̣saybiʻa are not one 
and the same book.
133 Cf. the use of the words wā ̣diʻ  and mudawwin by the translator Abū al-Faraj Ibn al- Ṭayyib, 
in Linley 1984, 4 and 78 (Arabic text).
134 Steinschneider 1893, 4, n. 10.
135 Gutas 1975, 222–225 gives the Greek and Arabic texts in parallel.
136 Boudon-Millot 2011, 21–22, identified the citation of Galen on his reading twice a day of Py-
thagorean exhortations as taken from the De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione 
et curatione, 6 De Boer [CMG, V,4,1,1, 1937, 21, 8–10]. Ullmann 1959, 22, had identified yet 
another reference to Galen’s daily reading of Pythagoras in the De cognoscenis curandisque 
animi morbis, cap. 6.
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Two Humanist Lives of Pythagoras
Ada Palmer – University of Chicago
Introduction
These two sixteenth-century descriptions of the life of Pythagoras were written 
fifty years apart by humanists in very different scholarly worlds: pre-Reforma-
tion Italy and post-Reformation Germany. Yet the treatments are closely linked, 
since the later took the former as its model. Neither was composed as an indepen-
dent work – indeed all known Renaissance lives of Pythagoras were composed as 
subsections of larger texts.
First is the entry on Pythagoras from the encyclopaedic 1506 Commentarii Ur-
bani of Raffaele Maffei (1451–1522). Sometimes called Volterrano or Volaterranus, 
Maffei came from Volterra and was educated in Rome under the guidance of 
his father Gherardo Maffei, a law professor and apostolic secretary under three 
popes. Raffaele mastered Latin and Greek, but found the corruption at the Vati-
can distasteful, and turned down a political career to dedicate his life to charity; 
he taught at an academy held in his home, founded a house of Poor Clares and 
considered a monastic life himself, finally joining the Servite Order. He translat-
ed Homer, Xenophon, sermons, and other Greek works, and wrote highly critical 
and influential lives of Sixtus IV, Innocent VIII, Alexander VI, and Pius III. His 
best known work is the massive Commentarii Urbani, dedicated to Julius II, which 
treats in three sections Geography, Anthropology (including contemporary his-
tory), and Philology, with extensive treatments of popes and emperors, animals, 
plants and minerals, the arts and sciences including optics and astrology, and the 
works of Aristotle. His brief entry on Pythagoras draws broadly upon Greek and 
Latin sources, and focuses on Pythagoras’ quasi-monastic school. Appearing as 
it does in the middle of a work, the Latin is simple and clear, since the humanist 
tendency to produce intentionally elaborate and ornamented Latin was restricted 
to Maffei’s introductions. Despite its enormous length and corresponding cost, 
the Commentarii Urbani were reprinted eight times within a century.
In 1559 – two generations and a Reformation later – Michael Neander (1525-
1595) had Maffei’s Commentarii Urbani at his desk when he wrote the dedicatory 
letter for his edition of the Golden Verses accompanied by poems of Phocylides. 
This was not the Michael Neander who taught astronomy and medicine at the 
University of Jena, but a philologist from Sorau, Germany, who later published 
several works on Greek erudition including Graecae Linguae Tabulae… Gnomologici 
Graecolatini in 1564 and Graecae Linguae Erotemata in 1586. His Pythagoras volume, 
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printed in Basel, was an early career-making effort by its 34-year-old editor; its 
dedication is addressed to the governors of Thuringia, and not to a princely pon-
tiff. Thuringia had been quick to embrace the Reformation, and by Neander’s 
day it was thoroughly suppressing Catholicism and had substantial Anabaptist 
activity. Neander’s description of Pythagoras’ life is nested toward the end of 
a letter focused on the value of Greek and Latin learning, which argues for the 
presence of divine knowledge in the Presocratics and a continuity of revelation 
from Moses through Pythagoras to Plato. The letter systematically repositions 
the arguments made by fifteenth-century humanists to defend classical learning 
in a Christian era, adapting them to strip out medieval authorities unpalatable in 
anti-Catholic lands, and to create an alternative history of learning, which jumps 
from Jerome to Erasmus. Neander shows uncommon courtesy by actually cred-
iting Maffei Volaterranus in his footnotes, and may be counting upon his Prot-
estant readers to know and respect Maffei’s pious life and his much-reprinted 
criticism of corrupt popes.
Latin Texts
Raffaele Maffei, 1506, Commentariorum urbanorum XXXXIII libri Raphaelis Volater-
raniocto et triginta libri… item oeconomicus Xenophontis, ab eodem Latio donatus (tran-
scribed from the Gryphius edition, Lyon, 1552. fol. z5v, 548).
Pythagoras Samius philosophus patre Demarato locuplete ac negotiatore, in 
Aegyptum primo, mox Babyloniam discendi siderum cursus gratia profectus 
est. Inde regressus in Cretam ac Lacedaemoniam pervenit, ut Lycurgi & Minois 
inclytas ea tempestate leges agnosceret. Ad ultimum in Italiam transmittens Cro-
tone consedit, ubi populos luxuriae adsuetos autoritate ac doctrina ad frugalem 
cultam revocavit. Matronas ad pudicitiam, iuvenes ad modestiam cohortari co-
epit. Eius passim sanctitate ac vitae abstinentia inductae mulieres, auratas vestes, 
ornamentaque lasciviora in tempo Iunoni consecravere. Sed & ex iuvenibus CCC 
cum sodalitii iure sacramento quodam nexi separatim a caeteris civibus religio-
nis ac modestiae causa agitarent, suspicione clandestinae coniurationis civitatem 
in se converterunt. Itaque eos in unam domum coactos vulgus cremare conten-
dens tumultu omnia complevit, ubi LX periere, caeteri in exilium profecti. Pytha-
goras itaque cum multos annos Crotone exegisset, Metapontum migravit, ibique 
decessit. Cuius tanta fuit admiratio ut ex domo eius templum facerent, eumque 
pro deo colerent. Haec ex Trogi libro XX Quintilianus autem libro IX Cicero vero 
ait. Tanta opinio de Pythagora praeiudicata potuit, ut eius etiam sine ratione va-
leret autoritas. Docuit in Italia regnante Servio Tullo, ut Livius & Dionysius auto-
res. Eius Philostratus in principio vitae Apollonii, pluribus verbis meminit. Que-
madmodum ab omnibus abstineret animalibus, animamque reducem putaret. Se 
propterea Euphorbum Troianum dicebat. Deinde pavonem fuisse, Ex quo Persius 
noster Pythagoraeum appellat pavonem. De ipsius secta scripsit Iamblycus libros 
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tris qui adhuc extant. In quos commentarios edidit Simplicius, opus utrunque 
[sic] in bibliotheca Vaticana conspicitur. Ipsius apophthema, φίλων τάντα [sic] 
κοινά, Amicorum omnia communia.
Michael Neander ed., 1559, En Lector, Librum Damus Vere Aureum… Basel, page 17 
(f. c1r).
Fuit vero Pythagoras philosophus, ex Samo insula oriundus, Mnesarchi an-
nulorum sculptoris filius. Is cum discendi amore vehementissimo flagraret, in 
Aegyptum primo, mox Babyloniam, discendi causa profectus est. unde deinde 
regressus, in Cretam ac Lacedaemoniam pervenit. id quod pro veteri consuetudi-
ne veterum plurimi sequuti sunt, quemadmodum de aPlatone, Euripide, Solone, 
bApollonio Tyaneo, cCicerone etiam, & e patribus divo dHieronymo, scriptores 
prodiderunt: & eGalenus, medicorum princeps, de suis profectionibus discendi 
causa susceptis, ipse meminit. Postea vero cum iam multa ubique vidisset, didi-
cisset, ac audivisset, ac cum doctissimis viris de studiis, iisque rebus de quibus 
dubitabat, seu quae scire cupiebat, saepe contulisset, ac patriam Samum a fPoly-
crate tyrano teneri intelligeret: ea relicta denuo, Crotone, quae civitas est Italiae, 
a gMilone Crotoniata & aliquot aliis praestantibus viris celebri concedit: ibique 
aperta schola, & iuventutem & eius loci cives optimis praeceptis ad studium ho-
nestatis, probitatis ac frugalitatis, aliarumque virtutum excitavit. Caeterum qui-
bus legibus suos auditores rexerit, ad quae etiam praescripta tum ipse vixerit, 
tum etiam suos omnes vivere voluerit, hpluribus exposuerunt, Laertius, Suidas 
in Pythagora, Philostratus quoque in suo Apollonio, & Iamblichus philosophus, 
Porphyrii Christianorum hostis discipulus: qui de Pythagorae vita & secta libros 
tres conscripsit, in quos Commentaria edidit Simplicius Aristotelis interpres. Ci-
cero etiam, ac Plutarchus: & de Graecis veteribus theologis, Clemens Alexandri-
nus, & Philo Iudaeus: Erasmus etiam in Chiliadibus, & Lilius, ubi symbola inter-
pretantur Pythagorae. Et quis veterum Pythagorae non meminit? ut nec Livii, nec 
Iustini, nec Gellii, nec Macrobii, nec Luciani etiam, Virgilii & Ovidii poetarum, 
hoc loco mentionem faciamus. Inde enim, si qui his non sunt contenti, plura de 
De Pythagora philosopho & aureis ipsius carminibus.
a De Platonis peregrinatione, et Euripidis, et Solonis, vide Laertium in vitis philosophorum, 
Plutarchum in Solone, Herodotum quoque lib. 1. et Platonem in Timaeo.
b De Apollonio vide libros 8 Philostrati de vita Apollonii. Volaterranum etiam lib. 13. Anthro-
pologias, & Trithemium li. 2 Epistolarum familiarum ubi librorum 8 Philostrati Epitome 
leguntur.
c  De Cicerone, vide Plutarchum in Cicerone.
d De Hieronymo, vide vitae Hieronymi ab Erasmo ex eius scriptis confectam, quae initio 1. 
Tomi cum operibus eius impressa est.
e  Lib 9 de Facultatibus medicamentorum simplicium, ubi agit de terra Lemnia.
f  De quo apud Herodotum lib 3. prolixa extat historia
g Cuius Pausanias, Plinius, Gellius & Valerius meminere, Galenus etiam in lib. qui ad bonas 
artes exhortationem continet.
h Qui auctores scripserint de Pythagora.
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Pythagora addiscere possunt. Ei autem Pythagorae quidam tribuunt poema, τò 
χρυσᾶ ἐπηκαλούμενον [sic] (1): hoc est, Aurea carmina nominatum, (poema vere 
aureum) quemadmodum id Suidas refert hisce verbis: τινὲς δὲ ἀνατιθέασιν αὐτῷ 
καὶ τὰ χρυσᾶ ἔπη (2). seu quod revera ipse, seu etiam tota schola Pythagorae (quo 
Gellius(3) inclinare videtur) eius autor fuerit: seu etiam, quod eiusmodi brevibus 
sententiis solitus fuerit proponere doctrinam de moribus: seu quod id scriptum 
eius moribus, eiusque vitae sanctimoniae maxime congruere sapiens iudicarit 
antiquitas. de quo alii aliter sentient: quae nos sub iudice ita in medio indiscussa 
relinquimus.
Translations
Raffaele Maffei, 1506, Commentariorum urbanorum XXXXIII libri Raphaelis Volater-
ra ni item oeconomicus Xenophontis, ab eodem Latio donatus (transcribed from the 
Gryphius edition, Lyon, 1552. fol. z5v).
Pythagoras of Samos the philosopher, whose father was the wealthy merchant 
Demaratus, embarked, under the influence of the stars, on a voyage of study, first 
to Egypt, soon thereafter to Babylon. Returning he came to Crete and Sparta, to 
acquaint himself with the famous laws of Lycurgus and Minos of that time. Final-
ly crossing to Italy he settled in Croton, where, by his prestige and teachings, he 
converted people accustomed to luxury to a frugal lifestyle. He strove to urge ma-
trons to chastity and youths to temperance. Everywhere women were inspired by 
the saintliness and purity of his life to consecrate their gilded garments and lewd 
accessories in the temple of Juno. But when three hundred of the youths bound 
together as comrades by a certain sacred oath were living together, separately 
from other citizens, in pursuit of religion and discipline, suspicions of a secret 
conspiracy against the commonwealth circled them. Consequently a mob glutted 
everyone with riot, and when [Pythagoras’ followers] had been herded into one 
building, they rushed to burn it, whereupon sixty died, and the others passed 
into exile. Thus Pythagoras, driven from Croton in old age, moved to Metapon-
tum and died there. His prestige was so great that people made his house into a 
temple, and honoured him like a god. This is described by Gnaeus Pompeius Tro-
gus in Book XX, also Quintilian Book IX, even Cicero. Such overwhelming esteem 
for Pythagoras can be clearly documented that, without question, his influence 
still flourishes. In Italy he taught during the reign of Servius Tullius, as Livy and 
Dionysius testify. Philostratus, in the beginning of his Life of Apollonius of Tyana, 
recalled many of [Pythagoras’] words: how he abstained from eating animals, 
and believed that the soul returns. For this reason he used to say he had been 
(1)  Aurea carmina Pythagorae (note not numbered in text).
(2)  In Pythagora (note not numbered in text).
(3)  Lib 6 cap 2 (note not numbered in text).
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Euphorbus the Trojan, and that next he had been a peacock, for which reason our 
Persius calls Pythagoras “peacock.” Iamblichus wrote three books about his sect 
which survive, on which Simplicius circulated commentaries; both works can be 
seen in the Vatican library. His own guiding rule was φίλων πάντα κοινά, Among 
friends all things are common.
Michael Neander ed., 1559, En Lector, Librum Damus Vere Aureum… Basel, page 17 
(f. c1r).
Pythagoras was truly a philosopher, born on the island of Samos, son of a ring- 
maker Mnesarchus. Since he blazed with the fiercest passion for learning, he set 
off to study first in Egypt, and soon after in Babylon. Returning thence he came to 
Crete and Sparta. Thereafter many ancients followed this example as a traditional 
custom, as authors have reported of Platoa, Euripides, Solon, Apollonius of Tyanab, 
even Ciceroc, and among the holy fathers Jerome15d; even Galen16e himself, prince of 
physicians, heeded it when undertaking his voyages of study. When [Pythagoras] 
had already seen, learned, and accepted many things, and debated with the most 
learned men about his studies and things he was uncertain of or eager to learn, 
and when he had discovered that his homeland Samos was oppressed by the 
tyrant Polycrates f, he left it behind and went to Croton, a city in Italy, where he 
took up with gMilo of Croton and other famous illustrious men. There, opening 
a school, he exhorted that city’s youths and citizens, with excellent teachings, to 
the pursuit of honesty, uprightness and frugality, and other virtues. And the laws 
by which he directed his disciples, by which rule he himself lived and wished 
all his people to live, are described by hmany: [Diogenes] Laertius, the Suda on 
Pythagoras, Philostratus too in his life of Apollonius, and Iamblichus the philos-
opher, a student of Porphyry the antagonist of the Christian Fathers, on which 
Simplicius, the translator of Aristotle, circulated commentaries. Also Cicero, and 
About the philosopher Pythagoras and his Golden Verses. (These notes are printed in Latin in the 
margins of the original edition, reproduced here).
a About Plato’s pilgrimage, and Euripides’, and Solon’s, see Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Philos-
ophers, Plutarch’s Solon, and Herodotus Book 1, and Plato’s Timaeus.
b On Apollonius see the 8 books of Philostratus on the Life of Apollonius [of Tyana]; likewise 
[Raffaele Maffei] Volterrano’s Anthropologia [i. e. Commentarii urbani part II] book 13, and book 
2 of [Johannes] Trithemius’s personal letters, in which a summary of the eight books of Phi-
lostratus can be read.
c  On Cicero, see Plutarch’s Cicero.
d On Jerome, see the life of Jerome by Erasmus excerpted from his writings, which was printed 
at the beginning of vol. 1 with his collected works.
e  Book 9 On the Powers of Simple Drugs, where he spent time on the land of Lemnos. (The refer-
ence is XXI 168–178).
f  Of whom there is a lengthy history in Herodotus book 3.
g Whom Pausanias, Pliny, Gellius, and Valerius remember, and Galen himself in the book 
which is an Exhortation to the Study of the Arts.
h Which authors wrote about Pythagoras.
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
524 Ada Palmer
Plutarch, and among Greek Fathers Clement of Alexandria and Philo Judaeus, 
and Erasmus in the Adages, and Lilius [Tifernas], by whom Pythagoras’ Symbols 
were interpreted. And which of the ancients does not recall Pythagoras? As if 
we could not name Livy, nor Justin Martyr, nor Gellius, nor Macrobius, nor even 
Lucian, Virgil & Ovid the poets. Thus, if any are not satisfied with this account, 
they can learn more elsewhere about Pythagoras. Yet some attribute to Pythago-
ras a certain poem, τò χρυσᾶ ἐπηκαλούμενον, (1) that is the Golden Verses (truly a 
golden poem), as the Suda says in these words: τινὲς δὲ ἀνατιθέασιν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ 
χρυσᾶ ἔπη. (2) The truth is either that he himself, or possibly the whole Pythago-
rean school (to which Gellius(3) seems to incline), was the author; or alternatively 
that it used to be a common practice to present moral precepts in brief aphorisms 
of that sort; or that ancient judgment pronounced those verses most congruent 
with [Pythagoras’] precepts and his very holy life. All sources have their own 
opinions on this matter, which we leave undecided in mid-dispute.
(1) Pythagoras’ Golden Verses.
(2) On Pythagoras (the Greek reads: “Some also attribute to him the Golden Verses” Suda, Ad-
dler π3120, “Pythagoras,” Suda On Line. tr. Catherine Roth. 4 April 2002. 26 February 2015 
http://www.stoa.org/sol-entries/pi/3120).
(3) Book 6 chapter 2.
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390, 391, 395, 401, 405, 420, 484, 485, 
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– transfer of: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 
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37, 40n–41, 42, 50, 51, 57, 89, 103, 105, 
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– true: 31, 87, 89, 190, 417, 428, 431
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397, 399, 400, 402, 403, 406, 413, 417, 
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65, 89, 94, 101, 148, 151, 158, 157, 188, 
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265, 275, 282, 286n, 295, 306, 327n, 
344n, 353, 371, 375, 380
Laws and customs (see also “Rule”): 100, 
101, 104, 124, 153, 191–192, 200, 222, 
296, 297n–298n, 339, 362, 365, 366, 367, 
384, 391, 395, 432, 461, 490, 495, 496, 
503, 522, 523 
Lifestyle: see “Way of life”
Light: 55, 89, 153, 188, 206, 208, 309, 353, 
375, 379, 393, 428, 470, 484, 506
 Lux ex oriente: 456, 457, 459, 462
Limiters and unlimited: 6, 63, 64, 65, 66, 
69, 70, 259
Locri: 47, 50, 56, 57, 200, 207, 216, 298–300, 
301, 333, 389, 439, 440, 496 
Logos: 474n
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– Heraclitean: 33, 34, 35–35n, 79
– hieros logos: 41, 42, 326, 330n
– Platonic: 10, 86
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– of wisdom (philosophia) (see also 
“Philosophy”): 35, 36n, 124, 225, 413, 
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Luxury: 104, 128, 211, 221, 223, 256, 375, 
376, 502, 520, 522
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Magi, of Persia: 217–217n, 355n
Magna Graecia: 126n, 132, 229, 249, 254n, 
297, 298–299, 300, 301, 384–384n, 386 
Magnificence (megaloprepeia): 145–145n, 
190n, 502
Male: 88, 136–137, 256, 267, 269, 271, 272, 
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Manichaeism: 419, 508
Marriage: 78, 153–153n, 155, 164, 202, 267, 
269, 271, 323, 343, 349n, 432
– husband: 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 153, 
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– wife: 87n, 88n, 89, 136, 137, 138, 139, 
141, 153, 163, 164, 270, 495, 503, 511
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Mathematics: 2, 10, 11, 25, 28, 49, 78n, 93, 
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431, 434, 437, 441, 442, 443, 444, 446, 
453–453n, 458–459, 460, 461, 485, 486
Medicine: 5, 9, 10, 13, 54n, 78n, 249–260, 
263– 275, 276–288n, 293, 294–295, 301n– 
 302, 305, 311, 314, 315, 322, 324, 339, 
467, 468–469, 473, 474, 489, 519, 521  
Memory: 18, 23, 51, 90, 94, 111, 136, 231, 
233, 323, 355, 384
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Messianism: 384, 386, 388, 390, 393–393n 
Metamorphosis: 405
Metaphysics: 6, 10, 57, 63, 67, 69, 72, 107, 
258, 268, 275, 328, 329, 330, 331, 333, 
334, 335, 337, 347n, 361–361n, 363, 364, 
365, 371, 372, 386, 396, 397, 399, 404, 
417, 424, 426, 427, 428, 431, 434, 441, 
442, 458, 459, 462
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tality of”): 5–7, 10–11, 13, 17–29, 40, 63–
76, 77, 78n, 79n–80, 83, 84, 89, 90, 93–101, 
103–115, 211n, 212n, 232, 251, 282, 353n, 
388–390, 404, 405, 457–457n, 470
Monadology: 11, 401, 459, 461, 462–462n
Monarchianism: 8, 192, 193–193n
Monasticism: 8, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 
158, 229, 235
– coenobium: 235–236n
– lifestyle of: 9, 157, 211–225, 232, 234, 
236, 237, 293n, 519
– rules of: 107, 127n
– terminology of: 237
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Monotheism: 8, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 
216, 218, 364, 365, 368, 369, 371, 428
Morality (see also “Pythagoreanism, eth-
ics”): 3, 8, 9, 11, 23, 68, 97, 105, 106–107, 
110, 111, 113, 115, 123, 124, 125, 144–
144n, 147, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 
159n, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 201, 209, 
214, 219, 220, 223, 249, 253, 254, 255, 
256, 258–258n, 260, 283–283n, 305, 
306, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 321, 
375, 377, 396, 397, 458, 497, 524  
Multiplicity: 146n, 349, 395, 397, 399, 400, 
406, 407, 424, 425, 426
Music: 6, 10, 13, 54–54n, 107, 123n, 125, 
127n, 212, 249, 250n, 255, 264, 268, 
269n, 271, 272, 274–274n, 277–277n, 
293, 297n–298, 299–300n, 302, 305, 310, 
313, 316–316n, 341, 353, 365, 395, 416, 
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– as therapy: 10, 42, 54n, 256–256n, 
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399, 405, 406, 486, 489
Nature (phusis): 8, 36, 56, 64, 65, 100, 144–
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336, 337, 338, 340, 343, 344, 347, 349, 
356, 363, 364, 370, 386, 387, 379, 392, 
417, 424
– triad (3): 108, 204, 264–264n, 265, 267, 
268, 269, 273, 274, 275, 279, 321, 323–
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348, 349n, 363, 364, 370, 375, 376, 379, 
380, 387–387n, 389, 392, 414 
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392, 425
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440
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– as creatures: 363, 364, 368
 as element: 307, 337, 350–351n, 352n, 
364, 443, 444, 448
– as figures or shapes: 337, 341, 391, 425, 
426
– as means for divination: 54n
– as Platonic forms: 335, 336
– as principle: 78, 185, 257, 307, 330, 334, 
337, 347n, 370, 371, 423n–424
– atomism: 401, 455
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424, 425 
 dialectics of: 417
 even and odd: 257, 274, 321, 322, 323, 
338, 343, 344, 347n, 363
– hymn to: 56–57
– ideal and real: 324, 336
– integer and fraction: 363–363n
– irrational: 80–81n, 406, 407
– Kabbalah: 373–384
– male and female: 259, 267, 271, 273, 
323, 338, 343, 347n
– metaphysics: 10, 331, 333, 337, 361–
361n, 402
– perfect: 264–264n, 265n, 267, 268, 271, 
323, 324n, 327n, 335, 336, 339, 348 
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 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
537Index of Topics
Pagans, Paganism: 8, 9, 127n, 151, 152, 
153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 163–169, 190, 
193, 194, 199, 220, 221, 225, 228, 231, 
232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 375, 
390, 446, 456, 480, 484 
Paideia: see “Education and learning”
Passion: 53, 114, 122, 141, 147, 170, 223, 
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494, 502, 503
– poroi and periodoi of: 287
– principle of life: 70, 72, 95, 109, 272, 275
– principle of movement: 85
– purification of (katharsis): 10, 22, 23, 
28, 111, 147, 159, 253, 256–256n, 260, 
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355, 487, 495
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Theurgy: 48, 52–52n, 205, 207, 454
Todi, Santa Maria della Consolazione: 
379, 380
Transmigration of souls: see “Metempsy-
chosis”
Troja, Trojan: 107, 211n, 353–353n, 523
Tyranny: 122, 123, 124, 298, 356, 493, 494
Underworld 
– Hades: 6, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 42, 
51, 85, 86, 88, 89, 94, 251, 326n
– Hell: 218
– Pluto: 22
– Tartarus: 22
Unity: see “Number, monad”
Unlimiteds and limiters: 6, 63, 64, 65, 66, 
69, 70, 251, 259, 260, 340, 414
Vegetarianism (see also “Taboos, meat” 
and “Dietetics”): 7, 105, 107, 113, 125, 
126n, 128–128n, 222, 251, 520, 522
Virtue: see “Excellence”
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– civic: 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 225
– contemplative: 31, 87, 137, 139, 141, 
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– ethical: 7, 135, 146, 154, 164, 209, 212, 214, 
219, 220, 222, 223, 314, 490, 492, 494, 523
– monastic: 107, 216, 218, 223, 224
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– practical: 10, 106, 137, 146, 147, 214
– spiritual: 214, 220, 221, 225
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74, 143n, 188
Voice: 42, 139, 140, 265, 295, 296n, 323n, 
439, 440
Way of life (tropos tou biou): 3, 5, 7–9, 10, 
12, 13, 26, 45, 78, 85, 121–132, 137, 165, 
168, 250, 253–253n, 258, 277, 278n–279, 
281n, 293–294n, 298, 332, 432–434, 
484, 500   
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– abstinence from: 26 , 139, 255
– in the Beyond: 21, 22
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– aphoristic: 220
– archaic: 31, 43, 94
– ascetic: 152, 154
– astronomic (see also “Astronomy”): 
204, 207
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– Christian: 109, 169
– divine: 34, 41, 82, 89, 186, 189n, 233, 
342, 347, 354, 363, 384, 390, 444, 470–
470n, 490, 494, 495
– empirical: 275
– erotic: 84, 88, 89
– esoteric: 252
– fostered by music: 314
– fifty ways of (see also “Number, 
number 50”): 392
– human: 4
– Kabbalistic: 384
– kakotechnie (see also “Knowledge, ka-
kotechnie”): 43, 79, 470
– liberty in: 223
– logos: 34
– love of (philosophia) (see also “Philos-
ophy”): 35, 36–37, 225, 420, 492
– moral: 8, 151, 152, 159n, 164, 167, 170, 
321
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– of others: 34, 494
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– pedagogy of: 484, 490, 492, 494
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– practical: 3, 250–250n, 253
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– private: 33n–34, 35n, 37, 38, 48, 79–79n
– sapiential literature: 494
– Seven Sages: see “Sages, Seven Sages” 
– spiritual: 164
– symbolic: 491
– traditional: 10, 103, 104, 106, 164, 168
– travellers: 232
– true: 35, 157, 158, 461
– universal: 224, 493
– unquestionable: 34
– vast: 34 
Wealth: 107, 139, 156, 158, 159, 224, 225, 
288, 499, 520, 522 
Woman: see “Female”
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Eubule: 135n, 140–140n
Euclid: 140, 264n, 271, 327n, 336n, 351n, 
352n, 366, 396, 443, 444, 469
Eudemus: 204n, 327n, 334, 344
Eudorus: 47, 185n, 329–329n, 331n, 356, 357 
Eudoxus: 332, 333, 356–356n, 506 
Eumenes: 137
Eunapius: 352n, 483n
Eunostus: 492
Euphorbus: 114, 211n, 353–353n, 520, 523
Euripides: 38–38n, 80n, 82, 83–83n, 141, 
144n, 222, 301n, 521– 521n, 523–523n 
Euryclea: 143
Eurydice: 140, 141n
Eusebius: 122n, 151, 153, 160, 191n, 193, 
194–194n, 234, 352n, 354n, 385, 474n, 
480, 482n, 506, 509 
Eustathius: 51n
Eustochium: 235
Euxytheus: 24n
Evagrius Ponticus: 151, 152, 153, 155, 158–
159, 160–160n, 485n 
Ezekiel: 152, 355n
Firmicus Maternus: 239
Galen: 222, 280–280n, 314, 352n, 468–468n, 
474, 505, 512–512n, 521–521n, 523–523n
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Gellius, Aulus: 127n, 236n, 354n, 521–
521n, 522, 523n–524
Gorgias: 144
Gregory of Nazianzus: 25–25n, 28, 385, 
386
Gregory of Nyssa: 153, 156, 157, 158, 159, 
160–160n
Harmonia: 270
Hecataeus: 34
Heliodorus, Caius Julius: 352n
Heliodorus of Athens: 352n
Hellanicus: 296n
Hephaestion: 235–235n
Hephaestus: 143
Heraclides Ponticus: 3, 23–24, 36, 95, 121, 
127–127n, 206, 332, 353, 354 
Heraclitus: 6, 7, 24–24n, 31, 32, 33, 34–36, 
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 77, 78–80, 81, 
82, 83, 88n, 95, 144n, 146n, 216–216n, 
287, 327, 366, 371, 402, 418
Hercules: 388–388n, 473, 481, 491
Hermes: 39, 88, 89, 406, 438, 468n
Hermes Trismegistus: 213
Hermias: 186–186n, 219, 353n, 437n
Hermippus: 42, 121, 332, 356n
Hermodamas: 493
Hermodorus: 356n
Hermotimus: 353
Herodian: 236n
Herodicus: 286n
Herodotus: 24, 25, 32, 39, 40–41, 42, 46, 
94n–95, 100, 205, 508, 521n, 523n  
Heron: 348, 349, 351–352n 
Herophilus: 268
Hesiod: 34, 51, 55, 79, 80–80n, 88, 99, 193, 
220, 270n, 277n 
Hestia: 203, 204, 340, 343
Hierocles: 212, 213–214n, 215n, 485n, 286n
Hippasus: 81n, 309, 371
Hippo: 249, 250n, 258, 327, 339, 345
Hippobotus: 25–25n, 137
Hippocrates: 10, 366, 468–468n
Hippodamus: 339n
Hippolytus (son of Theseus): 38
Hippolytus of Rome: 78n, 131n, 235n, 347–
349, 351, 353–357, 361n, 367, 369n, 511
Homer: 18, 54n–55, 79–80, 81, 85, 99, 121, 
143–143n, 186, 189n, 191–191n, 193, 
220, 277n, 296n, 300n, 309, 327, 391, 
519 
Hydra: 395
Hyginus: 107n
Hypatia: 351n, 352n
Hypsicles: 352–352n
Iamblichus: 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 23n, 25–25n, 
41–42n, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51–52, 
54–55, 57, 122n, 124n–125n, 127n, 
129–132, 135–138n, 139n, 142–142n, 
144, 148, 171n, 174n, 175n, 194n–195, 
201n–202, 208–209, 212, 213, 218–218n, 
221n, 229–230n, 232–232n, 234, 235, 
236, 237–240, 250–251, 252, 253n–254, 
255–256n, 258n, 277–278, 279, 280, 
281–282, 283, 284, 287, 288, 293–295, 
297, 298–300, 302–302n, 311, 312, 313n, 
321, 341, 342–342n, 350, 351n, 352n, 
355, 357, 395, 400, 416, 437–438n, 440–
446, 447, 448, 449–449n, 450, 454, 505, 
509, 512, 520, 521, 523  
Iamblichus the Younger: 55, 352n
Ibycus: 38–38n, 207
Ion of Chios: 7, 17n, 21–21n, 24, 32, 38, 39, 
41, 95, 339n
Iris: 88, 89
Isaac: 223
Isocrates: 36, 37–37n, 40, 95, 186n, 251, 
283n, 332
Ixion: 389
Jacob: 165, 391
Janus: 439
Jehovah: 390n
Jerome: 105–105n, 107–107n, 152, 153, 154, 
155, 167, 212n, 222, 235–235n, 385, 520, 
521–521n, 523–523n
Jesus of Nazareth: 114, 152, 154, 156, 157–
158, 168, 192, 193, 233, 234, 388, 506 
John Chrysostom: 158, 159–159n
John of Damascus: 152, 418–418n
John Philoponus: 413
John the Evangelist: 165
John the Lydian: 51n, 354n, 356n
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Julian the Apostate: 22n, 48, 386, 388n, 
483n
Julian the Chaldaean: 205, 207
Juno: 221, 520, 522
Jupiter: 199, 202, 203, 205, 388, 389, 390
Justin: 8, 155, 185, 186, 189n, 194–194n, 521, 524
Juvenal: 154
Leon: 36
Libethra: 49 
Linus: 327
Livy: 520, 521, 522, 524
Longinus: 47
Lucian: 131n, 135n, 231, 349n, 521, 524
Lucretius: 215
Luke the Evangelist: 156, 157n
Lycon: 121, 122 
Lycurgus: 104, 297–298, 520, 522
Lysias: 283n
Macrina: 157
Macrobius: 19–19n, 84n, 259n, 521, 524
Marcella: 163, 164, 165
Marcellus: 8, 192–192n 
Mark the Evangelist: 157n
Matthew the Evangelist: 154, 157n, 165, 
388
Medea: 141
Megillus: 505–505n, 512
Melania: 151
Melissa: 136n
Menaechmus: 333
Menander: 129n
Menelaus: 353n
Menon: 78n
Metis: 84–84n
Metrodorus: 351
Milon: 496, 521, 523
Minos: 104, 520, 522
Mithra: 508
Mnemosyne: 51
Mnesarchus: 32, 49, 79n, 185, 187, 306, 479, 
492, 521, 523
Moderatus: 47, 329–329n, 331n, 357
Moira, Moirai: 88, 323
Moses: 186, 189n, 191, 191n, 213, 214n–215, 
217, 218, 219, 223, 389, 391–391n, 393, 
457, 468n, 520
Muses: 51, 53, 77, 78n, 80n, 296n, 323, 349, 
496n–497
Musaeus: 21, 38, 192n
Musonius Rufus: 153–154, 155, 157 
Myia: 136n, 140n
Myllias: 135, 136, 137, 138
Naucratius: 157
Neanthes: 127–127n, 137–137n, 230, 326, 
332 
Nebuchadnezzar: 235n
Neleus: 333
Nemesius: 189, 353n, 415n, 418
Nicomachus: 127n, 136n, 194n, 229, 
230–230n, 231n, 234, 238, 263–264, 
265–266, 267–267n, 269, 271, 272, 273, 
321, 342, 349n, 352n, 357, 361, 362, 364, 
369n, 413, 414, 459–459n   
Nicostratus: 139n–140, 141–142 
Numenius: 47–47n, 55, 199, 200–200n, 
201n, 331n, 438, 457 
Nymphs: 131n
Nyx: 56
Ocellus Lucanus: 448
Olympiodorus: 94n, 353n, 412
Olympus: 299n
Onomacritus: 298
Origen: 151, 152, 153–153n, 155, 158–160, 
166, 212n, 353n, 485n   
Oromasdes: 356n
Orpheus: 17–17n, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 
31, 38–39n, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 49, 
50, 51–52, 54, 55, 57n, 80, 186, 191–193, 
194, 195, 204, 213, 438    
Orpheus the Theologian: 205
Ovid: 23–24, 107–107n, 193, 353n, 521, 524
Paapis: 229
Pamphilus: 160
Parmenides: 6, 77–78, 79n–80, 81, 83, 84, 
85–87, 88–90, 249, 287, 387, 402, 404, 
416, 439  
Paul the Apostle: 154, 157, 165, 166
Pausanias: 51n, 127n, 296n, 521n, 523n
Pelagius: 153
Penelope: 85n, 143–143n
Pentheus: 80n
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Pericles: 314
Perictione: 135n, 136n, 139n, 221n
Persephone: 22, 28, 85
Peter the Apostle: 165, 213
Phaedo: 69n
Phaedrus: 53
Phanes: 56
Phanton: 124n
Pherecydes: 21, 339n, 476–476n, 493, 508 
Philemon: 194
Philip of Opus: 271, 505n
Philo of Alexandria: 47, 153, 154, 155, 160, 
185n–186, 189n, 191, 222, 236–236n, 
237n, 263–263n, 323, 331, 341, 521, 524 
Philochorus: 131–131n
Philodemus: 230, 306, 313–314, 316–316n, 333
Philolaus: 6, 19–19n, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 
69–70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78n, 99, 100–
100n, 185n, 203, 206, 213, 220, 249, 250, 
257, 258–260, 265, 274, 309, 310, 322, 
325, 326, 327, 329n, 332, 333, 338n, 340, 
345, 361, 383, 384, 385, 387, 391, 395, 
396, 401, 402, 403, 439, 455, 459, 519   
Philoponus: 145, 219, 273–273, 413 
Philostratus the Elder: 144, 222, 228, 229, 
520, 521–522, 523–523n 
Philoxenus: 236n
Phintias: 105, 122–123
Phocylides: 12, 220–220n, 519
Photius: 135n, 229–229n, 356n, 361n, 
369n, 416
Phyllis: 136n, 140n
Phintys: 135n, 136n
Plato: 1, 6, 8, 10, 12, 19–24, 26, 27, 38–38n, 
45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56–57, 
63, 66, 76, 77, 78–78n, 80, 81–81n, 83, 
84, 85–86, 87, 88n–89, 90, 95, 96, 97–
98, 100, 108n, 121, 123, 129n, 130n, 
135–135n, 142, 143–143n, 145, 146, 
147, 158, 182n, 186–186n, 189n, 191–
191n, 193, 195, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 
204–205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 212n, 213, 
215, 216–217, 218, 219–220, 221n, 222, 
223, 224, 225, 230, 250n, 253, 259n, 
265–266, 269n–270, 271–272, 273, 
275, 280n, 283–283n, 287, 288–288n, 
293–293n, 298n, 306, 307, 309, 310, 314, 
316n, 321, 322, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 
329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335–336, 
337, 338–339, 340, 341, 342–343, 344, 
347n, 349–349n, 353–353n, 355–356, 
357, 361n, 366, 375–376, 384–384n, 387, 
388–388n, 390n, 396, 401, 402, 403, 404, 
405, 413, 414, 416, 418, 420, 423n–424, 
430, 434, 437–438, 439–440, 441, 442, 
443, 444, 445n–446, 447, 448–450, 454, 
457, 458–458n, 462n, 475, 478n–479n, 
481, 482, 483–483n, 485, 486, 505n, 
511, 520, 521–521n, 523–523n              
Pletho: 356n
Pliny the Elder: 218, 219–219n, 326, 356n, 
473, 521n, 523n
Plotinus: 47, 48, 49, 52, 55, 146, 189, 209, 
213, 219–219n, 352n, 353n, 437, 478n, 
480n, 481, 482n, 495n  
Plutarch: 12, 21–21n, 46, 55, 220, 222, 
263–263n, 295n, 296n–297n, 311n, 
313n, 354, 355n–356, 366, 402, 437n, 
445, 448, 469–469n, 478, 479, 480, 505, 
521–521n, 523n–524  
Pollux: 140–140n
Polycrates of Samos: 353, 356n, 493, 494, 
508, 520, 521, 522, 523
Polymnastes: 124n
Poros: 84n
Porphyry: 3, 8, 12, 23n, 38n, 40n, 47, 48, 
55, 93–94n, 99, 122n, 123n, 124n, 131n, 
136–136n, 137n, 138n, 159–159n, 163, 
164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171–172, 
173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180–181, 
182, 183–183n, 186n, 201n, 205, 212, 213, 
215, 218, 219–219, 222, 228–229, 230, 
232, 234–234n, 237n–238, 239, 240, 250, 
251, 254, 273, 274n, 293–294, 295, 297, 
298n–299, 302, 310, 352n, 355, 356n–
357, 362, 366, 413, 437n, 469–470, 471, 
472–472n, 473n–474n, 476, 477, 478–
478n, 480–482, 483, 485n–486, 487, 488, 
489–489n, 491, 495n, 497n, 504–504n, 
507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 521, 523       
Posidonius: 23n, 308n, 310, 327–328, 330, 
342–342n
Pratinas: 299n
Priscian: 437n
Proclus: 8, 11, 41–41n, 50, 51n, 54, 55, 56, 
57, 87n, 135–135n, 142, 148, 194, 199, 
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200, 201–202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207–
209, 210, 219, 263, 267–270, 271–272, 
273, 325, 349n, 353n, 415–417, 437n–
438, 439, 440, 442, 443–445, 447, 448, 
449, 470, 485n, 486n, 493n, 508, 512   
Prodicus: 355n
Prometheus: 258n, 389
Protagoras: 144n, 332
Ptolemy: 204, 208, 235–235n, 269n, 310, 
486
Pyrrho of Elis: 56n, 305, 315, 413
Pyrrhus of Delos: 353
Pythais: 492
Pytho: 495n
Python: 296n, 495n
Pythonax: 495n
Quintilian: 311n, 313, 520, 522
Rhea: 270–270n
Rhodope: 140
Rufinus: 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 167
Sabellius: 470n
Satyrus: 326, 332
Scylla: 404
Sechnuphis: 356
Seneca: 153–154, 157, 193, 219, 224
Serapion: 228n
Servius Tullius: 520, 522
Sextus Empiricus: 10, 305, 306–307, 308, 
309, 310, 311–314, 315, 316, 317, 327–
327n, 330, 331–331n
Sextus the Pythagorean: 8, 152, 153–154, 
156, 157, 158–159n, 167, 168, 169, 170, 
171, 174n, 183–183n, 497n, 510n  
Sibylla: 190–190n, 193
Simichus: 124n
Simmias: 6, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69–70, 71, 73, 74, 75
Simonides: 513
Simplicius: 203, 205, 206, 219, 222, 329n, 
331n, 369n, 370n, 447, 521, 523, 
Sirens: 51n, 341, 342–342n 
Sisyphus: 389
Socrates: 6, 8, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69n, 71, 72, 74, 
87–88, 89, 121, 123, 142, 143–144, 145, 
191n, 199, 200, 201, 207, 216–217, 218–
218n, 250, 309, 314, 329, 333, 334, 354n, 
366, 389, 402, 403, 416, 420, 430, 438, 
439–439n, 446, 460n, 462n, 470n, 474, 
475n, 479, 505n, 510, 511, 512   
Solomon: 220, 419, 470, 490
Solon: 191–191n, 222, 324, 327, 338, 345, 
476n, 482, 521–521n, 523–523n 
Sonchis: 356
Sopater: 352n 
Sophocles: 81n, 186, 190–190n, 194 
Soranus: 274–274n
Sosicrates: 125, 126–126n
Sotion: 326
Speusippus: 312n, 322, 324, 325, 328, 331, 
332, 333, 335, 336–338, 340, 341–342, 
344, 345  
Spintharus: 122, 123n
Stesichorus: 84
Stilpo: 56n
Stobaeus: 135n, 136n, 138n–140n, 141n–
142, 167, 221n, 254, 255, 257, 294n, 510, 
511, 512
Strabo: 51n, 296–296n
Strato: 121, 272–272n
Stratonicus: 125– 126n
Synesius: 437n
Syrianus: 51, 55, 199, 201n–202, 329n, 
443n, 447, 448
 
Tantalus: 389
Tatian: 189n
Telauges: 326
Telestes: 300
Terpander: 296–298
Teutamenes: 34n
Thales: 5n, 107, 220, 366, 479–479n, 481, 512 
Thaletas: 295, 296–298, 299–300, 301 
Thaumas: 88
Theano: 7, 135–135n, 138–142, 143, 147, 
148, 447, 485n, 495 
Themistius: 219
Themistoclea: 38, 299
Theodoret of Cyrus: 353n, 455–456, 474n, 
481, 482–482n, 508 
Theodorus: 47, 55
Theon of Alexandria: 352–352n
Theon of Smyrna: 108, 204, 205, 263–263n, 
265n, 327–327n, 349n, 351–351n, 357, 
369n, 437, 438–438n, 459–459n, 469  
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Theophrastus: 121, 220, 324, 327, 333, 335, 
339, 366, 437n
Theopompus: 124–124n, 301n, 332 
Theseus: 38
Thrasyllus: 47
Timaeonides: 140
Timaeus of Locri: 47, 50, 56, 57, 78n, 200, 
201, 206, 207, 216, 283, 333, 389–389n, 
439–440 
Timaeus of Tauromenium: 3, 7, 121, 122, 
126–126n, 128–129, 130–132, 236, 332, 
355–355n
Timareta: 140
Timon: 56n, 332, 439, 440
Timycha: 7, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143, 
147, 148
Tiresias: 81n
Titans: 24, 25
Trogus, Gnaeus Pompeius: 520, 522
Tyrrhenus: 492
Tzetzes: 483n
Uranus: 56
Valerianus: 152
Valerius Maximus: 105n, 122n, 521n, 523n
Varro: 322, 324, 328
Vettius Valens: 20–20n, 21n
Virgil: 193, 214, 387n, 389, 390, 521, 524
Vitruvius: 377, 379
Xenocrates: 220, 324, 328, 332, 335, 336, 
337–338, 340, 341n–342, 344, 347n, 
356, 437n 
Xenocritus: 298, 299–300
Xenodamus: 298, 299n
Xenophanes: 7, 23–24, 34, 77, 78n–81, 82n, 
84, 85n, 88n, 95, 144n, 366  
Xenophilus: 122–122n, 124n
Xenophon: 144, 220, 519
Zaleucus: 124n, 298–298n, 300, 302 
Zalmoxis: 42, 94n, 217–217n 
Zaratas: see “Zoroaster” 
Zaratos: see “Zoroaster” 
Zarathustra: see “Zoroaster” 
Zeno of Citium: 366, 371
Zeno of Elea: 106, 366, 416, 439, 476n–477
Zeus: 51, 56, 258n, 341n, 389, 390n 
Zora: see “Zoroaster” 
Zoroaster: 12, 213, 216, 217–217n, 268, 353, 
354, 355n–356n, 438, 481, 493–493n, 508
 © 2016, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co. KG, Wiesbaden
 ISBN Print: 9783447105941 # ISBN E-Book: 9783447195126
Index of Medieval and Modern Names
Abū al-Faraj Ibn al- Ṭayyib: see “Ibn 
al- Ṭayyib” 
Abū al- Ḥasan al- Āʻmirī: see “Al-‘Āmirī”
Abū al- Ḥasan Ibn Ghazāl Ibn Abī Sa’īd: 
see “Ibn Ghazāl”
Abū Shuwayrib, ‘Abd al-Karim: 472n, 
473n, 475n, 479n, 512n
Abū Zayd al-Balkhī: 510
Abul-Wata al-Mubassir: 106
Acker, Claudia: 87n
Adams, Sean A.: 232n
Afonasin, Eugene: 10, 347, 355n
Agricola, Rudolf: 219
Agrippa von Nettelsheim, Heinrich Cor-
nelius: 221n
Al-Fārābī: 385–385n, 423, 426–426n, 430, 
431, 434
Al-Ghafiqī: 474
Al-Ghazālī: 11, 12, 423, 428–429, 430–432, 
433–434 
Al-  Ḥakīm: 472, 507n
Al- Ḥarizi: 106–106n
Al-Kindī: 426n, 480n, 510
Al-Mubashshir ibn Fātik: see “Ibn Fātik”
Al-Mustazhir: 431n
Al-Najjār, ‘Āmir: 469–470, 474n
Al-Qā ̣dī, Wadād: 367n
Al-Shahrastāni: 10, 11, 361, 362, 365–371, 
372, 471n, 475n, 476n, 481, 484, 510
Al-Shahrazūrī: 472–473n, 484, 485n–486, 
489–489n, 490n, 507n, 512n
Alberti, Leon Battista: 375, 377–378, 379, 
380
Albertus Magnus: 7, 113–113n, 351
Albini, Umberto: 283n
Albrecht, Michael von: 235, 277n, 293n, 
294n
Alesse, Francesca: 98, 100–100n
Alexander VI (Pope): 221, 519
Alexandre, Monique: 231n
Allen, Michael: 437–437n, 440n, 446n
Alt, Karin: 165–165n
Altheim, Franz: 367n, 368n, 369n
Anaht, David: 11, 412–413, 414, 418, 419, 420
Anastos, Milton V.: 356n
Anawati, Georges: 468n
Antonio di Padova: 211
Antonius Melissa: 512
Aouad, Maroun: 480n, 482n
Aragione, Gabriella: 189n
Arcari, Luca: 8, 185, 186n, 192n
Arcerius, Johannes Theodoretus: 9, 218, 
219, 223, 225
Arevshatian, Sen Surenovitch: 412–412n
Ariel Blount, Justine: 151n
Armstrong, Arthur Hilary: 47
Arniem, Hans von: 280n
Arzhanov, Yury: 510
Athanassiadi, Polymnia: 46n
Aubenque, Pierre: 445n
Audring, Gert: 227n
Aurispa, Giovanni: 9, 213–214, 215–215n, 
218, 223, 224, 225 
Austin, Colin: 21n
Avicenna: see “Ibn Sīnā” 
‘Ayyād, Kāmil: 428n 
Badawī, ‘Abd al-Ra ̣hmān: 483n, 487–488, 
502n, 506, 509n–510
Badrān, Mu ḥammad Fat ḥ Allāh: 475n, 
510
Baffioni, Carmela: 362n, 367n, 368n, 369n, 
370n
Bagrationi, Anton: 415, 418–420
Bakar, Osman: 429n
Baker, Chet: 316
Baltes, Matthias: 47–47n, 56n, 200n, 329n, 
332n, 333n, 338n
Baltzly, Dirk: 8, 199, 201n, 209n
Bar Bahlul: 473n, 507
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Bar Konai, Theodore: 508
Bardenhewer, Otto: 465n
Barhebraeus: 470n, 477, 481, 482, 483, 506
Barker, Andrew: 9, 263, 306n, 324n
Barnes, Tim: 228–228n
Baron, Christopher: 122–122n, 125n, 126n, 
128n–129n, 130n, 131n–132n 
Bartelink, Gérard J.M.: 228n, 231, 238n
Bartoš, Hynek: 10, 249n, 277, 282n, 283n
Battezzato, Luigi: 21n, 46n
Baumstark, Anton: 508–508n
Bayle, Pierre: 453, 456n, 457n, 459
Beatrice, Pier Franco: 163n, 186n
Bechtle, Gerald: 441n
Benakis, Linos: 412n
Benardete, Seth: 84n
Benedict of Nursia: 153
Ber Chavel, Charles: 393n
Bergsträßer, Gotthelf: 468n
Bernabé Pajares, Alberto: 6, 17–17n, 21n, 
22n, 23n, 24n, 25n, 26n, 38n, 41n, 46n, 
57n, 75n, 77n, 82n, 84n, 93, 95n, 127n, 
354n
Bernard of Clairvaux: 211
Bernardo, Aldo: 212n
Bernsdorff, Hans: 229n
Bernstein, Alan E.: 109n
Beroaldo, Filippo the Elder: 9, 223, 224
Berthold of Moosburg: 415n
Bertolacci, Amos: 424n
Bessarion, Basilios: 375, 376, 377, 378, 447
Betegh, Gábor: 93, 94–94n, 95, 307n, 309
Bett, Richard: 306n, 308n, 313n, 315–
316n 
Bidez, Joseph: 164–164n, 508
Blachère, Régis: 469n
Blaise, Albert: 236n
Blank, David L.: 310, 313n
Boer, Emile: 235
Boll, Franz: 235
Bollansée, Jan: 125n
Bonazzi, Mauro: 345n
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mittelt wird und auf welche Weisen gerade 
literarische Texte dieses Wissen spiegeln, 
verarbeiten und modifi zieren.
3: Peter-André Alt, Volkhard Wels (Hg.)
Religiöses Wissen in der Lyrik 
der Frühen Neuzeit
2015. VI, 334 Seiten, 12 Abb., gb
170x240 mm
ISBN 978-3-447-10497-5
E-Book: ISBN 978-3-447-19413-6 
je € 68,– (D)
Der Band widmet sich religiösem Wissen in 
der Dichtung der Frühen Neuzeit, wobei der 
historische Schwerpunkt auf dem 17. und 
dem frühen 18. Jahrhundert liegt. 
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Episteme in Bewegung. Beiträge zu einer trans-
disziplinären Wissensgeschichte
Herausgegeben von Gyburg Uhlmann im Auftrag des Sonderforschungsbereichs 980 
„Episteme in Bewegung. Wissenstransfer von der Alten Welt bis in die Frühe Neuzeit“
5: Angelika Neuwirth, Nora Katharina 
Schmid, Nora Schmidt (Hg.)
Denkraum Spätantike
Szenarien der Refl ektion von „Antiken“ 
im Umfeld des Koran
2016. XII, 563 Seiten, 10 Abb., 2 Karten, gb
170x240 mm
ISBN 978-3-447-10599-6
E-Book: ISBN 978-3-447-19513-3
je € 94,– (D)
‚Spätantike‘ ist nicht nur ein hochgradig 
ambivalenter Begriff in der europäischen 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Lange Zeit be-
zeichnete er eine Epoche, die durch den Nie-
dergang einer ehemals blühenden antiken
Hochkultur geprägt war. 
Die Autoren dieses Bandes setzen sich aus 
ihrer jeweiligen Fachperspektive heraus mit 
spätantiken Wissensformen und -beständen 
in der formativen Phase des Islams aus-
einander und führen den Lesern auf diese 
Weise unterschiedliche Refl exionen von Anti-
ken im unmittelbaren und weiteren Um feld 
des Korans vor Augen. Soziale Prak tiken, 
Textkulturen und Materialitäten rücken dabei 
gleichermaßen in den Blick; historio grafi sche 
Modelle werden hinterfragt und neu per-
spektiviert.
Statt ‚Spätantike‘ als eine Epoche zu fassen, 
die mit der Verkündigung des Korans ihr Ende 
fi ndet, wird diese neu als ein ‚Denkraum‘ 
konturiert, in dem Religionen, Sprachen, 
Institutionen und soziale Praktiken in vielfäl-
tigen Beziehungen stehen. In einem so auf-
gespannten epistemischen Raum vollzieht 
sich Wissenswandel innerhalb komplexer 
Netzwerke. Die frühislamischen Wissensbe-
stände werden so, anders als die Forschung 
zum Koran und den frühislamischen Wis-
senschaften lange postulierte, als Teil des 
spätantiken Denkraums erkennbar.
6: Christian Vogel
Boethius’ Übersetzungsprojekt
Philosophische Grundlagen und didaktische 
Methoden eines spätantiken Wissenstransfers
2016. X, 184 Seiten, gb
170x240 mm
ISBN 978-3-447-10609-2
E-Book: ISBN 978-3-447-19514-0
je € 48,– (D)
Boethius fasst im 6. Jahrhundert den Plan, 
sämtliche Werke Aristoteles’ und Platons ins 
Lateinische zu übersetzen und mit Kommen-
taren zu versehen. Die Motivation für dieses 
Projekt liegt in seiner Einsicht in die bildungs-
theoretischen Grundlagen des Platonismus 
und des Aristotelismus begründet, die ihm
auch als Maßstab für seine ethischen Er-
kenntnisse und sein pädagogisch orientiertes 
Schaffen dienen.
Ziel dieses Buches ist es, Boethius’ Überset-
zungsprojekt in die verschiedenen Ebenen 
des mit diesem Projekt verbundenen Wis-
senstransfers aufzuschlüsseln und sowohl 
die Inhalte als auch die Bedingungen dieser 
Transfers aufzuzeigen. Die Übersetzungen 
im engeren Sinne sind hierbei nur ein Teil 
des Wissenstransfers. Denn mit Blick auf die 
Sorge um eine gelingende Vermittlung der 
Inhalte für die verschiedenen Niveaustufen 
seines Zielpublikums stellen die Kommentie-
rungen und die Maßnahmen der didaktischen 
Vermittlung einen integralen Bestandteil 
seines Übersetzungsprojekts und damit 
weitere Wissenstransferebenen dar. Die 
Vorgehens weisen bei diesen verschiedenen 
Aspekten der Übersetzung wiederum fi nden 
ihre Grundlage in den sprachphilosophischen 
und seelentheoretischen Einsichten, die für 
Boethius’ Konzeption einer gelingenden Ver-
mittlung verantwortlich sind. Die Theorie der 
Sprache bildet damit zugleich die Grundlage 
für die Praxis seiner Übertragung.
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